Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - BASILIO
CADAP, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 190633 Present: VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July
5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an
appeal from the Decision[1] dated
September 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03388
affirming with modification the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao, which adjudged appellant
Basilio Cadap guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape.
In an information filed before the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao, thereat docketed as Crim. Case No. 1658 and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of the court, Cadap was charged with statutory rape, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the afternoon of December 2, 2006 at Tungod, Lagawe, Ifugao, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],[3] a minor, eleven (11) years of age against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
During the
pre-trial conference, the private complainant spurned the proffered plea
bargaining to a lesser offense. The parties then stipulated on the following,
among others: The defense admitted the birth certificate of AAA (Exhibit “A”)
and the medical certificate (Exhibit “B”) prepared by Dr. Bernardo Bulintao,
but denied the veracity of the entries in both documents.
During trial, the prosecution presented testimonial
and documentary evidence essentially to establish the following facts and
incidents:
In the afternoon of December 2,
2006, AAA, then eleven (11) years old, was with her aunt, BBB, at the house of
one Robert Dinamling, in Tungod, Lagawe, Ifugao, attending a “Binogwa,” an
Ifugao ritual for a dead relative. After lunch, AAA decided to go to a friend’s
house to play. Before AAA could reach
her friend’s house, Cadap suddenly appeared, grabbed, and then led her to an
adjacent forested area. While alarmed over this turn of events, AAA did not
resist appellant’s advances, having been sexually abused once before and
threatened with physical harm by appellant. Appellant, while holding a piece of
wood, then removed both his pants and AAA’s clothes. He then laid AAA on the
ground and inserted his penis into her vagina while fondling her breast.
Moments later, something came out of appellant’s penis, implying that he
ejaculated.
Meanwhile,
BBB started looking for her niece. She met one Jenifer Gumiling who pointed her
in the direction where AAA was last seen traversing. Since she was carrying a
baby, BBB requested one Benedict to do the searching. Eventually, Benedict
found where AAA was. Thus informed of AAA’s whereabouts, BBB, together with
Bulahao Kimayong and several others, proceeded to the forested area. From a
short distance, BBB saw the naked appellant on top of AAA. Furious, BBB jumped
at appellant, kicking and shouting at him. BBB would later call the police to
arrest appellant. AAA would in turn be brought to the
On the other hand, the defense
expressly waived its right to present evidence.
The trial court found that
AAA positively identified appellant as the one who sexually abused her. The
court also found AAA’s testimony on the fact of molestation adequately
corroborated by competent testimonial evidence. On May 16, 2008, the RTC
rendered judgment[4]
finding appellant guilty of rape, as
defined under Paragraphs 1(a) and (d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay AAA PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and
PhP 50,000 as moral damages.
On appellate review, the CA affirmed the findings and
ruling of the RTC with the modification as to the amount and the kind of
damages imposable. The dispositive
portion of the CA’s decision dated September 30, 2009 reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Basilio Cadap is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On October 19, 2009, appellant
filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision, therein manifesting that he is
appealing said decision on the ground that it is contrary to facts, law and
jurisprudence. As before the appellate court, appellant would claim that the CA
and, the RTC before it, erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
We are not
persuaded.
For conviction in the crime of rape,[6] the following elements must be proved:
1.
that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman;
2.
that said act was accomplished under any of the
following circumstances––
a. through force, threat or intimidation;
b.
when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
d. when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.[7]
By the distinctive nature of rape cases, conviction thereon
usually rests solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that
such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[8] Accordingly, the Court has consistently
adhered to the following guiding principles in the review of similar cases, to
wit: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; while the accusation
is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[9]
Complementing the foregoing principles is the rule that the
credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in
prosecution for rape;[10]
that in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the highest degree of
respect must be afforded to the findings of the trial court.[11]
AAA had pointed to the appellant as the person who forced
himself on her in the afternoon of December 2, 2006. And the unyielding
principle is that denial cannot prevail over the victim’s categorical and
positive identification of the accused in the absence of proof of ill motive.[12]
Here, 11-year-old AAA identified appellant as the malefactor. Considering her
tender years, she could not have invented a horrid tale, but must have recounted
a harrowing experience. Indeed, it is
unbelievable for an 11-year-old country lass to publicly disclose that she had
been sexually abused, then undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public
trial if her motive were other than to protect her honor and bring to justice
the person who unleashed his lust on her.
Just like
the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s
credibility, having had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to
give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true.[13]
When a girl, especially a minor, says
that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was inflicted on her.[14]
Appellant
has made much of the absence of scratches or contusions in AAA’s external
genitalia. Given the unwavering
testimony of AAA as to her ordeal in the hands of appellant, however, the Court
cannot accord merit to the argument that the lack of physical manifestation of
rape weakens the case against appellant. As aptly observed by the CA, the
medical report on AAA is only corroborative of the finding of rape. The absence
of external signs or physical injuries, such as freshly broken hymen, or
laceration, on the complainant’s body, does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape.[15]
This is because complete or full penetration of the victim’s private parts is
not required to consummate the crime of rape. Neither is hymenal laceration or like
vaginal injury an element of the crime of rape,[16]
albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.[17]
What is more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the
victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[18]
AAA’s testimony that she was raped was, as found by
the CA, corroborated on its material points such that appellant and AAA were
seen by BBB in what appeared to be an act of sexual congress. Furthermore, as
related by the CA, although witness Bulahao testified to not actually seeing
the two having sexual intercourse, he nevertheless said seeing the two lying on
the ground naked. Bulahao’s testimony is inferential or circumstantial evidence
of sexual intercourse between the minor AAA and appellant.
In all, we find no reason to
disturb the factual findings of the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial
court.
The award by the CA of civil indemnity
ex delicto in the amount of PhP 75,000 up from the PhP 50,000 decreed by
the RTC, and the increase from PhP 50,000 to PhP 75,000 of the award of moral
damages, should be modified. The award of both items at the level set forth in
the CA decision is proper only in qualified rape where the imposable penalty
under the law is death, albeit Republic Act No. 9346[19]
now prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The charge against
appellant, however, and for which he was convicted, was simple rape punishable
under paragraph 1 of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion
perpetua. In line with current jurisprudence, the correct amount should be
PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and the same amount as moral damages.[20]
The award
of PhP 30,000 by way of exemplary damages is, however, proper as a measure to
deter other individuals with aberrant sexual tendencies.[21]
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of PhP 75,000 awarded
as civil indemnity and PhP 75,000 as moral damages shall be respectively
reduced to PhP 50,000.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-12. Penned by Associate Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Enriquez and Francisco P. Acosta.
[2]
[3] The name and personal circumstances of the victim and her immediate family are withheld per Republic Act No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (1992) and Republic Act 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act (2004).
[4] Supra note 2.
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Penile or organ rape.
[7] Revised Penal Code, Art. 266-A; People v. Barangan, G.R. No. 175480, October 2, 2007, 534 SCRA 570.
[8] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 444.
[9] Id.; People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 714; People v. Arsayo, G.R. No. 166546, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 275, 284; People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, October 21, 2006, 506 SCRA 481, 495.
[10] People v. Ceballos, Jr., G.R. No. 169642, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 493.
[11] People v. Balonzo, G.R. No. 176153, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 760.
[12] People v. Rentoria, G.R. No. 175333, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 708.
[13] Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 376.
[14] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006, 428 SCRA 435; People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, October 21, 2006, 506 SCRA 481.
[15] People v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682; citing People v. Boromeo, G.R. No. 150501, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 533, 546.
[16] People v. Espino, Jr., supra; citing People v. Esteves, 438 Phil. 687, 699 (2002).
[17] People v. Sambrano, G.R. No. 143708, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 106.
[18] People v. Espino, Jr., supra; citing People v. Logmao, 414 Phil. 378, 387 (2001).
[19] The Anti-Death Penalty Law.
[20] People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009; citing People v. Abellera, G.R. No. 166617, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 329.
[21] People v. Tabio, G.R. No. 179477, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 156.