Republic of the
Supreme Court
HEIRS OF SPOUSES CRISPULO FERRER and ENGRACIA
PUHAWAN, represented by ROMEO F.
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G.R.
NO. 190384
Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,*
and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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R E S O L U T I O N |
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BRION, J.: |
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Petitioners,
the heirs of spouses Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan, filed a petition for
certiorari[1] assailing
the rulings[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67923. The Court, acting through its Second Division, denied the
certiorari petition through a
Resolution dated
Brief Background
The present
case arose from an injunction suit[7]
instituted by the petitioners against respondent National Power Corporation (Napocor). Petitioners sought to enjoin Napocor from
selling the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant, as they claimed ownership over
portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot 1873 and
Napocor
denied the petitioners’ allegations and claimed it acquired portions of
The
petitioners opposed Napocor’s claims and contended that the sale of portions of
On
after finding their claims over Lot 1873 and
The trial
court ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of their
claim of ownership of
As for
The
petitioners assailed the RTC decision through a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The CA
found no reason to reverse the trial court’s decision and accordingly affirmed
it through its decision of May 12, 2009.[19] The CA
likewise found unmeritorious the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
denied it through its resolution of
Procedurally,
the Court found that the petitioners, by resorting to a certiorari petition, erred in choosing the legal remedy against the
CA rulings. We noted that the errors the
petitioners raised were errors of law rather than errors of jurisdiction, since
“[t]he gist of [the] petitioners’ objections to the CA ruling was the appellate
court’s failure to appreciate their arguments and evidence in support of their
claims, but this does not amount to an error of jurisdiction. A certiorari writ will not be issued to
cure errors by the lower court in its appreciation of the evidence, its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion
will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an
appeal x x x [by] certiorari filed under Rule 45 [of the Rules of
Court].”[21]
We considered the resort to a certiorari petition under Rule 65 as a
disingenuous move to circumvent the rule on the period for filing an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 which allows
only 15 days from notice of the judgment appealed from to file an appeal. As the petition was filed 38 days after
receipt of the assailed CA resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
the petitioners used the certiorari
petition as a substitute for the lost appeal, a move the Court has consistently
reproved.
Despite these
procedural lapses, the Court nevertheless reviewed the merits of the
petitioners’ case, but as the RTC and the CA did, found nothing to support the
petitioners’ claims. In seeking to
enjoin Napocor from selling Lot 1873 and to claim damages for the use and
occupation thereof, the petitioners relied on their claim of ownership which
they contended was sufficiently proved by (1) the certification from the Bureau
of Lands showing that their predecessor, Crispulo Ferrer, was a survey
claimant, and (2) the OCTs covering the lot in the name of co-petitioner Emiliano
Ferrer. We rejected these claims by
ruling that:
The
Bureau of Lands Certification] did not adequately establish their right to
We
further ruled that any objection the petitioners might have against the sale of
From
1936 when Napocor began construction of the power plant up to 1997 when the
action for injunction and damages was instituted, the petitioners made no move
to assert their claim over
As for
[T]he
CA correctly pointed out that the petitioners never took any issue with the
RTC’s ruling concerning the parties’ rights over [this lot]; the petitioners
devoted most of their time discussing their claims over
Insisting
that they have a rightful claim over Lot 1873 and
Petitioners’ Second Motion for
Reconsideration
The
petitioners insist that they have a better claim than Napocor over Lot 1873 and
In support of
their claim over
Additionally,
the petitioners challenge the CA’s finding that they never raised any objection
concerning
The Court’s Ruling
We DENY the requested leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration.
Section 3,
Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) sets forth the rule when the Court may entertain a second
motion for reconsideration. The rule
states:
Sec. 3. Second
motion for reconsideration. – The
Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration “in
the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only
be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members
shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En
Banc.
Aside from meeting the voting
requirements, a movant is required by the IRSC to substantially show that a
reconsideration of the Court’s ruling is necessary in the higher interest of
justice, which standard is satisfied upon proving that the assailed ruling is both
(1) legally erroneous and (2) patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
In this case,
petitioners’ reasons do not sufficiently establish that a reversal of the
Court’s ruling will serve the higher interest of justice. On the contrary, for the Court to consider
and find meritorious the petitioners’ argument will mean abandoning settled
principles of law to accommodate the petitioners’ stale and clearly
unsubstantiated claims.
The
petitioners insist that the Bureau of Lands certificate, stating that their
predecessor Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant of the property covered by Cadastral
Survey No. 90 of Lumban, Laguna, sufficiently establishes their claim over
A
survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for
adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties.[25]
The purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of
the land.[26] It is
not a proof of ownership of the land covered by the plan.[27] In the present case, the petitioners were not
even able to present the actual survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands;
all that they relied on was the Bureau of Lands certificate that proved nothing
more beyond than what was expressly stated therein: that
Notably, nothing
in the certificate indicated whether Crispulo Ferrer was actually in possession
of
Article 1137.
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.
The
petitioners’ reliance on Article 1137 of the Civil Code is not entirely
accurate. The petitioners alleged that
Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain may be acquired by private persons, not
by virtue of prescription but, through adverse
possession, upon compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of CA
141, which states:
Sec.
48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Verily,
it is not the mere lapse of time that vests title over the land to the claimant;
it is also necessary that the land be an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain and that the claimant be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the land. Listed down, the
acquisition through adverse possession of public lands requires the following:
1.
the
land applied for must be an alienable and disposable public land; and
2.
the
claimants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land since
Upon an
exhaustive review of the records and a thorough evaluation of the petitioners’
allegations and arguments, we are unconvinced that the petitioners have
satisfied these requirements.
First, no conclusive proof appears in the records showing that
Second, we similarly found nothing in
the records that would support the petitioners’ allegation that their
predecessors had occupied
Even
supposing that the petitioners, through their predecessors, have held
possession of
The
application of the principle of laches requires the presence of the following
elements – all of which are present in this case:
(1) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a
remedy;
(2) delay in
asserting the complainant’s right, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit;
(3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.[32]
Napocor
executed acts that were contrary to the petitioners’ asserted claim of
ownership over
x x x The Court aptly stated in Miguel v. Catalino:
Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay, and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon x x x only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor’s efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
To grant respondents relief when they have not even offered any justifiable
excuse for their inaction would be unjust.
It is certainly beyond our comprehension how they could have remained
silent for more than 50 years. They have only themselves to blame if the
Court at this late hour can no longer afford them relief against the inequities
they allegedly suffered.[33]
The
principle of laches applies with equal force to defeat the petitioners’ claim
over
The
essence of the Court’s adjudicatory function is to apply the law to facts, as
supported by the evidence and the records.
The petitioners have already exhausted all possible legal arguments and,
as we have discussed, none of which are compelling enough to require reconsideration
of our past ruling. To be sure,
repetitive filing of legally useless submissions cannot pressure this Court
into taking another look at an unmeritorious case; they can only increase the
petitioners’ legal expenses, as in this case, where we are ordering the payment
of double costs for the act of unnecessarily and stubbornly wasting the Court’s
time.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners’ motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration
of our
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division effective
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court; rollo, pp. 3-25.
[2] Referring to the CA decision dated
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Civil Case No. SC-3604; id. at 92-97.
[8] The petitioners were
also claiming ownership rights over a third lot,
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Crispulo Ferrer left
behind eight heirs who, the petitioners claimed, were each entitled to inherit
3,129.93 square meters of
[14] Penned by Judge Leonardo L. Leonida; id. at 117-124.
[15] The dispositive
portion of the RTC’s decision of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Denying
the petition for preliminary injunction;
2.
Dismissing
the action for damages;
3.
Ordering
the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the reasonable value of the excess area
occupied by [Napocor] in lot 90[,] estimated to be [438] square meters or such
excess area as may be determined through a survey of lot 90.
SO ORDERED.
[16]
[17] Sec. 44 – Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value
and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
x x x
Third. Any public highway or private way
established or recognized by law[.]
[18] Rollo,
p. 123.
[19] Supra note 2.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Rollo, pp. 219-220.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 239 Phil. 393, 402 (1987).
[26] Director of Lands v. Reyes, 160A Phil. 832 (1975).
[27] See Gimeno v. CA, 170
Phil. 645 (1977); Heirs of Marina
Regalado v. Republic, G.R. No. 168155,
[28] Republic v. Divinaflor, 402 Phil. 498, 507-508 (2001), citing Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 (1994).
[29] Republic v. CA, 238 Phil.
429 (1987).
[30] San Miguel Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-49903,
[31] Rollo, p. 120.
[32] Claverias v. Quingco, G.R. No. 77744,
[33] 502 Phil. 202, 229-230
(2005).