Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - Albert Teñoso y Lopez alias “Paking” and Edgardo Cocotan alias “Paot,” Appellants. |
|
G.R.
No. 188975 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
At bench is an appeal from
the March 19, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
affirming with modification the February 7, 2007 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Tayug,
Pangasinan, Branch 51. The RTC convicted
the accused of the crime of Murder and sentenced both of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify, in solidum, the heirs of the victim in the
liquidated sum of P300,000.00 as stipulated, and to pay the costs.[3]
In addition to what the RTC had imposed, the Court of Appeals ordered the accused
to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
THE FACTS:
Accused Albert Teñoso and Edgardo Cocotan
were charged with the crime of Murder.[4] The Information[5]
indicting them reads:
That on or about March 20, 2004, in the morning,
along Ylarde and Zamora St., municipality of San Nicolas, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed and with the use of
unlicensed firearm with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot ROSITO SAMBRANO @ Jongjong at his back which caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said ROSITO SAMBRANO @ JONG-JONG.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Republic Act 8294.
The
evidence for the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 20, 2004,
Rosito Sambrano, also known as “Jongjong,” was asked by Rebecca Saldivar to
bring her 6-year-old son, Leoncio Saldivar IV, to Barangay Siblot, San Nicolas,
Pangasinan; that Jongjong and Leoncio rode
a motorcycle with Leoncio seated in front of Jongjong; that when they
were near the public market, a shot was heard and they fell; that Albert
Teñoso alias “Paking” and Edgardo Cocotan alias “Paot” approached them and held Jongjong by his two arms; that they then mauled him and, later, shot
him; and that thereafter, Leoncio
reported to his mother saying, “Mama, Kuya Jongjong (is) already dead. He was killed by Kuya Paot.”[6]
In
his defense, accused Teñoso admitted that he was in the vicinity when the
shooting occurred, but denied any participation therein. He claimed that on that day, he and Paot were
summoned by Mayor Christopher Jones Rodrigo to put up a streamer in front of
the public market; that at the market, he asked Paot to get a ladder from a
fire station about 40 meters away; that later, he heard shouts and saw people
running; that he went near the place of the commotion and there he saw Paot fighting
with someone he did not know; that the two were grappling for a gun until he
heard an explosion followed by successive blasts; that when the two separated, he
saw a gun on the pavement, picked it up, boarded a tricycle, and went home; and
that he was brought to the police station where he surrendered the gun.[7]
On
his part, Cocotan asserted that he did not kill Jong Sambrano; that he was
hired as a personal driver and security of then Mayor Rodrigo; that at that
time, he and Teñoso were asked to hang a streamer at the tricycle terminal;
that while on his way to get a ladder from a nearby fire station, a motorcycle
driven by Jongjong stopped near him; that they then stared at each other; that
he sensed that Jongjong was about to draw a gun from his waistline; that upon
seeing this, he immediately held Jongjong’s waist causing the latter to fall
down from his motorcycle; that as Jongjong attempted to get his gun, he got
hold of its nozzle; that when Jongjong pulled
the trigger, the bullet hit him on his left toe; and that, thereafter, he heard
a shot from behind him and then they got separated from each other.[8]
The
trial court gave weight to the evidence of the prosecution over that of the
defense, and convicted the accused of the crime of Murder in its
Aggrieved,
the accused appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals. In the Appellants’
Brief,[10]
the accused prayed for their exoneration anchored on the following:
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED–APPELLANTS GUILTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE
THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND INSTEAD RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALBERT
TEÑOSO NOTWITHSTANDING THE DUBIOUSNESS OF HIS IDENTIFICATION.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANCE OF QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION.
V
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE PRESENCE OF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF USE OF UNLICENSED
FIREARM.
VI
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
VII
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RESULT OF THE PARAFFIN
TEST CONDUCTED ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALBERT TEÑOSO.
VIII
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF
THE FIREARM BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALBERT TEÑOSO.”[11]
As earlier stated, on
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
In
the main, accused-appellants anchor their arguments on the credibility of the
prosecution’s witnesses whose testimonies were replete with discrepancies. They assert that the trial court erred in
giving credence to the respective eye-witness accounts of Saldivar IV and Torio
alleging that the same were laden with inconsistencies and that the
identification given was uncertain and vague.
They further contend that the out-of-court identification made by
Saldivar IV was suggestive and hence, should be disregarded. They also impute error on the part of the
trial court in disregarding the results of the paraffin tests on Teñoso and
failure to present in evidence the firearm allegedly used by them. They contend that the mitigating circumstance
should have been appreciated in favor of accused-appellant Teñoso. Lastly, they insist that the trial court erred
in considering the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and use of unlicensed firearm since the prosecution failed to prove the same.
We
are not persuaded.
On
the issue of credibility of a witness, the well-established rule is that the
assessment of credibility of the witness is a matter best assigned to the trial
court which had the firsthand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude during
cross-examination. Such matters cannot
be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court’s findings carry great
weight and will be sustained by the appellate court unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the outcome of
the case. The exception finds no
application in the case before Us.
In
challenging the reliability of the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellants
labor on unfounded and tenuous arguments which will find no approval from this
Court. As We see it, the eye-witness
accounts of Torio and Saldivar IV were clear and unequivocal in pointing to
both accused-appellants as the victim’s attackers on the fateful morning of
x
x x x x x x x x
Accused-appellants
cannot also harp on the varying statements of the child-witness with respect to
whether he was playing or not before they left their house or the fact that the
child-witness did not immediately relate his experience to his mother as soon
as he saw her. Being collateral matters,
these have no bearing on the commission of the crime and will not render his
entire testimony unworthy of belief. As
previously held by the Supreme Court, the testimony of children of sound mind
is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, so that
once established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an
oath, their testimony should be given full credence. In the same vein, the perceived contradictions
with regard to the estimated distance between the witness and the victim or how
far the latter was able to run after the mauling are insignificant details that
cannot damage the entirety of Torio’s testimony.
Neither
will the disparity on the testimony of each witness with respect to the number
of shots heard by them, have an effect on the veracity of their eye-witness’
accounts considering that they were situated differently from the other. It should be stressed that the same incident,
when viewed from different angles or perspectives, may result in different
impressions on the part of several witnesses.
The circumstances attending the incident may add to the confusion, as in
the case at bar, where the quarry attempted to escape and the policemen all
made an effort to detain him. Recollection
of a particular happening, especially if it is unquiet or even tumultuous, is
at best imperfect but not necessarily perjurious. The narration of the same event by different
witnesses cannot be expected to be absolutely symmetrical, with all of them
agreeing fully on every detail, as if recorded in their minds with computer
accuracy.
Anent
Saldivar IV’s alleged vague description and out-of-court identification of
Teñoso, suffice it to state that whatever perceived vagueness or irregularity
there were in the identification of Teñoso
had been cured by the subsequent positive identification in court of
Teñoso not only by Saldivar IV, despite the attempt of the trial judge to
mislead the child witness by pointing to another person, but also by witness
Torio. Thus, as previously held by the
Supreme Court, the ‘inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification.’
Thus,
on the face of the categorical and unmistakable identification made by the
witnesses for the prosecution, We find that the prosecution was able to
establish beyond any tinge of doubt that Teñoso and Cocotan were responsible
for the death of Sambrano. In the light
of their positive identification and the credible accounts of the events
leading to the victim’s demise, their respective defenses of denial, cannot
overcome his positive identification by the eyewitnesses. A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a
weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. This
is especially true since We do not find any reason why the Saldivars would
involve their 6-year old son in this whole ordeal if not for their earnest
effort to attain justice.
Also,
the seeming nonchalant actuation of Teñoso in picking-up the gun after the
victim was gunned down and the flight of Cocotan to evade arrest, all the more
fortify their guilt for the death of Sambrano.
Moreover, the fact that Teñoso was found negative for the presence of
gunpowder nitrates will not, by itself, prove his innocence. As held in People v. Manalo,
“The second assigned error would
stress the alleged absence of physical evidence showing that the
accused-appellant fired a gun. To this,
We need only remark that such circumstance neither proves his innocence as
well. In fact, even if he were subjected
to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it cannot be
definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to
fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands
are washed before the test (People v.
Talingdan, 191 SCRA 333 [1990]; People v. Roallos, 113 SCRA 584 [1982]). The Court has even recognized the great
possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the
instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol (People v. Rebullar, 188 SCRA 838 [1990].”
Finding
the culpability of accused-appellants duly proven beyond reasonable doubt, We
find that, among those alleged in the Information, only the qualifying
circumstances of treachery was duly proven by the prosecution.
An
unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of
the attack, constitutes alevosia. For treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form
of attack employed by him. Given the
factual milieu of the present case, the prosecution was able to prove that the
victim was shot while on board his motorcycle.
The attack was undoubtedly swift and sudden which did not afford him any
opportunity to defend himself. As the
attack was without any forewarning, the victim, after having fallen from his
motorcycle, was assaulted by his attackers who acted in concert by restraining
his hands to prevent him from retaliating.
And even as the victim tried to flee, accused-appellants continued to
pursue him even shooting him from behind.
Indisputably, the victim was killed with the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
Verily,
accused-appellant Teñoso’s claim that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, has no merit. It should be recalled that Teñoso left the
public market right after the incident and waited in his house if someone will
look for him. It was only after learning
that he was indeed being sought after that he called the police not for the
purpose of surrendering but only ‘to
explain.’ In fact, when asked if it
was his intention to surrender himself when he went to the police station, he
denied the same and insisted that he only intended to surrender the firearm.
As
this Court sees it, Teñoso’s demeanor does not portray the voluntary surrender
required under the law since it lacks the intent to unconditionally surrender
himself to the authorities either as an acknowledgement of guilt or a desire to
save the authorities the trouble and the expense that would necessarily be
incurred in searching for and capturing the culprit. Jurisprudence has it that the act of
surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an
intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and
capture would require. Going to the
police station ‘to clear his name’ does not show any intent of appellant to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant, in addition to their civil
liability, are each ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
Apparently not satisfied with the
decision, the accused elevated their case to this Court. The accused filed a Manifestation
(In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), that they were adopting the Appellants’ Brief they filed
before the Court of Appeals.[13] Plaintiff, on the other hand, moved and
manifested that it would no longer file any Supplemental Brief and would also adopt
its arguments in the Appellee’s Brief previously filed.[14]
The Court resolves to deny the appeal.
No
reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering the well-written
In
their brief, the accused have capitalized on the supposed inconsistencies in
the testimony of prosecution witnesses. They pointed out that Arnold Torio had testified
that Teñoso @ Paking held Jongjong’s right hand while Cocotan @ Paot held the
other hand[15] and both
were punching his head and body. This
went on for less than a minute. Thereafter, Teñoso, using his right hand, shot
Jongjong.[16] Immediately, Torio heard two (2) explosions.[17]
Leoncio
Salvador IV, on the other hand, testified that Teñoso held Jongjong’s left arm
while Cocotan held the other arm;[18] that
they shot Jongjong at the back;[19]
that Jongjong ran and Cocotan chased him while Teñoso shot him at the back; and
that four shots were fired.[20]
The
accused enumerated other inconsistencies, to wit: (1) Arnold Torio testified that the
mauling took place right in front of him and his driver and the road ahead was
clear and empty,[21] but he also
mentioned that there were many people at the place where the mauling took place
since it was a market day;[22] (2) He also stated
that he saw the mauling incident at a distance of ten (10) meters,[23]
but on cross-examination, he replied that he was about fifteen (15) meters from
where the mauling took place;[24] (3) He further testified
that after being beaten up, Jongjong was able to run for about ten (10) meters
before he stumbled and got shot,[25]
but later, he said that it was a distance of fifteen (15) meters;[26] and
(4)
Leoncio initially stated that Cocotan
shot Jongjong but later he said that it was Teñoso who shot Jongjong at the
back.[27]
The
Court examined the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses but found them too inconsequential to adversely affect their overall
integrity. Such minor inconsistencies in
the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as
long as it is in its entirety coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies
may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every
single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.[28]
In
this case, the cited discrepancies as to the distance, the number of shots and
which hand was actually used in holding Jongjong were not too critical as to discredit
altogether the testimonies of Arnold Tenorio and Leoncio Saldivar IV. These are
minor details that cannot destroy the truthfulness of their story.
The
accused also tried to sway the Court with the inconsistency in the statement of
Leoncio Saldivar IV as to who actually shot the victim. The pertinent portions of his testimony read:
“PROS. BINCE:
Q: What
happened next after Paking and Paot were holding the hands of Kuya Jong Jong?
WITNESS:
A: They
shot him at the back.
COURT:
Questions
from the Court.
Q: How
would you know the holding, carrying and shooting when according to you
immediately upon the fall of that motorcycle you ran four (4) meters away to
the basketball court?
A: Because
at first I was by the jeep and they were in front of the jeep.
Q: Where
is the jeep? Was it beside the
motorcycle or to (sic) the basketball court where you were?
A: Near
the municipal hall, sir.
Q: And was
that motorcycle that fell also near the municipal hall?
A: (Witness
nodded).
Q: Was
that basketball court where you ran to also near the municipal hall?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: What
kind of jeep was that? Was it a small
owner type jeep which is long?
A: It’s a
passenger jeep, sir.
Next
question.
PROS. BINCE:
Q: You claimed that Kuya Jong was shot. Who shot him?
A: Paot.
COURT:
Q: With
what did Paot shoot?
WITNESS:
A: I do
not know.
COURT:
Q: Was it
a gun or a sling shot?
A: A small
gun.
Q: Can you
demonstrate the length?
A: (Witness
demonstrated a length of about six (6) inches.)
Q: Was it
made of wood or metal or what?
A: A
metal, sir.
PROS. BINCE:
Q: What did Paking do when Paot shoot (sic) Kuya Jong, if any?
A: Kuya Jong ran and he was chased.
Q: Who chased Kuya Jong?
A: Paot.
Q: What about Paking? What did he do, if any?
A: No, it was him who shot at the back.
COURT:
Q: Who shot at the back?
A: Paking.
Q: Whose
back did he shoot?
A: Of Kuya
Jong.
PROS. BINCE:
Q: So it’s now clear that it was Paking who
shot Kuya Jong at the back and not Paot?
A: Yes, sir.”[29]
From
the foregoing, the accused argues that there was an inconsistency in the sense
that at one point, Leoncio stated that it was Paot (Cocotan) who shot Jongjong.
Later, he pointed to Paking (Teñoso) as the gunman.
The Court is not persuaded. There is no inconsistency in the statement of
Leoncio. It can be gleaned from
Leoncio’s testimony that Paot initially shot Jongjong. When the latter had the opportunity to stand
and run, he was shot from behind by Paking. This seeming inconsistency only strengthens
the story of Leoncio that the two accused took turns in shooting Jongjong.[30] It bears stressing too that Leoncio, being a
child witness, cannot be expected to provide an accurate answer to every
question asked.[31]
Most
importantly, the trial court found Leoncio credible. The assessment by the trial court of his
honesty and reliability is worth repeating:
Anent Saldivar IV’s alleged vague description and
out-of-court identification of Teñoso, suffice it to state that whatever
perceived vagueness or irregularity there were in the identification of Teñoso
had been cured by the subsequent positive identification in court of Teñoso not
only by Saldivar IV, despite
the attempt of the trial judge to mislead the child witness by pointing to
another person, but also by witness Torio. x x x.[32]
The Court
has considered the defense of denial and alibi put up by the accused,[33]
but finds them relatively weak and insufficient to overcome the positive and
categorical identification of the accused as perpetrators. The rule is that the defense of denial, when unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[34]
Upon
re-examination of the records, the Court is of the considered view that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was duly proven. The elements of treachery are: 1)
the employment of means, methods or forms of execution that affords the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) that said
means, method or forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted.[35]
It
was clearly shown that Jongjong was shot while on board his motorcycle. The
attack was undoubtedly swift and sudden which did not afford him any
opportunity to defend himself. After falling from his motorcycle, he was
assaulted by the two accused who also restrained his hands to prevent him from
retaliating. When he was able to free himself, they pursued him and then shot
him from behind.
The award of civil indemnity is
proper. It requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the
crime and proof of the accused's responsibility therefor. Although jurisprudence fixed the civil
indemnity at P50,000.00 only,[36] the
Court upholds the award of P300,000.00 civil indemnity since the parties
had stipulated such amount in the event of a judgment of conviction.[37]
The award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is also correct. Moral
damages are awarded in view of the violent death of a victim. There is no need for any allegation or proof
of the emotional sufferings of the heirs. Likewise, the award of exemplary
damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,[38]
as in this case. Accordingly, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00[39] to
the heirs of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the
decretal portion of the March 19, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02751 is MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the
Court hereby sentences both of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rosito Sambrano in the amount of P300,000.00 as civil indemnity,
as stipulated; to pay, jointly and severally, the said heirs the amounts of P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the cost of the
suit.
Both accused are further ordered to pay
legal interest on the civil liabilities imposed until fully paid.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 183-201 penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga with Associate Justice Angelita M. Romilla-Lontok and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 253-277.
[3] Records, p. 277.
[4] CA rollo, p. 184.
[5] Records, p.1.
[6] CA rollo,
p. 185; TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9] Records, p. 277.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 65-118.
[11]
[12]
[13] See Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[14] See Rollo, pp. 34-37.
[15] CA rollo, p. 77; TSN, June 1, 2004, p. 5.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Sayoc v. People, G.R. No. 157723,
[29] TSN,
[30] CA rollo,
p. 186; TSN,
[31] People v. De Leon, 387 Phil. 779 (2000).
[32] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[33] Sayoc v. People, supra note 28.
[34] Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101,
[35] People v. Lumintigar, 424 Phil. 148 (2002).
[36] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602,
[37] Records, p. 40.
[38] People v. Gutierrez, supra note 36.
[39]