Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - RICARDO BODOSO y BOLOR, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. NO. 188129 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD,
and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
For final review by this Court
are the December 18, 2008 Decision[1] and February
17, 2009 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01526, which affirmed with modification the July 28, 2005 Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Tabaco City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. T-3285 and
Criminal Case No. T-3286, thus, sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
for each count of rape and reduced the amount of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The RTC Decision[4]
convicted the accused for two counts of rape which he committed against his own
daughter and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay “the sum
of P75,000.00, for
each case, as civil indemnity, the sum of P50,000.00 for each case, as moral damages, and the sum of P25,000.00 for each case, as
exemplary damages, or the aggregate sum of P300,000.00 plus the costs of the suit.”
It appears that on
Criminal Case No. T-3285
That on July 14,
1999, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay San
Isidro,
knowledge
with his own daughter, AAA,[5] a minor being only
14 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. T-3286
That sometime in
the month of September, 1999, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, more or
less, at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Malilipot, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force, threat
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with his own daughter, AAA, a minor being only 14 years of
age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of “Not
Guilty’ to both charges.[8] During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated
that there should be no dispute with respect to the following matters:
1. Identity of the accused;
2. The private complainant in this case is a minor,
being 14 years old on the date of the incidents,
3. The private complainant is the daughter of the accused;
and
4. The private complainant and the accused were living
in the same house at Brgy. San Ilawod, Malilipot, Albay.[9]
During
the trial, the prosecution presented, as its witnesses, private complainant AAA
and Dr. Arsenia Mañosca-Moran, the Municipal Health Officer who examined her. On the other hand, the accused, through
counsel, manifested in open court that he had no intention of presenting any
evidence.
Consequently, on April 2,
2001, the cases against the accused were considered submitted for decision.[10]
On
In
compliance with the aforementioned order of this Court, the trial court allowed
the accused to present his evidence on
The trial court wove together the evidence
presented by the prosecution and summarized its version of the incidents in
this wise:
Complainant AAA
is a 14-year-old minor daughter of accused Ricardo Bodoso. She was living with her father (accused
herein), mother and other siblings at their house located at Brgy.
Sometime in the
evening of 14 July 1999, complainant's mother and other siblings went to the
Poblacion of Malilipot, Albay, to watch the coronation night of the Search for
Miss Malilipot 1999. Complainant, on the other hand, was watching television at
the house of her grandmother, about 8 to 10 meters away from their house, when
she was summoned by her father (herein accused) to go home. She obeyed her father and immediately went
home at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Upon reaching
their house, complainant entered the bedroom to look for a dress. Her father also entered the bedroom and told
her to come near him. When complainant failed to respond, her father pulled her
and forcibly laid her on the bed. After undressing himself, complainant's father
removed her shirt and shorts. He then inserted
his sexual organ into the vagina of the complainant and made push and pull
movement for about 5 minutes. Complainant tried to extricate herself from her
father's hold but to no avail, and so she just cried out her misfortune.
After the
sexual act, accused helped complainant in putting back her shirts and shorts and
they both went out of the room. Later, they rode together in a bicycle and
proceeded to the Poblacion of Malilipot, Albay, to watch the beauty contest. When the contest ended at about 12:00 o'clock
midnight, complainant, together with her mother and other siblings, all walked
home to Brgy.
The said
incident of sexual abuse was followed by another incident at about 8:00 o'clock
in the morning during the month of September, 1999, while complainant was
reading a pocketbook inside their bedroom.
Her mother then was in Tabaco, Albay, selling spices while her sister
Vivian was burning dry leaves in their yard. After her father entered the
bedroom, he pulled her in order to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to get away from her father's hold
but she could not, so she just kept on crying while she was sexually molested. After satisfying his lust, complainant's father
just helped her put on her shorts and panty, dressed himself and left the room.
When her mother arrived at about
Apprehensive
that she or mother would be killed by her father if she would divulge the aforementioned
rapes committed on 14 July 1999 and September, 1999, and fearful that she would
again be sexually abused by her own father, complainant decided to leave their
house on 07 January 2000, together with a friend named Cheryll Binaday who was
also being maltreated by her own mother. Together, they walked along the
seashore towards the direction of Brgy. Salvacion, Tabaco, Albay, when a
motorized tricycle being driven by a certain Melchor passed by. When Melchor recognized the complainant, he
brought them to his house, located at Brgy.
At the
Municipal Police Station of Malilipot, Albay, complainant was investigated by
the police and she gave her sworn statement. Complainant was also examined by
Dr. Arsenia Mañosora-Moran, Municipal Health Officer, Malilipot, Albay. The examination
of the complainant yielded the following results as contained in a Medical Certificate
dated
“Genitalia: Hymen: with heat sealed incomplete
laceration at 1:00, 3:00, 5:00, & 11:00 and complete laceration at 9:00
o'clock with sharp coaptable borders without congestion.”
Explaining her
findings, Dr. Moran stated that the lacerations found in the hymen of the complainant were
caused by sexual intercourse and that because there was no congestion, the
incident could have happened a long time ago before the examination of the
patient. Hence, the present criminal complaints
against the accused.[17]
(Citations omitted.)
The defense version
of the events was summed up by the trial court in this manner:
Setting up
denial and alibi, accused Ricardo Bodoso averred that on the night of
The
trial court, in its July 28, 2005 Decision,[19]
finally convicted the accused of two (2) counts of rape defined under Article
266-A, and penalized under Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. It did not give due consideration to the defense
of denial and alibi put up by the accused and, instead, gave credence to the
evidence of the prosecution. It noted
that in contrast to the “evasive” narration of the accused,[20]
AAA testified in a straightforward and categorical manner.[21] Thus,
the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused RICARDO BODOSO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of Rape, defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He is also ordered to pay complainant AAA the sum of Php75,000.00 for each case, as civil
indemnity; the sum of Php50,000.00 for each case, as moral damages; and the sum
of Php25,000.00 for each case, as exemplary damages, or the aggregate sum of Php300,000.00,
plus costs of the suit.
Let the
entire records of these two (2) cases, together with the evidence, be forwarded
to the Hon. Court of Appeals for automatic review, pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 20-2005 dated
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved,
the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals presenting in his Brief[22] the
following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE MINORITY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[23]
On December
18, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the subject decision echoing the
findings of the trial court that the accused was guilty of the crimes leveled
against him. The appellate court,
however, was of the view that the award of civil indemnity should be reduced to
P50,000.00[24] considering
that R.A. 9346[25]
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 16, P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each case.
SO ORDERED. [26]
Hence this appeal.
In a
resolution dated
In
his brief, the accused argues that AAA’s testimony of what happened after the
first rape incident on
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. That
night after your father supposedly raped you, you accompanied him to watch the
program or contest in Poblacion, Malilipot, Albay?
A. Yes.
Q. Before
going to Malilipot to watch the program or contest you eat [sic] supper with
your father?
PROS. PIFAÑO:
Vague, what date?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I am referring to the date of the supposed first rape
incident.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A. Not
yet.
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
Q. What
time did you take your supper that night?
A. After
watching the program and contest in Malilipot late that night.
Q. You
do not take your supper before going to Poblacion, Malilipot to watch [the] program
or contest because you were then in a hurry to see that program?
A. Yes.
Q. Of
course you were happy to watch the program or contest in Poblacion, Malilipot,
Albay?
A. Yes.
Q. What
kind of program were [sic] shown?
A. Search
for Binibining Malilipot.
Q. And
that contest consist of making the contestant[s] who were women or ladies to
walk while wearing bathing suits?
A. Yes.
Q. And
of course being a lady yourself, you are so happy, watching them showing how
feminine they are?
A. Yes.
Q. You
have seen these women or ladies walking in front of [the] public wearing
swimming suits that made you happy but did not cause sadness to you considering
that you were just supposedly raped that night before going to watch to
program?
A. Yes.
Q. You
did not imagine yourself being supposedly violated while watching those ladies
in skimpy attire?
A. I
felt that.
Q. And
yet you are happy watching them?
A. I
was happy just waiting for the declared winner.
Q. Do
you think that [it] is normal to be happy watching those ladies in skimpy
attire just after you were supposedly raped by your father?
A. No,
that is not normal.
Q. What
time did you went [sic] home after watching those [sic] program.
A. Late
in the evening about
Q. And
you also went home with your father?
A. No,
with me was my mother.
Q. Why,
where was your father when you left the program when you go [sic] home?
A. Outside,
I did not know where.
Q. But
before you go home, you looked for him in the vicinity of the venue of the
program so that he could accompany you
home, is that correct?
A. Not
anymore because with me was my mother.
Q. But
of course in going to the program, you and your father were together in going
there?
A. Yes.
Q. You
walked all the way from your house to the Poblacion of Malilipot which is more
than three (3) kilometers?
A. No,
we rode on a bicycle.
Q. Your
farther [sic] drove the bicycle?
A. Yes.
Q. And
you rode on the bicycle while standing beside [sic] him?
A. In
front because I did not know how to ride at the back.
Q. So,
you were seated in the bicycle between the bicycle handle, which is equivalent to
the wheels of [a] motor vehicle, and you father?
A. Yes.
Q. You
chose to seat [sic] between the driver’s handle and you father because it is
where you could conveniently sit?
A. Yes.
Q. You
did not choose to ride by standing behind your father by clumping your feet on
the axle of the rear wheel because that is somewhat convenient for you?
A. Because
I might fall from that position.[30]
The accused argues that if AAA had
indeed been raped, she would have naturally felt pain all over her body and
could not have sat behind the bike’s handle, travelled for three (3) hours to
Malilipot and enjoyed watching the pageant.
The
accused also points out the following testimony of AAA on what she and her
mother talked about as they were walking home. Thus:
Q. When you went home with your mother, in as much as your father
was left behind the Poblacion of Malilipot, Albay, the bicycle was also left
with him?
A. Yes.
Q. So, with nothing to ride on, you and your mother just walked
all the way from Poblacion Malilipot to San Isidro Ilawod, right?
A. Yes, because we are so many then.
Q. And you walked for about an hour?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you talk about while walking towards your house?
A. We talked about who could win because when we left, nobody
was declared yet.
Q. You and your mother were talking about happy things while
walking towards home?
A. They were happy but not me.
Q. Before you were raped, your usual self has been very happy?
A. No.
Q. Your mother did not ask you why you were very sad?
A. I did not manifest that I was sad.
Q. You pretended to be happy while walking with your mother?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you initiated [a] topic that are [sic] happy to pretend
that you are happy?
A. Yes.[31]
The
accused contends that if AAA was indeed raped by the accused, her agitated
state could not have escaped her mother’s attention because it normally takes a
while for a rape victim to regain her composure. Since she was not at all agitated while she
was walking home with her mother, it could not be said that AAA was raped. At
such a young age, AAA could not have calculatedly presented herself as if
nothing had happened.
Moreover,
the accused finds it hard to believe that AAA would reveal her tormenting
experience to a certain Melchor Brusola and his family, a stranger to her, but not
to her own mother.
Finally,
the accused asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove the minority of
AAA because it failed to introduce in evidence her birth certificate.
The Court
finds no merit in the appeal.
Time and again, this
Court has emphasized that the manner of assigning values to declarations of
witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility. In essence, when the question arises as to
which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy
of belief, the assessment of the trial court is generally given the highest
degree of respect, if not finality. The assessment made by the trial court is even
more enhanced when the Court of Appeals affirms the same,[32] as in
this case.
In its effort to ferret out the truth, the Court examined the transcripts of stenographic notes. Like the trial court, the Court finds that the
victim’s testimony on the incident was candid and straightforward, indicative
of a reliable and trustworthy recollection of what took place on that fateful
day. She narrated the sexual abuse in
this manner:
PROS. PIFAÑO:
Q. On
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Where
were you on said date and time?
A. In
our house.
Q. While
there on said date and time, do you remember if there was any unusual incident
that happened?
A. There
was.
Q. Will
you tell the Honorable Court what is that unusual incident that happened?
A. I
was then in our house and I entered the bedroom. He call[ed] me but I did not
come near him. When I did not come near
him, he pulled me and forcibly laid me on the bed then while I was on the bed,
he entered his sexual organ into my vagina.
INTERPRETER:
Witness was crying in making this statement.
PROS. PIFAÑO: (Continuing)
Q. After
the accused entered his sexual organ into your vagina, what happened next?
A. He
made a push and pull movement with his organ inside my vagina.
Q. For
how long did the accused make his push and pull movement with his organ inside
you vagina?
A. About
five minutes.
Q. While
he was doing this to you, what did you do?
A. I
tried to extricate from his hold but I was not able to.
Q. So
what did you do?
A. I
kept crying.
Q. After
the accused sexually abused you on said date and time for 5 minutes, what
happened next?
A. He
put on my dress on me then he also put back his shirts and shorts.
Q. After
he dressed up, what did he do?
A. He
went out.
PROS. PIFAÑO: (Continuing)
Q. How
about you, did you report the incident to your mother?
A. No,
because I was afraid.
Q. Why?
What are you afraid of?
A. He
might kill my mother and my siblings.
Q. When
the incident of sexual abuse committed by the accused against you, who was the
person present if there is any?
A. Nobody,
because the other members of the family were in Malilipot. The only person left in our house were he and
me.
Q. On
September 1999, do you remember where were you?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Where
were you on said date and time?
A. In
our house.
Q. While
in your house on said date and time at about
A. There
was.
Q. Will
you tell the Honorable Court what is that unusual incident that happened?
A. I
was then in the bedroom lying and reading pocket books when he pulled my dress
up then removed my shorts and panty.
PROS. PIFAÑO: (Continuing)
Q. After
he removed your shorts and panty, what happened next?
A. He
entered his penis into my vagina.
Q. When
your father entered his penis into your vagina, to whom do you refer?
A. Ricardo
Bodoso.
Q. And
what is your relation to him?
A. My
father.
Q. After
the accused entered his penis into your vagina, what happened next?
A. Then
he again made a push and pull into my vagina.
Q. For
how long did he make that push and pull?
A. About
3 minutes.
Q. When
the accused sexually abused you on September 1999 at about
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Who?
A. My
sister.
Q. What
is the name of your sister?
A. BBB
Q. How
far was she in your place where you were sexually abused?
A. She
was in the yard burning dry leaves.
Q. When
the accused sexually abused you on said date and time, what did you do?
A. I
was trying to get away from his hold but I couldn’t.
Q. So
what did you do?
A. I
kept crying.
INTERPRETER:
Witness still crying.
PROS. PIFAÑO: (Continuing)
Q. When
the accused satisfied his lust, what did he do?
A. He
put on my shorts and panty.
Q. After
the accused put on your shorts and panty, what did he do?
A. He
went away.
Q. Where
was your mother then when the incident happened?
A. She
was in the Tabaco market vending some spices.
Q. What
time then (sic) your mother went home?
A. About
The Court gives considerable
weight on the above testimony of AAA since, ordinarily and customarily, Filipino children revere and respect
their elders. This is deeply ingrained
in them and is even recognized by law. Thus,
it is unthinkable, if not completely preposterous, that a daughter would
audaciously concoct a story of rape against her father in wanton disregard of
the unspeakable trauma and social stigma it may generate on her and the entire
family. An unmarried teenage lass does
not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father,
if it never did happen.[34]
The
Court finds difficulty in subscribing to the assertion of the accused that AAA
could not have been possibly raped simply because she was able to travel on a
bicycle with her father and watched a beauty pageant right after the incident. AAA’s honor might have been tarnished and her
womanhood desecrated, but it does not follow that her physical capacity was affected.
The
fear of bodily harm against herself and her mother can explain why AAA acted
the way she did while walking home with her mother. After going through a
harrowing experience in the hands of her father, her young mind could only
imagine the worst from him. Few things
are more recognized than the love that a daughter has for her mother. Verily, the guilt of the accused cannot be
doubted just because AAA did not act as expected of a rape victim. Her behavior after the incident can be attributed to her young age,
her father’s moral ascendancy over her, and her fear that he might harm her and
her mother should she find out that he had ravished their daughter. At any rate, not all rape
victims are expected to act conformably to the usual expectation of everyone.[35]
Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the
proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. In People
v. Silvano,[36]
it was written:
It is a time-honored precept that different
people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is
no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.
For
the same reason, the fact that AAA first confided the rape to Melchor Brusola and
his family, instead of her mother, should not be taken against her.
The
prosecution’s version of what transpired on the two unforgettable occasions is fortified
by the medical findings of Dr. Arsenia Mañosca-Moran, who testified that the
lacerations found in her hymen could have been caused by sexual intercourse. Her report that there was no congestion
because the incident took place several months before the examination of the
patient on January 8, 2000 is consistent with the story of AAA that she was
raped on July 14, 1999 and September 1999. When
the testimony of the witness corresponds with medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge
have been established.[37] The mass of physical and testimonial
evidence in this case clearly establishes the guilt of the accused. In fine, the trial court was correct in its
findings.
In both incidents, the accused
puts up the defense of denial and alibi. In a long line of cases, it has been consistently held that
between the positive assertion of prosecution witnesses and the negative averment
of an accused, the former undisputedly deserves more credence and is entitled
to greater evidentiary value than mere denial.[38]
On the other hand, for alibi to prosper,
the accused must not only prove that he was at another place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene at that time.[39] As noted
by the trial court:
Besides, the claim of the accused that he stayed in
Tabaco in (sic) the evening of July
14, 1999 until midnight was belied by his own admission during the hearing on
February 17, 2000, thus:
ATTY.
BONAFER, JR.: (continuing)
xxx xxx
Q. Now,
Mr. witness, how would you describe your relationship or your dealings with the
private complainant prior to
A. In
fact, I was so surprised because on the night of
The assertion of the accused that the
minority of AAA was not established because the prosecution failed to present
her birth certificate in evidence deserves scant consideration. The Informations specifically alleged that AAA
was a minor, i.e., barely 14 years old on
In
this regard, the Court is also guided by the ground rules laid down in the case
of People
v. Pruna,[44] in appreciating the age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Thus:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or
authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth
of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to
the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
The trial court should
always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, the minority of AAA was never in question
as it was never contested. Not only did the accused admit such fact during
the pre-trial conference,[45]
but he also neither objected to, nor refuted, the following: AAA’s testimony
during the trial; the Medical Certificate[46]
issued by Dr. Mañosca-Moran on January 10, 2000 and signed by AAA and her
mother, which stated that she was only 14 years old at the time of the
examination; and AAA’s sworn statement[47]
subscribed and sworn to on the same date before Judge Edwin C. Ma-Alat.
With respect to the penalty, the Court of Appeals
failed to state that the reduction from death to reclusion perpetua is without eligibility for parole
as held in the case of People v. Antonio Ortiz.[48] This should be rectified.
Moreover, it also erred
in reducing the amount of the civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. As the penalty would still have been death
had it not been abolished, the amount of the civil indemnity should have
remained at P75,000.00. The discussion in People v.
Rodolfo Lopez[49] is worth noting. Thus:
On pecuniary
liability, this Court ruled in People of
the Philippines v. Sarcia that:
The principal
consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable
for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the
civil indemnity and moral damages, People
v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages
as follows:
The Court,
likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally
in accordance with the ruling in People
v. Sambrano which states:
As to damages,
we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying
circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be Php75,000.00 . . . Also, in rape cases, moral damages are warded
without the need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed
that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award. However, the trial court's award of Php50,000.00 as moral damages
should also be increased to Php75,000.00 pursuant to current jurisprudence on
qualified rape.
It should be
noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still
death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently,
the civil indemnity for the victim is still Php75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to
the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,
correctly awarded the following amounts: Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified
by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; Php75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even
without proof thereof, x x x.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the
appellant because of the prohibition in R. A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of Php75,000.00
is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows “not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”
The litmus test
therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death
penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis
included)
Moreover,
to conform with existing jurisprudence,[50]
the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded, the accused should also pay interest
at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid.[51]
WHEREFORE, the December 18, 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01526, finding accused RICARDO BODOSO y BOLOR guilty of two
(2) counts of rape is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty of two
(2) counts of rape committed against his daughter, AAA, the Court hereby
sentences the accused, in each count, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole; and to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
to pay the costs.
The accused
shall also pay legal interest on all damages awarded until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO M. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T
E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle dated June 16, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam
concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-26.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 60-70; Records
(Volume No. 1), pp. 229-239.
[4]
[5]
The Court shall use fictitious initials in lieu of the real names and
circumstances of the victim and the latter's immediate family members other
than accused-appellant. (See People v.
Gloria, G.R. No. 168476, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 742; citing Sec. 29
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 9262, and Sec. 40 of the
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children; and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419).
[6] CA rollo, p.5.
[7]
[8] Records (Volume No. 1), pp. 37-38.
[9]
[10]
Records (Volume No. 1), p.106.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; CA rollo, pp. 15-17; Records (Volume 1) pp.
231-233.
[18]
RTC Decision, p.5; CA rollo, p. 17. Records (Volume 1) p. 233.
[19]
Supra note 4.
[20]
RTC Decision, p.8; CA rollo, p. 20; Records (Volume No. 1),
p.236.
[21]
RTC Decision, p.6; CA rollo, p 18; Records (Volume No. 1),
p.234.
[22]
CA rollo, pp. 44-59.
[23]
[24]
CA Decision, p. 23. Rollo, p. 24.
[25]
An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the
[26] Rollo, p. 25.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
TSN,
[31]
[32]
People v. Dalipe, G.R. No. 187154,
[33]
TSN,
[34]
People v. Miranda, G.R. 176634, April
5, 2010, citing People v. Alvero, 386
Phil. 181, 198 (2000).
[35]
People v. Silvano, 368 Phil. 676 (1999).
[36]
[37] People v. Anthony Rante y Reyes, G.R. No. 184809, March 29, 2010, citing People v. Tuazon, G.R. No.
168102, 22
August 2008, 563 SCRA 124, 135.
[38] People v. Bustamante, 445 Phil. 345 (2003); People v. Monteron, 428 Phil. 401 (2002) and Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999).
[39] People v. Alvarado, 429 Phil. 208 (2002).
[40] TSN,
[41] Sec.
4. Judicial
admissions. - An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made (Emphasis supplied.)
[42] Alano v. CA,
347 Phil. 549 (1997).
[43]
Afable, et al. v. Ruiz, et al., 56 O.G. 3767; supra; Munasque v. Court of
Appeals, 224 Phil. 79 (1985) and Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. v.
Teodoro, 135 Phil. 364 (1968).
[44] 439 Phil. 440 (2002).
[45] Records (Volume No. 1), pp. 46-47.
[46]
Exh. C, Records (Volume 1) p.
4; Exh. D. Records (Volume 2) p. 4.
[47]
Exh. A. Records (Volume 1) p.
2; Exh. B. Records (Volume 2) p. 2.
[48] G.R.
No. 179944,
[49]
G.R. No. 179714,
[50] People v. Antonio Dalisay y Destresa, G.R. No. 188100, November 25, 2009 and People v.
Elmer Peralta y Hidalgo, G..R. No. 187531, October 16, 2009.
[51] People v. Bagos G.R. No. 177152,
January 6, 2010, citing
People v. Guevarra, G.R. No.
182192, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 288, 313; People v. Antivola, 466
Phil. 394 (2004) and People v. Olaybar,
459 Phil. 114 (2003).