THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - |
G.R. No. 182793 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,* and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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DIONISIO CALONGE y VERANA, Accused-Appellant. |
Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated November 29,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01516 which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision[2] dated August 10,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27 in
Criminal Case Nos. 4077-4080 finding the above-named accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and frustrated parricide.
The facts as culled from the records:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s
legitimate wife, with whom he had three (3) children, namely: Melody, Dony Rose
and Kimberly whose respective ages at the time of the incident were nine (9),
seven (7) and six (6) years.[3] The family lived in a four (4) by five (5) meters
house at a farm land near the house of Rosita’s parents at Barangay Cabuluan,
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
On
Police investigators found no signs of struggle or forcible
entry as the things inside the house were not disarranged. Photographs of the three (3) dead victims
(Rosita, Dony Rose and Kimberly) were also taken at the crime scene. When interviewed by the policemen, Melody’s
grandmother, Ana O. Amlag, said that Melody told her it was their father
(appellant) who attacked her, her mother and her sisters. Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was
appellant because they had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill
them. On the other hand, when appellant
was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not
know. Appellant asked to be treated also
and they brought him to the hospital.[5]
While still in the hospital, Melody, assisted by her first
cousin Ana Fe Huang, gave her statement to the police. She identified her father, who had a quarrel
with her mother the previous night, as the one (1) who hacked her and also
fatally stabbed her mother and two (2) sisters.[6]
On
Criminal
Case No. 4077
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab ROSITA CALONGE y AMLAG, legal wife of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal
Case No. 4078
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, hack KIMBERLY CALONGE y AMLAG, 06 years old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Criminal
Case No. 4079
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab DONY ROSE CALONGE y AMLAG, 07 years old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
Criminal Case No.
4080
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a bladed object, hack Melody Calonge y Amlag, 09 years old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds and performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Parricide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely medical attendance given which prevented the victim’s death, but nevertheless resulted to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented
as witnesses PO3 Alfelmer Balut, Dr. Telesforo A. Ragpa (Municipal Health
Officer), Lourdes Amlag, Dr. Lirio Marie Ronduen-Adriatico and Melody A.
Calonge.
The sole witness for the defense was appellant who gave a
different version of the incident.
According to appellant, he came home on the night of
On
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Dionisio Calonge y Verana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of parricide and one count of frustrated parricide, he is hereby sentenced as follows: (1) for the killing of Kimberly Calonge and Dony Rose Calonge, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer death penalty by lethal injection for each case; to pay the heirs of the said victims, the sums of P75,000.00 for each case as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the heirs actual damages in the sum of P21,255.00 for the death of Kimberly, Dony Rose and Rosita A. Calonge; (2) for the killing of Rosita Calonge, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay the heirs of Rosita the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) for the crime of frustrated parricide for wounding Melody Calonge, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as the minimum term to 20 years of [reclusion temporal[13]] as the maximum term; to pay the victim moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00 and P11,015.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment but
modified the death penalty imposed on appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 4078 and
4079 (parricide committed against Kimberly and Dony Rose) by reducing it to reclusion perpetua.[15] Appellant filed a notice of appeal[16] and accordingly
the records of the case were elevated to this Court.
On
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by the RTC and
CA on the following grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS MELODY CALONGE DESPITE ITS EVIDENT CONTRADICTIONS AND APPARENT UNREALITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[20]
Appellant contends that
the trial court overlooked the following inconsistencies and contradictions in
the testimony of Melody: (1) the alleged misunderstanding between her parents
prior to December 1, 2001, which she first denied but changed it during a
subsequent hearing when she claimed her parents had a quarrel before the
stabbing incident occurred, (2) the time of such quarrel for which she gave
three (3) different answers (8:00 to 9:00 p.m. of November 30, 2001; 2:00 early
morning of December 1, 2001; and 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of November 30, 2001), and (3) whether it was Melody or her mother
who was first hacked by her father.
These inconsistent statements of the alleged eyewitness engender doubt
as to their reliability and veracity.
Appellant further argues that Melody’s identification of
appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes remained uncorroborated. The failure to present such other alleged
witnesses (her grandparents) was not satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution. He assails Melody’s
testimony as highly incredible. While
Melody claimed that she saw appellant hacked and stabbed her sisters, the fact
is that, during that time, according to her, she was sleeping together with her
mother in another room inside their house.
Moreover, it was impossible for Melody to have seen that the person who
killed her mother and two (2) sisters was appellant when in fact, according to
her, there was no light inside their room when the incident happened. Clearly, the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving the identity of the offender.
We disagree.
It is plain that the errors imputed to the trial court are
factual and chiefly assail its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. The doctrinal rule is that findings of fact
made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies are
entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better
position to assess the same, an opportunity not equally open to the appellate
court.[21] We find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and CA in this case.
It was established from prosecution evidence that the lone
survivor Melody saw appellant using his bolo and knife, struck at her mother
who was able to evade it and run outside the house. Appellant then turned to Melody, and hacked
her three (3) times before stabbing Dony Rose and Kimberly who were both still
sleeping. After finishing off his
family, appellant inflicted his lone superficial wound before lying down on the
floor, apparently to avoid suspicion that he was himself the culprit and create
an impression that a trespasser had attacked all of them in the night. Melody vividly recounted to the court what
she had witnessed while pretending to be still asleep even after she was hacked
by appellant.
Melody’s account was corroborated by the findings of
prosecution witnesses Dr. Ragpa (who conducted the autopsy on the bodies of the
three [3] victims) and Dr.
Ronduen-Adriatico (who examined and treated Melody). Dr. Ragpa testified that Rosita sustained
only a single stab wound on the chest. He
explained that the width of such wound, 2 ½ inches, was caused by a single upward
thrust and pulling out of the bladed instrument. The six (6)-inch deep wound hit the lower tip
of the heart and resected the pulmonary vessels. For Rosita, the cause of death was
hypovolemic shock due to resected pulmonary blood vessels. As for Kimberly, she sustained a hacking
wound on the left axilla (armpit), probably inflicted in a lying position,
which cut the head of the left humerus and resecting the axillary blood
vessels. Kimberly also died from hypovolemic shock due to injured/resected left
axillary blood vessels. Dony Rose had
one (1) incised wound and one (1) stab wound on her chest, which penetrated the
left ventricle of the heart. She
likewise died of hypovolemic shock due to penetrating stab wound on the chest.[22] On the other hand, Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico
testified that Melody sustained five (5) wounds and had three (3) amputations
of the three (3) digits of her right hand.
She found the wounds located at the left side of the head, lower lip,
left side of the neck, left shoulder, chest and the third, fourth and fifth
fingers. Although the only fatal wound
is that at the left side of the neck, the combination of all wounds would have
caused the death of Melody had there been no timely medical assistance rendered
on the patient. The neck wound was a
fatal injury (victim could have died in less than six [6] hours) because of its
proximity to large blood vessels such as carotid and tubular vessels.[23]
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding Melody’s
testimony clear and unequivocal, despite her answers not being as complete as
would be desired, considering her age and difficulty of translating the
questions to her in the Ifugao dialect.
Her account of the incident was consistent with the physical evidence,
particularly the findings of Dr. Ragpa and Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico on the
injuries sustained and cause of death of the victims as a result of the carnage
wrought upon their family by appellant.
The inconsistencies mentioned by appellant relate only to
minor details and not to the fact of the fatal stabbing of his wife and two (2)
children in his own hands. We have
consistently ruled that not all inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony
affect their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimonies. Thus, although there may be inconsistencies on the testimonies of
witnesses on minor details, they do not impair credibility where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of
the assailants.[24] Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters – not to the central fact of the crime – do not affect
the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of a witness as long as
it is coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[25]
It must be further stressed that during her testimony, Melody
had to be assisted by an interpreter as she responded to the questions in the
Ifugao dialect. Besides, ample margin of
error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more
than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience
of testifying before a court.[26] Despite the language barrier, Melody remained
categorical and steadfast in declaring that it was her very own father,
appellant, who hacked her, her mother and her younger sisters using his bolo and knife in the early morning
of
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. Do you recall of any incident at that evening that is relevant to this case involving the killing of your sister Dony Rose, Kimberly, your mother and the fact that you were wounded?
A. Yes, there was sir.
Q. What was that incident that you recall Melody?
A. He hacked us, sir.
Q. Who
hacked you?
A. My papa, sir.
COURT:
Q. Do you know the full name of your papa or nickname?
A. Yes, sir I know.
Q. What is the full name of your papa?
A. Dionisio Calonge, sir.
x x x x
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. What did your father use in hacking you Melody?
A. The knife and the bolo, sir.
x x x x
PROS. TURINGAN:
These bolo and knife, how are they related to the bolo and knife used by your father in hacking you, your sister and your mother?
A. He stabbed and then he hacked, sir.
Q. By the way, these bolo and knife, do you know who own these bolo and knife?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who own these bolo and knife Melody?
A. My father sir.
Q. How are these knife and bolo related to the bolo and knife used by your father in hacking your sister, yourself and your mother?
A. He
used that bolo in hacking and stabbing my mother and my sister, sir.
Q. Who was hacked first by your father Melody?
A. I, sir.
Q. After hacking [you] Melody. . .By the way, what part of your body was hacked by your father?
A. This one, sir. (Witness showing to the Court the three fingers that were cut from the middle finger up to the small finger of the left arm and also below the shoulder of the left arm).
Q. Where else, Melody?
A. (Witness showing to the Court the scar located at the left side of her lower lip and also at the back of her left ear).
Q. After your father Melody hacked you, what happened next?
A. My mother, sir.
COURT:
Q. What was done to your mother?
A. He stabbed her, sir.
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. And after he stabbed your mother, what did your father do next Melody?
A. He returned back and used the bolo in hacking me three times, sir.
Q. After that, what happened next Melody?
A. Next,
sir my father used the bolo in stabbing my sister’s armpit and used in hacking
her abdomen.
Q. Which of these bolo and knife did he use in hacking and stabbing your sister?
ATTY. TABAGO:
Who? Sister?
A. Both, sir.
COURT:
Q. Are you saying that your father was holding two weapons at the same time?
A. Yes, sir.
Alright, go ahead.
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. After that what did your father do?
A. He
pretended to stab his body, his neck and his abdomen, sir.
Q. What did your father use in stabbing and wounding himself?
A. The bolo, sir.
Q. You are referring to this Exh. “G”?
A. Yes, sir.[27] [Emphasis supplied.]
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT
BY PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. When was that again when your mother and your sisters were hacked and stabbed by your father?
A.
Q. In
the early morning of
A. None, sir.
Q. The weapons used by your father in hacking and stabbing you, your mother and your sisters, if you can see them could you be able to identify them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There are here a bolo and a knife Melody, can you please examine these bolo and knife and tell the Court if these are the same weapons used by your father in hacking and stabbing you, your mother and your sisters?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who owns these bolo and knife Melody?
A. My father, sir.[28]
As to appellant’s assertion that
Melody could not have seen her father stab her two (2) sisters who slept on the
other room since it was still dark inside the house, Melody (during
cross-examination[29]) had described
their “rooms” as not actually separated by walls. She could thus see her two (2) sisters and
appellant from where she was sleeping.[30] The policemen who investigated the crime
scene also found that the partition was just a curtain.[31] Melody slept beside her mother while her
sisters were beside their father on the other “room.”[32] And while indeed it was still dark when
appellant started hacking his wife and daughters, Melody had sufficient
illumination provided by the flashlight used by appellant. This was mentioned by Melody in the later
part of her direct examination:
Q. Please tell the Court how you were able to see your father hacked and stabbed you, your mother and sisters?
A. (No answer yet)
COURT:
Q. x x x Why don’t you start with where was she at the time the hacking and stabbing took place?
PROSECUTOR:
We withdraw that, your Honor. Aside from these bolo and knife Melody, was your father holding any other things?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that Melody?
A. Flashlight, sir.
Q. Can you identify that flashlight it (sic) [if] you can see it Melody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There is here a flashlight marked as Exhibit “I”. Can you please examine this flashlight and tell the Honorable Court if it is the same flashlight you mentioned?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who owns this flashlight Melody?
A. My father, sir.
x x x x[33]
Q. Could you please tell the Court how this flashlight was being held by your father?
A. He
put in his head the flashlight, sir.
Q. Can you demonstrate how he placed in his head Melody?
A. (Witness
demonstrating how he placed the flashlight at the left side of her head with
the use of a rubber tied on the flashlight).[34] [emphasis
supplied.]
On cross-examination, Melody fixed
the time of the incident at
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.[37] The key element
in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.[38] All the elements of the crime were clearly
and sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
Even granting arguendo
that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters,
the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the appellant as the
perpetrator. Direct evidence of the
actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when
circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that
circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one
circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven
and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[39] While no general rule can be laid down as to
the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only
one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person.[40]
As correctly found by the CA, the following circumstances taken
together established without doubt that it was appellant who inflicted fatal
wounds on Rosita, Melody, Dony Rose and Kimberly inside their house early
morning of December 1, 2001: (1) after
having a quarrel with Rosita the previous night, appellant was seen by Melody
sharpening his bolo which he
later hid under his pillow; (2) the bolo,
knife and flashlight used in the hacking of the victims belong to appellant,
and which were found in his possession when policemen arrived at the scene; (3)
the medical findings showed that the victims’ injuries were caused by sharp and
bladed instruments; (4) there were no sign of forcible entry as the things
inside the house were not disarranged; (5) the only persons inside the house
were appellant, Rosita and their three children who slept in adjacent rooms
separated only by a curtain; (6) the only house near appellant’s house was that
of his parents-in-law; (7) Rosita was heard by her relatives shouting for help
before their bodies were discovered; (8) appellant sustained only superficial
wounds and was found conscious by the policemen; (9) appellant could not
explain or say anything about how and when he and the victims were
injured; and (10) Melody saw her father initially strike at her
mother before the latter ran outside the house, and then stab her also five (5)
times.
Appellant simply raises the defense of denial, which is
inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive identification[41] made by Melody
that he was the one (1) who hacked her, her mother and her sisters. Moreover,
an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness,[42] as in this case,
the child of the assailant who survived his murderous rampage.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, the penalty for parricide
is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.
In the killing of Dony Rose and Kimberly, the trial court was
correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is
treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no
opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.[43] Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected
than when a father stabs to death his two (2) young daughters while they were
sound asleep and totally defenseless.
Thus, for the parricide committed against both Dony Rose and Kimberly,
appellant was properly meted the death penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 4079 and
4078. Since the killings were committed
in 2001, the trial court was correct in imposing upon appellant the supreme
penalty of death. In view, however, of
the passage and effectivity of R.A. No. 9346
on
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (Underscoring supplied.)
As to the killing of
Rosita, neither treachery nor evident premeditation was present considering
that she was able to parry the first thrust of appellant and ran away outside the
house, and there is no evidence proving that appellant determined to commit the
crime even as Melody recounted that she saw his father sharpening his bolo before they slept the previous
night. Evident premeditation needs proof
of the time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of
the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are
beforehand selected to carry out that intent.
All such facts and antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing
design to accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven to the satisfaction of
the court.[45] There is paucity of evidence as to the time,
motive and the means chosen by appellant to carry out the intent to kill his
entire family. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court was correct in
sentencing appellant to the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua[46] in Criminal Case
No. 4077.
On the civil indemnity
awarded by the trial court in the amount of P75,000.00 each and another P50,000.00
each as moral damages, for the deaths of Dony Rose and Kimberly, the Court
sustains the same. Likewise, the heirs
of Rosita are entitled to civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00
as moral damages.
With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that –
ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. – The courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provisions of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the
case, may likewise reduce by one degree the penalty which under Article 51
should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such crimes.
We therefore find the penalty imposed
by the trial court proper and correct for this offense.
The trial court awarded Melody moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.00, and another P20,000.00 as exemplary damages which are
justified under Articles 2219 (1) and
2229 of the Civil Code. Further,
under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages are awarded
to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as vindication of undue
suffering and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured person, and as
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[47]
Melody is likewise entitled to the sum of P11,025.00
as cost of her treatment and hospitalization.
Anent actual or compensatory damages, it bears stressing that only
substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be
recognized by the courts.[48] Prosecution witness Lourdes Amlag testified
that the family incurred expenses in connection with the funeral, wake and
burial, totalling P21,255.00, as shown in the itemized list submitted to the trial
court.[49]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision dated
With costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
*
Designated additional member per
Special Order No. 843 dated
[1] CA
rollo, pp. 108-125. Penned by
Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Fernanda Lampas Peralta.
[2] Records, pp. 252-265. Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales.
[3] Exhibit “B” and Pre-Trial Order, records, pp. 15 and 93.
[4] TSN, July 10, 2002, pp. 3-4, 7-13; TSN, August 6, 2002, pp. 1-2; TSN, September 11, 2002, pp. 4-6; TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 5-9; Exhibits “O” and “Q”, records, pp. 199-200.
[5] Exhibits “P”, “P-2” and “P-1”, records, pp. 16, 41 and 60; TSN, August 6, 2002, pp. 1-4, 6-7, 10, 12.
[6] Exhibit “G”, records, p. 4; TSN,
[7] Records, p. 1.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] As amended by Order dated
[14]
[15] CA rollo, p. 125.
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 25.
[18]
[19]
[20] CA rollo, p. 45.
[21] People
v. Villamor, G.R. Nos. 140407-08 & 141908-09,
[22] Exhibits “I”, “J” and “K”, records, pp.
193-195; TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24] People v. Castro, G.R. No. 172370, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 586, 595-596, citing People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, February 16, 2000, 325 SCRA 671, 677 and People v. Valla, G.R. No. 111285, January 24, 2000, 323 SCRA 74, 82.
[25] People
v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76,
[26] People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 116726, July 28, 1997, 276 SCRA 352, 357, citing People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 84391, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 170, 177.
[27] TSN,
[28] TSN,
[29] TSN,
[30]
[31] TSN,
[32] TSN,
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] TSN,
[36] TSN,
[37] LUIS B. REYES, The Revised Penal Code, 2006 Edition, Book II, p. 457.
[38]
[39] People v. Mactal, G.R. No. 141187, April 28, 2003, 401 SCRA 612, 617-618, citing People v. Abella, G.R. No. 127803, August 28, 2000, 339 SCRA 129; People v. Bago, G.R. No. 122290, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 115; People v. Sañez, G.R. No. 132512, December 15, 1999, 320 SCRA 805, 815; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754, 764; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 92537, April 25, 1994, 231 SCRA 737 and People v. Retuta, G.R. No. 95758, August 2, 1994, 234 SCRA 645.
[40] People
v. Castillo, G.R No. 172695,
[41] People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 83326,
[42] People
v. Tumulak, G.R. No. 177299,
[43] People
v. Delima, Jr., G.R. No. 169869,
[44] People v. Castro, supra note 24 at 607.
[45] People v. Torpio, G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 9, 15-16, citing People v. Recepcion, G.R. Nos. 141943-45, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 558, 590.
[46] See People
v. Ayuman, G.R. No. 133436,
[47] People v. Castro, supra note 24, at 609, citing People v. Gandia, G.R. No. 175332, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 115, People v. Daleba, Jr., G.R. No. 168100, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 708.
[48] People
v. Listerio, G.R. No. 122099,
[49] Exhibits “L”, “M” and “N”, records, pp. 196-198;
TSN,