Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
LYDIA ESCARCHA, for and in behalf of
JOSEPH ERWIN M. ESCARCHA, SHEILA MAY ESCARCHA, and ALYSSA M. ESCARCHA, Petitioner, -
versus - LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. and/or
WORLD MARINE Respondents. |
G.R. No. 182740 Present: CARPIO
mORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, *ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review
on certiorari[1]
the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On February 16, 1999, Eduardo S.
Escarcha (Eduardo) entered into a
one-year contract of employment with Leonis Navigation Company, Inc. and World
Marine Panama, S.A. (collectively, the
respondents). He was employed as a
First Engineer on board the M.V. Diamond
Glory with a basic monthly salary of US$950.00.[7]
Eduardo submitted himself to the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME), and was pronounced fit to work by
the company-designated physician.[8] He
boarded the M.V. Diamond Glory on
Sometime in April 1999 (or roughly a
month after coming on board), Eduardo became ill while M.V. Diamond Glory was on its way to
Eduardo’s condition worsened despite
medical attention, and he became comatose. The attending physician, Dr. James R.
Patterson (Dr. Patterson), found
Eduardo to be suffering from advanced
mycobacterium tuberculosis, advanced Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
disease, cardiac dysrhythmias, and
anemia. Dr. Patterson’s discharge summary also stated that Eduardo’s Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was
under treatment.[10]
On
Despite continued treatment, Eduardo
died on
At the time of his death, Eduardo
left behind his wife
The petitioners demanded the payment
of death benefits from the respondents which refused to grant the demand. The petitioners
then sought the assistance of the Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s
Union of the
The Labor Arbitration Rulings
Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera (LA de Vera) dismissed the petitioners’
complaint.[12] He held that Eduardo’s illness was
pre-existing; Eduardo was already afflicted with HIV when he boarded the respondents’
vessel. LA de Vera noted that Eduardo admitted to Nigel Griffiths (
The NLRC, in its resolution of
The NLRC held that LA de Vera erred
in concluding that Eduardo’s illness was pre-existing based on (1) the result of
the HIV test conducted by the
The NLRC further ruled that Eduardo’s
illness was aggravated by his employment.
As First Engineer, Eduardo monitored the ship’s engine on a daily basis;
he was responsible for its mechanical propulsion, maintenance, and operation. He also supervised welding job orders. In
undertaking these tasks, he was exposed to various engine toxics and
deleterious residues and substances such as metallic iron, oxides, asbestos and
carbon monoxides.
The respondents moved for the
reconsideration of this resolution, but the NLRC dismissed their motion in its
resolution of March 12, 2007.[14]
The CA Decision
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98719. While the respondents’ petition was pending,
the petitioners moved for the execution of the NLRC resolutions. Despite the respondents’ opposition, the
labor arbiter issued a writ of execution. To prevent the execution of the NLRC’s
judgment, the respondents agreed to pay the petitioners P4,737,810.00, without
prejudice to the outcome of their petition for certiorari before the
CA. The petitioners, in turn, agreed to desist from pursuing the execution
proceedings they initiated.[15]
The CA reversed and set aside the
NLRC resolutions.[16] According to the CA, death arising from a
pre-existing illness is not compensable.
Although Eduardo was pronounced fit to work after undergoing the PEME,
the CA declared the PEME result unreliable to determine a person’s real state
of health because a PEME is not exploratory.
Thus, the CA held that the petitioners cannot be compensated for
Eduardo’s death because the latter did not disclose that he was already
afflicted with HIV when he applied for the position of first engineer. Moreover, the petitioners failed to show a
reasonable connection between Eduardo’s work and his sickness, or that the
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease.
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration
of this decision, but the CA denied their motion in its resolution of April 29,
2008.[17]
The Petition FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
The petitioners allege that the CA
erred in denying the award of death compensation benefits.
The petitioners argue that Eduardo
had no pre-existing illness because he underwent a PEME and was declared fit to
work. In addition, the petitioners claim
that a reasonable connection existed between Eduardo’s work and the illnesses
that caused his death. In fact, pneumonia
and pulmonary tuberculosis are listed as compensable illnesses. Even if it were otherwise, the petitioners
contend it was not necessary to prove the work-relatedness of Eduardo’s
illnesses. Unlike the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
Standard Employment Contract (SEC),
the 1996 POEA-SEC, which governs Eduardo’s employment contract with the
respondents, does not require proof of work-relatedness as condition sine qua non for the claim of death
compensation benefits. It is enough that
death occur during the term of the contract.
In their Comment,[18]
the respondents maintain that death benefits are not payable if the death
occurred beyond the term of the employment contract or if the deceased
fraudulently concealed his real state of health. The respondents likewise pray
that the petitioners be ordered to return the amount of P4,737,810.00.
THE COURT’S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The Rule on Death Benefits
POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 or the “Revised Standard Employment Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-going
Vessels”[19]
provides for the minimum requirements for Filipino seafarer’s overseas
employment. Section 20(A) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, which is based
on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, clearly states:
Section 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION
AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of
death of the seafarer during
the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries
the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to
each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children,
at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
x x x x
4. The other
liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or
illness during the term of employment
are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s
beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport
the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
c. The employer shall pay the
beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount
of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment. [Emphases supplied.]
Stated differently, for death of a
seafarer to be compensable under this provision, the
death must occur during
the term of his contract of employment; it is the
only condition for compensability. The
employer is liable upon proof that the seaman died during the effectivity of
his employment contract.[20]
Corollary, Section
18(B) (1) of the 1996 POEA-SEC further provides that the employment of the seafarer is terminated when he “signs-off and is
disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to Section 20 (B) [4] of [the]
Contract.”[21]
In the
present case, Eduardo was repatriated for medical reasons; he arrived in the
The
death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the
employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. However, if the seaman dies after the termination of his
contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to
the death benefits enumerated above.[22] [Emphasis supplied.]
The Collective
Bargaining Agreement
The petitioners likewise cannot seek refuge from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA)[23]
executed between the respondents and the Associated Marine Officers’ and
Seamen’s Union of the
The Company shall pay to the covered Seafarer’s
next-of-kin US$60,000.00 for death provided that such covered Seafarer dies while on board the ship, or while travelling to or from the Ship. x
x x If the Union has paid a part of the death compensation in accordance with x
x x SECTION 2 below, the Company shall pay the balance remaining x x x after deducting
the amounts advanced by the
As
earlier stated, Eduardo boarded
the ship on
Work-relatedness
Issues
The petitioners argue that work-relatedness of the illnesses that caused Eduardo’s death is not a material issue under the 1996 POEA-SEC, as it only requires that death occur during the term of the contract.[25] We agree with this position, but given that Eduardo died two years after the termination of his employment contract, we see no point in belaboring this issue.
Alternatively, the petitioners argue that Eduardo’s death should be compensable because his work triggered the illnesses or worsened them.[26]
Eduardo’s death which occurred two years after his repatriation is covered by a death certificate that listed pneumonia as the immediate cause; Pulmonary Tuberculosis, Tuberculosis Meningitis, Disseminated Candidiasis, Anemia Secondary to Chronic Disease, Wasting Syndrome, Scabies and Seborrheic Dermatitis as antecedent causes; and AIDS as underlying cause. Properly understood, these findings are significant as they point us to a definite conclusion on the issue of work-relatedness or work-aggravation.
Pneumonia, the immediate cause of Eduardo’s death, is listed under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (ECC Rules) as an occupational disease. But for a disability or death from this cause to be compensable, all the following conditions must be satisfied:
(1)
The [seafarer’s]
work must involve the risks described herein;
(2)
The disease was contracted as a result of the [seafarer’s]
exposure to the described risks;
(3)
The disease was
contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it; [and]
(4)
There was no
notorious negligence on the part of the [seafarer]. [Emphases supplied.]
Corollary, the ECC Rules specifically requires for compensability that pneumonia must have been contracted under the following conditions:
(a) There must be an honest and definite history
of wetting and chilling during the course of employment and also, of injury to
the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases,
fumes and other deleterious substances in the place of work.
(b) There must be a direct connection between
the offending agent or event and the worker’s illness.
(c) The signs of consolidation should appear
soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should
at least be 24 hours after the injury or exposure.
(d) The patient must manifest any of the
following symptoms within a few days of the accident: (1) severe chill and
fever; (2) headache and pain, agonizing in character, in the side of the body; (3)
short, dry, painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration; and (4) physical
signs of consolidation, with fine rales.
Significantly, these are the very same conditions required under the
POEA-SEC for pneumonia to be considered a compensable occupational disease.[27]
Our consideration of the attendant facts shows the petitioners failed to adduce evidence establishing these required conditions. On the contrary, the causes of Eduardo’s death, as shown by his death certificate, indicate that pneumonia was simply the final illness that immediately brought about Eduardo’s death. The long road to pneumonia started from an underlying cause – AIDS – that rendered him susceptible to the antecedent cause of tuberculosis, and to pneumonia as the immediate cause of death. This is discussed at length below in the discussion on AIDS. Suffice it to state for now that no evidence on record shows that Eduardo’s working conditions on board as a First Engineer caused the pneumonia that brought on his death two years after he had disembarked from his vessel.
Pulmonary Tuberculosis[28] was listed as one of the antecedent causes of Eduardo’s death, i.e., it was a condition that led to or precipitated the immediate cause of his death, as recorded in the death certificate.[29] Related to pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, this means that Eduardo’s pneumonia directly sprang from and was directly linked and traceable to pulmonary tuberculosis, that in turn traced itself to AIDS. Parenthetically, tuberculosis is listed under the ECC Rules and the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease. Eduardo, however, was not engaged in any of the occupations where tuberculosis is a listed illness. Moreover, no evidence on record shows how Eduardo’s working conditions brought on or aggravated the tuberculosis that became the antecedent cause of his death two years after repatriation.
An underlying cause is defined by the World Health Organization as the disease or injury that initiated the train of events leading directly to death, or the circumstances of the accident or violence that produced the fatal injury.[30] AIDS, described in Eduardo’s death certificate as the underlying cause of death, is a human disease characterized by a marked decrease of helper-induced T-lymphocyte cells, resulting in a general breakdown of the body’s immune system.[31] In simpler terms, it is a disease that attacks a person’s immune system, leaving it so damaged that certain diseases (opportunistic infections) or cancers develop. AIDS is the final and most serious stage of HIV infection,[32] and it takes time for HIV to progress to AIDS.[33]
According to the Merck Manual of Medical Information, the virus that causes AIDS can only be transmitted in the following ways: (a) sexual relation with an infected person; (b) injection or infusion of contaminated blood; and (c) transfer of the virus from an infected mother to a child before or during birth.[34] HIV is not transmitted by casual contact or even by close, nonsexual contact at work, school or home. No contact of HIV transmission has been traced to the coughing or sneezing of an infected person or to a mosquito bite.[35]
Opportunistic infections that develop with AIDS are infections by organisms that do not cause disease in people with healthy immune systems. Both the HIV infection and the opportunistic infections and cancers produce the symptoms of AIDS.[36]
Pneumonia caused by the fungus Pneumocystis
carinii is a common and recurring opportunistic infection in people with
AIDS, and is the first opportunistic infection to develop. Tuberculosis is more frequent and deadlier
in people who have HIV infection than in those who do not, and is difficult to
treat if the strain of the tuberculosis is resistant to antibiotics. Another mycobacterium, Mycobacterium avium
complex, is a common cause of fever, weight loss, and diarrhea in people
with the advanced disease.[37]
AIDS
is not listed as an occupational disease both under the POEA-SEC and the ECC
Rules. Thus, the claimant bears the
burden of reasonably proving the relationship between the work of the deceased
and AIDS, or that the risk of contracting AIDS was increased by the working
conditions of the deceased.
In the present case, we do not find Eduardo’s AIDS to have been work-related. Records have shown that it was a pre-existing illness that Eduardo did not disclose during his PEME with the respondents’ medical testing center.
The evidence reveals that Eduardo had undergone a
previous PEME on
Eduardo underwent another PEME, this time in relation to his application with the respondents in 1999 (or two years after PROBE’s test). The PEME was conducted by the respondents’ designated testing center – the Holy Angel Medical Clinic.[40] Fortunately or unfortunately for Eduardo, this testing center did not require an AIDS clearance test, and he did not disclose that he had been tested HIV positive when he filled up the PEME form. In fact, he answered “No” to the question, “Has applicant suffered from, or been told he had, any of the following conditions: x x x 21) Sexually Transmitted Disease.”[41] Thus, through a confluence of events – a testing center that for some reason did not test a prospective seaman for AIDS, and the seaman’s own failure to disclose his affliction – Eduardo was able to board the respondents’ vessel in March 1999 despite his HIV positive condition.
Records show that within a short two months after deployment with the respondents’ vessel, Eduardo was diagnosed to be suffering from, among others, advanced HIV. Dr. Patterson of the Touro Infirmary in New Orleans, where Eduardo was admitted in May 1999,[42] mentioned in the Physician’s Discharge Summary that Eduardo’s AIDS was “under treatment”; and that the “[p]atient had a very stormy course related to his advanced HIV disease, which was discovered here, but which the patient knew about 18 months prior to admission.”[43] Apparently, it was only at this point that the respondents came to fully know that Eduardo had AIDS.
The nature of HIV and AIDS negates the petitioners’ claim that the illnesses that caused Eduardo’s death were acquired during his employment on board the respondents’ vessel because he passed the company’s PEME. Three reasons, already touched upon in the discussions above, militate against this claim.
First, the respondents’ testing center did
not test for HIV, and Eduardo did not disclose his HIV positive condition. Under these circumstances, a PEME cannot lead
to the conclusion that Eduardo was HIV-free when he boarded the respondents’
vessel and acquired his HIV/AIDS only while on board the vessel. We
have had occasion to recognize in the past that a PEME, in the way it is
conducted in the maritime industry, is generally not exploratory in nature, nor
is it a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical
condition. The PEME, usually cursorily
made, determines whether one is “fit to work” at sea or “fit for sea service”;
it does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant.[44] In the present case, the worthlessness of the
respondents’ PEME for AIDS determination purposes is hardly disputable.
Second, from the causes of AIDS we pointed out
above, it appears – in the absence of any record of blood transfusion while on
board – that Eduardo acquired his AIDS
through sexual relations with an infected person and not because of his brief
two-month stay on board or of his working conditions during that period. As discussed above, HIV/AIDS, while
communicable, can be transmitted only under specific conditions. By a process
of elimination, Eduardo could have acquired his AIDS only through sexual
transmission – a claim made by the respondents, albeit through an unsigned report
by a foreign nurse who was not available for examination during the arbitration
and whose statement cannot therefore be appreciated as evidence.[45]
Third, HIV/AIDS is a disease of the immune system that does not progress to the point of attracting opportunistic infections until the immune system has substantially been weakened by the progress of the disease. It does not reach this advanced stage in two months’ time as established medical literature shows. Eduardo did not succumb to the disease and the opportunistic infections it carried until after two years from the respondents’ discovery of the disease, and four years after he was tested positive by PROBE.
Based on
these considerations, we cannot escape the conclusion that the petition is
without merit and that the CA was correct when it reversed and set aside the
NLRC award of death benefits to the petitioners as heirs of Eduardo. This is a conclusion that cannot be helped nor
swayed by the intent of our laws and jurisprudence to be read liberally in
their application to our overseas Filipino workers. Liberal construction is not a license to
disregard the evidence on record or to misapply our laws.[46]
That the petitioners have now secured the execution of the NLRC decision
involving a very sizeable sum is unfortunate, but is a situation that is not
irremediable since the parties themselves agreed that this would be a live
issue subject to the final outcome of the case.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98719. In
light of this judgment, the petitioners are hereby ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of Four Million Seven Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ten
Pesos (P4,737,810.00) to the respondents. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, and concurred in by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag; rollo, pp. 21-27.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo, p. 97.
[11] Rollo, p. 75.
[12] Supra note 6.
[13] Supra note 4.
[14] Supra note 5.
[15]
[16]
[17] Supra note 3.
[18]
[19] During the signing of the parties’ contract of employment, and at the time of Eduardo’s repatriation, the 2000 POEA-SEC (Department Order No. 4, s. of 2000) was not yet effective.
[20]
See Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc.
v. Delgado, G.R. No. 168210,
[21] Section 20(B) [4]. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
[22]
G.R. No. 166580,
[23] Took effect on
[24] Rollo, p. 85.
[25]
[26]
[27] Section 32-A. Occupational Diseases:
x x x x
13. Pneumonia. All of the following conditions must be met:
a. There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment and also, of injury to the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious substances in the place of work.
b. There must be direct connection between the offending agent or event and the seafarer’s illness.
c. The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should at least be 24 hours after the injury or exposure.
d. The patient must manifest any of the following symptoms within a few days of the accident: (1) severe chill and fever; (2) headache and pain, agonizing in character, in the side of the body; (3) short, dry, painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration, and (4) physical signs of consolidation, with fine rales.
[28] Among the illnesses listed in the death certificate as antecedent causes of Eduardo’s death, only pulmonary tuberculosis was listed under the ECC Rules and POEA SEC as occupational.
[29] http://www.jrank.org/health/pages/33876/antecedent-causes-death.htm
>antecedent causes of death, last visited on
[30] Under
international rules for selecting an underlying cause from the reported
conditions, every death is attributed to one underlying cause based on the information
reported on the death certificate. See: Wisconsin Department of Health Services
(http://dhs.wisconsin.gov/wish/main/Mortality/define.htm),
last visited on
[31] Webster’s Family Encyclopedia, Volume 1, p. 16.
[32] HIV is an infection by one of two viruses that progressively destroys white blood cells called lymphocytes, causing Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other diseases that result from the impaired immunity.
[33] (http://www.ashastd.org/learn_hiv_aids.cfm), last visited on May 24, 2010; see also The Merck Manual of Medical Information, Pocket Book, Simon and Schuster, Inc. (1997 ed.), p. 927.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] CA rollo, p. 91.
[39]
[40]
[41] Ibid.
[42]
[43] Ibid.
[44] See NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 161104,
[45] CA rollo, pp. 100-104.
[46]
See Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v.
Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas, G.R. No. 168560,