EN BANC
|
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and
BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as represented by JOVITO R. SALONGA,
Petitioners, - versus - LEONCIO
M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY; GREGORY S. ONG,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN,
METRO MANILA,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 180543 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 27, 2010
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On
July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation
of the Court’s Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1]
filed a petition[2] under
Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the “amendment/correction/supplementation or
annotation” of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.
Via
the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four
Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.
As
Ong’s petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28, 2007,[3]
petitioners-therein oppositors[4]
filed on
Meanwhile,
by Order of
In
the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public
respondent “erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not
voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring
herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent
Gregory S. Ong.”[10]
The
Court, by Resolution of
The Court shall first resolve the
preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and the OSG claim that
petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the
hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the
defective verification renders the petition as unsigned pleading, and the lack
of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules.
The question on the propriety of the
remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v. Tuazon,[11] where the Court discussed the various
remedies available to a party declared in default, including a petition for
certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if the trial court
improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration. A party declared in default
may thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order
of default and the judgment of default.[12]
On the choice of remedy, the
Court finds petitioners’ recourse procedurally allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the
choice of court forum.
The hierarchy of courts serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals and petitions for
extraordinary writs.[13] The rule on hierarchy of courts is not
absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly with it. A
direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction may be allowed where
there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.[14]
The present petition is bereft of even a
single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance to warrant an
exception to the rule. In fact, this
valid objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all
procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply.
If petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the
direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.
Further, the petition carries a
defective verification since it was verified without stating the basis
thereof. In the Verification/ Certification of
the Petition, the affiant states that he “has read the same and all the facts
contained therein are true and correct.”[15]
The Rules clearly state that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading
required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading.[16] Verification
is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the
name of mere expedience or sheer caprice.
For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of
an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been
made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.[17]
Moreover, this Court observes that the
affiant failed to present competent evidence of his identity before the notary
public, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.[18] The Court cannot assume that affiant, being a
public figure, is
personally known to the notary public, for the jurat does not contain a statement
to that effect.
Records also show that petitioners
failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the petition. The Rules require that the petition should be
filed with proof of service on all adverse parties, and that the failure to
comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.[19]
On procedural grounds alone then, the
petition is susceptible to dismissal.
The Court deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in
the interest of justice.
In
their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel,
and public respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which,
along with the school’s Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported
Ong’s petition through newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the
proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing the order of default without
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for
inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly
unwarranted.
The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge
may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(underscoring supplied)
In keeping with the tenet that judges
should not only act with fairness, independence, impartiality and honesty but
should also be perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities, the Court
added the rule on voluntary
inhibition in 1964. In outlining the
genesis of the provision, the Court narrated:
In Umale v. Villaluz, the
Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision,
which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964.
Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did
not depend upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in
a given case. If those concerned were not disqualified, it was their
official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to
account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit
themselves on grounds of prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they
themselves took great interest and an active part in the filing of the
case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v. Javelona
paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification–
those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.[20]
While the second paragraph does not
expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the
sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid
reasons. The import of the rule on the
voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is
left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought
before him. It makes clear to the
occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or
previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might
be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus
calling for inhibition. That is to betray
a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections
are many and varied.[21]
In the
final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the
inhibition of judges. Each case should
be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances.
The
issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge.
It is a subjective test, the result of which the
reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of
arbitrariness and whimsicality. The
discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are
in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones
who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[22]
Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its reality, in order to provide “good, sound or ethical grounds” or “just and valid reasons” for inhibition.[23] Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.[24] In Gochan v. Gochan,[25] the Court elucidated further:
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably– both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.[26] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The
Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal
Canning, Inc.[27]
where the judge’s
right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to decide the case without fear of
repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of
a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of
forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more
sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair
administration of justice.[28]
A judge must decide based on a
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in a case
brought before him.[29] In the present case, petitioners cite public respondent’s
affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their
motion for the voluntary inhibition of public respondent.
Before the trial court, petitioners
alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong and his counsel,
they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell
partiality.
Inhibition is not allowed at every
instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for
one of the parties, however.[30] In one case,[31]
the Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground
for inhibition.
Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come before him or her for action.
A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.[32] (underscoring supplied)
The added fact that the law school’s
alumni association published statements in support of Ong’s application cannot
lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to
indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and participated in the
adoption and publication of the alumni association’s stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the
alumni association’s statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the
manifesto as a matter of creed.
Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either
from the fact that public respondent resolved the motion for voluntary
inhibition one day after it was filed.
Since the personal process of “careful self-examination”[33]
is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the
factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because
from there on the resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase.
That public respondent, Ong and his
counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all graduates of San Beda College of
Law was clearly and early on established.
Hence, this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears
repeating, no longer required a hearing or called for the submission of a
comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not prejudice
petitioners.
In one case,[34] it was held that the Rules of Court
does not direct the court to order the filing of comments or oppositions to the
motion before the motion is resolved.
The parties may orally argue and ventilate their positions and,
thereafter, the court may rule on the motion.
The
Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration
and deferment) which basically reiterated their previous arguments, they no longer
set the motion for hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments,
thereby recognizing the non-litigious nature of their allegations.
Even assuming that Ong interposed no
objection to the motion, it was still up to public respondent to discern, for a
qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in a case by sheer agreement of
the parties.
Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear
the case and declared them in default without first resolving their pending
motion. Records show that petitioners
filed on
While there is no specific rule providing for a definite
period of time within which to resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order
denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly on it within the
mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial.[37]
The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007
as confirmed by the entry of the nunc pro
tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the denial of the Omnibus
Motion.
During
the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the arguments and
counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong] and the Office of the Solicitor
General, and finding no cogent reasons to reconsider its earlier position,
denied in open court the motion seeking a reconsideration of the Order dated
August 7, 2007 which denied movants’ “Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of
Presiding Judge”. Corollarily, for lack
of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the instant case was similarly
denied. (see TSN,
The
cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial
court on the given date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the arguments, the trial court
ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:
COURT: That’s right, so there’s no basis to overturn our previous Order denying the motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong Now, there’s another matter being raised here, counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the proceedings What the Supreme Court wanted is to have an Order summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought at their level. Supreme Court was expecting that they will do so again in our level, but in… since there’s seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary arguments, so, it will, when it reaches the Supreme Court, it will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to litigate. They’re supposed to litigate because if they believe they’re… for the denial of the petition, unless the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should do so without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very… an active group and Bantay Katarungan, they should be a party to expeditious resolution of cases, not to a delay. How many are we here from government. We are here to litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings is also denied. The settings for August were all placed in the Order which was published in the newspaper of general circulation. We have previously agreed that we will proceed to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or would you agree to the suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial?[39] (underscoring supplied)
The issuance of a nunc pro tunc
order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a court at a former
time had not been entered of record as rendered.[40] The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies
“now for then,” or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal
force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done.[41] The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc is to make a present record of an order that the
court made in a previous term, but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered
has previously been made, but, by inadvertence, has not been entered.[42]
In the case at bar, the trial court
actually took judicial action which was, however, by mistake or inadvertence,
not placed in proper form on record. In
any event, petitioners neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript
used as basis for such confirmatory order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice
from the fact of its resolution during their non-appearance in the scheduled
hearing.
The
disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show
arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.[43] For one, the grant of such is not a matter of
right for it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[44] Parties have absolutely no right to assume
that their motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare
for the hearing, lest they pass the blame to no one but themselves.
Further,
in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason
for the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.[45] In
this case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. The
Omnibus Motion was, however, “submitted ex
parte and without further arguments from Oppositors,”[46] drawing
public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying it.
As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with
nothing to assess since they did not file any Opposition to Ong’s Petition
despite the grant to them of extension of time for the purpose and their
various submissions to the trial court all related to peripheral issues.
No trace of bias can be found at that
juncture when the court proceeded to declare petitioners in default after
resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine
that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the
merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned
from participating in the case. As
long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the
evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion –
even if later found to be erroneous – will not prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge.
While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order
itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose.[47]
Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence between counsel and the judge is not a proper ground for
disqualification. Opinions framed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based
on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias
or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a
litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualification.[48]
As for the allegation of undue haste, the
Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the trial court even granted
petitioners additional period within which to file an Opposition and in view of
the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders
expediting proceedings.[49]
In the absence then of clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot
just be overturned.[50] In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such
acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. Unjustified
assumptions and mere misgivings
that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the
performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a
judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its
facts.
In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit himself from hearing the
case.
On the second issue, petitioners assail
the Orders of
Rules of
procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must
be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.[51] Section
5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that “[t]he civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition,
or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.” Records show that the notice
was last published on
The trial court pointed out that
petitioners filed their entry of appearance[53]
without any attached Opposition to Ong’s petition and that, despite the grant
to them of additional five days from
Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007 Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a
prejudicial issue that should have been resolved first before the trial court
proceeded with the case. Notably, in
both the Motion to Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission,
petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly waived other defenses or
grounds for the lifting of the default order.
For
a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of
the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a
proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.[55]
As the trial court observed, the motion
to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to comply with paragraph
(b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,[56] it noting, inter alia, that the motion
was “not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed
any opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of
merit.”[57]
Indeed, a trial court has no authority
to consider a motion to lift the order of default where such motion was not
made under oath.[58] Moreover, a motion to lift an order of
default must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect which caused the failure to answer.[59]
In this case, petitioners’ unverified
motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their failure to file an
appropriate responsive pleading.
Petitioners’ persistent stance on the pendency of their Omnibus Motion
deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of the nunc pro tunc order confirming the
Moreover, the filing of a motion for
inhibition could not
toll the running of the reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, for
where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of
Court expressly provides for such a suspension.[60] Despite
the grant of an extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to
Ong’s Petition, even one ex abundante ad
cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the
alleged pending incident.
Further, petitioners failed to allege,
much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any argument to protect whatever
interest they may have under the entry which they resist to be corrected,
either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified
motion itself.[61] Petitioners would later admit that they are
“not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense” as they are acting as
“judicial monitors and observers.”[62]
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[63] discusses the meaning of meritorious
defense:
Moreover,
when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that
she has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the
order of default set aside. The term
meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of proving such a
defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually do not require such a
strong showing. The test employed
appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment,
that is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for submission
to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not
clear that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a
meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove
to be a useless exercise. Thus, her
motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she intends to
present if the motion is granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable
belief that the result of the case would probably be otherwise if a new trial
is granted.[64] (emphasis
in the original)
Conjunctively, the glaring
deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no intention to delay the
case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of day in
court. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda[65]
did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic requirements of a
motion to lift an order of default.
Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in
default and deny their motion to lift the order of default.
Respecting the trial court’s Decision of
The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[68]
stated that substantial corrections
to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are
effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Jurisprudence has settled that
such proceedings are adversarial in nature or “[o]ne having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it.”[69] In this case, impleaded as defendants
were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having
or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while petitioners’ “interest”
was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading.
Petitioners raise no additional ground
to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent insofar as the issuance of the
WHEREFORE,
in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] G.R.
No. 177721,
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S.
Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging
the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all
necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to
show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his
birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[2] Rollo, pp. 89-132. Entitled “Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil
Registrar of
[3] Order
of
[4] Notice
of Appearance of
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 469 Phil. 1020 (2004).
[12]
[13] LPBS Commercial, Inc. v. Amila,
G.R. No. 147443,
[14] Cf. Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr., G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 396, 419; Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 115, 123.
[15] Rollo, p. 16.
[16] Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 4.
[17]
[18] A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004), Rule II, Sec. 6 in relation to Section 12.
[19] Rules of Court, Rule 56, Sec. 2 in relation to Rule 46, Sec. 3.
[20] Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 355, 361.
[21] Gutang v. CA, 354 Phil. 77, 85 (1998).
[22]
[23] Vide Parayno v.
Meneses, G.R. No. 112684,
[24] People v. Governor Kho, 409 Phil. 326, 336 (2001).
[25] 446 Phil. 433 (2003).
[26]
[27] G.R. No. 160966,
[28]
[29] Vide Chin v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 440, 451 (2003).
[30] Vide
Santos et al. v. BLTB Co., Inc., etc. et al., 145 Phil. 422, 438 (1970);
Cf. Masado and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, A.M. No.
87-9-3918-RTC,
[31] Bellosillo v. Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the
[32]
[33] Pimentel v. Hon. Salanga, 128 Phil. 176, 183 (1967).
[34] Calo v. Tan, G.R. No. 151266,
[35] Rollo, pp. 5, 119-122.
[36]
[37] Vide Custodio v. Judge Quitain, 450 Phil. 70, 76-77 (2003).
[38] Rollo, p. 26.
[39] Transcript of Stenographic Notes,
[40] Cardoza v. Singson, G.R. No.
59284,
[41] Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862, 880 (1923); vide Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362, 373.
[42] Maramba v. Lozano, et al., 126 Phil. 833, 837-838 (1967); vide Tirol, Jr. v. Justice del Rosario, 376 Phil. 115, 119-120 (1999), where the Sandiganbayan issued a written order nunc pro tunc 18 days after the ruling in open court.
[43] Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 152202,
[44] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219,
[45] Sevilla
v. Quintin, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1603,
[46] Rollo, p. 121.
[47] Gochan v. Gochan, supra at 447-448; Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206, 216 (1997).
[48] People v. Governor Kho, supra at 336.
[49] Rules of Court, Rule 108, Sec. 6.
[50] Sps. Hizon v. Sps. Dela Fuente, 469 Phil. 1076, 1083 (2004).
[51] Philippine
National Bank v. Deang Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 177931,
[52] Vide rollo, p. 144.
[53]
[54]
[55] Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 244 Phil. 49 (1988), which was decided under the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 3 of Rule 18 of which was substantially retained as Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[56] A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside in such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (Underscoring supplied)
[57] Rollo, p. 34.
[58] SSS v. Hon. Chaves, 483 Phil. 292, 301 (2004).
[59] Villareal v. CA, 356 Phil. 826, 844 (1998).
[60] Vide Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 784 (1996).
[61] Vide Capuz v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112795,
[62] Rollo, p. 131.
[63] G.R. No. 155488,
[64]
[65] G.R.
No. 170427,
[66] Rollo, p. 288.
[67]
[68] Supra note 1 at 366 citing Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39 (2004), Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001), Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408 (1986).
[69] Tan Co v. The Civil Registrar of