FIRST DIVISION
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MA. SOCORRO MANDAPAT, petitioner, - versus - ADD FORCE PERSONNEL SERVICES, INC.
and COURT OF
APPEALS,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 180285 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July 6, 2010 |
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PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the 27 July 2007 Decision[1]
and the 17 October 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98868.
The factual premise of the case
follows –
On 15 September 2003, petitioner Ma.
Socorro Mandapat was hired as Sales and Marketing Manager for respondent Add
Force Personnel Services, Inc. As
detailed in her appointment letter, her duties include negotiation and
consummation of contracts with clients who wanted to avail of respondent’s
services. She reported directly to the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Colwyn Ron C. Longstaff (Longstaff).[2]
Respondent claims that during her five-month
stint as sales manager, petitioner failed to close a single deal or contract
with any client. In addition, petitioner
issued several proposals to clients which were either grossly disadvantageous
to respondent or disregarded the client’s budget ceiling. Petitioner also sent out several
communications to clients containing erroneous data and computations; submitted
fictitious daily activity reports and reimbursement slips; and consistently
failed to submit her reports, such as the daily activity report, expense
report, weekly sales call plan and internet-based calendar system on time.[3]
These infractions were contained in a
show-cause notice sent to petitioner on 23 February 2004, directing her to
explain why she should not be disciplined for gross and habitual neglect of
duties and willful breach of trust.
Petitioner was also preventively suspended and was asked to turn over
pending tasks and to leave the office premises.
We quote the pertinent portion of the memorandum:
x x x x
Please remember that as Sales Manager and head of the Sales Department, the company demands from you a disciplined approach on the implementation of the sales plans of the company as well as ability to lead your people by example. However, from Management’s evaluation of your performance these last five (5) months, you have not only failed to set a good example to your subordinates but you have, in fact, been the first one to violate company rules and procedures.
On account of the sensitivity of the position you currently hold, please be informed that Management has decided to put you on PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION during the course of the investigation of this matter. Accordingly, you are requested to immediately turnover to Ms. Abigail E. Villavert all of your pending tasks and, thereafter, leave the office premises.
For your information and appropriate action.
From:
MARIA CRISTINA S. SAMSON
Corporate Counsel
Approved by:
JACQUES A. DUPASQUIER
Chairman
Accompanied by her letter in response
to the show-cause memorandum, petitioner tendered her resignation dated 25
February 2004 supposedly in protest of the preventive suspension meted on her.[4]
On
15 March 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with the
labor arbiter.
In
her position paper, petitioner alleged that she was constructively dismissed,
as indicated by the following actions of respondent – first, she was illegally
placed on preventive suspension; second, her access to the internet was cut
off; and third, she was pressured by respondent into resigning in exchange for
payment of separation pay.[5]
Petitioner
also questioned as illegal her preventive suspension because she did not pose
any danger to the lives of respondent’s officers, as well as its properties.[6]
Petitioner
denied that she was negligent and proffered that she faithfully and
painstakingly performed her duties as sales manager. She faulted Longstaff for his indecisiveness
and the lack of support personnel and staff for the sales department.[7]
Respondent insisted that petitioner
was not dismissed, that instead, she tendered her resignation. Hence, the claim
for reinstatement had no basis. Respondent countered that petitioner was
properly placed on preventive suspension because of the risk she posed on the
property and business of respondent.[8]
On
30 September 2005, the labor arbiter rendered judgment[9]
finding petitioner to have been illegally and constructively dismissed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered finding that complainant was illegally and constructively dismissed on 2/23/04 thus, ORDERING:
1) Respondent company ADD Force Personnel Services, Inc. to pay her full backwages from date illegally dismissed on 6/23/04 until actual payment and/or finality of this decision, which as of date amounts to basic P1,311,360.00 (P68,300.00 x 19.2 months), 13th month pay of P109,280.00, and the combined amounts of her leaves (VL & SL) of P107,913.68 (30 days/year x P2,276.66/day x 1.58 years);
2) Respondent company ADD Force Personnel Services, Inc., in lieu of complainant’s reinstatement, to pay her separation pay of one (1) month per year of service/putative service reckoned from 09/15/03 until finality of this decision or actual payment which as of date, amounts to P136,600.00 (P68,300.00 x 2 years);
3) Respondents ADD Force Personnel Services, Inc., JACQUES A. DUPASQUIER (Chairman), COLWYN RON C. LONGSTAFF (CEO), ATTY. CRISTINA SAMSON (Corporate Counsel), to pay her in solido moral damages of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00;
4) Respondent ADD Force Personnel Services, Inc. to pay her proportionate 13th month pay (Jan. to 02/23/04), last month’s salary (February, 01-23, 2003) and reimbursements P2,000.00;
5) Respondent ADD Force Personnel Services, Inc. to pay her 10% of the total award as attorney’s fees.[10]
The
labor arbiter found that petitioner was illegally suspended without basis. The charges of gross and habitual neglect of
duties, as well as the loss of trust and confidence were not substantiated. Thus, the labor arbiter concluded that
petitioner was constructively dismissed by respondent.[11]
The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)[12]
affirmed with modification the findings of the labor arbiter. The NLRC deleted the award of moral and
exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent but it was denied
for lack of merit.
On
21 June 2007, respondent filed a manifestation and motion stating that the NLRC
had issued a writ of execution for the amount of money claims. Unable to satisfy these claims, the sheriff
garnished the bank accounts of respondent.
On
27 July 2007, the Court of Appeals, to which the case was elevated, enjoined
the execution of the NLRC decision and subsequently reversed its decision, as
well as that of the labor arbiter’s.
The
dispositive portion provides:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 27 November 2006 affirming the Labor Arbiter’s decision; its Resolution, dated 28 February 2007, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 30 September 2005, are SET ASIDE. Ma. Socorro Mandapat’s Complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED.[13]
The
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was not constructively dismissed but
that the latter chose to resign from her job.
Petitioner’s bare allegation that she was coerced into resigning was not
given credence by the appellate court.
With respect to the allegation of illegal suspension, the Court of
Appeals upheld the exercise by respondent of its management prerogative in
suspending petitioner pending investigation for a perceived violation of
company rules.
Furthermore,
the appellate court declared that the issue of preventive suspension had been
rendered moot by petitioner’s resignation.[14]
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution issued on 17
October 2007.[15]
The
principal issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether petitioner
was constructively dismissed.
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment.[16]
Upon perusal of the records of this
case, we find no evidence to support discrimination which led to constructive
dismissal.
Petitioner reiterates that she was
constructively dismissed. She harps on
the alleged pattern of harassment committed by respondent as tantamount to
constructive dismissal, such as, illegally placing her under preventive
suspension, the disconnection of her internet account, and the pressure exerted
by respondent to force her to resign.[17]
Petitioner claims that the preventive
suspension meted upon her is illegal for being indefinite, as the duration of
her suspension was not stated in the company’s memorandum.
On the other hand, respondent
employer argues that petitioner’s preventive suspension for one day can hardly be
considered indefinite, given the fact that petitioner immediately resigned one
day after the suspension.
We find that there was no act of
discrimination committed against petitioner that would render her employment
unbearable.
Preventive suspension may be legally
imposed against an employee whose alleged violation is the subject of an
investigation. The purpose of his
suspension is to prevent him from causing harm or injury to the company as well
as to his fellow employees.
The pertinent
rules dealing with preventive suspension are found in Section 8 and Section 9
of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, which read as follows:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides, after completion of the hearing, to dismiss the worker.
When preventive suspension exceeds
the maximum period allowed without reinstating the employee either by actual or
payroll reinstatement[18] or when preventive suspension is for
indefinite period,[19]
only then will constructive dismissal set in.
While no period was mentioned in the
show-cause memorandum, it was wrong for petitioner to infer that her suspension
was for an indefinite period. It must be
pointed out that the inclusion of the phrase “during the course of
investigation” would lead to a reasonable and logical presumption that said
suspension in fact has a duration which could very well be not more than 30
days as mandated by law. And, as the
Court of Appeals correctly observed, the suspension has been rendered moot by
petitioner’s resignation tendered a day after the suspension was made
effective.
Petitioner contests the grounds for
her suspension as she denies posing a danger on the lives of the officers or
employees of respondent or of their properties.
Petitioner adds that she was not in a position to bind respondent to any
contract, therefore, she could not and would not be able to sabotage the
operations of respondent.[20] Upon the other hand, respondent asserts that
preventive suspension was necessary in order to protect the assets and
operations of the company pending investigation of the alleged infractions
committed by the employee concerned.[21]
Respondent
is correct. Indeed, as sales manager,
petitioner had the power and authority to enter into contracts that would bind
respondent, regardless of whether these contracts would prove to be beneficial
or prejudicial to the interest of respondent.
Respondent has every right to protect its assets and operations pending
investigation of petitioner.
Neither could we consider the acts of
disconnection of computer and internet access privileges as harassment. Respondent clearly explained that the
cessation of her internet and network privileges were but a consequence of the
investigation against her and not for the purpose of harassment.[22] The Court of Appeals gave merit to
respondent’s explanation and held, thus:
x x x while her suspension, cessation of internet privileges, and exclusion from local network access were but a consequence of the investigation against her, and were intended to prevent her from having further access to the company’s network-based documents and forms.[23]
The acts respondent complains about are
just measures enforced by respondent to protect itself while the investigation
was ongoing.
Petitioner claims that Longstaff
forced her to resign by baiting her with the promise of separation pay;[24]
but respondent maintains that there was nothing illegal in giving petitioner
the option to either resign or be separated for a just cause.[25]
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that there was no coercion employed on petitioner. The appellate court made the following
observation:
Unfortunately, however, before the investigation could proceed to the second step of the termination process into a hearing or conference, Mandapat chose to resign from her job. Mandapat’s bare allegation that she was coerced into resigning can hardly be given credence in the absence of clear evidence proving the same. No doubt, Mandapat read the writing on the wall, knew that she would be fired for her transgressions, and beat the company to it by resigning. Indeed, by the disrespectful tenor of her memorandum, Mandapat practically indicated that she was no longer interested in continuing cordial relations, much less gainful employment with Add Force.[26]
Mere allegations of threat or force
do not constitute evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. In order
for intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must concur: (1) that
the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be
unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer,
leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as
the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact
that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to
inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.[27]
None of these requisites was proven by
petitioner. No demand was made on
petitioner to resign. At most, she was
merely given the option to either resign or face disciplinary investigation,
which respondent had every right to conduct in light of the numerous
infractions committed by petitioner.
There is nothing irregular in providing an option to petitioner. Ultimately, the final decision on whether to
resign or face disciplinary action rests on petitioner alone.
All told, the instances of harassment
alleged by petitioner appear to be more apparent than real. We find no reason to disturb the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that petitioner resigned and was not constructively
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The 27 July 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98868 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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JOSE
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WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Penned by Labor Arbiter Renaldo O.
Hernandez.
[10]
[11]
[12] Penned by Commissioner Raul T. Aquino with Commissioners Victoriano R.
Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan (on leave) concurring.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Formantes v. Duncan Pharmaceuticals, G.R. No. 170661, 4 December 2009 citing Endico v. Quantum Foods Distribution Center, G.R. No. 161615, 30 January 2009, 577 SCRA 299, 310; Montederamos v. Tri-Union International Corp., G.R. No. 176700, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 370, 376; Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174141, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 160, 174-175 citing Hyatt Taxi Services v. Catinoy, 412 Phil. 295, 306 (2001).
[17] Rollo, p. 36.
[19] Pido v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 169812, 23 February 2007, 516 SCRA
609, 617-618.
[20] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Vicente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175988, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 240, 249 citing St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 354 Phil. 491, 509-510 (1998).