Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
SM SYSTEMS CORPORATION (formerly
Springsun Management Systems Corporation), Petitioner, - versus - OSCAR CAMERINO, EFREN
CAMERINO, CORNELIO MANTILE, DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, and HEIRS OF NOLASCO Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 178591
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 26,
2010 |
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RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1]
dated October 23, 2006, and its Resolution[2]
dated June 29, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 92994.
The facts of the case, as summarized
in Springsun Management Systems
Corporation v. Camerino,[3]
and as found by the CA, are as follows:
Victoria Homes, Inc. (
Since 1967, respondents Oscar
Camerino, Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Domingo Enriquez, and Nolasco del
Rosario (herein represented by his heirs) were farmers-tenants of
On P11,545,000.00. When Springsun failed to pay its loans, the
mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially.
At the public auction sale, the lots were sold to Banco Filipino, being
the highest bidder, but they were eventually redeemed by Springsun.
On March 7, 1995, respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256, P9,790,612.00. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court
affirmed the RTC decision with a modification on the award of attorney’s fees.[7]
Aggrieved, Springsun elevated the
matter to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
161029. On January 19, 2005, we affirmed
the CA Decision.[8] With the
denial of Springsun’s motion for reconsideration, the same became final and
executory; accordingly, an entry of judgment was made.[9] Respondents thus moved for the execution of
the Decision.[10]
Petitioner[11]
instituted an action for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90931.[12]
Petitioner sought the annulment of the RTC decision allowing respondents to
redeem the subject property. Petitioner argued that it was deprived of the
opportunity to present its case on the ground of fraud, manipulations and
machinations of respondents. It further
claimed that the Department of Agrarian Reform, not the RTC, had jurisdiction
over the redemption case. The CA,
however, dismissed the petition on
Meanwhile, on December 18, 2003,
respondents executed an Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favor of Mariano Nocom
(Nocom), authorizing him, among other things, to comply with our January 19,
2005 Decision by paying the redemption price to Springsun and/or to the court.[17]
Respondents, however, challenged the power of attorney in an action for
revocation with the RTC. In a summary
judgment, the RTC annulled the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being contrary
to law and public policy. The RTC explained that the power of attorney was a
disguised conveyance of the statutory right of redemption that is prohibited
under Republic Act No. 3844. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision. However, this
Court, in G.R. No. 182984, set aside the CA Decision and concluded that the RTC
erred in rendering the summary judgment.
The Court thus remanded the case to the RTC for proper proceedings and
proper disposition, according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits
and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary
judgment.
On August 4, 2005, as petitioner
refused to accept the redemption amount of P9,790,612.00, plus P147,059.18
as commission, respondents deposited the said amounts, duly evidenced by
official receipts, with the RTC. The RTC further granted respondents’ motion
for execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541, and 123872 in the
name of petitioner were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897 were
issued in the names of respondents. It
also ordered that the “Irrevocable Power of Attorney,” executed on
On August 20, 2005, petitioner and
respondents (except Oscar Camerino) executed a document, denominated as Kasunduan,[19]
wherein the latter agreed to receive P300,000.00 each from the former,
as compromise settlement. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Hold Execution in
Abeyance on the Ground of Supervening Event.[20]
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
defendant’s Motion to Hold in Abeyance Execution on Ground of Supervening Event
is denied and the Kasunduan separately entered into by Efren Camerino, Cornelio
Mantile, Domingo Enriquez[,] and the Heirs of Nolasco del Rosario are hereby
disapproved.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order and the denial of its
motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On May 8,
2006, counsel for respondents moved that they be excused from filing the
required comment, considering that only Oscar Camerino was impleaded as private
respondent in the amended petition; and also because respondents already
transferred pendente lite their
contingent rights over the case in favor of Nocom.[22] Nocom, in turn, filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Admit Attached Comment to the Petition.[23]
On
October 23, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, finding
petitioner guilty of forum shopping. The CA concluded that the present case was
substantially similar to G.R. No. 171754. It further held that the compromise
agreement could not novate the Court’s earlier Decision in G.R. No. 161029
because only four out of five parties executed the agreement.
Undaunted, petitioner comes before us in this petition for
review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
1. Whether or not the Kasunduan effectively novated the judgment obligation.
2. Whether or not the Court should rule on the Motion to Expunge the Comment of Mariano Nocom filed by the Petitioner.
3. Whether or not Mariano Nocom should be allowed to participate in the instant case on the basis of the null and void Irrevocable Power of Attorney.
4. Whether or not the (sic) there is grave abuse of discretion when Judge Lerma denied the Motion to inhibit filed by Petitioner despite Judge Lerma’s clear showing of partiality for the other party.
5. Whether or not there is forum-shopping.[24]
Contrary to the conclusion
of the CA, we find petitioner not guilty of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act
of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and on the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another.[25]
The rationale against
forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration
of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping
seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the
pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration
of justice, to prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and to save
the precious time of the courts. It also
aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[26]
To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important question to
ask is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will result
to res judicata in another.[27]
It is true that after the
finality of this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 161029 dated January 19, 2005, petitioner instituted
and filed various petitions and motions which essentially prevented the
execution of the aforesaid Decision. Yet, we do not agree with the CA that the
instant case is dismissible because it earlier filed an action for annulment of
judgment that involved substantially the same set of facts, issues, and reliefs
sought. While petitioner’s goal in filing the instant case is the same as that
in G.R. No. 171754 (which stemmed from the petition for annulment of judgment),
that is to prevent the execution of the January 19, 2005 Decision, still, there
is no forum shopping.
In the action for
annulment of judgment, petitioner sought the nullification of the January 19,
2005 Decision on the ground that it was deprived of its opportunity to present
its case and that the RTC had no jurisdiction to decide the case. While in the instant case, petitioner prays
that the execution of the January 19, 2005 Decision be held in abeyance in view
of the compromise agreement entered into by petitioner and four
respondents. In short, the issue threshed
out in the annulment case was the validity of the 2005 Decision, while in this
case, the issue is focused on the effect of the compromise agreement entered
into after the finality of the Decision sought to be executed. Clearly,
therefore, there is no identity of issues in the two cases.
In view of the foregoing,
a review of the assailed Decision is in order, particularly on the effect of the
compromise agreement entered into after final judgment has been rendered.
Once a case is terminated
by final judgment, the rights of the parties are settled; hence, a compromise
agreement is no longer necessary.[28]
Though it may not be prudent to do so, we
have seen in a number of cases that parties still considered and had, in fact,
executed such agreement. To be sure, the parties may execute a compromise
agreement even after the finality of the decision.[29]
A reciprocal concession inherent in a
compromise agreement assures benefits for the contracting parties. For the defeated litigant, obvious is the
advantage of a compromise after final judgment as the liability decreed by the
judgment may be reduced. As to the
prevailing party, it assures receipt of payment because litigants are sometimes
deprived of their winnings because of unscrupulous mechanisms meant to delay or
evade the execution of a final judgment.[30]
As much as we would like
to settle the issues raised in this petition, we cannot make a definitive
conclusion on the validity of the compromise agreement because of some facts that
complicate the present case.
We must recall that, in
our January 19, 2005 Decision, we upheld respondents’ right to redeem the
subject lots for P9,790,612.00. On December 18, 2003,
respondents executed an Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favor of Nocom,
authorizing him to redeem the subject lots.
Pursuant to the aforesaid authority, Nocom deposited with the court the
redemption money plus commission on August 4, 2005. Consequently, the certificates of title in
the name of petitioner were cancelled, and new ones were issued in the name of
respondents. It was only on August 20,
2005 that petitioner and respondents executed the Kasunduan or the compromise agreement. Although we could have easily declared that
the agreement was invalid as there was nothing more to
compromise at that time with the redemption of the
property by Nocom, yet, as narrated earlier, respondents assailed in a separate
case the validity of the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney
allegedly executed by them in favor
of Nocom. The case had reached this Court in G.R. No. 182984, but we remanded
it to the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, for further proceedings and in
accordance with the rudiments of a regular trial, with the instruction not to
dispose of the case through a summary judgment.
The Court notes that respondents
herein are the farmers-tenants, but records show that the pleadings in answer
to the petition were filed by Nocom for and in his own behalf. Nocom is actively participating herein on the
basis of the questioned Irrevocable Power of Attorney. But to date, the
authority of Nocom to exercise the right of redemption is still in issue in a
separate case.
With the foregoing discussion, the
resolution of the issues herein have to be held in abeyance, pending the
settlement of the questions raised in the other action.[31]
We are not unmindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his
case,[32] but the rights of the parties herein cannot
be properly determined until the resolution of the issues in the other action.
The court in which an action is
pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, hold the action in abeyance
to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court.[33]
Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets,
considering its time and effort, and those of counsel and litigants.[34] Every order suspending proceedings must be
guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, or when the rights of
parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions
raised in the first action are settled.[35]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the resolution of this petition is hereby SUSPENDED or HELD IN ABEYANCE until after the proceedings in Civil Case No.
05-172 shall have been terminated.
Let a copy of this Resolution be
furnished the
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; rollo, pp. 61-77.
[2]
[3] 489 Phil. 769 (2005).
[4] P7,223,799.00; and the lot
covered by TCT No. S-72244 for P2,566,813.00.
[5] Rollo, pp. 93-100.
[6] Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto Lerma; id. at 111-117.
[7] Embodied in a Decision dated September 23, 2003; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a retired member of this Court) and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, concurring; id. at 133-153.
[8] Embodied in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (ret.), with former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Associate Justices Renato C. Corona (now Chief Justice) and Conchita Carpio Morales, concurring; 489 Phil. 769.
[9] Rollo, p. 64.
[10]
[11] At this point, Springsun already changed its name to SM Systems Corporation, as shown in its Amended Articles of Incorporation.
[12] Rollo, pp. 188-220.
[13] Embodied in a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine, concurring; id. at 221-229.
[14]
[15] Embodied in a Minute Resolution of the First Division; id. at 279.
[16]
[17] Nocom v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 390.
[18]
[19] Rollo, pp. 869-875.
[20]
[21]
[22] CA rollo, pp. 171-174.
[23]
[24] Rollo, pp. 1090-1091.
[25] Briones
v. Henson-Cruz, G.R. No. 159130,
[26] Huibonhoa
v.
[27]
[28] Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511 (2005).
[29] Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 571.
[30] Magbanua v. Uy, supra note 28, at 196.
[31] Before the RTC of
[32] SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, G.R. No. 164687,
[33] Magestrado
v. People, G.R. No. 148072,
[34] SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra note 32, at 557-558; id. at 141.
[35] SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra, at 558.