IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION G.R. No.
177861
AND CORRECTION
OF ENTRIES IN THE
RECORD OF BIRTH,
EMMA K. LEE, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,**
and
MENDOZA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,
LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,
JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY
LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by Promulgated:
RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondents.
July 13, 2010
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad
testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case against his
children.
The
Facts and the Case
Spouses
Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
In 1948, Lee brought from
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned
that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh.
This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.
After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
[I]t is very
obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG,
but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these
Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG
possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own
legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and
secure their future. The doctor lamented
that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his
second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children
of KEH SHIOK CHENG.[1]
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the
eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th
child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already
38 years old at the time. Another of the
Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh
was then already 40 years old, and so forth.
In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children,
Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children
filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City[2] in
Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth
of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace
the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex
parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The
RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.[3] On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the
subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu
was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her
into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for
reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,[4] setting
aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005 Order.
The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section
4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her
incapable of testifying. The party
seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be
unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee
failed to do.
Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by
resolution of May 8, 2007,[5] she
filed the present petition with this Court.
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not
the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the
correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she
is not Keh’s daughter.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed
the subpoena ad testificandum it
issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given
the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning
the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave
birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable
and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad
duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession
of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION
4. Quashing a subpoena. — The
court may quash a subpoena duces tecum
upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified
therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the
subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production
thereof.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of
Lee v. Court of Appeals[6] that
the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of
entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee
included. The Court recognized that the
ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children
were not children of Keh. Thus:
It is precisely the province of
a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. The petitions filed by private
respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth
were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the
petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are
not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.[7]
(Underscoring supplied)
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh
children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is
the mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony
that Lee’s other children were not hers.
The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking
Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to
compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring
Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in
court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it
would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
1. Regarding the
physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma
Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the
Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the
trial court. The RTC would have to update
itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to
undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena
issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might
subject her to badgering by adverse counsel.
The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive
behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of
advanced age.[8]
2. Tiu claimed
before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter,
petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
which reads:
SECTION
25. Parental and filial privilege.-
No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article
315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether
civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that
she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to
“direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965
thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of
the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently,
Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
WHEREFORE,
the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
SO
ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Special Order No. 858 dated July 1, 2010.
** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 863 dated July 5, 2010.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[2]
Branch 131.
[3] Sec. 25.
Parental and filial privilege.
— No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
[4] Rollo,
pp. 9-23; Opinion of then Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired
Associate Justice of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[5]
[6] 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
[7]
[8] Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. - A
witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a
claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness: x x x (2) Not to be
detained longer than the interests of justice require; (3) Not to be examined
except only as to matters pertinent to the issue; x x x.