Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
DR. DIOSCORO
CARBONILLA, Petitioner, - versus - MARCELO
ABIERA and MARICRIS ABIERA PAREDES, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 177637
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 26,
2010 |
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review
are the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 18, 2006 and
the Resolution dated April 17, 2007, which
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for ejectment against respondents.
The case arose from the following
antecedents:
Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla,
filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents, Marcelo Abiera and
Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
To corroborate his claim, petitioner
presented copies of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3784; Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership dated November 10, 2002, executed by the heirs of Jovita
Yanto Garciano; Tax Declaration (TD) with ARP No. 07020-000019; and Demand
Letter dated November 20, 2002. TCT No. T-3784 shows that the land was
originally registered on January 30, 1968 in the name of Diosdado Carbonilla,
petitioner’s father, under Original Certificate of Title No. 185.
In their defense, respondents vehemently
denied petitioner’s allegation that they possessed the building by mere
tolerance of the previous owners. Instead,
they asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having inherited the same
from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelo’s parents and
respondent Maricris’ grandparents. They maintained that they have been in
possession of the building since 1960, but it has not been declared for
taxation purposes. As for the subject
land, respondents claimed that they inherited the same from Francisco Plasabas,
grandfather of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed out that the land had, in fact, been
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Plasabas under TD No.
4676, before the Second World War. This TD was later cancelled by TD No. 8735
in 1948, TD No. 14363 in 1958, and TD
No. 16182 in 1963. Respondents averred
that the building was previously a garage-like structure but, in 1977, Alfredo
Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano repaired and remodeled it, for which reason,
they obtained a building permit on April 11, 1977 from the then Municipality of
Maasin. Finally, respondents contended
that the case should be dismissed for failure to implead as defendants respondent
Marcelo’s siblings, who are co-heirs of the subject properties.[3] Respondents presented copies of the two TDs in
the name of Francisco Plasabas and the Building Permit dated April 11, 1977.
The MTCC decided the case in favor of
respondents. It opined that petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject
parcel of land was not successfully rebutted by respondents; hence,
petitioner’s ownership of the same was deemed established.[4] However, with respect to the building, the
court declared respondents as having the better right to its material
possession in light of petitioner’s failure to refute respondents’ claim that
their predecessors had been in prior possession of the building since 1960 and that
they have continued such possession up to the present.[5] In so ruling, the court applied Art. 546[6] of
the Civil Code which allows the possessor in good faith to retain the property
until he is reimbursed for necessary expenses.
Thus, in its decision dated March 15, 2004, the MTCC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the collated evidences at hand [have] preponderantly established, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants DECLARING the defendants to have the better rights of (material) possession to the assailed building and deemed as possessors in good faith and are legally entitled to its possession and occupancy.
The
plaintiff judicially affirmed as the land owner is enjoined to respect the
rights of the defendants pursuant to the provisions of Art. 546, Chapter III,
New Civil Code of the
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). On July 12, 2004, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC that the land is
owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in their conclusion with
respect to the building. The RTC placed
the burden upon respondents to prove their claim that they built it prior to
petitioner’s acquisition of the land, which burden, the court found, respondents
failed to discharge. The RTC held that,
either way—whether the building was constructed before or after petitioner
acquired ownership of the land—petitioner, as owner of the land, would have every
right to evict respondents from the land.
As theorized by the RTC, if the building was erected before petitioner
or his predecessors acquired ownership of the land, then Article 445[8] of
the Civil Code would apply. Thus, petitioner, as owner of the land, would be
deemed the owner of the building standing thereon, considering that, when
ownership of the land was transferred to him, there was no reservation by the
original owner that the building was not included in the transfer. On the other hand, if the building was
constructed after petitioner became the owner of the land, it is with more
reason that petitioner has the right to evict respondents from the land. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1. Reversing the decision of the court a quo;
2. Ordering defendants to immediately vacate the residential house/building subject of this litigation;
3.
Ordering defendants to pay attorney’s fee in the amount
of P30,000.00; and
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondents
then filed a petition for review with the CA. Finding no evidence to prove that respondents’
possession of the building was by mere tolerance, the CA reversed the RTC
decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint. Because of this, the CA,
following this Court’s ruling in Ten
Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the complaint
as one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the action had
prescribed since the one-year period for filing the forcible entry case had
already lapsed. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision dated September 18, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed decision promulgated on July 12, 2004 of
Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of
the Decision, but the CA denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.[11] Hence,
petitioner came to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
On September 3, 2007, respondents’
counsel informed this Court that respondent, Maricris Abiera Paredes, died on
June 25, 2006 of asphyxia due to hanging, and moved that the latter’s heirs be
allowed to substitute for the deceased.[12] In the Resolution[13]
dated November 14, 2007, the Court granted the motion.
Petitioner argues that he has
sufficiently established his ownership of the subject properties; consequently,
he asserts the right to recover possession thereof.
The petition has no merit.
To set the record straight,
while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no
other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a
Without a doubt, the registered owner
of real property is entitled to its possession. However,
the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses
what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for
such action to prosper.
In the
present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment
cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved.[14] The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
party’s title to the property is questionable.[15] For this reason, an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of
the subject property. Key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in
the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The
statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by
mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person’s
withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the
latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right
to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.[16]
A requisite for a valid cause
of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful,
and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess.[17]
It must be shown that the possession was
initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove
that respondents’ possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit
of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents’ entry to and
occupation of the subject properties. A
bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt
acts indicative of his or his predecessor’s permission to occupy the subject
property. Thus, we must agree with the
CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records
revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to prove his claim that
petitioners’ possession of the subject building was by mere tolerance as
alleged in the complaint. Tolerance
must be [present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to
be within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with
it “permission” and not merely silence or inaction for silence or
inaction is negligence, not tolerance.[18]
In addition, plaintiff
must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from
the very start of the possession—from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.[19]
Notably, no mention was made in the
complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Neither was there
any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some
other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by filing an
accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the
better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property.
We stress, however, that the
pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the land.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 18, 2006 and Resolution
dated April 17, 2007 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Executive Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring; rollo, pp. 85-95.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Art. 546 of the Civil Code reads in full:
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired
by reason thereof.
[7] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[8] Art. 445 of the Civil Code reads in full:
ART. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
[9] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[10] Supra
note 1, at 94-95.
[11] Rollo, p. 105.
[12]
[13]
[14] Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 183-184 (2001).
[15] David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[16] Republic v. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 140, 152-153.
[17] Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853 (2004).
[18] Rollo, p. 91.
[19] Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 369, 377.
[20] Asis v. Asis Vda. de Guevarra, G.R. No. 167554, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 580, 583.