Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
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CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS’
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), Petitioner, - versus - ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) and MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 174697
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, *CARPIO MORALES, **velasco, JR., *
NACHURA, **leonardo-de castro, brion, **peralta,
**BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: July 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION,
J.:
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This is
a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[1] to
nullify Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR),
promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) on January 18,
2006. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders’ Associations, Inc. asserts that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, which
obligates certain customers to advance the amount needed to cover the expenses
of extending lines and installing additional facilities, is unconstitutional
and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as “The Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).”
The
Background Facts
The petitioner
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation, organized under the laws of the
Republic of the
The ERC
is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative regulatory body created under Section
38 of the EPIRA, with office address at the
Respondent
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a corporation organized under the laws of
the Republic of the
Pursuant
to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA, the ERC promulgated the Magna Carta
for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna
Carta), which establishes residential consumers’ rights to have access to
electricity and electric service, subject to the requirements set by local
government units and distribution utilities (DUs).[5] Article
14 of the Magna Carta pertains to the rights of consumers to avail of
extension lines or additional facilities. It also distinguishes between consumers located within 30 meters from existing
lines and those who are located beyond 30 meters; the latter have the
obligation to advance the costs of the requested lines and facilities, to
wit:
Article 14. Right to
Extension of Lines and Facilities.—A consumer located within thirty (30) meters
from the distribution utilities’ existing secondary low voltage lines, has the
right to an extension of lines or installation of additional facilities, other
than a service drop, at the expense of the utility inasmuch as said assets will
eventually form part of the rate base of the private distribution utilities, or
will be sourced from the reinvestment funds of the electric cooperatives. However, if a prospective customer is beyond
the said distance, or his demand load requires that the utility extend lines
and facilities, the customer may initially fund the necessary expenditures.
Article
14 of the Magna Carta continues with a provision on how the costs advanced by
the residential end-user can be recovered:
To recover his
aforementioned expenditures, the customer may either demand the issuance of a notes
payable from the distribution utility or refund at the rate of twenty-five (25)
percent of the gross distribution revenue derived for the calendar year, or, if
available, the purchase of preferred shares.
Revenue derived from
additional customers tapped directly to the poles and facilities so extended
shall be considered in determining the revenues derived from the extension of
facilities.
The same article specifies that if a developer
initially pays the cost of the extension lines but passes it to the registered
customer, the customer would still be entitled to recover the cost in the
manner provided under this article:
When a developer
initially paid the cost of the extension of lines to provide electric service
to a specific property and incorporated these expenses in the cost thereof, and
that property was purchased and transferred in the name of the registered
customer, the latter shall be entitled to the refund of the cost of the
extension of lines, and exercise the options for refund provided in this
article.
On
2.6. MODIFICATIONS AND
NEW PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS: RESIDENTIAL
2.6.1 RIGHT TO EXTENSION
OF LINES AND FACILITIES – In accordance with the Magna Carta, a residential
End-user located within thirty (30) meters from the distribution utilities’
existing secondary low voltage lines has the right to an extension of lines or
installation of additional facilities, other than a service drop, at the
expense of the utility. However, if a
prospective customer is beyond the said distance, the customer shall advance
the amounts necessary to cover the expenditures on the facilities beyond thirty
(30) meters.
2.6.2 REFUND—To recover
the aforementioned advanced payment, the customer may either demand the
issuance of a notes payable from the distribution utility or a refund at the
rate of twenty-five (25) percent of the gross distribution revenue derived from
all customers connected to the line extension for the calendar year until such
amounts are fully refunded or for five (5) years whichever period is shorter,
or, if available, the purchase of preferred shares. Revenue derived from additional customers
tapped directly to the poles and facilities so extended shall be considered in
determining the revenues derived from the extension of facilities.
Distribution Connection
Assets paid for through advances from residential End-users shall be deemed
plant in service in the accounts of the DU.
Unpaid advances shall be a reduction to plant in service. If replacement becomes necessary at any time
for any Distribution Connection Assets paid for by residential End-users, the
DU shall be solely responsible for the cost of such replacement which shall
become plant in service in the accounts of the DU, and shall not require
another advanced payment from the connected residential End-users unless the
replacement is due to End-user fault.
The
petitioner alleged that the entities it represented applied for electrical
power service, and MERALCO required them to sign pro forma contracts that (1) obligated them to advance the cost of
the construction of new lines and other facilities and (2) allowed annual
refunds at 25% of the gross distribution revenue derived from the customer’s
electric service, until the amount advanced is fully paid, pursuant to Section
2.6 of the DSOAR.[6]
The
petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the following grounds:
(1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due
process and equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of the
EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust enrichment.[7]
Petitioner
claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as it is oppressive to
the affected end-users who must advance the amount for the installation of
additional facilities. Burdening residential end-users with the installation
costs of additional facilities defeats the objective of the law – the electrification
of residential areas – and contradicts the provisions of the legislative
franchise, requiring DUs to be financially capable of providing the
distribution service. Moreover, the
questioned provision violates the equal protection clause since the difference
in treatment between end-users residing within 30 meters of the existing lines
and those beyond 30 meters does not rest on substantial distinctions.[8]
In
addition, the petitioner alleges that the assailed provision contravenes
Sections 2, 23, 41 and 43 of the EPIRA[9]
which are geared towards ensuring the affordability of electric power and the
protection of consumers.[10] Lastly, requiring consumers to provide the
huge capital for the installation of the facilities, which will be owned by
distribution utilities such as MERALCO, results in unjust enrichment.[11]
The
Respondents’ Case
a. The ERC Position
Contradicting
the petitioner’s arguments, the ERC avers that it issued Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR as an exercise of police power directed at promoting the general
welfare. The rule seeks to address the
inequitable situation where the cost of an extension facility benefiting one or
a few consumers is equally shared by them.[12]
The ERC
likewise asserts that the equal protection clause is observed since the
distinction between end-users residing within 30 meters of the existing lines
and those beyond 30 meters is based on real and substantial differences,
namely: (1) proximity of end-user service drop to the main distribution lines;
(2) manner of checking status service; (3) system loss risk; (4) cost in
installing the facilities; and (5) additional risk posed by the possibility of
the customer defaulting in his electric service with the DU.[13]
The ERC
also maintains that Section 2 of the DSOAR is consistent with Sections 2, 23,
41 and 43 of the EPIRA. By not
subjecting most consumers to the payment of installation costs benefitting
customers located beyond a reasonably-set boundary, the provision in question
gives effect to the EPIRA policy to ensure that the prices of electricity
remain affordable, transparent, and reasonable to the majority. The policy of accelerating the total
electrification of the country is also served when the residents of far-flung
areas are given the option to apply for extension lines. This option is subject only to the condition
that the cost of the extension of existing lines is advanced by the end-user,
who will eventually be reimbursed; without such condition, businesses will be
reluctant to provide service connection in remote areas.[14]
Additionally,
the ERC points out that the DSOAR provisions do not result in unjust enrichment
since the DUs do not stand to be materially benefited by the customers’
advances. The DUs have the obligation to
reimburse the customers the advances within five years, and whatever advances
are unpaid during the five-year period are recorded as reductions in “plant in
service.”[15]
Finally,
it argues that petitioner lacks the standing to file the present suit since the
petitioner is not an end-user who will sustain a direct injury as a result of
the issuance and implementation of the DSOAR. The ERC likewise maintains the
petition for certiorari must fail
since petitioner fails to impute grave abuse of discretion to the ERC.[16]
b. The MERALCO Position
MERALCO
reiterates the defenses raised by the ERC.
It also contends that the present petition does not involve the ERC’s
judicial and quasi-judicial functions so that a petition for certiorari is an improper remedy. MERALCO likewise argues that the petition for
certiorari, assuming it to be a
correct remedy, should be dismissed since the petitioner failed to observe the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing an original petition with this Court.
On the
merits, MERALCO points out that even if Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is struck
down, the provision in the Magna Carta, on the same point, would nevertheless
require end-users located beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance the
cost. The petitioner’s members are not also end-users, but subdivision
developers, brokers, and various entities who are not affected by the
questioned provision; if a developer would apply for electric service, the
terms and conditions of the service will not be governed by Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR.[17]
MERALCO
also elaborates on why the provision does not result in unjust enrichment and
justifies the distinction between end-users within the 30-meter limit and those
located outside of this limit. The DSOAR
provides that the unpaid amounts that the end-users advanced for the electrical
facilities are not included in “plant in service.” The total “plant in service” is the basis in
fixing the rates collected by the DU from all its customers. By having the end-users, located 30 meters
away from existing lines, advance the amount, this amount is no longer included
in the rates passed on to regular consumers.
The DSOAR further limits the subsidies by regular consumers, by limiting
the amount to be recovered to 25% and to five years. Thus, if the costs of the lines are too great
and the revenues are too small, it is the end-user who would bear the cost and
not the regular customers.[18]
The
Issues
The petitioner
summarizes the issues as follows:
Procedural Issues:
A. Whether petitioner can challenge the
constitutionality of a quasi-legislative act (i.e., the Rules) in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
B. Whether the Honorable Supreme [Court] has
original jurisdiction over this case.
C. Whether petitioner has legal standing to sue.
D. Whether petitioner is authorized to file this
suit.
Substantive issues:
A. Whether Section 2.6
of the Rules violates the due process and equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
B. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules violates
R.A. No. 9136.
C. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules violates the
rule against unjust enrichment.
D. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules is a valid
exercise of police power.[19]
The
Court’s Ruling
We resolve to dismiss the petition for its
serious procedural and technical defects.
a. The Petitioner Has No Legal Standing
We do
not see the petitioner as an entity with the required standing to assail the
validity of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR.
Legal
standing or locus standi refers to a
party’s personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct
injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged
governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized
grievance. The term “interest” means a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Unless a person’s
constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental
action, he has no legal standing to challenge the statute or governmental
action.[20]
The
petitioner expressly enumerates its members to be the following: developers,
brokers, appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers, architects,
and other persons or entities engaged in the housing and real estate business.[21] It does not question the challenged DSOAR
provision as a residential end-user and it cannot because the challenged
provision only refers to the rights and obligations of DUs and residential
end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. In fact, the DSOAR has separate provisions
for the extension of lines or installation of additional facilities for
non-residential end-users, under its Section 2.7 entitled “Modifications and
New Connections: Non-Residential.”
Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as
residential end-users, arising from the challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR,
nor cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-users that would
result from the invalidation of the assailed provision.
The
petitioner meets the objection to its capacity to bring suit through the claim
that subdivision developers are directly affected by the assailed provision because
MERALCO has asked them to advance the cost of installing additional lines and
facilities, in accordance with Section 2.6 of the DSOAR.[22] This claim is specious.
Section
1, Rule I of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree (PD 957) and Other Related Laws provides
the minimum design standards for subdivisions.
These minimum standards include an electrical power supply, described
under subsection C(7) thus:
7. Electrical Power Supply System
Mandatory individual
household connection to primary and/or alternate sources of power.
x x x x
Provision of street
lighting per pole is mandatory at 50-meter distance and every other pole if
distance is less than 50 meters.
Thus,
subdivision developers are obligated under these rules to include in their
design an electrical power supply system that would link individual households
within their subdivision to primary and/or alternate sources of power. This requirement is intended to protect the
rights of prospective subdivision homeowners,[23]
and exists regardless of the validity of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR.
In
other words, the invalidation of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR would not permit
subdivision developers to renege from their duty to ensure power supply and to
pass the costs of installing a proper electrical power supply system to MERALCO.
In this light, it is immaterial that MERALCO
did require certain developers to sign the Agreement for Extension of Lines
And/Or Additional Facilities[24]
as this was required under the provisions of the Magna Carta, not under the
assailed DSOAR provision that, in the first place, does not govern the
relationship of subdivision developers (who are not residential end-users) and MERALCO.
a. 1. No Transcendental Issue
Involved
The
petitioner cites instances when the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
waived the procedural rule on standing in cases that raised issues of transcendental
importance. We do not, however, view the
present case as one involving a matter of transcendental importance so that a
waiver of the locus standi rule
should be recognized.
The
Court, through Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano (now retired),
provided the following instructive guides as determinants in determining
whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.[25]
In this case, the three determinants
are glaringly absent. Public funds are
not involved. The allegations of constitutional
and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are unsubstantiated by
facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the rules, a matter that will be
further discussed in this Decision. In
addition, parties with a more direct and specific interest in the questions
being raised – the residential end-users – undoubtedly exist and are not
included as parties to the petition. As the Court did in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary,[26]
we cannot waive the rule on standing where the three determinants were not
established.
b.
Rule 65 is both a Wrong
and Misapplied Remedy
The
petitioner’s choice of remedy – a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court – is an incorrect
remedy.
Rule
65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court mandates that the remedy of certiorari is directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
Section 1. Petition
for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Judicial
functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy.[27] Quasi-judicial function is a term that
applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies
given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action using discretion of a judicial nature.[28] Thus, in Philnabank
Employees Association v. Estanislao, we did not grant a petition for certiorari against the Department
Secretary who did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity but merely
promulgated the questioned implementing rules under the mandate of Republic Act
No. 6971, the applicable law in this cited case.[29]
Contrary
to Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court, the petitioner and its members
are not even parties who are aggrieved by the assailed DSOAR provision, as
already discussed above. Even if they
had been properly aggrieved parties, the petition must still be dismissed for
violation of yet another basic principle applicable to Rule 65. This rule requires, for a petition for certiorari to be an appropriate remedy,
that there be no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[30] Since the petitioner assails the validity of
a rule or statute and seeks our declaration that the rule is unconstitutional,
a petition for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court[31]
provides a remedy more appropriate than certiorari.
Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari;
the rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of recourses to these
courts. In original petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court will not
directly entertain this special civil action – as in the present case – unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
elsewhere based on exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying
immediate resort to this Court.[32]
In the
present case, the petitioner alleges that the constitutionality and legality of
the assailed provision are of “immense importance to the public”[33]
and are a “recipe for financial ruin of the affected parties.”[34] Moreover, it maintains that its petition
raises transcendental and weighty issues that would merit the Honorable Court’s
exercise of original jurisdiction.[35] To support its position, it cites the cases
of the Senate of the Philippines v.
Ermita[36]
and Ople v. Torres.[37]
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita[38] was a
case for certiorari and prohibition,
while our Decision in Ople v. Torres[39] did not clearly state whether the case was
filed as a petition for certiorari. But granting that both cases were filed as petitions
for certiorari, they prompted the
Court to suspend its rules of procedure as they involved clear violations of the
Constitution which urgently needed to be addressed. Moreover, they were unquestionably filed by
the proper parties.
The
petitioners in the Ermita case
included the Philippine Senate, which assailed Executive Order No. 464 for
infringing on their prerogatives as legislators, to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.[40] We had to immediately resolve this case since
the implementation of the challenged order had already resulted in the absence
of officials invited to Senate hearings.
In the Ople case, Senator Blas F. Ople sought to invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308, which “establishes a system of identification that is
all-encompassing in its scope, [and that] affects the life and liberty of every
Filipino citizen and foreign resident.”[41] The petition was based on two important
constitutional grounds: (1) usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate
and (2) impermissible intrusion into the citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
In the
present case, the petitioner cannot come before this Court using an incorrect
remedy and claim that it was oppressed, or that its rights to due process and
equal protection have been violated by an administrative issuance that does not
even affect its rights and obligations. The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that the Court issues only
under closely defined grounds and procedures that litigants and their lawyers
must scrupulously observe. They cannot
seek refuge under the umbrella of this remedy on the basis of an undemonstrated
claim that they raise issues of transcendental importance, while at the same
time flouting the basic ground rules for the remedy’s grant.[42]
These
conclusions render any further discussion of the improperly raised substantive
issues unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we hereby DISMISS the petition for
its serious procedural and technical defects.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (on official travel) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice (on
official travel) TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice (on
official travel) LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate
Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE Associate Justice |
(on
leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice (on leave) ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice (on official travel) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
*
On leave.
** On
official travel abroad.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Under Section 4(q) of the EPIRA, a distribution utility refers to any electric cooperative, private corporation, government-owned utility, or existing local government unit which has an exclusive franchise to operate a distribution system in accordance with this Act.
[6] Rollo, pp. 7-9.
[7]
[8]
[9] Section
2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
x x x x
b) To ensure the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power;
c) To ensure transparent and reasonable
prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full
public accountability to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency
and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market;
x x x x
f)
To protect
the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric
utilities and other providers of electric power[.]
Section 23. Functions of Distribution Utilities. - A distribution utility shall
have the obligation to provide distribution services and connections to its
system for any end-user within its franchise area consistent with the
distribution code. Any entity engaged
therein shall provide open and non-discriminatory access to its distribution
system to all users.
x
x x x
Section 41. x
x x The ERC shall handle consumer complaints and ensure
the adequate promotion of consumer interests.
x
x x x
Section 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry.
[10] Rollo, pp. 15-17.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720, 756-757; Olama v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 169213, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 343, 353; and Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 487.
[21] Rollo, p. 4.
[22]
[23] The “WHEREAS” clauses of Presidential Decree No. 957
state that:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to
afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to
provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers[.]
[24] Rollo, pp. 208-222; Annexes “A” to “E” of the Reply to Respondents’ Comments.
[25] Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 39-40; and Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 139, citing Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-157.
[26] G.R. No. 166052,
[27] Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 467, 477; and Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Workers’ Association v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 661, 681 (2003).
[28] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346, 357; and Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 497, 506 (1999).
[29] G.R. No. 104209,
[30] Esguera v. Gonzales-Asdala, G.R. No. 168906, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 50, 64-65; Franco-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172238, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 531, 538; and Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157660, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 664, 668.
[31] Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
[32] Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 378, 384-385; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 294, 297; and Santos v. Cruz, G.R. Nos. 170096 and 170097, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 66, 75.
[33] Rollo, p. 238.
[34]
[35] Ibid.
[36] G.R. No. 169777,
[37] 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[38] Supra note 36.
[39] Supra note 37.
[40] Supra note 36. The challenged order, Executive Order No. 464, required all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. In its petition, the Senate considered this as a flagrant violation of their prerogatives under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, among other provisions.
[41] Supra note 37, at 966.
[42]
Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 156905,