Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR
COMPLETO and ELPIDIO ABIAD, Petitioners, - versus - SGT. AMANDO
C. ALBAYDA, JR., Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 172200
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 6,
2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the
Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated January 2, 2006 and the Resolution[2]
dated March 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68405.
The Facts
The facts of
the case are as follows:
Respondent
Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air
Force, 527th Base Security Squadron, 520th Airbase,
Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base (VAB),
The
amended complaint alleged that, on August 27, 1997, while Albayda was on his
way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along
Conciliation
between the parties before the barangay
failed. Thus, Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay
City. On the other hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property
through reckless imprudence against Albayda. On January 13, 1998, the Office of
the City Prosecutor issued a resolution,[6]
recommending the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
physical injuries against Completo. The counter-charge of damage to property
was recommended dismissed.[7]
The
case was raffled to the
Albayda
alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which necessitated his stay in
the hospital for approximately seven (7) months was the negligence of Completo
who, at the time of the accident, was in the employ of Abiad. The pain he
suffered required him to undergo medical physiotherapy for a number of years to
regain normality of his left knee joint, and he claimed that he incurred actual
damages totaling Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P276,550.00),
inclusive of his anticipated operations.[9]
He
further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental anguish,
frights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation resulting from his injuries, his wife abandoned him in
May 1998, and left their children in his
custody. He thus demanded the amount of
Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) as moral damages. He likewise
asked for exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
and attorney’s fees of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), plus One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per court appearance.[10]
In
his answer to the amended complaint, Completo alleged that, on August 27, 1997,
he was carefully driving the taxicab along
Completo
also asserted that he was an experienced driver who, in accordance with traffic
rules and regulations and common courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already
reduced his speed to twenty (20) kilometers per hour even before reaching the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets. In contrast, Albayda
rode his bicycle at a very high speed, causing him to suddenly lose control of
the bicycle and hit the rear door on the right side of the taxicab.[12]
The
deep indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab was caused by the impact
of Albayda’s body that hit the taxicab after he had lost control of the
bicycle; while the slight indentation on the right front door of the taxicab
was caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab after Albayda let go of
its handles when he had lost control of it.[13]
Completo
maintained that Albayda had no cause of action. The accident and the physical
injuries suffered by Albayda were caused by his own negligence, and his purpose
in filing the complaint was to harass petitioners and unjustly enrich himself at
their expense.[14]
After
submission of the parties’ respective pleadings, a pretrial conference was
held. On December 8, 1998, the RTC issued a pretrial order. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.[15]
Albayda
presented himself, Michael Navarro (Navarro), Dr. Rito Barrosa, Jr. (Dr.
Barrosa), Dr. Armando Sta. Ana, Jr., Dr. Ranny Santiago, (Dr. Santiago), and
Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira (Dr. Magtira) as witnesses in open court.[16]
On
direct examination, Navarro testified that, on August 27, 1997, at around 1:45 p.m.,
he saw a taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, coming from
Dr.
Santiago, the orthopedic surgeon who treated Albayda when the latter was
admitted at AFPMC, testified that the cause of the injury was “hard impact,”
and recommended an operation to alleviate the suffering. On cross-examination,
he said that there was a separation of the fragments of the proximal leg, the
injured extremity, called levia. They placed the victim on knee traction or calcaneal
traction,[18] in
order to avoid further swelling. They bore the calcanean bone with a stainless
steel pin so that they could put five percent (5%) of the body weight of the
patient to cool down the leg. He treated Albayda for three (3) months. He
recommended surgery, but the victim had other medical problems, like an
increase in sugar level, and they were waiting for the availability of the
implant. The implant was supposed to be placed on the lateral aspect of the
proximal leg or the levia, the part with the separation. It was a long implant
with screws.[19]
Dr.
Magtira testified that Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC on January 25, 1999
because of complaints of pain and limitation of motion on the knee joint. Upon
evaluation, the pain was caused by traumatic arthritis brought about by
malunion of the lateral trivial condial. An operation of the soft tissue release
was conducted for him to mobilize his knee joint and attain proper range of
motion. After the operation, Albayda attained functional range of motion, but
because of subsisting pain, they had to do osteoplasty[20]
of the malunion, which was another operation. On cross-examination, Dr. Magtira testified that he rendered free
medical service at AFPMC.[21]
Albayda
testified that he was thirty-six (36) years old and a soldier of the Armed
Forces of the
Upon
examination, it was found that Albayda suffered fracture in his left knee and that
it required an operation. No orthopedic doctor was available at PAFGH. Thus, he
was transferred that same afternoon to AFPMC, where he was confined until
February 11, 1998.[23]
At
AFPMC, Albayda’s left leg was drilled on and attached to traction. When his leg
was drilled, it was so painful that he had to shout. After his release from the
hospital, he continued to suffer pain in his leg. He underwent reflexology and
therapy which offered temporary relief from pain. But after some time, he had to undergo
therapy and reflexology again.[24]
On
January 25, 1999, Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC and operated on. On June 24,
1999, he was operated on again. Wire and screw were installed so that he could
bend his knee. Nonetheless, he continued to suffer pain. As of the date of his
testimony in court, he was scheduled for another operation in January 2000,
when the steel that would be installed in his leg arrives.[25]
For
his food, Albayda spent Thirty Pesos (P30.00) each day during his six
(6) months of confinement; for his bed pan, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00);
for his twice weekly reflexology, Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) every
session since April 1997; for his caretaker, P300.00 per day for six
months. He also asked for P600,000.00 in moral damages because Completo
did not lend him a helping hand, and he would be suffering deformity for the
rest of his life. He demanded P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00
for every court appearance of his lawyer.[26]
On
cross-examination, Albayda testified that, on the date of the incident, he was
the base guard at VAB, and his duty was from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m. That afternoon, he was not in a hurry to go to
his place of work because it was only about 1:45 p.m., and his place of work
was only six (6) meters away. After the accident, he was brought to PAFGH, and
at 3:00 p.m., he was brought to the AFPMC. When he was discharged from the hospital,
he could no longer walk.[27]
Dr.
Barrosa’s testimony during cross-examination emphasized that he was with 2
other persons when he carried Albayda into the taxicab driven by Completo. He
was certain that it was not Completo who carried the victim into the
taxicab. It was only a matter of seconds
when he rushed to the scene of the accident. The taxicab backed up fifteen (15)
seconds later. Albayda lay 2 meters away from the corner of 8th and
11th Streets.[28]
Completo,
Abiad, and Benjamin Panican (Panican) testified for the defense.[29]
Completo
alleged that he had been employed as taxi driver of FOJS Transport, owned by
Abiad, since February 1997. On August 27, 1997, he was driving the taxicab, with
Plate No. PYD-128, from 10:00 a.m. At around 1:45 p.m., he was on his way home
when a bicycle bumped his taxicab at the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets, VAB. The bicycle was travelling from south to north, and he was going
east coming from the west. The bicycle was coming from
On
cross-examination, Completo testified that when Albayda hit the rear right door
of the taxicab, the latter fell to the ground. When he heard a noise, he
immediately alighted from the taxicab. He denied that he stopped about 10
meters away from the place where Albayda fell. He carried Albayda and drove him
to the hospital.[31]
Panican
testified that he worked as an airconditioner technician in a shop located on
When
questioned by the trial court, Panican testified that the bicycle was running
fast and that he saw it bump the taxicab. The taxicab already passed the
intersection of 11th and 8th Streets when the bicycle
arrived.[33]
Abiad
testified that, aside from being a soldier, he was also a franchise holder of
taxicabs and passenger jeepneys. When Completo applied as a driver of the
taxicab, Abiad required the former to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and
driver’s license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since the time
he was employed in February 1997. Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver
and a good man. Being the operator of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and
personally check all the taxicabs.[34]
On
July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision,[35]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff [Albayda] and against the defendants [Completo and
Abiad]. Accordingly, the defendants [Completo and Abiad] are hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff [Albayda] the following sum:
1. P46,000.00
as actual damages;
2. P400,000.00
as moral damages; [and]
3. P25,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
Costs
against the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
SO ORDERED.[36]
Completo
and Abiad filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the trial court with modification in
a Decision[37] dated
January 2, 2006, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated 31 July 2000 rendered by the
1. the award of Php 46,000.00 as actual
damages is DELETED;
2. temperate damages in the amount of Php
40,000.00 is awarded in favor of appellee;
3. moral damages in favor of appellee is REDUCED to Php 200,000.00;
4. appellants Redentor Completo and
Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay appellee Amando C. Albayda, Jr. said
temperate and moral damages, as well as the attorney’s fees in the amount of
Php 25,000.00 awarded by the trial court;
5. the temperate and moral damages shall
earn legal interest at 6% per annum
computed from the date of promulgation of Our Decision;
6. upon finality of Our Decision, said
moral and temperate damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum,
in lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.[38]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners
presented the following issues for resolution: (1) whether the CA erred in
finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision;
(2) whether Abiad failed to prove
that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family; and (3) whether
the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees to Albayda had no
basis.[39]
The Ruling of the Court
The
petition is bereft of merit.
The
issues raised by petitioners essentially delve into factual matters which were already
passed upon by the RTC and the CA. Conclusions and findings of fact of the
trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed
unless for strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the
findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[40] To be sure, findings of fact of lower courts
are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court, save only for clear
and exceptional reasons,[41] none
of which is present in the case at bar.
The
instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle which
resulted in serious physical injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s
breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.[42]
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the
question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact.
It
was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the
time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not
slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way,
considering that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
The
bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other
vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually
more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of
care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over
the bicycle.[43]
At
the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet
per second, while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost
thirty-seven feet per second, and split-second action may be insufficient to
avoid an accident. It is
obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than
vice versa. Accordingly, while the
duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to
the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from the
motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist.[44] Simply stated, the physical advantages that
the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist
than vice versa.[45]
Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon proof
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent. This
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the
legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words,
the burden of proof is on the employer.[46]
The
trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid
collision with Albayda at the intersection of 11th and 8th
Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and
his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.[47]
The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is
also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and
supervising his employee.[48]
The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside
the vehicle at the time of the collision.[49]
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees,
employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.[50]
Abiad
testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show his
bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Abiad likewise stressed that
Completo was never involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and
that, as operator of the taxicab, he would wake up early to personally check
the condition of the vehicle before it is used.
The protestation of Abiad to escape
liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s evidence consisted entirely
of testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad
was insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the
selection and supervision of his driver.
II. On Damages
The
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages by the RTC because Albayda
failed to present documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount
that he incurred during his hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he
suffered. In the absence of stipulation, actual damages are awarded only for
such pecuniary loss suffered that was duly proved.[51]
While
the amount of actual damages was not duly established with certainty, the Court
recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda incurred a considerable amount for
the necessary and reasonable medical expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss
of capacity to earn increased wages, cost of occupational therapy, and harm
from conditions caused by prolonged immobilization. Temperate damages, more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[52] Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.[53] Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable under the
circumstances.
Doubtless,
Albayda suffered immeasurable pain because of the incident caused by petitioners’
negligence. The CA explained:
The court vicariously feels the pain the
plaintiff [Albayda] suffered a number of times. After he was bumped by
defendants’ cab, he cried in pain. When the doctors bore holes into his left
knee, he cried in pain. When he was
tractioned, when he was subjected to an operation after operation he suffered
pain. When he took the witness stand to testify, he walked with crutches, his
left knee in bandage, stiff and unfuctional. Pain was written [on] his face. He
does deserve moral damages.[54]
Moral
damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The permanent
deformity and the scar left by the wounds suffered by Albayba will forever be a
reminder of the pain and suffering that he had endured and continues to endure because
of petitioners’ negligence. Thus, the award of moral damages in the amount of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) is proper.
Finally,
an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum is due on the amount of P100,000.00,
as temperate damages, and P500,000.00, as moral damages, which we have
awarded. The 6% per annum interest rate on the temperate and moral damages
shall commence to run from the date of the promulgation of this Decision. Upon
finality of the Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall
be imposed on the amount of the temperate and moral damages until full payment
thereof.[55]
The
award of attorney’s fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that
petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s just and
valid claim.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Decision dated January 2, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 30, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68405 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, viz.:
(1)
The estate of the late Redentor
Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), as temperate damages, and Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00), as moral
damages;
(2)
The temperate and moral damages hereby
awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality of this Decision,
an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the
amount of the temperate and moral damages until full payment thereof.
Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 50-91.
[2]
[3] Completo died pending appeal of the instant case to this Court.
[4] Rollo, p. 51.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Traction is the use of a pulling force to treat muscle and
skeleton disorders. Traction is usually applied to the arms and legs, the neck,
the backbone, or the pelvis. It is used to treat fractures, dislocations, and long-duration muscle spasms, and to
prevent or correct deformities. Traction can either be short-term, as at an
accident scene, or long-term, when it is used in a hospital setting. <http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/traction>
(visited June 8, 2010.)
[19] Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[20] Bone grafting or bone repair of the malunion.
[21] Rollo, p. 57.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Penned by Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon,
RTC, Branch 117,
[36]
[37] Supra note 1.
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 325.
[40] Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian
Sambaan,
G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010;
Poliand
Industrial Limited v. National Development Company, G.R. Nos. 143866 and 143877, August 22, 2005, 467
SCRA 500, 543.
[41] Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. v. Capitol
Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., G.R. No. 168074, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 473; Bulay-og v. Bacalso, G.R. No. 148795, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 308.
[42] 11 AMJUR POF 3d 395.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46] Skyi v. Begasa, 460 Phil. 381 (2003); Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc., 459 Phil. 156 (2003).
[47] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2194.
[48] Cerezo v. Tuazon, 469 Phil. 1020 (2004).
[49] Sps. Hernandez v. Sps. Dolor, 479 Phil. 593 (2004).
[50] Skyi v. Begasa, supra note 46.
[51] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2199.
[52] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2224.
[53] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2225.
[54] Rollo, p. 65.
[55] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.