Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioner, - versus - Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172102 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: July 2, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated
May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077, which
affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281. Petitioner also assails
the CA Resolution[2] dated
March 30, 2006, denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover
Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an application for Registration of Title
over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New) under Vs-072219-000396,
situated in Barrio Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of One Hundred Three Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters, more or less, pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application stated that
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the approved
Technical Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale in favor of Hanover’s
President and General Manager; 4) a copy of a Waiver executed by the President
and General Manager of Hanover in favor of the latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's
Certificate attesting that the property was surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7)
a tax clearance; 8) a Municipal Assessor's Certification stating, among others,
the assessed value and market value of the property; and 9) a CENRO
Certification on the alienability and disposability of the property.
Except for the Republic, there were no
other oppositors to the application. The Republic contended, among others, that neither Hanover nor its
predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax payments
attached to or alleged in the
application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for; Hanover is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels of land
applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic and are
not subject to private appropriation.
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded
with the presentation of its evidence. The Republic was represented in the
proceedings by officers from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered
its Decision[3]
approving
On appeal by the State, the judgment
of the RTC was affirmed by the CA via the presently assailed Decision and
Resolution.
Hence,
the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE INITIAL HEARING OF THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF.
II
DEEDS OF
Petitioner claims
that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. It avers that the RTC set the initial hearing
of the case on September 25, 1995 in an Order dated June 13, 1995. Petitioner
contends, however, that, pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial
hearing of the case must be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later
than ninety (90) days from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of
the initial hearing. Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the
initial hearing should have been set not earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days
from June 13, 1995) and not later than September 11, 1995 (90 days from June
13, 1995). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held
on September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14) days later than the prescribed
period.
Petitioner
also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence in the
form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of the occupation of
its predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has been in possession of
the subject lot under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The petition
is meritorious.
As to the
first assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s
contention that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It is true
that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the
jurisdictional requirements. In the
instant case, though, there is no dispute that respondent complied with the requirements
of the law for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
With respect
to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under
Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the
setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land registration court and
not the applicant. Citing Republic v.
Manna Properties, Inc.,[5]
this Court held in Republic v. San
Lorenzo Development Corporation[6]
that:
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x
x x x x
x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication. x x x
In the instant
case, there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the registration
proceedings via publication was duly made.
Moreover,
petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely faulted if the
initial hearing that was conducted on September 25, 1995 was outside the 90-day
period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that
respondent substantially complied with the requirement relating to the registration
of the subject land.
Hence, on the
issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any error in
giving due course to respondent’s application for registration.
The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the more important issue that
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it or its
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property for the
period required by law.
Section 14 (1)
of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.[7]
Likewise,
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073, states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.[8]
As the
law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or
more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the
piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This provision
is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.[9]
Thus, pursuant
to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
It is true, as
respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites involve delving into
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the
court a quo are generally binding on
this Court, except for certain recognized exceptions,[10]
to wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[11]
The Court
finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth exceptions.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC
and the CA will show that there is neither finding nor discussion by both the
trial and appellate courts which would support their conclusion that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the disputed parcel of land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
No testimonial
evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-interest
had been possessing and occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Hanover’s President and General Manager testified only with respect to
his claim that he was the former owner of the subject property and that he
acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused
the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was
issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot,
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanover’s possession of
the property started in 1990.[12]
The pieces of
documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that its
predecessor’s possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period
or duration required by law. The earliest date of the Tax Declarations
presented in evidence by respondent is 1965, the others being 1973, 1980, 1992
and 1993. Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why the realty
taxes due on the subject property were only paid starting in 1965. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership.[13]
In the present case, the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to
the presumption that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or
possession of the subject lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the
burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show
by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and
occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.[14] Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the
pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the “well-nigh
incontrovertible” proof necessary in cases of this nature.
Lastly, the Court notes that
respondent failed to prove that the subject lot had been declared alienable and
disposable by the DENR Secretary.
The well-entrenched rule is that
all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to
the State.[15] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.[16]
In
the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject
property, Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting that “lot 4488, CAD-545-D,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square
meters, more or less, situated at Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu” was found to be within
“Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 28, per map
2545 of Consolacion, Cebu.” However, this certification is not sufficient.
In Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[17]
this Court held that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable, thus:
x x x The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for
land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable x x x.[18]
In
the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the CENRO
Certification was not confirmed as only the President and General Manager of
respondent corporation identified said Certification submitted by the latter.
It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a
witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.[19]
In the present case, Hanover’s President and General Manager, who identified
the CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He was not the one who
prepared the Certification. The government official who issued the
Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could have testified
regarding its contents. Hence, the RTC
should not have accepted the contents of the Certification as proof of the
facts stated therein. The contents of the Certification are hearsay, because
Hanover’s President and General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth
of the contents of such Certification. Even if the subject Certification is
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.[20]
Moreover, the CENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands.[21]
Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official
publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Respondent, however, failed to
comply with the foregoing requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2005 Decision and
March 30, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077 and
the August 7, 1997 Decision of the
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated June 9, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47.
[2] Rollo, p. 48.
[3]
[4]
[5] G.R. No. 146527, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 247.
[6] G.R. No. 170724, January 29, 2007, 513 SCRA 294, 300-301.
[7] Emphasis supplied.
[8] Emphasis supplied.
[9] Republic v. Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 423, 433.
[10] Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, 548 SCRA 160, 166.
[11] Manila Electric Company v. Vda. de Santiago, G.R. No. 170482, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 315, 321-322. (Emphasis supplied.)
[12] See TSN, February 3, 1997, pp. 2-8.
[13] Spouses Melchor and Saturnina Alde v. Ronald B. Bernal, et al., G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010.
[14] Ong v. Republic, supra note 10, at 168.
[15] Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 486.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]