Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
ANTONIO B. RAMOS (Deceased), Substituted by his Surviving Heirs, namely, MA.
MARGARITA A. RAMOS, ANTONIO A. RAMOS, MA. Petitioners, - versus - people of the and ROGERIO H. ESCOBAL, Respondents. |
|
G.R.
No. 171565 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION,* PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 13, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court challenging: (1)
the July 29, 2005 Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90344,[2]
dismissing outright the petition for review (under Rule 42) filed by petitioner
Antonio B. Ramos; and (2) the February 14, 2006 Resolution[3]
of the same court denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
On
1. I am the lawful assignee of shares of
stock covered by the following stock certificates: (a) Travellers Life Assurance of the
Philippines, Inc. (TLAP) Stock Certificate Nos. 313 and 314, and (b) Travellers
Insurance & Surety Corporation (TRISCO) Stock Certificate Nos. 173 and 174,
by virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed by the respondent Emerito M. Ramos,
Sr. and his wife (my mother) Susana B. Ramos in my favor in August 1994.
x x x x
x x x x x
2. Sometime in August 13, 1996, Gloria Ramos Lagdameo,
EVP/Treasurer of Travellers Insurance & Surety Corporation (TRISCO), and having
been entrusted by Antonio B. Ramos with the safekeeping of the aforesaid stock
certificates turned over the same to Emerito Ramos, Sr. at his insistence, and
as such knew that they were actually indorsed in my name in 1994, as shown in
her affidavit, x x x.[5]
3. After
receiving the said stock certificates,
3.1 the respondents, Emerito M. Ramos, Sr. and Rogerio H. Escobal, conspiring and conniving with one another altered the four (4) aforementioned stock certificates by the erasure of the entry “ANTONIO B. RAMOS” and the superimposition of the type-written entry “E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc.” on the dorsal side of each of the four questioned stock certificates, as supported by the Questioned Documents Report No. 652-998 of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
3.2 The respondent Escobal upon the prodding of
and with the criminal assent of the respondent Ramos, and in his own
handwriting, altered the true date when Susana B. Ramos endorsed both TRISCO
and TLAP Stock Certificate Nos. 174 and 314 making it falsely appear that
Susana B. Ramos indorsed both Stock Certificates with intent to assign
the same on
“January 19, 1998” when in truth Travelers Insurance & Surety Corporation
(TRISCO) Stock Certificate Nos. 173 and 174, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment,
was indorsed in my favor, as early as in August 1994.
x x x x x x x x x
4. The
alteration made on the aforementioned genuine documents by the respondents has
changed the meaning of the same, for their own personal use and benefit, by:
4.1. Making it falsely appear that the assignee of
the questioned stock certificates is “E.M. Ramos & Sons” instead of “Antonio
B. Ramos,” as the lawful and legal assignee of the shares of stock covered by
the aforesaid stock certificates.
4.2. Making it falsely appear that Susana B. Ramos
indorsed both Stock Certificates with intent to assign the same on ‘January 19,
1998’ when she could not have done so because as early as September 1996,
Susana B. Ramos was already physically incapable of signing any documents as
supported by the statement of Alberto Alcancia, Ricardo Deliza and Analia
Ogario, and Maria Cecilia Santiago, and a Medical Summary made on her medical
condition by Martesio C. Perez, M.D., affecting therefore the veracity of the
above document purporting an assignment made by her in favor of “E.M. RAMOS &
SONS, INC.” on the said date.
After the
preliminary investigation, the Investigating Prosecutor issued a Resolution,
dated April 20, 1999,[6]
finding probable cause and recommending that both respondents Emerito M. Ramos,
Sr. and Rogerio H. Escobal be indicted for violation of paragraph 1 of Article 172 in
relation to
paragraph 6
of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[7]
Specifically, Assistant City
Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio pointed
out that:
The first issue to be
resolved is whether or not probable cause exists for falsification of document.
A thorough and careful
examination of the evidence presented would show that there is probable cause
for falsification of documents.
Respondent Emerito Ramos
admitted in his sworn statement that he caused the erasure of the name of the
complainant as the assignee in the dorsal portion of the subject certificates
of stock and superimposed therein the name E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. as the
new assignee.
Respondents tried to justify such action by stating that
complainant failed to comply with the prestation required of him in the Deed of
Assignment executed on 17 August 1994.
In the exercise of [their] right of dominion, as Emerito Ramos Sr. and
Susana Ramos were still the registered owners of subject shares of stocks, complainant’s name was erased and substituted by another
in all four stock certificates.
The defense invoked by the respondents is untenable. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the deed of assignment executed on
There is no showing that this deed of assignment was
later nullified or declared void by failure of the complainant to fulfill his
undertaking as declared in the deed of assignment. On the other hand, respondent Emerito Ramos
Sr. by his own unilateral action, rescinded the contract and subsequently
decided to assign subject shares of stocks to EMRASON. Complainant questioned this action of Emerito
Ramos Sr. and even filed with Securities and Exchange Commission an action for
nullity of assignment of shares and other reliefs (SEC Case No. 03-98-5955).
In the absence of proof that there was [a] valid
rescission of the first Deed of Assignment, [the] validity of the execution of
the Second Deed of Assignment is now placed in question. Respondent Emerito Ramos Sr. could not now
invoke defense that substitution of Antonio Ramos to E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.
was made to speak the truth.
In any case, it was established that respondents made the
alterations as borne out by their sworn statements making them liable for
falsification of documents.
Anent the date “January 19, 1998” in the subject stock
certificates, there appears to be a conflict in relation to the allegations of
the opposing parties. Complainant claims
that respondents erased the original date and superimposed the same with the
date January 19, 1998 making them liable under paragraph (5) (altering true
dates) of Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code. Respondents maintain that prior to
the filling up of the date, there was already a blank space and respondent
Rogerio Escobal was required to fill it up with the date
Complainant failed to have this part of the document examined
by the NBI unlike in the case of the name of the assignee wherein the NBI made
its findings. In the absence of this, it
is safe to assume, as admitted by the respondents themselves, that the date
January 19, 1998 was placed by Rogerio Escobal in a blank space appearing on
said documents. Therefore, violation of
paragraph 6 and not paragraph 5 of Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code was committed.
The second issue to be resolved is whether or not
respondents conspired to commit the offense of falsification of document.
It should be noted that
respondent Rogerio Escobal occupies [a] high position in EMRASON (Senior
Vice-President thereof). As such, he
could have known of the details of the special meeting of the Board of
Directors of EMRASON held on
At the time respondent Rogerio Escobal assigned the
different certificates of stock on April 19, 1998[,] it should be assumed that [,
as witness] he read the contents of the documents before affixing his
signature. Perusal of the documents
would remind him of the subject of [the] special meeting held on January 14, 1998.
Moreover, it was shown by the complainant that it was not
true that it was only [on] 19 January 1998 that respondent Rogerio Escobal saw [the]
subject certificates[,] as he was present along with Col. Nicolas, Mr. &
Mrs. Lagdameo and Mr. Romeo Isidro when the deed of assignment, together with
the indorsement of subject stocks certificates[,] were executed in
complainant’s favor in August 1994.
In fine, complainant was able to establish by sufficient
evidence that respondents conspired with one another in erasing his name as
assignee in subject stock certificates and substituted it with E.M. RAMOS &
SONS, INC.[,] and placing the date January 19, 1998 as the date of execution of
the first deed of assignment[,] in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 172 in
relation to paragraph 6 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that both respondents be indicted
for violation of above-mentioned provisions of law.
Corollarily,
four (4) separate Informations,[8]
charging private respondents Emerito Ramos, Sr. and Rogerio H. Escobal with the
crime of Falsification of Commercial Document under paragraph 1 of Article 172
in relation to paragraph 6 of Article 171 of the RPC, were filed. Those were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 94961-94964, and raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
When these cases were called for
arraignment and pre-trial, counsel for the accused manifested that an Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss the cases against Ramos, Sr. had been filed on the ground
that he already passed away. Counsel
also moved for the deferment of the arraignment of the other accused, Rogerio
Escobal (Escobal), considering
that there was, before the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor, a pending
Motion for Reconsideration[9]
of the Resolution (dated April 20, 1999) recommending
the filing of these cases. The MeTC
denied the latter motion and ordered the entry of a plea of NOT guilty because private
respondent refused to enter a plea.[10]
The Motion for Reconsideration presented
two (2) issues, to wit: (1) whether or not probable
cause exists for falsification of document; and (2) whether or
not respondents conspired to commit the offense of falsification of document.[11]
Anent the first issue,
private respondent Escobal argued that Article 1191[12]
of the Civil Code finds application. He
explained that on the basis of the said provision, private respondent Ramos,
Sr. cannot be held criminally liable for the consequences of the performance of
a lawful act, i.e., the rescission of the Deed of Assignment executed earlier
in favor of complainant (petitioner Ramos), who failed to comply with the
prestations required of him under the Deed, which rescission necessarily
resulted in the cancellation or erasure of the name of complainant as assignee
in the subject stock certificates.
As regards the second issue,
private respondent Escobal averred that conspiracy was NOT proved as the
crime itself through clear and convincing evidence.
On November 23, 1999, the Office of
the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution[13]
granting the Motion for Reconsideration and recommending that the Informations
against both accused be withdrawn. The
Office of the City Prosecutor made the following explanations:
(1) The Deed of Assignment executed on August
17, 1994 clearly indicated the obligation of complainant (petitioner Ramos) to
transfer his one-tenth (1/10) share in the real properties located in North
Susana and North Olympus subdivisions and one-tenth (1/10) portion in the
undivided one-hectare, all in Quezon City.
Apparently, the stock certificates were purposely placed in the custody
of TRISCO Executive Vice President Gloria R. Lagdameo. No evidence showing that
the assignment has been recorded in the company’s stock and transfer book.
Respondent E. Ramos, therefore, has the authority to rescind the contract
unilaterally in the exercise of a right granted under Article 1191 of the New
Civil Code.
(2) Respondent E. Ramos, having acted in good
faith, never denied authorship of the cancellation or erasure. He even placed his signatures to indicate that
he was the one who caused the erasures. Hence,
in so doing he acted without malice. Generally, the word alteration has
inherent in it the idea of deception of making the instrument speak something
which the parties did not intend to speak. To be an alteration in violation of the law,
it must be one “which causes the instrument to speak a language different in
legal effect from that which it originally spoke.” In this case, complainant ceased to be the
assignee of the certificates of stock, the corrections made by respondent
speaks only of the truth.
(3) As it appears that the liability of
respondent Rogerio Escobal only depends on the criminal liability of Ernesto
Ramos, there is no reason for further prosecution.
On
Petitioner appealed before the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and
on February 15, 2002, the DOJ sustained the November 23, 1999 Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.[15]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.[16]
On March 14, 2003, the MeTC of
The
MeTC
enumerated the elements
of falsification of commercial documents under paragraph 6 of Article 171 of
the RPC. Thus:
1. That there be an alteration (change) or
intercalation (insertion) on a document;
2. That it was made on a genuine document;
3. That the alteration or intercalation has
changed the meaning of the document; and
4. That the change made the document speak
something false.
The
MeTC
ruled that the referred
alterations committed by accused E. Ramos in changing the name of the indorsee
of the stock certificates from that of the complainant Antonio Ramos to E.M.
RAMOS & SONS, INC., could not be considered as the falsification
contemplated by the law as the change did not make the document speak something
false. The commercial documents subject
of these cases were admittedly altered by the accused Ramos, Sr., purposely to
correct the inequity brought about by the failure of petitioner Ramos to comply
with what was incumbent upon him under their agreement.
The private prosecutors filed a Motion
for Reconsideration.[18]
Private respondent Escobal filed his
Comment/Opposition.[19]
Private prosecutors, thereafter, filed their Reply.[20]
On
On
(a)
THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION WHEN SHE ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
INSTANT CASE FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE DESPITE HER PREVIOUS DETERMINATION OF
THE EXISTENCE THEREOF WHEN SHE ISSUED A WARRANT OF ARREST.
(b)
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER
DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE UNDUE INTERFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITH
THE INSTANT CASE AFTER HAVING ALREADY MADE A PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST
(c)
THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE’S BASELESS DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT CASE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE
PROSECUTION’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.”[23]
On January 3, 2005, the RTC of
On June 8, 2005, the RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner.[26]
Petitioner then sought relief from the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner assailed the January 3, 2005 Decision and
the June 8, 2005 Resolution of the RTC.
In its challenged July 29, 2005
Resolution,[27]
the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the petition filed by petitioner. Specifically, the Court of Appeals pointed out
that:
“x x x a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure may be availed of
only if the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court was rendered in the
exercise of the latter’s appellate jurisdiction, such as when a
plaintiff files an action for ejectment or sum of money, etc. before the
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court against a defendant and said court
renders judgment thereon. If the losing
party appeals the decision of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court to the
Regional Trial Court and the latter exercising its appellate court, affirms or
reverses the decision, then a petition for review filed by the losing party
before this Court under Rule 42 of the revised Rules on Civil Procedure is in
order.
However, in the case at
bench, it clearly appears that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City that
renders the assailed Decision of
In the other challenged Resolution
dated February 14, 2006,[28]
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, this petition under Rule 45
challenging the above Resolutions of the Court of Appeals anchored on the
following grounds:[29]
(A)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED UNDER RULE 42 OF THE 1997
REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS A PROPER
MODE TO QUESTION THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS.
(B)
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED UNDER RULE 42 OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL
(C)
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE THE PETITION FOR
(D)
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON THE MERITS
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PATENT ERROR COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
94961 TO 94964 ON THE SOLE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, THEREBY SANCTIONING AN ABDICATION OF JUDICIAL DUTY AND JURISDICTION.
(E)
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW DESPITE THE
PALPABLE ERROR COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94961 TO 94964
FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING ITS EXISTENCE.[30]
The grounds raised by the petitioner boil down to one basic
issue ¾ whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition under Rule 42 filed by herein petitioner before it.
We resolve
the issue in the negative.
The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition
outright. Under the Rules, appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be
by petition for review under Rule 42.[31]
What was filed by the petitioner before the RTC was a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
It has long been settled that certiorari, as a
special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction
of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and
independent action that is not part of the
trial or the proceedings of the complaint filed before the trial court.[32] The petition for certiorari,
therefore, before the RTC is a separate and distinct action from the criminal
cases resolved by the MeTC.
It is true that litigation is not a game
of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly
followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that
the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural
rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.[33]
In this case, there was nary a cogent reason to depart from the general rule.
Indeed,
the ground alone that petitioner resorted to an improper remedy, makes the
petition dismissible and undeserving of the Court’s attention.
Even
if the Court glosses over such infirmity, the
petition should nonetheless be dismissed for lack of substantive merit.
Once
a criminal action has been instituted by the filing of the Information with the
court, the latter acquires jurisdiction and has the authority to determine
whether to dismiss the case or convict or acquit the accused. Where the
prosecution is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish the
guilt of an accused, it cannot be faulted for moving for the withdrawal of the
Information. However, in granting or denying the motion to withdraw, the
court must judiciously evaluate the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no
satisfactory evidence against the accused and this conclusion can only be
reached after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution.[34] In this case, the trial court had sufficiently
explained the reasons for granting the motion for the withdrawal of the
Information. The Court agrees with the dispositions
made by the trial court. Corollarily,
the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition (under Rule 65)
filed by petitioner challenging the ruling of the MeTC.
It bears emphasizing that when the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor
to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary
of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of compliance to or
defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice, but in sound and
faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. The trial court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The rule applies to a motion to
withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after the arraignment of the accused.[35]
The prior determination of probable cause by the trial court
does not in any way bar a contrary finding upon reassessment of the evidence
presented before it.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July 29, 2005 and February
14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional member in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated June 16, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 81-84.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam, with Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao concurring.
[3] Rollo, pp. 86-88.
[4]
[5] Annex “B” of Complaint-Affidavit.
[6] Rollo, pp. 103-107.
[7] “Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. – The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
x x x x x x x x x.”
“Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 shall be imposed upon any officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x x x x x x x
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
x x x x x x x x x.”
[8] Rollo, pp. 108-115.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] ART. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment , if the latter should become impossible.
x x x x x x x x x.
[13] Rollo, pp. 128-130.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] 235 Phil. 465 (1987).
[26] Rollo, p. 502.
[27]
[28]
[29] After the relevant
pleadings have been filed, this Court has directed the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda (Rollo, pp. 929-930).
Private respondent Escobal filed his Memorandum (Rollo, pp.
1027-1052). The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), manifested that it is adopting its Comment dated
[30] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[31]
SECTION 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[32] San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association.
Inc. v. The City of
[33] Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 603 (2001).
[34] Fuentes v. The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 139618, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 478.
[35] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 25.