Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and MARIA
CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION
(TRANSCO), Respondents, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro
City), and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioner, -
versus
- DEMETRIA CACHO, represented by alleged Heirs DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL
and/or TEOFILO CACHO, AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and LAND
TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City), and LAND TRADE REALTY
CORPORATION as represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina, Respondents, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x LAND TRADE REALTY
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - DEMETRIA CONFESOR
VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x TEOFILO CACHO and/or ATTY. GODOFREDO
CABILDO, Petitioner, -
versus - DEMETRIA
CONFESOR VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
170375
G.R. No. 170505
G.R. Nos. 173355-56
G.R. No. 173401
G.R. Nos. 173563-64
G.R. No. 178779 G.R. No. 178894 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2010
|
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I
S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before
the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court,
respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation,
ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way
of consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and
65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of
Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106,
particularly, the: (1) Resolution[1]
dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation
of the Republic for the latter’s failure to implead indispensable parties and
forum shopping; and (2) Resolution[2] dated
October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the
Republic.
G.R.
Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, where Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or
Atty. Godofredo Cabildo
assail the
Decision[3]
dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution[4]
dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[5]
dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 (RTC-Branch 3) of
G.R.
No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE urges the Court to
reverse and set aside the Decision[6]
dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714
and 85841. The appellate court annulled
several issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5) of
Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil Case No. 6613,
specifically, the: (1) Order[7]
dated August 9, 2004 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of
LANDTRADE; (2) Writ of Execution[8] dated
August 10, 2004; (3) two Notices of Garnishment[9]
both dated August 11, 2004, and (4) Notification[10]
dated August 11, 2004. These issuances
of the RTC-Branch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution pending appeal of the
Decision[11] dated
February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of
Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF,
the ejectment case said corporation instituted against the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
G.R.
Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed separately by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. Both Petitions seek to annul the Resolution[12]
dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1) granted the Omnibus Motion of
LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ of execution and the designation of a
special sheriff for the enforcement of the Decision[13]
dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613, and (2)
denied the applications of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December 12, 2005 of
RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision dated February 17,
2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, favoring LANDTRADE.
G.R. No.
173401 involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Republic, which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the
following issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4) of Iligan
City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order[14]
dated December 13, 2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686; and
(2) Order[15] dated
May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
I
THE PRECEDING CASES
The consolidated seven cases have
for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho
v. Government of the United States[16] (1914 Cacho case).
The 1914 Cacho Case
Sometime in the early
1900s, the late Doña Demetria Cacho (Doña Demetria) applied for the
registration of two parcels of land: (1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the
smaller parcel with an area of 3,635
square meters or 0.36 hectares (Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II-3732, the
larger parcel with an area of 378,707
square meters or 37.87
hectares (Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was then the
The
application in GLRO Record No. 6908
covered
The
application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved
Only
the Government opposed Doña Demetria’s applications for registration on the
ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the
On
December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in
GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
Based
on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings in GLRO Record No. 6908:
6th. The court is convinced from the proofs that
the small parcel of land sold by the
Moro woman Alanga was the home of herself and her husband, Darondon, and was
their conjugal property; and the court so finds.
x x x x
As we have seen,
the deed on which applicant’s title to the small parcel rests, is executed only
by the Moro woman Alanga, wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either
by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the Philippine Islands. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto
Darondon, is alive yet, and before
admitting this parcel to registration it is ordered that a deed from Datto
Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented, renouncing all his rights in the
small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant.[17]
(Emphases supplied.)
In GLRO Record No. 6909, the LRC observed
and concluded that:
A tract of land 37
hectares in area, which is the extent of the land under discussion, is larger
than is cultivated ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands
of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is
not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all
his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in
question. x x x
x x x x
The court is also convinced from the
proofs that the small portion in the
southern part of the larger parcel, where, according to the proofs, Datto
Anandog had his house and where there still exist some cocos and fruit trees, was the home of the said Moro Datto Anandog;
and the court so finds. As to the rest of the large parcel the
court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay established. According to his own declaration his
residence on this land commenced only a few days before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he is
supposed to have planted had not yet begun to bear fruit at the time of the
sale, and were very small. Datto Duroc
positively denies that Bunglay lived on the land, and it clearly appears that
he was not on the land when it was first occupied by the military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have planted
the three mango trees by the roadside near point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the rest of this
parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by Datto Anandog, was land claimed by Datto
Duroc and also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos as a part of their
general jurisdiction, and that it is the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits
the sale of, by the dattos, without the express approval of the
Government.
It is also found that Datto Bunglay is
the nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman Alanga, grantor of the
small parcel, is the sister of Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue.
x x x x
It appears also that according to the
provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of the ‘Luwaran Code’ of
the Moros, the Moro woman Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by
her deceased brother, Datto Anandog. By
article LXXXV, section 3, of the ‘Luwaran Code,’ it will be seen that the
brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion
of the more distant relatives. Therefore
Datto Bunglay had no legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the
applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho. But the
Moro woman, Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the applicant without
having made any claim to the land, the court finds from this fact that she has
ratified the sale made by her nephew.
The
court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner of the
portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the
southern part of the large parcel object of expediente
No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in
said case is denied. And it is ordered
that a new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented,
excluding all the land not occupied and cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said
survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30th
day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the
Division of the Philippines.
On the 8th day of December,
the court was at
The LRC
additionally decreed at the end of its December 10, 1912 Decision:
It is further ordered that one-half of
the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the
Government of the
Apparently
dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doña Demetria appealed to this
Court. In its Decision dated December
10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto
the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact
of the court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during
trial.
Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the
Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of
Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals[20] (1997 Cacho case).
The 1997 Cacho Case
On June
29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doña Demetria’s son
and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two
original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909.
Teofilo’s
petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the
City of
Acting
on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and
NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilo’s petition for reconstitution of
titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the
titles sought to be restored. According
to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of decrees
since “it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and
18969, respectively, were issued.”
Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his
amended petition, but the RTC refused.
When elevated to this Court in Cacho
v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved to remand the
case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilo’s
amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees.
In
opposing Teofilo’s petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered
from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real
party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doña Demetria was
not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were
ever issued in Doña Demetria’s name; and that the issuance of the decrees was
dubious and irregular.
After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilo’s petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the issuance of Decree No. 10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of concerned officials. The original issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and
dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because:
(1) re-issuance of Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 could not be made
in the absence of the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case; (2) the heir of a
registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of the property and
title thereto by laches; and (3) Teofilo failed to establish his identity and
existence and that he was a real party-in-interest.
Teofilo
then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997
Cacho case. The Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC
approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact
been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner,
Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the
then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA).
The Court further reasoned that:
[T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling
as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a
derogation of the doctrine of res
judicata. Significantly, the
issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the
issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land
Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final
judgment. It is also worth noting that
the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without
the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the
presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before
March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in
GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge
on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon
which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring
the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree
would render the finality attained by the Cacho
vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the
resulting decree are res judicata,
and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature
of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an
impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of
registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.[21]
As to
the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled doctrine that laches
cannot bar the issuance of a decree. A
final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious
by the statute of limitations nor by laches.
Anent
the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real
party-in-interest, the Court found that these were sufficiently established by
the records. The Court relied on
Teofilo’s Affidavit of Adjudication as Doña Demetria’s sole heir, which he
executed before the Philippine Consulate General in
In the
Resolution dated July 28, 1997,[22]
the Court denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and NSC.
As a
result of the 1997 Cacho case, the
decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued
for the two parcels of land in Doña Demetria’s name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was based on re-issued
Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908, while OCT No.
0-1201 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219465 in GLRO Record No.
6909.
THE
ANTECENT FACTS
The
dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels
of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency
of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case,
G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case, G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894;
(3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution
pending appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of
Titles and Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401.
These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via
the present Petitions. In the Resolution[23] dated
October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that
they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues.
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No.
170375)
The Complaint for Expropriation was
originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now
the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s
mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to
RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 2729[24]
dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel
industry in the
On
November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,[25]
reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in
When
the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No.
106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to
sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the
Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the
alternative, for the substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106 was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron
and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals[26] (ISA case), the Court remanded the case
to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow the substitution of the Republic
for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment
was made in the ISA case on August
31, 1998. In an Order[27]
dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the
Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in
the 1997 Cacho case encroached and
overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed
with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated
October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated
September 28, 2004[28]
seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and
their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to
file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic
was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the
Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period
of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an
independent action to revive the judgment.
MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six
years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the
action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on
the ground of estoppel by laches.
In its
Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated
November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic
for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the
RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit
its Supplemental Complaint. The
RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for
execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such
motion for execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order
dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for
ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable
parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution
by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same
parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued
a Resolution[29] on July
12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge
Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the
expropriation of the subject parcels of land.
Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed
against the owner of the land subject thereof.
In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States
x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of
the late Doña Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to
the question of ownership thereof. Since
MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in
this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed.
This Court notes that the Republic [has filed
reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of
land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4.
[The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its “Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping” attached to its Supplemental Complaint
dated September 28, 2004. [It is
therefore] guilty of forum shopping.
Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts
ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an
inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of
justice.[30]
The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005,
insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge
Mangatora in a Resolution[31] dated October
24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the
Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the
Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R.
Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Demetria
Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18, 1998, a Petition[32]
for Quieting of Title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the Register of Deeds
of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 and raffled to RTC-Branch
3.
In
the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the late Doña
Demetria’s sole surviving heir, entitled to the parcels of land covered by OCT
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.).
She averred that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal
(Francisco) and Fidela Arellano Confesor.
Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Doña
Demetria.
AZIMUTH,
for its part, filed the Petition as Vidal’s successor-in-interest with respect
to a 23-hectare portion of the subject parcels of land pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998 and Deed of Conditional Conveyance
dated August 13, 2004, which Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH.
Teofilo
opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause of action because there
was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a
third party, and Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial ownership of the
parcels of land in question; that the matter and issues raised in the Petition
had already been tried, heard, and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and
affirmed with finality by this Court in the 1997
Cacho case; and that the
Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches.
LANDTRADE,
among other parties, was allowed by the RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case
No. 4452. LANDTRADE alleged that it is
the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land, measuring 270,255 square meters or about 27.03
hectares, which it purportedly acquired through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty.
Cabildo. LANDTRADE essentially argued
that Vidal's right as heir should be adjudicated upon in a separate and
independent proceeding and not in the instant Quieting of Title Case.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties
manifested that there was no possibility of any amicable settlement among
them.
Vidal
and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial
before the RTC-Branch 3. Teofilo and
Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all
during the trial, while LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to have
waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim.
On July
17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision[33]
in Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the petitioners and against the respondents and intervenors:
1)
DECLARING:
a.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the sole
surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho;
b.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal alone
has the hereditary right to and interest in the Subject Property;
c.) Petitioner Azimuth International
Development Corporation is the successor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria C.
Vidal to a portion of the Subject Property to the extent provided in their 2
April 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 13 August 1998 Deed of Conditional
Conveyance;
d.)
Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not a son or heir of the late Dona Demetria
Cacho; and
e.)
Respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and any of their
transferees/assignees have no valid right to or interest in the Subject
Property.
2)
ORDERING:
a.)
Respondent Register of Deeds of Iligan City, and any other person acting
in his behalf, stop, cease and desist:
i)
From accepting or registering any affidavit of self- adjudication or any
other document executed by respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or
any other person which in any way transfers the title to the Subject Property
from Dona Demetria Cacho to respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or
any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
ii)
From cancelling the OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject
Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title,
and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondents Teofilo
Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo their transferees/assignees, including the
intervenors.
b)
Respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo, their
transferees/assignees, and any other person acting in their behalf, to stop,
cease and desist:
i) From executing, submitting to any
Register of Deeds, or registering or causing to be registered therein, any
affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document which in any way transfers
title to the Subject Property from Demetria Cacho to respondents Teofilo Cacho,
Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the
intervenors.
ii) From canceling or causing the
cancellation of OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in
the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from
issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondent Teofilo Cacho,
Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the
intervenors.
iii) From claiming or representing in any
manner that respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of Demetria Cacho or
has rights to or interest in the Subject Property.
3) ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and
Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, the
following:
a)
For temperate damages - P 80,000.00
b) For nominal damages - P 60,000.00
c) For moral damages - P500,000.00
d) For exemplary damages - P
500,000.00
e)
For attorney's fees (ACCRA Law)-P1,000,000.00
f) For Attorney's fees - P500,000.00
(Atty.
Voltaire Rovira)
g) For litigation expenses - P300,000.00
For lack of factual and legal basis, the
counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo is hereby dismissed.
Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor
IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the petitioners succeeded in
proving their cause of action.
On the cross-claim of intervenor
IDD/Investa, respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo are ORDERED
to pay IDD/Investa, jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036 with
15% interest per annum.
For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim
of Intervenor Landtrade Realty Development Corporation is dismissed.
Likewise, Intervenor Manguera's
counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis.[34]
The
joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo with the Court of
Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00456.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[35]
of January 19, 2007, affirmed in toto
the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3.
According to the Court of Appeals, the
RTC-Branch 3 did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal’s status, filiation,
and hereditary rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the
subject properties. It was indubitable
that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo and juridical
personality of LANDTRADE as they both filed their Answers to the Petition for
Quieting of Title thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of said trial court. Likewise, the
Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within the jurisdiction of the
RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its
jurisdiction. Moreover, Teofilo and
LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to assail the
jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 at the first opportunity and even actively
participating in the trial of the case and seeking affirmative reliefs.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho case only determined the
validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed
before the Philippine Consulate General in the
The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of
the RTC-Branch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly supports Vidal’s
claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doña
Demetria. The appellate court further
adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject
parcels of land. The prescriptive period
for real actions over immovables is 30 years.
Vidal’s rights as Doña Demetria’s successor-in-interest accrued upon the
latter’s death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already
filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidal’s cause of action had not yet
prescribed. And, where the action was
filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine of laches
was also inapplicable.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution[36] of
the same court.
On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed
with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo
and Atty. Cabildo filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 178894.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the
Unlawful Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two
parcels of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan City, denominated as
Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36 hectares) and
3,177 square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power
sub-station, known as the Overton Sub-station, while on
Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the
Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located, LANDTRADE filed with the
MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo,
two parcels of land at Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, P450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of the first extra-judicial
demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the subject properties.
In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO
denied the material allegations in the Complaint and countered, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res
judicata; that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to sue.
On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its
Decision[39]
in favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC
disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land
Trade Realty Corporation represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina and against
defendant National Power Corporation represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio
M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by its President Dr. Allan T.
Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A. Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional Center,
Ma. Cristina,
1. Defendants National Power Corporation and
TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any person/s acting on its behalf
or under its authority to vacate the premises;
2.
Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily:
a.
Php500,000.00 a month representing fair rental value or compensation since June
29, 1978 until defendant shall have vacated the premises;
b. Php20,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees and
c. Cost of suit.
Execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and executed in favor of
the plaintiff, to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time
of judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal,
defendants deposit with the appellate court the amount of P500,000.00
per month, as reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises for the
preceding month or period on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month
or period.[40]
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice
of Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6613, was initially assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over
by Judge Maximino Magno Libre (Judge Libre).
LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for
Execution, asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither filed a supersedeas
bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the RTC the monthly rental
for the properties in question, so as to stay the immediate execution pending
appeal of the MTCC judgment. However,
the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing under Rule
15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
LANDTRADE then filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of
Hearing.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint
Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan
v. Marayag,[41]
in which the Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings
in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to
possession of the subject parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in its
favor by Teofilo on October 1, 1996, the ejectment case should be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same
properties are in issue, i.e., (1)
Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated
October 1, 1996 filed by Teofilo against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch
4; and (2) Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case filed by Vidal and
AZIMUTH against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3.
LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for
Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion to Suspend
Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
After said hearing, the RTC-Branch 5 directed the parties to file their
memoranda on the two pending Motions.
LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the
pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, should not
preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Case
because the issue involved in the latter was only the material possession or possession de facto of the parcels of
land in question. LANDTRADE also
reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the action for annulment of the Deed of Sale
dated October 1, 1996 instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that
the RTC-Branch 4 had approved the Compromise Agreement executed between
LANDTRADE and Teofilo.
NAPOCOR
and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement to
its Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the Decision
rendered on July 17, 2004 by the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452, the
Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the
predecessor-in-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the subject
parcels of land. Resultantly, the right
of LANDTRADE to the two properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was
effectively declared as non-existent too.
On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an Order[42] denying the Joint Motion
to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The RTC held that the pendency of other actions involving the same
parcels of land could not stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment
because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed to post the required bond and pay the
monthly rentals.
Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch
5 issued another Order[43]
granting the Motion of LANDTRADE for execution of the MTCC judgment
pending appeal.
The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk
of Court, Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal[44] which directed Sheriff IV
Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to execute the MTCC Decision dated February
17, 2004.
A
day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two Notices of Garnishment[45] addressed to PNB and Land
Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects,
stocks, interests in stocks and shares, and any other personal properties
belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by and under the
possession and control of said banks. On
even date, Sheriff Borres also issued a Notification[46] to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO
for them to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums
of (a) P156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the
said properties, computed at P500,000.00 per month, beginning June 29,
1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and (b) P20,000.00
as attorney's fees.
Thereafter,
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro
City a Petition for Certiorari, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction. The
Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85174 and 85841, were eventually
consolidated.
The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a
TRO[47] enjoining the enforcement
and implementation of the Order of Execution and Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5 and Notices of Garnishment and Notification of
Sheriff Borres.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[48]
dated November 23, 2005, determined that public respondents did commit grave
abuse of discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC
judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally excused from
complying with the requirements for a stay of execution specified in Rule 70,
Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas
bond and periodic deposits of rental payments.
The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states:
ACCORDINGLY,
the two petitions at bench are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the Writ
of Execution Pending Appeal dated 10 August 2004, the two Notices of
Garnishment dated 11 August 2004, and the Notification dated 11 August 2004,
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.[49]
Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this
Court on January 10, 2006 via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505.
In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre
and the inhibition[50]
of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new presiding judge of RTC-Branch 5, Civil Case
No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge
Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated
on December 12, 2005 a Decision[51]
in Civil Case No. 6613 which affirmed in
toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF
favoring LANDTRADE.
NAPOCOR
and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin Motions, namely: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Mangotara. The
RTC-Branch 1 denied both Motions in a Resolution dated January 30, 2006.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals
separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889,
respectively. In a Resolution dated March
24, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO.
With
the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May 23, 2006, NAPOCOR
filed on May 15, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation and Motion
praying for the resolution of its application for preliminary injunction.
On
May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of Appeals granted the
motions for extension of time to file a consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE filed an Omnibus
Motion seeking the issuance of (1) a writ of execution pending appeal, and (2)
the designation of a special sheriff in accordance with Rule 70, Section 21 of
the Rules of Court.
In a
Resolution[52] dated June 30, 2006, the Court of
Appeals granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and denied the applications for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect, the appellate court authorized the
execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by the RTC-Branch
1, thus:
IN LIGHT OF
THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]’s omnibus
motion for execution pending appeal of the decision rendered in its favor which
is being assailed in these consolidated petitions for review. Accordingly, the [NAPOCOR and TRANSCO’s]
respective applications for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction are both
denied for lack of factual and legal bases.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Iligan City, which at
present has the custody of the records of the case a quo, is hereby
ordered to cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to its
decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case No. 11475-AF.[53]
On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a
Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an urgent plea for a TRO,
docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On
August 2, 2006, TRANSCO filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
173563-64.
On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a Resolution[54]
dated July 26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO,[55]
effective immediately, which enjoined public and private respondents from
implementing the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the
MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
On
July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, contending therein that Vidal was the
lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case as
confirmed in the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case
No. 4452. In a Resolution dated
September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the Motion of
Vidal and AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion pending the
submission of such comments.
The Cancellation of
Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R.
No. 173401)
On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a
Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and
Reversion against the late Doña Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs,
Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
6686, was raffled to the RTC-Branch 4.
The
Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.)
and the reversion of the parcels of land covered thereby to the Government based
on the following allegations in its Complaint, under the heading “Cause of
Action”:
5. On October 15, 1998, Original
Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) were issued
in the name of “Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased…” consisting of a total
area of Three Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707)
square meters and Three Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five (3,635) square
meters, respectively, situated in Iligan City, x x x
x x x x
6. The afore-stated titles were issued in
implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909
dated December 10, 1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in Cacho v.
Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616 (December 10, 1914),
7. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos.
6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were issued, did not grant the entire area
applied for therein. x x x
x x x x
9. As events turned out, the titles issued
in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 – i.e. OCT Nos. 0-1200
(a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) – cover property MUCH LARGER in area than that granted
by the land registration court in its
corresponding decision, supra.
10. While the LRC Decision, as affirmed by
the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the southern part of the 37.87
hectare land subject of LRC (GLRO)
Record Case No. 6909, the ENTIRE
37.87 hectares is indicated as the property covered by OCT 0-1200
(a.f.). Worse, OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.)
made reference to Case No. 6908 as
basis thereof, yet, the decision in said case is clear:
(i)
The
parcel “object of Case No. 6908 is small”
(Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, p. 619)
(ii)
“The
parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares…”
11. More significantly, the technical
description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200 (a.f.) specifies the
date of survey as “August 31 to September 1, 1910,” which is EARLIER than the
date the Supreme Court, in Cacho
supra, resolved LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 (involving 37.87 hectares). In resolving the application involving the 37.87 hectares, the Honorable Supreme
Court declared that only the southern
part of the 37.87 hectare property applied for is granted and that a new survey specifying the “southern
part” thereof should be submitted.
Accordingly, any survey involving the “granted southern part” should
bear a date subsequent to the December 10, 1914 Supreme Court decision. x x x
x x x x
12. The Honorable Supreme Court further
declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 was reserved:
“Final decision in these case is reserved
until the presentation of the … new plan.” (28 Phil. 616, p. 631;
Underscoring supplied)
In other words, as of December 10, 1914,
when the Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on appeal in LRC (GLRO)
Record No. 6909, “final decision” of the case was still reserved until the
presentation of a new plan. The metes and bounds of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.)
could not have been the technical description of the property granted by the
court – described as “the southern part of the large parcel object of
expediente 6909 only” (Cacho vs.
Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617, 629). As earlier stated, the technical description
appearing in said title was the result of a survey conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court
decision was rendered in 1914.
13. In the same vein, Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 as the basis thereof (see front page of OCT No. 0-1201
(a.f.)). Yet, the technical description
makes, as its reference,
14. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos.
6908 and 6909 has become final and executory, and it cannot be modified, much
less result in an increased area of the property decreed therein.
x
x x x
16. In sum, Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are null and void since the
technical descriptions vis-à-vis the areas of the parcels of land covered
therein went beyond the areas granted by the land registration court in LRC
(GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.[56]
Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss
dated December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of
action; (2) assuming arguendo that
the Republic has a cause of action, its Complaint failed to state a cause of
action; (3) assuming arguendo that
the Republic has a cause of action, the same is barred by prior judgment; (4)
assuming further that the Republic has a cause of action, the same was
extinguished by prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.
Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4
issued an Order[57] dated
October 4, 2005, declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty.
Cabildo, in default since they failed to submit their respective answers to the
Complaint despite the proper service of summons upon them.
LANDTRADE subsequently filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also moved for the setting aside and
reconsideration of the Order of Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4
on October 20, 2005.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an
Order[58] dismissing the Complaint of the
Republic in Civil Case No. 6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and
AZIMUTH.
The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had
no cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doña Demetria
committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the
Republic. Doña Demetria had sufficiently
proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC
in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. On
the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of
land. The Regalian doctrine does not
apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doña Demetria and
segregated from the mass of the public domain.
The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic
failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the Republic – i.e., the absence of a new survey plan
and deed, the titles covered properties with much larger area than that granted
by the LRC – had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case. Also, the
Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles
registered and that the Director of Lands requested the reversion of the
subject parcels of land.
The
RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case already decreed the
registration of the parcels of land in the late Doña Demetria’s name and the 1997 Cacho case settled that there was
no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first case have not
been complied with.
The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the
cause of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or extinguished by
prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree,
which prescribes a one-year period within which to file an action for the
review of a decree of registration.
Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic
guilty of forum shopping because there is between this case, on one hand, and
the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of parties, as well as
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming
rights of ownership over the same parcels of land.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTC-Branch 4
in its Order[59] dated
May 16, 2006.
Assailing the Orders dated
December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on
August 11, 2006 a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 173401.
ISSUES
AND DISCUSSIONS
Expropriation
Case
(G.R. No.
170375)
The
Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July
12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made
the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 106
CONSIDERING THAT:
(a)
THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
(b)
AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT
THAT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIALLY
INDISPENSABLE;
(c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM SHOPPING
WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686
WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF THE
Filing of consolidated petitions under both
Rules 45 and 65
At the outset, the Court notes that
the Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and
Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The Republic explains that it filed the
Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals[61]
(MWSS case).
The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS
case to justify its mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the pronouncements
of this Court in said case out of context.
The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the right to
remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under both
Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as
respondent. The court which rendered the
judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or
respondent. The Court, however, also
acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant
would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in
which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or
respondent. While the Court may have
stated that in such an instance, “the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65,” the Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both
Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed.
The
Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the distinction
between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez
v. GSIS Family Bank,[62] the Court elucidated:
In Ligon
v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as
“an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,” this Court, in frowning over
what it described as a “chimera,”
reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between
Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide.
However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best
reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of
judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
But in
the same case, the Court also held that:
This
Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of
Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review.[63]
It is
apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode
of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are
two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor
successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed
on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for
extension of time to file its petition.
The Court, in a Resolution[64] dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic
a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic
was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period.
Hierarchy of courts
The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
According
to Rule 41, Section 2(c)[65] of the Rules of Court, a
decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition
raises only questions of law.[66]
A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted.[67] A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation.[68]
Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure
questions of law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been
dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum
shopping. Thus,
the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.
The Court shall now consider the propriety of the
dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the
Republic.
The proper parties in the expropriation
proceedings
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA
as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this
Court in the ISA case. The
dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:
WHEREFORE, for
all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to
the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the
expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the
substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel
Authority for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.[69]
The ISA case had already become final and
executory, and entry of judgment was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November
16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a
motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or
other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ.[70] The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch
1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment
of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of
execution superfluous.
Besides, no substantive right was violated by the
voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case
even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced
the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While
it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously
observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural
lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the
orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek
which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties.[71]
The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any
remedy from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order already became
final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set aside on the
ground of “honest mistake.”
The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the
expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to
be expropriated. The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since the
exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private land
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a
complaint for expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land
sought to be expropriated.
The
Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest, impleaded as
a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or
occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its
ownership of the said properties. In addition,
the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action.
Rule
67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court[72]
described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The
complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing
of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning
or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein,
showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
For sure, defendants in
an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be
expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner
alone. As this Court held in De
Knecht v. Court of Appeals[74]:
The
defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all
other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain,
the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation.
In the American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’ when employed in statutes
relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties
to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an
executory contract. Every person having
an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share
in the award. If a person claiming an
interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given
the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of the filing of the
Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over
the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277[75]
dated November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands
reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,
also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by
the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related
facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in
the same Letter of Instruction that:
(1) NSC
shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government,
for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy
rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per
square meter or equivalent to the assessed value thereof (as determined by the
City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option
to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures, equipment, machinery and
other facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a
price equivalent to the fair market value thereof as appraised by the Asian
Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC.
(2) In
the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise
its authority under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate
the expropriation of the aforementioned occupancy
rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the plant, structures,
equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and
thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the properties, subject to bonding
and other requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)
Being the occupant of the parcel of
land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in
Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1
evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for
not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by
the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been
filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s
of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for
misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SEC.
11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just.
Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately. (Emphasis supplied.)
MCFC contends that the aforequoted
rule does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be
expropriated, is an indispensable party.
An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.[76]
Now, is
the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when “title to the
property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
To
recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels
of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the
Republic. Letter of Instructions No.
1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the
property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for
Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.
Assuming for the sake of argument that
the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation
proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate
dismissal of the complaint for expropriation.
In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos,[77] the Court applied
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an
indispensable party, viz:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's
failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this
case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the
alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the
Court, the Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in
the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the
parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 – sought leave of court to file a
Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the
Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original
Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC.
Forum
shopping
The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in
finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously
instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil
Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent
positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the
expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the
reversion case.
There
is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case
No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation
Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint
for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion[78]
dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13,
2004. The records, however, do not show
when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation[79]
dated September 28, 2004 was filed with the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for
Expropriation was filed after the
Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the Republic mentioned
in the former the fact of filing of the latter.[80] Even then, the Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping[81]
attached to the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the
filing of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the
Court finds that the Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both
Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang,[82] the Court laid down the circumstances when
forum shopping exists:
Forum-shopping
takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other case. Forum-shopping is an act
of malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.
Here,
the elements of litis pendencia are
wanting. There is no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686.
Civil Case No. 106 was instituted
against MCFC to acquire, for a public purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights
over 322,532 square meters or 32.25 hectares of land which, at the time of the
filing of the original Complaint in 1983, was not yet covered by any certificate
of title. On the other hand, Civil Case
No. 6686 sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.),
which was entered into registration on December 4, 1998 in Doña Demetria’s
name, on the argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates
exceeded the areas granted by the LRC to Doña Demetria in GLRO Record Nos. 6908
and 6909, as affirmed by this Court in the 1914
Cacho case.
Expropriation
vis-à-vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in
contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings
for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for
reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for
expropriation. Even if the land is
reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as
against the occupants thereof.
Also,
Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when “the title to
any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners.”
Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims.
– If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting
claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the
person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of
the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental
Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH,
is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated are privately owned. At
most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there
are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert,
in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of
land are part of the public domain.
In
sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and
disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the
Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the
RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and
reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R.
Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Essentially,
in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, LANDTRADE and Teofilo, and/or Atty.
Cabildo are calling upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals,
in its Decision dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456, erred in (1)
upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issues on Vidal's
status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, the action for quieting
of title; (2) not holding that Vidal and AZIMUTH have neither cause of action
nor legal or equitable title or interest in the parcels of land covered by OCT
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to
establish Vidal’s status as Doña Demetria’s granddaughter and sole surviving
heir; and (4) not holding that Civil Case No. 4452 was already barred by
prescription.
In
their Comment, Vidal and AZIMUTH insisted
on the correctness of the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 19, 2007, and
questioned the propriety of the Petition for Review filed by LANDTRADE as it
supposedly raised only factual issues.
The Court rules in favor of Vidal and
AZIMUTH.
Petitions for review under Rule 45
A scrutiny of
the issues raised, not just in the Petition for Review of LANDTRADE, but also
those in the Petition for Review of Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo, reveals that
they are both factual and legal.
The Court has held in a long line of cases that in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised as the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. It is
settled that as a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially
those affirming the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed
on appeal to the Supreme Court. The
exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) where the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation
of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[83] None of these exceptions exists in the
Petitions at bar.
Be that as it may, the Court shall
address in full-length all the issues tendered in the instant Petitions for
Review, even when factual, if only to
bolster the conclusions reached by the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals,
with which the Court fully concurs.
Jurisdiction
vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty.
Cabildo argue that the RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisidiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and
heirship in an action for quieting of title as said issues should be ventilated
and adjudicated only in special proceedings under Rule 90, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agapay v. Palang[84] (Agapay
case) and Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay
and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario[85] (Yaptinchay
case). Even on the assumption that
the RTC-Branch 3 acquired jurisdiction over their persons, LANDTRADE, Teofilo,
and/or Atty. Cabildo maintain that the RTC-Branch 3 erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction by adjudicating and passing upon the
issues on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in the Quieting of Title
Case. Moreover, LANDTRADE, Teofilo,
and/or Atty. Cabildo aver that the resolution of issues regarding status,
filiation, and heirship is not merely a matter of procedure, but of jurisdiction
which cannot be waived by the parties or by the court.
The aforementioned arguments fail to persuade.
In the first place, jurisdiction is
not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
The Court distinguished between the two, thus:
Jurisdiction
is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on
all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction.
And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[86] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here,
the RTC-Branch 3 unmistakably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties in Civil Case No. 4452.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or
body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot
be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of
a law. The power to change the
jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but
the legislature may do. Congress has the
sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.[87]
The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting
of title under the circumstances described in Section 19(2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Records
show that the parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 4452 have a combined
assessed value of P35,398,920.00,[88]
undisputedly falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3.
The
RTC-Branch 3 also acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Teofilo when he filed his Answer to the Complaint of Vidal
and AZIMUTH; and over the juridical personality of LANDTRADE when the said
corporation was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452.
Considering that the
RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case
No. 4452, then it can rule on all issues in the case, including those on
Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship, in exercise of its jurisdiction. Any alleged erroneous finding by the
RTC-Branch 3 concerning Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case
No. 4452, is merely an error of judgment subject to the affirmation,
modification, or reversal by the appellate court when appealed.
The
Agapay and Yaptinchay cases
LANDTRADE,
Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo cannot rely on the cases of Agapay and Yaptinchay to
support their position that declarations on Vidal’s status, filiation, and
heirsip, should be made in special proceedings and not in Civil Case No. 4452.
In the Agapay
case, the deceased Miguel Agapay (Miguel) contracted two
marriages. Miguel married Carlina
(sometimes referred to as Cornelia) in 1949, and they had a daughter named
Herminia, who was born in 1950. Miguel
left for
In
resolving Erlinda’s Petition, the Court held in the Agapay case that Article 148 of the Family Code applied to Miguel
and Erlinda. Article 148 specifically
governs the property relations of a man and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Under said provision, only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In this case,
the Court found that the money used to buy the subject properties all came from
Miguel.
The
Court then proceeded to address another issue in the Agapay case, more relevant to the one at bar:
The second issue concerning Kristopher
Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate is
here resolved in favor of respondent court’s correct assessment that the trial
court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and
filiation “inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the
latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or
in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession.”[89]
The Yaptinchay
case involved two parcels of land in
The
Court first observed in the Yaptinchay
case that the Yaptinchay heirs availed themselves of the wrong remedy. An order of dismissal is the proper subject
of an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Next, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the
amended complaint, thus:
Neither did the respondent court commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second
Amended Complaint of petitioners, x x x.
x x x x
In Litam,
etc., et al. v. Rivera, this court opined that the declaration of heirship
must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals where the
court held:
“In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil.
364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants
filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit
his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to
Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the
plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in
question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the
latter was his only heir. On appeal to
this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only
heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it
is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition.’ (p. 378).”
The trial court cannot make a declaration
of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only
be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as “one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong’ while a special proceeding is
“a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.” It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.[90]
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or
Atty. Cabildo missed one vital factual distinction between the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, on one
hand, and the present Petitions, on the other, by reason of which, the Court
shall not apply the prior two to the last.
The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, as well as
the cases of Litam v. Rivera[91]
and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[92]
cited in the Yaptinchay case, all
arose from actions for reconveyance;
while the instant Petitions stemmed from an action for quieting of title.
The Court may have declared in previous cases that
an action for reconveyance is in the nature of an action for quieting of title,[93]
but the two are distinct remedies.
Ordinary civil action
for reconveyance vis-a-vis special proceeding for quieting of title
The
action for reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act, as amended, which states “[t]hat in all cases of
registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.”
The
Court, in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v.
Enriquez,[94]
described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in
personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another’s name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free
from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts
of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
person for value. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
On the
other hand, Article 476 of the Civil Code lays down the circumstances when a
person may institute an action for quieting of title:
ART. 476.
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent
a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In Calacala v. Republic,[95]
the Court elucidated on the nature of an action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the
trial court, quieting of title is a common
law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence,
its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that
the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best x x x . (Emphases supplied.)
The
Court expounded further in Spouses Portic
v. Cristobal[96] that:
Suits
to quiet title are characterized as proceedings
quasi in rem. Technically,
they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant. However, unlike suits in
rem, a quasi in rem judgment is
conclusive only between the parties.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an
action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may
also be availed of by a person other
than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, “title”
does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of
title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does
not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
The Court pronounced in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases that a declaration of heirship cannot
be made in an ordinary civil action
such as an action for reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it involves the
establishment of a status or right.
The appropriate special proceeding would have been
the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Nonetheless, an action for quieting of title is also a special
proceeding, specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on
declaratory relief and similar remedies.[97] Actions for declaratory relief and other
similar remedies are distinguished from ordinary civil actions because:
2. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief
sought is the declaration of the
petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder.
The concept of
a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to declaratory
relief as this special civil action presupposes that there has been no breach
or violation of the instruments involved.
Consequently, unlike other judgments, the judgment in an action for
declaratory relief does not essentially entail any executional process as the
only relief to be properly granted therein is a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under the
instrument, although some exceptions have been recognized under certain situations.[98]
Civil Case No. 4452 could not be considered an
action for reconveyance as it is not based on the allegation that the two
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, have
been wrongfully registered in another person’s name. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.),
covering the subject properties, are still in Doña Demetria’s name.
Vidal and Teofilo each claims to have inherited the two parcels of land
from the late Doña
Demetria as said decedent’s sole heir, but neither Vidal nor Teofilo has been
able to transfer registration of the said properties to her/his name as of
yet.
Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an
action for quieting of title, a special proceeding wherein the court is
precisely tasked to determine the rights of the parties as to a particular
parcel of land, so that the complainant and those claiming under him/her may be
forever free from any danger of hostile claim.
Vidal asserted title to the two parcels of land as Doña Demetria’s sole heir. The cloud on Vidal’s title, which she sought
to have removed, was Teofilo’s adverse claim of title to the same properties,
also as Doña Demetria’s only
heir. For it to determine the rights of
the parties in Civil Case No. 4452, it was therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch
3 to squarely make a finding as to the status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal
in relation to those of Teofilo. A
finding that one is Doña
Demetria’s sole and rightful heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the
claim of the other.
Even
assuming arguendo that the proscription
in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases against making
declarations of heirship in ordinary civil actions also extends to actions for
quieting of title, the same is not absolute.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran[99] (Portugal
case), the Court recognized that there are instances when a declaration of
heirship need not be made in a separate special proceeding:
The common
doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the
special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings
are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if
a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an
ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a
property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[100]
In the Portugal
case itself, the Court directed the trial court to already determine
petitioners’ status as heirs of the decedent even in an ordinary civil action, i.e., action for annulment of title,
because:
It appearing x x x that in the
present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case—subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of
the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the
trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial, x x x.[101]
Another case, Heirs
of Teofilo Gabatan v. Court of Appeals[102]
(Gabatan case), involved an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of property with the opposing parties insisting that
they are the legal heirs of the deceased.
Recalling the Portugal case,
the Court ruled:
Similarly,
in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be
more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan,
specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed
jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
In Fidel v. Court of Appeals[103] (Fidel case), therein respondents, the heirs of the late Vicente Espineli (Vicente) from his first marriage, instituted an action to annul the sale of Vicente’s property to therein petitioners, the spouses Fidel. The subject property was sold to petitioners by Vicente’s heirs from his second marriage. Even though one’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, the Court held that it was necessary to pass upon respondents’ relationship to Vicente in the action for annulment of sale so as to determine respondents’ legal rights to the subject property. In fact, the issue of whether respondents are Vicente’s heirs was squarely raised by petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief. Hence, petitioners were estopped from assailing the ruling of the trial court on respondents’ status.
In
Civil Case No. 4452, Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo themselves asked the
RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issue of Vidal's legal or beneficial ownership of
the two parcels of land.[104] During trial, Vidal already presented before
the RTC-Branch 3 evidence to establish her status, filiation, and
heirship. There is no showing that Doña
Demetria left any other property that would have required special
administration proceedings. In the
spirit of the Portugal, Gabatan, and
Fidel cases, the Court deems it more practical and expeditious to settle
the issue on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452.
“Title” in quieting of title
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo further
contend that Vidal and AZIMUTH have no cause of action for quieting of title
since Vidal has no title to the two parcels of land. In comparison, Teofilo’s title to the same
properties, as Doña Demetria’s only heir, was already established and
recognized by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case.
Again, the Court cannot sustain the foregoing
contention of LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo.
It must be borne in mind that the concept of a
cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to quieting of
title. In declaratory relief, the
subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance.
The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the
petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory
relief, this special civil action presupposes that there has yet been no breach
or violation of the instruments involved.[105]
In an action for quieting of title, the subject
matter is the title sought to have quieted.
“Title” is not limited to the certificate of registration under the
Torrens System (i.e., OCT or
TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff must have legal
or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the
action for quieting of title. The
plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed
Doña Demetria’s sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or
interest in the two parcels of land by right of succession, even though she has
not yet secured certificates of title to the said properties in her name.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty.
Cabildo mistakenly believe that the 1997 Cacho case had conclusively
settled Teofilo's identity and existence as Doña Demetria’s sole heir. They failed to appreciate that the 1997 Cacho case involved Teofilo’s
petition for reconstitution of title, treated as a petition for the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The grant by the RTC of Teofilo’s petition,
affirmed by this Court, only conclusively established the prior issuance and existence and the subsequent loss of the two decrees, thus, entitling Teofilo to the re-issuance of the said decrees in their
original form and condition.
As the
Court of Appeals pointed out in its assailed Decision dated January 19, 2007,
the issue of Teofilo’s heirship was not the lis
mota of the 1997 Cacho case. It was addressed by the Court in the 1997 Cacho case for the simple purpose of
determining Teofilo’s legal interest in filing a petition for the re-issuance
of the lost decrees. The Court merely
found therein that Teofilo’s Affidavit of Adjudication, executed in the U.S.A.
before the Philippine Consulate General, enjoyed the presumption of regularity
and, thus, sufficiently established Teofilo’s legal interest. The 1997
Cacho case, however, did not conclusively settle that Teofilo is indeed
Doña Demetria’s only heir and the present owner, by right of succession, of the
subject properties.
Factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the
Court of Appeals
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty.
Cabildo additionally posit that the evidence presented by Vidal and AZIMUTH
were insufficient to prove the fact of Vidal's filiation and heirship to Doña
Demetria. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or
Atty. Cabildo particularly challenged the reliance of the RTC-Branch 3 on
Vidal’s baptismal certificate, arguing that it has no probative value and is
not conclusive proof of filiation.
Alternative
means of proving an individual’s filiation have been recognized by this Court
in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals.[106] The property in litigation in said case was
co-owned by Lourdes Sampayo (Sampayo) and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario
Cuario (collectively referred to as the spouses Conti). Sampayo died without issue. Therein respondents, claiming to be Sampayo’s
collateral relatives, filed a petition for partition of the subject property,
plus damages. To prove that they were
collaterally related to Sampayo through the latter’s brothers and sisters,
respondents submitted photocopies of the birth certificates, certifications on
the non-availability of records of births, and certified true copies of the
baptismal certificates of Sampayo’s siblings.
The spouses Conti questioned the documentary evidence of respondents’
filiation on the ground that these were incompetent and inadmissible, but the
Court held that:
Under Art. 172 of the Family
Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of
birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or
private document duly signed by the parent.
Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. By analogy, this method of
proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
x x x x
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus -
x x x the entries made in
the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in
the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church
during the course of its business.
It may
be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration
of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates
which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and
Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis
and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such
baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.[107]
Thus,
Vidal’s baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative
value. It may be appreciated, together
with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal’s
filiation, to wit:
The first issue proposed by petitioners
for resolution is whether or not petitioner Demetria C. Vidal is the sole
surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho.
To prove that, indeed, she is the sole surviving heir of the late Doña
Demetria Cacho, she testified in open court and identified the following
documentary evidence, to wit:
Exhibit “A” – Birth Certificate of
Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit “B” – Partida de Bautismo of
Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit “C” – Certificate of Baptism
Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit “D” – Cacho Family Tree
Exhibit “D-1” – Branch of Demetria Cacho
Exhibit “F” – Death Certificate of
Demetria Cacho.
Exhibit “P” – Driver’s license of
Demetria C. Vidal.
Exhibit “Q” to “Q5” – The book entitled
“CACHO”, the introductory page on March 1988 when the data were compiled, page
58 on the Vidal branch of the Cacho family, page 62 on Demetria Cacho and her
descendants, page 69 on the family member with the then latest birth day 26
March 1988, and page 77 with the picture of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Dionisio
Vidal and Francisco Vidal.[108]
In
contrast, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo failed to present any
evidence at all in support of their claims.
According to the RTC-Branch 3:
Landtrade was also declared to have
waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim in the
above-entitled case in view of its failure to present evidence on their
scheduled trial date.
x x x x
Since respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty.
Godofredo Cabildo opted not to adduce evidence in this case as they failed to
appear during the scheduled trial dates, the court shall decide on the basis of
the evidence for the respondents-intervenor and petitioners.[109]
Based
on the evidence presented before it, the RTC-Branch 3 made the following
factual findings:
From the evidence adduced, both
testimonial and documentary, the court is convinced that petitioner Vidal is
the granddaughter of Demetria Cacho Vidal, the registered owner of the subject
property covered by decree Nos. 10364 & 18969, reissued as Decrees No.
19364 and No. 16869. Such being the
case, she is an heir of Demetria Cacho Vidal.
Petitioner Vidal’s Certificate of Birth
(Exh. “A”) shows that she was born on June 3, 1941, with the name Demetria
Vidal. [Her] father was Francisco Vidal
and her mother was Fidela Confesor, Francisco Vidal is the son of Dionisio
Vidal and Demetria Cacho as shown by [his] Partida de Bautismo (Baptismal
Certificate). Moreover, it was shown in
the same document that her godmother was Demetria Cacho. By inference, this Demetria Cacho is actually
Demetria Cacho Vidal because she was married to Dionisio Vidal, the father of
Francisco Vidal.
Now then, is Demetria Cacho Vidal the
same person referred to in Cacho v. Government of the United States (28 Phil.
616 [1914])? Page 618, Vol. 28 of the Philippine Reports would indicate that
the applicant for registration was Doña Demetria Cacho y Soriano (Exh.
“R-1”). The Death Certificate of
Demetria Cacho Vidal shows that her mother was Candelaria Soriano (Exh. “F”). Necessarily, they are one and the same person. This is further confirmed by the fact that
the husband of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Señor Dionisio Vidal, was quoted in pp.
629-630 of the aforecited decision as the husband of Demetria Cacho (Exh.
“R-3”).
The book “CACHO” (Exhs. “Q” to “Q-5”) and
the Cacho Family Tree (Exhs. “D” to “D-1”) further strengthen the aforecited
findings of this Court.
It was established by petitioner Vidal’s
own testimony that at the time of Doña Demetria Cacho's death, she left no heir
other than petitioner Vidal. Her husband,
Don Dionisio, died even before the war, while her only child, Francisco Cacho
Vidal – xxx Vidal’s father – died during the war. Petitioner’s only sibling – Francisco
Dionisio – died at childbirth.
x x x x
The next factual issue proposed by
petitioners is whether or not respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of
the late Doña Demetria Cacho. The
following facts and circumstances negate the impression that he is the son, as
he claims to be, of Doña Demetria Cacho.
Thus:
a) Doña Demetria Cacho was married to Don
Dionisio Vidal, and thus her full name was Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal. Her only child, expectedly, carried the
surname Vidal (Francisco Cacho Vidal).
Had Teofilo Cacho actually been a son of Demetria Cacho, he would and
should have carried the name “Teofilo Cacho Vidal”, but he did not.
b) Teofilo Cacho admits to being married to
one Elisa Valderrama in the Special Power of Attorney he issued to Atty.
Godofredo [Cabildo] (Exh. “O”). Teofilo
Cacho married Elisa Valderrama on 27 May 1953, in the Parish of the Immaculate
Conception, Bani, Pangasinan. The
Certificate of Marriage shows that Teofilo Cacho is the son of Agustin Cacho
and Estefania Cordial, not Demetria Cacho.
In his Certificate of Baptism (Exh. “G”), he was born to Agustin Cacho
and Estefania Cordial on May 1930 (when Doña Demetria Cacho was already 50
years old).
c) The Cacho Family Tree (Exh. “D”) (that
is, the Cacho Family to which Doña Demetria Cacho belonged) as well as the book
on the Cacho Family (Exh. “Q”) are bereft of any mention of Teofilo Cacho or
his wife Elisa Valderrama, or even his real father Agustin Cacho, or mother
Estefania Cordial. They are not known to
be related to the Cacho family of Doña Demetria Cacho.
d) Paragraph 1.11 of the Petition charges
respondent Teofilo Cacho of having falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the
son and sole heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho. In his answer to this particular paragraph,
he denied the same for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. He should know whether this allegation is
true or not because it concerns him. If
true, he should admit and if false, he opted to deny the charges for lack of
knowledge or information to form a belief.
The Court considers his denial as an admission of the allegation that he
is falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late
Doña Demetria Cacho.[110]
Considering
the aforequoted factual findings, the RTC-Branch 3 arrived at the following
legal conclusions, quieting the titles of Vidal and AZIMUTH, viz:
The first proposed legal issue to be
resolved had been amply discussed under the first factual issue. Certainly,
petitioner Vidal has hereditary rights, interest, or title not only to a
portion of the Subject Property but to the entire property left by the late
Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal, subject, however, to the Deed of Conditional
Conveyance executed by petitioner Vidal of a portion of the Subject Property in
favor of petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation (Exh. “J”)
executed pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. “I”). Consequently, it goes without saying that
petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation has a right, interest
in, or title to a portion of the subject property.
As discussed earlier in this decision,
Teofilo Cacho, not being the son, as he claims to be, of the late Doña Demetria
Cacho Vidal, has no hereditary rights to the Subject Property left by Doña
Demetria Cacho Vidal. He failed to show
any evidence that he is the son of the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal as he and
his co respondent, Atty. Godofredo Cabildo, even failed to appear on the
scheduled trial date.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that
respondents Teofilo Cacho and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo and their
transferees/assignees have no right, interest in, or title to the subject
property.
Prescinding from the
finding of this Court that respondent Teofilo Cacho is not the son of the
registered owner of the Subject Property, the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal,
respondent Cacho committed false pretenses and fraudulent acts in representing
himself as son and sole heir of Doña Demetria Cacho (Vidal) in his petition in
court, which eventually led to the reconstitution of the titles of Doña
Demetria Cacho (Vidal). Certainly, his
misrepresentation in the reconstitution case, which apparently is the basis of
his claim to the subject property, casts clouds on [respondents'] title to the
subject property.
It is only right that
petitioner Vidal should seek protection of her ownership from acts tending to cast
doubt on her title. Among the legal
remedies she could pursue, is this petition for Quieting of Title under Chapter
3, Title I, Book II of the Civil Code, Articles 476 to 481 inclusive. x x x.[111]
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch
3. The appellate court even soundly
trounced Teofilo’s attack on the factual findings of the trial court:
[T]he material facts sought to be
established by the afore-mentioned documentary evidence corroborated by the
testimony of VIDAL, whose testimony or credibility neither Teofilo and LANDTRADE even attempted to
impeach, only proves one thing, that she is the granddaughter of DOÑA DEMETRIA
and the sole heiress thereof.
x x x x
Hence, it is now too late for appellant
TEOFILO to assail before Us the facts proven during the trial, which he failed
to refute in open court. Verily,
TEOFILO’s lackadaisical attitude in the conduct of his defense only shows that
he has no proof to offer in refutation of the evidence advanced by appellee
VIDAL.
Otherwise stated, appellant TEOFILO is an
impostor, a pretender and bogus heir of DOÑA DEMETRIA.
x x x x
Besides, it is quite unnatural and
against human nature for a rightful heir, if TEOFILO is really one, to merely
stand still with folded arms, while the accusing finger of VIDAL is right on
his very nose. In all likelihood, and
with all his might and resources, a rightful heir may even be expected to cross
continents and reach distant shores to protect his interest over the subject
properties, which in this case is arguably worth more than a King’s ransom.
It stands on record that TEOFILO CACHO
has all along even prior to executing his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985 in
Chicago, United States of America, and in simultaneously executing a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of ATTY. CABILDO, had remained in the United States,
and not for a single moment appeared in court except through his agents or
representatives. To Our mind, this fact
alone adversely affects his pretension in claiming to be an heir of DOÑA
DEMETRIA.[112]
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial
court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are borne out by the
record or are based on substantial evidence.
It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. The
Court has consistently held that the findings of the Court of Appeals and other
lower courts are, as a rule, accorded great weight, if not binding upon it,
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[113] There is no justification for the Court to
deviate from the factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals
which are clearly supported by the evidence on record.
Prescription
LANDTRADE finally asserts that the
action for quieting of title of Vidal and AZIMUTH already prescribed since
LANDTRADE has been in possession of the two parcels of land in question. The prescriptive period for filing said
action lapsed in 1995, ten years from the time Teofilo executed his Affidavit
of Adjudication in 1985. Yet, Vidal and
AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 only in 1998.
It is
too late in the day for LANDTRADE to raise the issue of prescription of Civil
Case No. 4452 for the first time before this Court. In
this jurisdiction, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Such defense may be waived, and if it was not
raised as a defense in the trial court, it cannot be considered on appeal, the
general rule being that the Appellate Court is not authorized to consider and
resolve any question not properly raised in the lower court.[114]
But even if the Court takes cognizance of the issue of prescription, it will rule against LANDTRADE.
A real
action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as
indicated in what is now Rule 4, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a real action
is an action affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property.[115] An action for quieting of title to real
property, such as Civil Case No. 4452, is indubitably a real action.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code plainly provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. Doña Demetria died in 1974, transferring by succession, her title to the two parcels of land to her only heir, Vidal. Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, filed a petition for reconstitution of the certificates of title covering said properties in 1978. This is the first palpable display of Teofilo’s adverse claim to the same properties, supposedly, also as Doña Demetria’s only heir. When Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 in 1998, only 20 years had passed, and the prescriptive period for filing an action for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
Nevertheless,
the Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code also clearly states that
the 30-year prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to what is
established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription. Thus, the Court must also
look into the acquisitive prescription periods of ownership and other real
rights.
Acquisitive
prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. [116]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law.[117] In the case of ownership and other real
rights over immovable property, they are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of 10 years.[118]
LANDTRADE
cannot insist on the application of the 10-year ordinary acquisitive
prescription period since it cannot be considered a possessor in good
faith. The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[119]
LANDTRADE
came to possession of the two parcels of land after purchasing the same from
Teofilo. The Court stresses, however, that Teofilo is not the registered owner of
the subject properties. The said
properties are still registered in Doña Demetria’s name under OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The Affidavit of Adjudication, by which
Teofilo declared himself to be the sole heir of Doña Demetria’s estate, is not even annotated on the
OCTs. Worse, LANDTRADE is not dealing
directly with Teofilo, but only with the latter’s attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Cabildo. It is axiomatic that one
who buys from a person who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in good
faith.[120]
Furthermore, in its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF
before the MTCC, LANDTRADE itself alleged that when it bought the two parcels
of land from Teofilo, portions thereof were already occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7
Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. This
is another circumstance which should have prompted LANDTRADE to investigate or
inspect the property being sold to it.
It is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land
to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants
possess the land en concepto de dueño,
in concept of owner. As is the common
practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises
involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends
to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case,
is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to
verify the extent of the occupant’s possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take
such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby
preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a “purchaser in good
faith.”[121]
Since
the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10 years does not apply to
LANDTRADE, then the Court turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
ART.
1137. Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
LANDTRADE
adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452
was already instituted two years
later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot tack its adverse possession
of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo considering that there is no
proof that the latter, who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely
possessed the properties at all.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it
affirmed in toto the judgment of the
RTC-Branch 3 which declared, among other things, that (a) Vidal is the sole
surviving heir of Doña
Demetria, who alone has rights to and interest in the subject parcels of land;
(b) AZIMUTH is Vidal’s successor-in-interest to portions of the said properties
in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 2004 Deed of
Conditional Conveyance; (c) Teofilo is not
the son or heir of Doña
Demetria; and (d) Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and their transferees/assignees,
including LANDTRADE, have no valid right to or interest in the same properties.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
The Petitions in G.R.
Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64 all concern the execution pending appeal
of the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF,
which ordered NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to vacate the two
parcels of land in question, as well as to pay rent for the time they occupied
said properties.
LANDTRADE filed its Petition for Review in G.R. No. 170505 when it failed to have
the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 executed while Civil Case No. 6613,
the appeal of the same judgment by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, was still pending
before the RTC-Branch 5.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO sought recourse from this Court
through their Petitions for Certiorari
and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 173355-56
and 173563-64 after the RTC-Branch 1 (to which Civil Case No. 6613 was
re-raffled) already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case
No. 6613, affirming the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004. Expectedly, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO appealed the
judgment of the RTC-Branch 1 to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for
execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE, and denied the application for
preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The requirements of posting a
supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution
The pivotal issue in G.R. No. 170505 is whether
LANDTRADE is entitled to the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17,
2004 even while said judgment was then pending appeal before the RTC-Branch
5. The RTC-Branch 5 granted the motion
for immediate execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE because of the failure of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to comply with the requirements for staying the execution
of the MTCC judgment, as provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court. The Court of Appeals subsequently
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Branch 5 in issuing the
Order dated August 9, 2004 which granted execution pending appeal and the Writ
of Execution Pending Appeal dated August 10, 2004; and on the part of Sheriff
Borres, in issuing the Notices of Garnishment and Notification to vacate, all
dated August 11, 2004. According to the
appellate court, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO are exempt from the requirements of filing
a supersedeas bond and depositing
rent in order to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court lays down
the requirements for staying the immediate execution of the MTCC judgment against
the defendant in an ejectment suit:
SEC. 19. Immediate
execution of judgment; how to stay same. – If judgment is rendered against
the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with
the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed.
All amounts so
paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized
government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition
of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in
the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from
time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon
motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its
course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case
is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the
defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court. In any case wherein it appears
that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or
building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and
restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court had previously recognized the exemption
of NAPOCOR from filing a supersedeas
bond. The Court stated in Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue[122]
that a chronological review of the NAPOCOR Charter will show that it has been
the lawmakers’ intention that said corporation be completely exempt not only
from all forms of taxes, but also from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas
bonds in any court or administrative proceedings. The Court traced the history of the NAPOCOR
Charter, thus:
Republic Act No. 6395 (10 September
1971) enumerated the details covered by the exemptions by stating under Sec. 13
that “The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from
its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for
expansion…the Corporation is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all
taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any court or
administrative proceedings in which it may be a party, restrictions and duties
to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and
other government agencies and instrumentalities . . .” Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 380 (22 January 1974), Sec. 10 made even
more specific the details of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both
direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential
Decree No. 938 (27 May 1976), Sec. 13 amended the tax exemption by
simplifying the same law in general terms.
It succinctly exempts service fees, including filing fees, appeal bonds,
supersedeas bonds, in any court or
administrative proceedings. The use of
the phrase “all forms” of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to give NPC
all the exemption it has been enjoying before.
The rationale for this exemption is that being non-profit, the NPC
“shall devote all its return from its capital investment as well as excess
revenues from its operation, for expansion.[123]
(Emphases supplied.)
As presently worded, Section 13 of Republic Act No.
6395, the NAPOCOR Charter, as amended, reads:
SEC. 13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by the Government and Government Instrumentalities. – The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
In A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, captioned In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, the Court addressed the query of a Clerk of Court
from the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan on whether NAPOCOR is exempt from the
payment of filing fees and Sheriff’s Trust Fund. In its Resolution dated December 6, 2005, the
Court, upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, declared that
NAPOCOR is still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision dated November 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841
declaring that NAPOCOR was exempt from filing a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment while
the same was pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The appellate court also held that the
exemption of NAPOCOR extended even to the requirement for periodical deposit of
rent, ratiocinating that:
On the whole,
the posting of supersedeas bond and
the making of the periodical deposit are designed primarily to insure that the
plaintiff would be paid the back rentals and the compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises should the municipal trial court’s decision be
eventually affirmed on appeal. Elsewise
stated, both the posting of the supersedeas bond and the payment of monthly
deposit are required to accomplish one and the same purpose, namely, to secure
the performance of, or to satisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is
affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.
x x x x
Thus viewed,
the inescapable conclusion is, and so We hold, that although the term “making
of monthly deposit in ejectment cases” is not expressly or specifically
mentioned in Section 13 of R.A. 6395, however, inasmuch as it has the same or
similar function, purpose, and essence as a supersedeas bond, it should be
deemed included in the enumeration laid down under the said provision. This accords well with the principle of ejusdem generis which says that where a
statute uses a general word followed by an enumeration of specific words
embraced within the general word merely as examples, the enumeration does not
restrict the meaning of the general word which should be construed to include
others of the same class although not enumerated therein; or where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
In a nutshell,
We hold that petitioner NAPOCOR enjoys exemption not only from posting
supersedeas bond in courts in appealed ejectment cases, but also from
periodically depositing the amount of the monthly rental or the reasonable
compensation of the use and occupancy of the property, as determined in the
municipal trial court’s decision.[124]
The
Court of Appeals further adjudged that the exemptions of NAPOCOR similarly
applied to TRANSCO since “[i]t is
all too obvious that the interests of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO over the premises in
litigation are so interwoven and dependent upon each other, such that whatever
is adjudged in regard to the former, whether favorable or adverse, would
ineluctably and similarly affect the latter[;]” and “[c]onsequently, x x x the
stay of the execution of the appealed decision insofar as NAPOCOR is concerned
necessarily extends and inures to its co-defendant TRANSCO, not by virtue of
the former’s statutory exemption privilege from filing supersedeas bond and
making periodic deposits, but by the indisputably operative fact that the
rights and liabilities in litis of BOTH defendants are so intimately
interwoven, interdependent, and indivisible.”[125]
Only recently, however, the Court
reversed its stance on the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing fees, appeal bonds,
and supersedeas bonds. Revisiting A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, the Court
issued Resolutions dated October 27, 2009 and March 10, 2010, wherein it denied
the request of NAPOCOR for exemption from payment of filing fees and court fees
for such request appears to run counter to Article VIII, Section 5(5)[126]
of the Constitution, on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the
rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the
sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. The Court categorically pronounced that
NAPOCOR can no longer invoke its amended Charter as basis for exemption from
the payment of legal fees.
Nevertheless, in this case, the
RTC-Branch 1 already promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 6613 on
December 12, 2005, denying the appeal of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO and affirming the
MTCC judgment against said corporations.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO presently have pending appeals of the RTC-Branch 1
judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the
Rules of Court applies only when the judgment of a Municipal Trial Court (and
any same level court such as the MTCC) in an ejectment case is pending appeal
before the RTC. When the RTC had already
resolved the appeal and its judgment, in turn, is pending appeal before the
Court of Appeals, then Rule 70, Section
21 of the Rules of Court governs.
The
Court already pointed out in Northcastle
Properties and Estate Corporation v. Paas[127]
that
Section 19 applies only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the RTC, and
Section 21 to those already decided by the RTC.
The Court again held in Uy v. Santiago[128]
that:
[I]t is only execution of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court
which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule
70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial
Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision
shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately
executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before
the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied.)
According
to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, “[t]he judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.” It no longer provides for the stay of
execution at such stage.
Thus, subsequent events have rendered the Petition
of LANDTRADE in G.R. No. 170505 moot and academic. It will serve no more purpose for the Court
to require NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to still comply with the requirements of filing
a supersedeas bond and depositing
rent to stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment, as required by Rule
70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, when the appeal had since been resolved
by the RTC.
Preliminary injunction to stay execution of RTC judgment against
defendant in an ejectment case
The issues raised by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO in their Petitions
in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 boil down to the sole issue of whether the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to enjoin the execution of the Decision
dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 while the
same is pending appeal before the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of a writ
of execution in favor of LANDTRADE and denied the application for writ of
preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO because Rule 70, Section 21 of
the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the RTC judgment in an ejectment
case, which is adverse to the defendant and pending appeal before the Court of
Appeals, shall be immediately executory and can be enforced
despite further appeal. Therefore, the
execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal is the ministerial duty of the
Court of Appeals, specifically enjoined by law to be done.
NAPOCOR
and TRANSCO argue that neither the rules nor jurisprudence explicitly declare
that Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court bars the application of Rule 58 on preliminary injunction. Regardless of the immediately executory
character of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, the Court of Appeals,
before which said judgment is appealed, is not deprived of power and
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction when circumstances so
warrant.
There is merit in the present Petitions of NAPOCOR
and TRANSCO.
The Court expounded on the nature of a writ of
preliminary injunction in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc. [129]:
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary
injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment
or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from
a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or
a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights
of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its
extreme necessity. An
extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case
can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special
recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.
Section 3,
Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction:
SEC.
3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary
injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or
non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Under the cited provision, a clear and positive
right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is
not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it
will not issue to protect a right not in
esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the
complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals[130] sets forth the following elucidation on the
applicability of Rule 58 vis-à-vis Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court:
This section [Rule 70, Section 21] presupposes that
the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior
court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution
without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. It is our opinion
that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances
so require.
In the case of Amagan
v. Marayag, we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño that the proceedings in an ejectment
case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew
a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal
detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of
confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should
a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any
order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment
in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It
is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy
the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of
the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth
and without resorting to the courts.
Patently, even
if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory,
preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to
be directed violate said right. (Emphasis supplied.)
As
in Benedicto, substantial considerations exist herein that compels the
Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the
February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC, as affirmed by the December 12, 2005
Decision of the RTC-Branch 1, until the appeal of latter judgment, sought by
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, is finally resolved by the Court of Appeals.
First, the two parcels of land claimed by LANDTRADE are
the subject of several other cases. In
fact, Vidal and AZIMUTH, who instituted the Quieting of Title Case against
Teofilo and LANDTRADE (also presently before the Court in G.R. Nos. 178779 and
178894) have filed a Motion For Leave to Intervene in the instant
case, thus, showing that there are other parties who, while strangers to the
ejectment case, might be greatly affected by its result and who want to protect
their interest in the subject properties.
And although cases involving title to real property, i.e., quieting of title, accion publiciana, etc., are not prejudicial to and do not suspend an ejectment case,[131]
the existence of such cases should have already put the Court of Appeals on
guard that the title of LANDTRADE to the subject properties – on which it
fundamentally based its claim of possessory right – is being fiercely
contested.
Second, it is
undisputed that TRANSCO and its predecessor, NAPOCOR, have been in possession
of the disputed parcels of land for more than 40 years. Upon said properties stand the TRANSCO Overton
Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse. The
Overton Sub-station, in particular, is a crucial facility responsible for
providing the power requirements of a large portion of Iligan City, the two
Lanao Provinces, and other nearby provinces.
Without doubt, having TRANSCO vacate its Overton Sub-station, by
prematurely executing the MTCC judgment of February 17, 2004, carries serious
and irreversible implications, primordial of which is the widespread disruption
of the electrical power supply in the aforementioned areas, contributing
further to the electric power crisis already plaguing much of Mindanao.
Lastly, allowing
execution pending appeal would result in the payment of an astronomical amount
in rentals which, per Sheriff Borres’s computation, already amounted to P156,000,000.00
by August 11, 2004, when he issued the Notices of Garnishment and Notification
against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO; plus, P500,000.0 each month
thereafter. Payment of such an amount
may seriously put the operation of a public utility in peril, to the detriment
of its consumers.
These circumstances altogether present a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences, not just to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, but
to a substantial fraction of the consuming public as well, which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation. The
issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction is
justified by the circumstances.
The Court must emphasize though that in so far as
the Ejectment Case is concerned, it has only settled herein issues on the
propriety of enjoining the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17,
2004 while it was on appeal before the RTC, and subsequently, before the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has yet
to render a judgment on the appeal itself.
But it may not be amiss for the Court to also point out that in G.R.
Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), it has already found that
Vidal, not Teofilo, is the late Doña Demetria’s sole heir, who alone inherits Doña Demetria’s rights to and interests in the
disputed parcels of land. This
conclusion of the Court in the Quieting of Title Case will inevitably affect
the Ejectment Case still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals since
LANDTRADE is basing its right to possession in the Ejectment Case on its
supposed title to the subject properties, which it derived from Teofilo.
The Cancellation of
Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R. No. 173401)
The Republic is assailing in its
Petition in G.R. No. 173401 the (1) Order dated December 13, 2005 of the
RTC-Branch 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 6686, the Complaint for Cancellation of
Titles and Reversion filed by the Republic against the deceased Doña Demetria,
Vidal and/or Teofilo, and AZIMUTH and/or LANDTRADE; and (2) Order dated May 16,
2006 of the same trial court denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Republic, averring that:
With due respect, the trial court decided
a question of substance contrary to law and jurisprudence in ruling:
(i) THAT PETITIONER HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION
IN INSTITUTING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.)
AND 0-1201 (A.F.), INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION.
(ii) THAT PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT FOR
CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 0-1201 (A.F.) INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE
TITLES, AND REVERSION IS BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN CACHO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (28 PHIL. 616 [1914] AND CACHO VS COURT OF APPEALS (269 SCRA 159
[1997].
(iii) THAT PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS
PRESCRIBED; AND
(iv) THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING.[132]
The Court finds merit in the present
Petition.
Cause
of action for reversion
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the
cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all their
derivative titles, and reversion. The
Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its
Order dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground
that the State does not have a cause of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no
showing that the late Doña Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in
violation of any right of the Republic.
Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No.
6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public domain. By the own judicial admission of the
Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned, even before
the same were registered in Doña Demetria’s name.
The Court disagrees.
Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court defines a cause of action as “the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.” Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to
the latter.[133]
Reversion is an
action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government
under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee.[134] In
Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic[135]
(Yujuico case), reversion was defined
as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of
public domain. It bears to point out,
though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for
reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a
patent of the conditions imposed by law;[136]
and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering
inalienable forest land[137]
or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.[138] In Republic
v. Guerrero,[139]
the Court gave a more general statement that the remedy of reversion can be
availed of “only in cases of fraudulent
or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of
title.”
The
right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[140] It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which declares “[a]ll lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x” No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; it is
indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the State.[141]
The
reversion case of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 rests on the main
argument that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201
(a.f.), issued in Doña Demetria’s name, included parcels of lands
which were not adjudicated to her by the Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Contrary to
the statement made by the RTC-Branch 4 in its December 13, 2005 Order, the
Republic does not make any admission in its Complaint that the two parcels of
land registered in Doña Demetria’s name were privately owned even prior to
their registration. While the Republic
does not dispute that that two parcels of land were awarded to Doña Demetria in
the 1914 Cacho case, it alleges that
these were not the same as those covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201
(a.f.) issued in Doña Demetria’s name 84 years later. If, indeed, the parcels of land covered by
said OCTs were not those granted to Doña Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, then it can be presumed, under the Regalian
doctrine, that said properties still form part of the public domain belonging
to the State.
Just
because OCTs were already issued in Doña
Demetria’s name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for
reversion. Indeed, the Court made it
clear in Francisco v. Rodriguez[142] that Section 101 of the Public Land Act “may be
invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or a certificate of
title has already been issued[,]” for the basic premise in an action for
reversion is that the certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included
land of the public domain, hence, calling for the cancellation of said
certificate. It is actually the issuance
of such a certificate of title which constitutes the third element of a cause
of action for reversion.
The
Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686
sufficiently states a cause of action for reversion, even though it does not
allege that fraud was committed in the registration or that the Director of
Lands requested the reversion.
It is a
well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In the
resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a
court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged
and pursuant to the prayer therein.
Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of
the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically
admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.[143] The hypothetical admission extends to the
relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Hence, if the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense
that may be assessed by the defendants.[144]
In Vergara v. Court of Appeals,[145]
the Court additionally explained that:
In determining whether allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the
trial on the merits of the case. To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The
Republic meticulously presented in its Complaint the discrepancies between the 1914 Cacho case, on one hand, which
granted Doña Demetria title to two parcels of land; and OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.)
and 0-1201 (a.f.), on the other, which were supposedly issued pursuant to the
said case. In paragraphs 9 and 16 of
its Complaint, the Republic clearly alleged that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and
0-1201 (a.f.) cover properties much larger than or areas beyond those granted
by the land registration court in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Thus, the Republic was able to satisfactorily
allege the unlawful inclusion, for lack of an explicit grant from the
Government, of parcels of public land into Doña Demetria’s OCTs, which, if
true, will justify the cancellation of said certificates and the return of the
properties to the Republic.
That the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 does not allege that it had been filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), at the behest of the Director of Lands,
does not call for its dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, simply requires
that:
SEC. 101.
All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clear
from the aforequoted provision that the authority to institute an action for
reversion, on behalf of the Republic, is primarily conferred upon the OSG. While the OSG, for most of the time, will
file an action for reversion upon the request or recommendation of the Director
of Lands, there is no basis for saying that the former is absolutely bound or
dependent on the latter.
RTC-Branch
4 cited Sherwill Development Corporation
v. Sitio Niño Residents Association, Inc. [146] (Sherwill
case), to support its ruling that it is “absolutely necessary” that an
investigation and a determination of fraud should have been made by the
Director of Lands prior to the filing of a case for reversion. The Sherwill
case is not in point and does not constitute a precedent for the case at
bar. It does not even involve a
reversion case. The main issue therein
was whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint of Sherwill
Development Corporation for quieting of title to two parcels of land,
considering that a case for the declaration of nullity of its TCTs, instituted
by the Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc., was already pending before the
Land Management Bureau (LMB). The Court
recognized therein the primary jurisdiction of the LMB over the dispute, and
affirmed the dismissal of the quieting of title case on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
Res
judicata
Public
policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issues more than once.
It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence,
that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed
organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final
and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been
well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an
important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that
it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.[147]
The doctrine of res judicata
comprehends two distinct concepts - (1) bar by former judgment, and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. For res judicata to serve as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former
judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of
action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by
former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[148]
The 1914
Cacho case does not bar the Complaint for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686
by res judicata in either of its two
concepts.
There
is no bar by prior judgment because the 1914
Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686 do not have the same causes of action
and, even possibly, they do not involve identical subject matters.
Land
registration cases, such as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, from which the 1914 Cacho case arose, are special
proceedings where the concept of a cause of
action in ordinary civil actions does not apply. In special proceedings, the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.[149] Civil Case No. 6686 is an action for
reversion where the cause of action is the alleged unlawful inclusion in OCT
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) of parcels of public land that were not
among those granted to Doña Demetria in the 1914
Cacho case. Thus, Civil Case No.
6686 even rests on supposition that the parcels of land covered by the
certificates of title in Doña Demetria’s name, which the Republic is seeking to
have cancelled, are different from the parcels of land that were the subject
matter of the 1914 Cacho case and
adjudged to Doña Demetria.
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
likewise, does not apply as between the 1914
Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686.
A careful study of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 reveals that the
Republic does not seek to re-litigate any of the issues resolved in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic no longer questions in Civil
Case No. 6686 that Doña
Demetria was adjudged the owner of two parcels of land in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic is only insisting on the strict
adherence to the judgment of the Court in the 1914 Cacho case, particularly: (1) the adjudication of a smaller
parcel of land, consisting only of the southern portion of the 37.87-hectare
Lot 2 subject of Doña
Demetria’s application in GLRO Record No. 6909; and (2) the submission of a new
technical plan for the adjudicated southern portion of Lot 2 in GLRO Record No.
6909, and the deed executed by Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, renouncing
all his rights to Lot 1, in GLRO Record No. 6908, in Doña Demetria’s favor.[150]
Similarly, the 1997
Cacho case is not an obstacle to the institution by the Republic of Civil
Case No. 6686 on the ground of res
judicata.
Bar
by prior judgment does not apply for lack of identity of causes of action
between the 1997 Cacho case and Civil
Case No. 6686. The 1997 Cacho case involves a petition for re-issuance of decrees of
registration. In the absence of
principles and rules specific for such a petition, the Court refers to those on
reconstitution of certificates of title, being almost of the same nature and
granting closely similar reliefs.
Reconstitution denotes a restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original
form or condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document
is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by
law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.[151] Reconstitution
is another special proceeding where the concept of cause of action in an
ordinary civil action finds no application.
The
Court, in the 1997 Cacho case,
granted the reconstitution and re-issuance of the decrees of registration
considering that the NALTDRA, through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M.
Kapunan,[152] its
Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of
Registration, certified that “according to the Record Book of Decrees for
Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No.
6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908[;]”[153]
thus, leaving no doubt that said decrees had in fact been issued.
The 1997
Cacho case only settled the issuance, existence, and subsequent loss of
Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969.
Consequently, said decrees could be re-issued in their original form or
condition. The Court, however, could not
have passed upon in the 1997 Cacho case
the issues on whether Doña
Demetria truly owned the parcels of land covered by the decrees and whether the
decrees and the OCTs subsequently issued pursuant thereto are void for
unlawfully including land of the public domain which were not awarded to Doña Demetria.
The
following pronouncement of the Court in Heirs
of Susana de Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[154]
is instructive:
Precisely, in both species of
reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature
of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have
been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The
purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper
proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred,
and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. It bears stressing
at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of
title. Registering land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what
the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before
Branch 74. The trial court will then
conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective
evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the
court to resolve the said issue. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
Whatever
findings the Court made on the issue of ownership in the 1997 Cacho case are mere obiter
dictum. As the Court held in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.[155]:
Petitioner claims in his
petition that the 3 October 1957 Decision resolved the issue of ownership of
the lots and declared in the body of the decision that he had “sufficiently
proven uncontroverted facts that he had been in possession of the land in
question since 1946 x x x [and] has been in possession of the property with
sufficient title.” However, such findings made by the CFI in the said
decision are mere obiter, since the ownership of the properties, titles to
which were sought to be reconstituted, was never the issue in the
reconstitution case. Ownership is not the issue in a
petition for reconstitution of title. A reconstitution of
title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title.
It may perhaps be argued
that ownership of the properties was put in issue when petitioner opposed the
petition for reconstitution by claiming to be the owner of the
properties. However, any ruling
that the trial court may make on the matter is irrelevant considering the
court’s limited authority in petitions for reconstitution. In a
petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of
a reconstituted title because the reconstituting officer’s power is limited to
granting or denying a reconstituted title. As stated earlier, the
reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title, and any change in the ownership of the property
must be the subject of a separate suit. (Emphases
supplied.)
The Court concedes that the 1997 Cacho case, by reason of conclusiveness of judgment, prevents
the Republic from again raising as issues in Civil Case No. 6686 the issuance
and existence of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, but not the validity of said
decrees, as well as the certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
Forum
shopping
Forum
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. A party
violates the rule against forum shopping if the elements of litis pendentia are present; or if a
final judgment in one case would amount to res
judicata in the other.[156]
There
is forum shopping when the following elements are present:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars, is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.[157]
Given
the preceding disquisition of the Court that the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases
do not constitute res judicata in
Civil Case No. 6686, then the Court also cannot sustain the dismissal by the
RTC-Branch 4 of the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 for forum
shopping.
Prescription
According
to the RTC-Branch 4, the cause of action for reversion of the Republic was
already lost or extinguished by prescription, citing Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 32. Review
of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. – The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority,
or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation
of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not
later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser of value” or an equivalent
phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
Decree
No. 10364 in GLRO Record No. 6908 was issued on May 9, 1913, while Decree No. 18969
in GLRO Record No. 6909 was issued on July 8, 1915. In the course of eight decades, the decrees
were lost and subsequently reconstituted per order of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The reconstituted decrees were issued on
October 15, 1998 and transcribed on OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201
(a.f.). The reconstituted decrees were
finally entered into the Registration Book for Iligan City on December 4, 1998
at 10:00 a.m. Almost six years had
elapsed from entry of the decrees by the time the Republic filed its Complaint
in Civil Case No. 6686 on October 13, 2004.
Nonetheless,
elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its
subdivisions. When the government is the
real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to
recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense grounded on laches
or prescription. Public land
fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.[158]
The
Court discussed lengthily in Republic v.
Court of Appeals[159]
the indefeasibility of a decree of registration/certificate of title vis-à-vis
the remedy of reversion available to the State:
The petitioner invokes Republic v. Animas, where this Court declared that a title founded on fraud may be cancelled notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. Thus:
x x x The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:
"The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. x x x"
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
This doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Mina, where Justice Relova declared for the Court:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. And, a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. x x x The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Justifying the above-quoted provision, the Court declared in Piñero, Jr. v. Director of Lands:
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Private respondent
PNB points out that Animas involved
timberland, which is not alienable or disposable public land, and that in Piñero the issue raised was whether the
Director of Lands would be enjoined by a writ of prohibition from investigating
allegations of fraud that led to the issuance of certain free patents.
Nevertheless, we find that the doctrine above quoted is no less controlling
even if there be some factual disparities (which are not material here),
especially as it has been buttressed by subsequent jurisprudence.
In Director of Lands v.
Jugado, upon which the appellate court based its ruling, the Court declared
meaningfully that:
There is, however, a
section in the Public Land Law (Sec. 101 of Commonwealth Act 141), which
affords a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be
recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government. But the
provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (See Director of Lands v. De
Luna, supra). As the party in interest in this case is the Director of
Lands and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action cannot prosper in
favor of the appellant.
The reference was to the
Public Land Law which authorizes the reversion suit under its Sec. 101, thus:
Sec. 101. All actions for
the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
This remedy was recently
affirmed by the Court in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose and
Victoria Aliwalas, thus:
x x x Title to the property
having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If
indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an
action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper
remedy.
It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that
despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of
registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General,
may still institute an action for reversion when said decree/certificate was
acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title
does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the
doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens system does not by
itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant’s already existing
one. Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.[160]
But
then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the
State to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the
title to the land is void for reasons other than having been secured by fraud
or misrepresentation. One such case is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals,[161]
where the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted a patent to
the spouses Morandarte which included a portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an action for
reversion 10 years after the issuance of an OCT in the name of the spouses
Morandarte. The Court ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
Another
example is the case of Republic of the
Phils. v. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV,[162]
in which the homestead patent issued by the State became null and void because
of the grantee’s violation of the conditions for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even though
the land subject of the patent was already covered by an OCT and the Republic
availed itself of the said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action
accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering
that the statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil Case No.
1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit brought by the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines as a sovereign state and, by the express provision
of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or alienation of a
homestead grant within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is null
and void and constitute a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In
Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that "the Court below committed no
error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein,
notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of title based on the
patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of the
grantee heirs. Thus, where a grantee is
found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his
having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the Court may properly
order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been
brought under the operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the government to bring
an appropriate action for reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the
Statute of Limitations does not run against the State." (Italics
supplied). The above ruling was reiterated in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945.
If the Republic is able to establish after trial
and hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs in Doña Demetria’s name are void for some reason, then the
trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the
same because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of
title. The RTC-Branch 4 jumped the gun
when it declared that the cause of action of the Republic for reversion in
Civil Case No. 6686 was already lost or extinguished by prescription based on
the Complaint alone.
All told, the Court finds that the RTC-Branch 4
committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
and Reversion of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686. Resultantly, the Court orders the
reinstatement of said Complaint. Yet,
the Court also deems it opportune to recall the following statements in Saad-Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic[163]:
It has been held that a complaint for
reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the
return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the
original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of
title, including the transfer certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as
the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the
application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of
title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. It is
but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show
the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land
and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It may do well for the Republic to remember that
there is a prima facie presumption of
regularity in the issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, as well as OCT Nos.
0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), in Doña Demetria’s name, and the burden of proof falls upon the Republic to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that said decrees and certificates
of title are null and void.
IV
DISPOSITIVE PART
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the Petitions
at bar:
1) In G.R.
No. 170375 (Expropriation Case),
the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the
2)
In G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title
Case), the Court DENIES the
consolidated Petitions for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo
Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. It AFFIRMS
the Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00456, affirming in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation,
Teofilo Cacho, and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.
3) In G.R.
No. 170505 (The Ejectment or
Unlawful Detainer Case – execution pending appeal before the Regional Trial
Court), the Court DENIES the
Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and academic
given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte
had already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No.
6613. No costs.
4) In
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
– execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals), the Court GRANTS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition of the
National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. It SETS
ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
further ORDERS the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil
Case No. 6613, while the same is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889. It
finally DIRECTS the Court of Appeals to resolve without further delay
the pending appeals before it, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, in a manner
not inconsistent with this Decision. No
costs.
5) In G.R. No. 173401
(Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case), the Court GRANTS the
Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Iligan City in Civil Case No.
6686.
It further ORDERS the
reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 and the return of the
original record of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
|
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), pp. 71-74.
[2] Id. at 75-76.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy Liacco-Flores and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 37-83; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), pp. 41-87.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy Liacco-Flores and Jane Aurora C. Lantion, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 84-85; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), pp. 89-90.
[5] Penned by Presiding Judge Albert B. Abragan; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 375-414.
[6] Penned by Associate Justice
Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizzaro and Ricardo S.
Rosario, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp.
28-54.
[7] Penned by Judge Maximino Magno Libre, id. at 485-492.
[8] Id. at 493-494.
[9] Id. at 495-498.
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 449-450.
[11] Penned by Judge Marito P. Abragan; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 93-116 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 47-70.
[12] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 54-62 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 38-46.
[13] Penned by Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 176-178 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 71-73.
[14] Penned by Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon; rollo (G.R. No. 173401), pp. 57-68.
[15] Id. at 69.
[16] 28 Phil. 616 (1914).
[17] Id. at 627-629.
[18] Id. at 624, 627-630.
[19] Id. at 630-631.
[20] 336 Phil. 154 (1997).
[21] Id. at 166-167.
[22] Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 383
(1997).
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 178779), p. 300-A; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), p. 92.
[24] An Act Creating the Iron and Steel
Authority.
[25] Reserving
for the Use of the National Steel Corporation Certain Lands of the Public
Domain Situated in the City of Iligan, Island of Mindanao and Amending Any and
All Previous Presidential Proclamations, Executive Orders and Letters of
Instructions Inconsistent or Contrary Hereto.
[26] 319 Phil. 648 (1995).
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 91.
[28] Id. at 132-170.
[29] Supra note 1.
[30] Id. at 73-74.
[31] Supra note 2.
[32] Rollo (G.R. No.178779), pp. 1265-1287.
[33] Supra note 5.
[34] Id. at 411-414.
[35] Supra note 3.
[36] Supra note 4.
[37] An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation, as amended.
[38] Rollo (G.R. No. 170505),
pp. 143-144.
[39] Supra note 11.
[40] Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 115-116 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 69-70.
[41] 383 Phil. 486 (2000).
[42] Penned by Judge Maximino Magno Libre; rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 464-469.
[43] Supra note 7.
[44] Supra note 8.
[45] Supra note 9.
[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 499-500.
[47] Id. at 588-589.
[48] Supra note 6.
[49] Id. at 53.
[50] Judge Badelles was a former legal
consultant of NAPOCOR.
[51] Supra note 13.
[52] Supra note 12.
[53] Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), p. 61 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), p. 45.
[54] Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 184-185.
[55] Id. at 186-187.
[56] Rollo (G.R. No. 173401), pp.
74-86.
[57] Penned by Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, id. at 351.
[58] Supra note 14.
[59] Supra note 15.
[60] Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 41.
[61] 227 Phil. 585 (1986).
[62] G.R. No. 163988, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 305, 316.
[63] Id.
[64] Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 9.
[65] SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases
where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
[66] SEC. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
[67] Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 501 Phil. 516, 526 (2005).
[68] Id.
[69] Supra note 26 at 665.
[70] Rule 39, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
[71] Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 361.
[72] At the time the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 was filed, the old Rules of Court was still in effect. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court was then titled “Eminent Domain.”
[73] Rule 67 of the present Rules of Court bears the title
“Expropriation.” Section 1 thereof
reads:
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (Changes emphasized.)
[74] 352 Phil. 833, 852 (1998).
[75] Directing the Measures to Facilitate the Implementation of the Integrated Steel Mill Project of National Steel Corporation, One of the Major Industrial Projects of the Government.
[76] Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court.
[77] G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 499, 504-505.
[78] Rollo
(G.R. No. 173410), pp. 70-88.
[79] Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), pp. 140-170.
[80] Id. at 156.
[81] Id. at 163.
[82] 499 Phil. 423, 435-436 (2005).
[83] Aclon v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 219, 230 (2002).
[84] 342 Phil. 302 (1997).
[85] 363 Phil. 393 (1999).
[86] Republic v. “G” Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 608, 619.
[87] Navales v. Abaya, 484 Phil. 367, 391 (2004).
[88] According
to Tax Declaration No. 02-029-01514, the parcel of land covered by OCT No.
0-1200 (a.f.) has an assessed value of P34,844,670.00 (rollo
[G.R. No. 178779], pp. 886-867). Per Tax
Declaration No. 02-023-00186, the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 0-1201
(a.f.) has an assessed value of P554,250.00 (Id. at 884-885).
[89] Agapay v. Palang, supra note 84 at 313.
[90] Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, supra note 85 at 398-399.
[91] 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
[92] G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 119.
[93] The Court made such a declaration in relation
to determining whether an action for reconveyance had prescribed. For example, in Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals (335 Phil. 19, 32 [1997]), the Court ruled that:
[A]n
action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the
person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
[94] G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 190.
[95] 502 Phil. 681, 688 (2005).
[96] 496 Phil. 456, 464-465 (2005).
[97] Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphases supplied.)
[98] Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1 (9th revised edition [2005]), pp. 765-766.
[99] G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198.
[100] Id. at 198.
[101] Id. at 199-200.
[102] G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 70, 80-81.
[103] G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 186, 194.
[104] As stated in the RTC Decision dated July 17, 2004; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 1296.
[105] Supra at note 98.
[106] 360 Phil. 536 (1998).
[107] Id. at 548-550.
[108] Rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 1311-1312.
[109] Id. at 1306 and 1311.
[110] Id. at 1312-1314.
[111] Id. at 1314-1315.
[112] Id. at 68-70.
[113] Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 485, 491.
[114] Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino, G.R. No. 161029, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 65, 86.
[115] Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502 (2001); Serrano v. Delica, G.R. No. 136325, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 82, 88.
[116] Civil Code, Article 1117.
[117] Id.
[118] Id., Article 1134.
[119] Id., Article 1127.
[120] Samonte v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 487, 498 (2001).
[121] Spouses Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 870, 891 (1998).
[122] G.R. No. 154028, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 308, 314-315.
[123] Id. (footnote 10).
[124] Supra note 6 at 43-45.
[125] Id. at 47-49.
[126] SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[127] 375 Phil. 564 (1999).
[128] 391 Phil. 575, 580 (2000).
[129] G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 236, 251-252.
[130] G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363, 370-371.
[131] See Hilario v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202 (1996), citing Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.
[132] Rollo (G.R. No. 173401), p. 34.
[133] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No.
159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 293-294.
[134] Caro
v. Sucaldito, 497 Phil. 879, 888 (2005).
[135] G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007,
537 SCRA 513.
[136] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79582, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 721, 734.
[137] Republic v. De la Cruz, 160-A Phil. 374, 381-382 (1975).
[138] Spouses
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 870, 885 (2004).
[139] G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424.
[140] Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
[141] Gordula
v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 670, 685 (1998).
[142] 116 Phil. 765 (1962).
[143] Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 824, 833-834 (1997).
[144] Ceroferr Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 522, 529 (2002).
[145] 377 Phil. 337, 342 (1999).
[146] 500 Phil. 288 (2005).
[147] Legarda
v. Savellano, 241 Phil. 988, 993 (1988).
[148] Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369, 386 (2001).
[149] Sta.
Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961).
[150] Incidentally, it is also for the same reason that the
Court will not apply its ruling in the Yujuico
case (supra note 141) to the instant Petition. In the former case, the Court ordered the
dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of the action for reversion filed by the
Republic before the RTC. The Court held
therein that if the title to land was granted judicially, not administratively,
then the proper remedy of the Republic would be to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the land registration
court, in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the Republic is not
seeking the annulment of the CLR judgment, affirmed in the 1914 Cacho case, but the cancellation of the OCTs which allegedly
included parcels of land beyond those awarded to Doña Demetria. Based on the allegations in the Complaint of
the Republic, Civil Case No. 6686 is a “civil action which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) [,]”
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC [Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980].
[151] Republic v. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828, 838 (2004).
[152] Who subsequently became a Justice of the Supreme
Court.
[153] Cacho v. Government of the United
States, supra note 17 at
160.
[154] 465 Phil. 114, 126-127 (2004).
[155] G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524
SCRA 641, 654-655.
[156] San Juan v.
Arambulo, Sr., G.R. No. 143217, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 725, 728.
[157] Id.
[158] Republic of the Phils. v. Heirs of
Angeles, G.R. No. 141296, October 7, 2002, 439 Phil.
349, 358.
[159] G.R. No. 60169, March 23, 1990, 183
SCRA 620, 626-629.
[160] Republic
v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 674 (2002).
[161] Supra note 138 at 885.
[162] 216
Phil. 385, 388 (1984).
[163] G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006,
503 SCRA 522, 528-529.