Republic of the
Supreme Court
PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT (PRRM),
Petitioner, -
versus - VIRGILIO E. PULGAR, Respondent. - |
G.R. No.
169227
Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, *ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.:
Before
us is the petition for review on certiorari[1]
filed by the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) to assail
the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision, dated May
25, 2005,[2]
and its resolution, dated August 5, 2005,[3] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 62036. The appellate court set aside the National Labor
Relations Commission’s (NLRC)
BACKGROUND FACTS
PRRM is a
non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization. Pulgar was the manager of
PRRM’s branch office – the Tayabas Bay Field Office (TBFO) – in
In her investigation report, Solis
stated that part of the funds allotted to the TBFO was missing or not properly
accounted for. The report also stated that some of the receipts that the TBFO
submitted to liquidate the organization’s financial transactions were fictitious
and manufactured.[4]
The PRRM management sent Pulgar a
copy of the report, together with a memorandum, asking him to explain these
findings.[5]
In a letter dated February 24, 1997,
Pulgar admitted that TBFO’s reported expenses did not reflect its actual
expenses. He explained that as field manager, he presumed he had the
discretion to determine when and how the funds would be used, as long as the
use was devoted to the implementation of TBFO projects. Thus, there were
instances when he used the funds intended for one project to sustain the
activities of other projects. Pulgar further admitted that some of the receipts
he submitted to liquidate TBFO’s expenses were not genuine; he claimed that
he had to produce fake receipts to comply with the central office’s
requirements and deadlines, otherwise the release of TBFO’s subsequent funds
would be delayed. Pulgar also disclosed that he had, on his own initiative, opened
a separate bank account at the Capitol Bank[6]
for TBFO’s savings; the account had a remaining balance of P206,958.50.
Lastly, Pulgar manifested his willingness to attend a meeting with the senior
officers, scheduled on February 28, 1997, to further explain his side.[7]
On P207,693.10. According to Pulgar, this balance represented
the TBFO savings he mentioned in his response. At this point, two versions of
the story develop.
PRRM
maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave on
March 3-10, March 20-25, and April 1-15, 1997. After the lapse of his last
leave on April 15, 1997, Pulgar no longer reported to work, leading PRRM to
believe that Pulgar had abandoned his work to evade any liability arising from
the investigation. PRRM was therefore
surprised to learn that Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case on April 3,
1997.
Pulgar
tells another tale. According to him, on March 17, 1997, he submitted a letter
to PRRM to complain that he was not given the right to confront and question
Solis,[8]
but his letter went unanswered. Thereafter, on
Believing
he was constructively dismissed by PRRM’s actions, Pulgar filed a complaint
against PRRM on April 3, 1997 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and
nonpayment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Pulgar
also asked for actual damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees. At the
mandatory conferences before Labor Arbiter Pablo Espiritu, Jr. (Labor Arbiter), Pulgar dropped the
illegal suspension charge, as well as his claim for payment of service
incentive leave with pay.[9]
On
March 31, 1999, the Labor Arbiter found in his decision[10]
that Pulgar had been illegally dismissed and ordered PRRM to pay Pulgar P319,387.50
as full backwages. However, the Labor Arbiter chose not to award Pulgar moral
or exemplary damages after finding that PRRM had legitimate grounds to
investigate Pulgar. Due to the strained relations between PRRM and Pulgar, the
Labor Arbiter opted to award Pulgar separation pay instead of ordering his
reinstatement.
On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in its January 28, 2000 decision
and dismissed Pulgar’s complaint,[11]
giving more weight to PRRM’s allegation that Pulgar abandoned his work. This
prompted Pulgar to bring the
matter to the CA via a
petition for review on certiorari (should be petition for certiorari)
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.[12]
On
May 25, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision,[13]
granting Pulgar’s petition and reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The
appellate court noted that PRRM never rebutted Pulgar’s contentions that he had
been prevented from entering the premises and that his personal effects were
taken from his office and placed in storage. The CA further observed that PRRM
presented no evidence to prove that Pulgar abandoned his job. Reasoning that
filing an illegal dismissal complaint is inconsistent with the charge of
abandonment, the appellate court concluded that Pulgar had been illegally
dismissed.
In
the present petition, filed after the appellate court denied PRRM’s Motion for
Reconsideration, PRRM raises the issue of whether Pulgar was illegally
dismissed from employment.
PRRM
posits that it did not dismiss Pulgar from employment. Rather, Pulgar chose not to return to work,
after his leave of absence, to evade any criminal liability that might arise
from the ongoing investigation PRRM was conducting regarding the alleged
financial anomalies Pulgar committed when he was the field manager of the TBFO.
PRRM opines that Pulgar filed the present illegal dismissal case as a
diversionary tactic to avoid having to submit himself to PRRM’s ongoing
investigation. Lastly, PRRM asks this Court to order Pulgar to return the PRRM
funds still in his custody amounting to P207,693.10.
On
the other hand, Pulgar claims that this Court should respect the Labor
Arbiter’s factual finding that he was illegally dismissed since the Labor
Arbiter had the opportunity to observe the actuations, behavior and demeanor of
the parties. Pulgar further alleges that PRRM can no longer claim the PRRM
funds in his possession since the Labor Arbiter had already ruled that PRRM
failed to raise the award of these funds as a relief in its Position Paper.
Since PRRM never appealed this part of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, it is now
bound by these findings.
THE
COURT’S RULING
We grant the
petition.
Procedural issue
Under the Rules of Court and settled doctrine, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive, and this Court will not review them on appeal.[14] This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of several exceptions.[15]
To resolve the issue of whether PRRM is guilty of illegal dismissal, we necessarily have to determine the veracity of the parties' allegations, a function we are ordinarily barred from performing when deciding a Rule 45 petition. However, due to the conflicting factual findings of the NLRC and the CA, as well as the presence of some relevant facts that, had they been considered by the CA, would have justified a different conclusion, we find the review of the evidence on record compelling and proper.
The illegal
dismissal issue
In concluding that Pulgar was
constructively dismissed from employment, the CA relied on two main factors:
(a) Pulgar’s claim that he was barred from entering the premises on
Primarily, we underscore the fact
that when Pulgar filed an illegal dismissal complaint on April 3, 1997, he was
still on leave from the organization. In
other words, from PRRM’s standpoint, Pulgar was still its employee
when he filed the illegal dismissal case against the organization.
Pulgar claims that he was forced to file an illegal dismissal complaint
against PRRM while he was on leave because he was not allowed to enter the
office premises on March 31, 1997. But aside from making this allegation,
Pulgar failed to provide any other details on how he was prevented from
entering the premises. Was he physically prevented from entering the premises
by a security guard? Did the senior officers of PRRM refuse to let him into the
office when he reported to work? We are left to guess the particulars of how
PRRM prevented Pulgar from entering the premises, leaving us to doubt the
veracity of this allegation.
To bolster his contention that he was constructively dismissed, Pulgar
asserts that his personal things were taken from his office, placed in boxes
and put in storage. To support this allegation, he attached three photographs.[16] But the only thing seen in these photographs
is a storage room with sealed boxes on the floor. Taken at face value, there is nothing in the
photographs that proves that the boxes in the storage room even contain
Pulgar’s personal things. Absent such
proof, we cannot use these pictures to prove that Pulgar was constructively
dismissed from employment.
We further note that at the time PRRM
was conducting an investigation into the alleged anomalies committed in the
liquidation and use of PRRM funds at the TBFO during Pulgar’s management,
Pulgar went on a number of leaves, specifically on March 3-10, 1997, then on
March 20-25, 1997, and finally on April 1-15, 1997. The timing and frequency of these leaves,
while not indicative of Pulgar’s intention to sever his employment, at the very
least, imply Pulgar’s active efforts to evade the organization’s ongoing
investigation.
Significantly, while Pulgar claims he was constructively dismissed when
he was barred from the premises on
Also worth mentioning is the fact that Pulgar continued to receive his
salary from PRRM even after
These circumstances, taken together, lead us to conclude that PRRM did
not terminate Pulgar’s employment. On the contrary, what appears from the
evidence is that it was Pulgar himself who terminated his employment with PRRM
when he filed an illegal dismissal complaint against the organization while he
was on leave.
The key to understanding Pulgar’s motive in severing his employment with
PRRM lies in Pulgar’s letter dated
Noticing that even at the Central Office, project funds allotted for one field office or branch were used to sustain the operation of other on-going activities of another field office/branch or even of the Central Office, I presumed that the same is also applicable in the field office. That is, as field manager, it was to my discretion as to where and how the fund should be used so long as its utilization concerns the implementation of the project. With this in mind, I made some major decisions at the field office which I believe could be of great help make the operations smooth sailing.
For instance, there were cases when funds for the FSP were used to finance the operations of the Community-based Mangrove and Community based Reforestation projects and other side activities (e.g. Rapid Site Assessment, election campaign) in order to accomplish the project/activity on time. Likewise, cost savings measures were undertaken so that funds could be made available to the office when the immediate need for the fund arises particularly during situations when the release from the Central Office were delayed. And since the implementing guidelines from the CO was silent on the maintenance of another account for savings made by the field office, I took the initiative to open a separate account for the field office’s savings. By doing this, possible disruption of work at the field and the delay in the salary of the staff were prevented.
As for the inconsistencies of the liquidation documents submitted, this was necessary in order to comply with the requirements and deadlines set by the Central Office, otherwise, the release for the succeeding quarter or period in questions will be put on hold. Given the situation and with the continuity of the field office’s operation still in mind, I was forced to adjust the documents submitted just to meet the deadlines and avoid disruption of work. However, never had I intentionally done this with malicious intent of, as Ms. Solis puts it, using the fund for personal gain. As I will explain later, funds were used to finance activities that were related to the operations of the field office and whatever savings were made remains in safekeeping for possible use of the office’s operation. x x x
With regard to the case of the AECI project, its account has been required to be closed and cash advances liquidated (with accompanying Official Receipts) by November 1996 or exactly by the end of its six months of implementation. This being the case, and with the slight delay met in the implementation of the project, adjustment in the documents became a necessary evil in order to comply with the requirements of the CO.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the same letter, Pulgar manifested
that the TBFO had savings in the amount of P206,958.50, which he
deposited with Capitol Bank under Account No. 2-042-00188-9.[18]
At the meeting with PRRM senior officers on March 4, 1997, Pulgar also admitted
that the TBFO’s savings in the amount of P207,693.10 were actually
deposited with the Cooperative Bank of Quezon in an account under his name.
From Pulgar’s own admissions, we
consider the following facts to be established:
First, Pulgar took funds intended for one
activity or project and applied them to other activities/projects.
Second, Pulgar took the savings from the
TBFO and placed them in a bank account under his own name. To
date, Pulgar has not turned over these funds to the PRRM.
Third, Pulgar submitted manufactured and
fake receipts to PRRM to liquidate TBFO’s expenses.
Noticeably, from Pulgar’s disclosures
alone, a prima facie case for estafa can already be made out against
Pulgar. With the danger of criminal prosecution hanging over his head, Pulgar’s
abrupt decision to terminate his employment with PRRM becomes easily
understandable.
While we recognize the rule that in
illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however,
the facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the
employee was dismissed from employment. Before
the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be
no question as to its legality or illegality.[19] Bare allegations of constructive dismissal,
when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[20]
As we said in Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.:[21]
The
rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus,
petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed
them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this
fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer
bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here
because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.[22]
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although under normal circumstances,
an employee’s act of filing an illegal dismissal complaint against his employer
is inconsistent with abandonment; in the present case, we simply cannot use
that one act to conclude that Pulgar did not terminate his employment with
PRRM, and in the process ignore the clear, substantial evidence presented by
PRRM that proves otherwise. Our
ruling on this point in Leopard Integrated Services, Inc. v. Macalinao is very relevant. We said: [23]
The fact that respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as noted by the CA, is not by itself sufficient indicator that respondent had no intention of deserting his employment since the totality of respondent's antecedent acts palpably display the contrary. In Abad v. Roselle Cinema, the Court ruled that:
The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal should be taken into account together with the surrounding circumstances of a certain case. In Arc-Men Food Industries Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the substantial evidence proffered by the employer that it had not, in the first place, terminated the employee, should not simply be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. “This is clearly a non-sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee.”[24] [Emphasis supplied.]
While the Constitution is committed to
the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should
not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor
of labor. Management also has its rights
which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with
less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward
the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the
Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and
doctrine.[25]
PRRM’S monetary claim is belatedly raised
Examining the records of the case, it
appears that Pulgar has not yet returned the money he took from the TBFO and
deposited in his name to PRRM.
We have
previously ruled on the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule on all money
claims, including those of the employer, arising out of the employer-employee
relationship.[26] Unfortunately
for PRRM, it never raised as an issue the money allegedly still in Pulgar’s
custody in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, or even before the NLRC.
As the Labor Arbiter held:
One final note. The
Labor Code allows for claims made by employers against employees arising from
employer-employee relations. In this case, the records show that Pulgar holds
the amount of P207,693.10 as alleged “savings” as manager of TBFO. PRRM
attached Annex 11, which is a savings passbook of Pulgar with Cooperative Bank
of P207,693.10. [A]s it were, we cannot act on the same in
view of PRRM’s failure (for reasons known only to it) to pray for such award. [Emphasis
supplied.][27]
As a factual matter, this issue
should have been raised at the earliest opportunity before the Labor Arbiter,
to allow both parties to present their evidence. The rule is well-settled that
points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered
by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[28]
because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[29]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT
the petition. The May 25, 2005 Decision
and the August 5, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62036 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 28, 2000 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 019914-99 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the RULES OF COURT; rollo, pp. 9-45.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Mariano del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal de Leon; id. at 46-53.
[3]
[4] Dated February 13, 1997; id. at 165-174.
[5] Dated February 20, 1997; id. at 175.
[6] Account Number 2-042-00188-9.
[7] Rollo, pp. 176-182.
[8]
[9] Per the Labor Arbiter’s decision; id. at 67.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] Amigo v. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).
[15] (1)
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
[16] Rollo, p. 117.
[17]
[18]
[19] Ledesma,
Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 174585,
[20] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358.
[21] G.R.
No. 168664,
[22]
[23] G.R. No.
159808,
[24]
[25] Enriquez v. Bank of Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 172812, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 590, citing Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, 156 SCRA 392 (1987).
[26] See Bañez v. Valdevilla, 387 Phil. 601 (2000).
[27] Rollo, p. 75.
[28] Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151; Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 588 (1986); Berin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57490, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 508 (1991).
[29] Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738,