Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG
MANGGAGAWA NG TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL, represented by SABINO F. GRAGANZA, Union
President, and REYVILOSA TRINIDAD, Petitioners, - versus
- SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., Respondents. x
---------------------------------------- x TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL
(PHILS.), INC., Petitioner, - versus - BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA NG TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL, ELOISA
FIGURA, JERRY JAICTEN, ROWELL FRIAS, MARGARITA PATINGO and ROSALINDA OLANGAR,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 167401
G.R. No. 167407 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, *ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July
5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before the Court are two separate petitions[1]
which were consolidated pursuant to our Resolution dated
The Antecedents
The
relevant facts, clearly laid out in the challenged CA decision, are summarized
below.
The
union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that
expired on P180.00
a day, spread over three (3) years, as follows: P70.00/day from P60.00/day
from P50.00/day from P42.00 for three
years, then increased it to P45.00, also for three years.
The
negotiations reached a deadlock, leading to a Notice of Strike the union filed
on
On
On
On
February 2 and 3, 2000, several employees attempted to report for work, but the
striking employees prevented them from entering the company premises.
In
a petition dated February 8, 2000,[10] the
company asked the Labor Secretary to issue an order directing the union to
allow free ingress to and egress from the company premises; to dismantle all
structures obstructing free ingress and egress; and, to deputize the Philippine
National Police to assist the DOLE in the peaceful implementation of the Labor Secretary's
January 27, 2000 order.
The
Labor Secretary reiterated his directives in another order dated
At
a conciliation meeting held on
The
striking employees returned to work on March 3 and 4, 2000 but twenty (20)
union officers and a shop steward were not allowed entry into the company premises. The excluded union leaders were each served
identical letters[15]
directing them to explain in writing why their employment should not be
terminated or why no disciplinary action should be imposed on them for defying
and violating the Labor Secretary’s assumption order of January 27, 2000 and
the second return-to-work order of February 22, 2000; for blocking and
resisting the entry of returning employees on February 2, 3, and 8, 2000; for acts of violence committed on
February 24 and 25, 2000; and for defying the company's return-to-work order of all employees on February
8, 2000.[16]
On
At
the conciliation meeting of
On
The
union officers explained, as required, through their respective affidavits,[21]
and a hearing followed on
On
The LABOR Secretary’s Decision
The
Labor Secretary resolved the bargaining deadlock[24] and
awarded a wage increase of P48.00 distributed over three years, as follows:[25]
Effective P15.00/day
Effective P16.00/day
Effective P17.00/day
The union’s other
economic demands and non-economic proposals were all denied.
The union moved for the reconsideration[26]
of the Labor Secretary’s decision, while the company moved for its own partial
reconsideration.[27] The
Labor Secretary denied both motions, declaring that the petition to cite the company
and its responsible officers for contempt had already been rendered moot and
academic.[28] He also
ruled that the legality of the union officers’ dismissal properly falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter under Article 217
of the Labor Code.
The union elevated the case to the CA, through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[29]
on the following grounds:
1.
The Labor Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied
the proposals of the 1,130 union members to improve the existing CBA.
2.
The Labor Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion when he declared that the issue of reinstatement of
the officers of the union and the petition to cite the company and its
responsible officers for contempt had become academic.
The union insisted on its demanded P180.00 daily
wage increase distributed over three years (1999 to 2001), arguing that the
demand is just, fair and reasonable based on the company's capacity to pay and
the company’s bargaining history. It noted
that the company gave a P55.00 increase for the years 1993-1995, and P64.00
for the years 1996 to 1998. It also objected
the rejection of its other economic demands and non-economic proposals.
The
union also contended that the company and its responsible officers should have
been held in contempt for violating the Labor Secretary’s return-to-work order. It argued that the officers should have been
reinstated in the absence of substantial evidence supporting the charges
against them.
The company responded by praying for the dismissal of the
petition for lack of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Secretary. It posited that the P48.00 wage
increase award is more than reasonable, and that the Labor Secretary properly stayed
his hand on the issue of illegal dismissal as the matter was beyond his
jurisdiction. The company likewise argued
that any question on the award had been mooted by the workers’ acceptance of the
wage increase.
While the petition was pending, individual settlements were
reached between certain individual petitioners (Cenon N. Dionisio, Catalina N.
Velasquez, Nila P. Tresvalles, Vivian A. Arcos, Delia N. Soliven, Leticia S.
Santos, Emerita D. Maniebo, Conchita R. Encinas, Elpidia C. Cancino,
Consolacion S. Umalia, Nenette N. Gonzales, Creselita D. Rivera, and Rolando O.
Madera) and the company. These
petitioners executed their respective Release, Waiver and Quitclaim after
receiving their separation pay and other benefits from the company.[30]
In light of these developments and the workers’ acceptance
of the wage award (except for the union officers), the company moved for the
dismissal of the petition.[31] The union and the remaining union officers
opposed the motion, contending that the workers’ acceptance of the awarded wage
increase cannot be considered a waiver of their demand; the receipt of the P48.00
award was merely an advance on their demand.
The Release, Waiver and Quitclaim executed by the 13 officers, on the
other hand, cannot bind the officers who opted to maintain the petition.
On
The CA Decision
The CA found the petition partly meritorious. It affirmed the Labor Secretary's wage
increase award, but modified his ruling on the dismissal of the union officers.[33]
On the wage issue and related matters, the CA found the Labor
Secretary’s award legally in order. It
noted the following factors supportive of the award:
1.
The average daily salary of an
employee of P310.00 is more than the statutory minimum wage as admitted
by the union itself.
2.
The company grants to its
employees forty-two (42) other monetary and welfare benefits.
3.
The increase in the wages of
the employees carries with it a corresponding increase in their salary-based benefits.
4.
The wage increase granted to
workers employed in the industry is less than the increase proposed by the company.
5.
The Asian financial crisis.
The CA also noted that, in the meantime, the parties had
executed a new CBA for the years 2002 to 2005 where they freely agreed on a total
P45.00/day wage increase distributed over three years.
On the other hand, the CA faulted the Labor Secretary for
not ruling on the dismissal of the union officers. It took exception to the Labor Secretary's
view that the dismissal question is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. It invoked the ruling of this Court in Interphil
Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc.,[34]
which, in turn, cited International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor,[35] where
we held that the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction over all questions and
controversies arising from an assumed dispute, including cases over which the
labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
The CA pointed out that while the labor dispute before the
Labor Secretary initially involved a bargaining deadlock, a related strike
ensued and charges were brought against the union officers (for defiance of the
return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary, and leading, instigating, and
participating in a deliberate work slowdown during the CBA negotiations) resulting
in their dismissal from employment; thus, the dismissal is intertwined with the
strike that was the subject of the Labor Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction.
The CA, however, avoided a remand of the illegal dismissal
aspect of the case to the Labor Secretary on the ground that it would compel
the remaining six officers, lowly workers who had been out of work for four (4)
years, to go through the “calvary” of a protracted litigation. In the CA’s view, it was in keeping with
justice and equity for it to proceed to resolve the dismissal issue itself.
The six remaining officers of the union – Reyvilosa
Trinidad, Eloisa Figura, Jerry Jaicten, Rowell Frias, Margarita Patingo, and
Rosalinda Olangar (shop steward) – all stood charged with defying (1) the Labor
Secretary’s return-to-work order of
The charges were supported by the affidavits of Ernesto P.
Dayag,
For failure of the company to prove by substantial evidence
the charges against the remaining officers, the CA concluded that their
employment was terminated without valid and just cause, making their dismissal
illegal.
With respect to
The appellate court thus affirmed the
The CA denied the motions for reconsideration that the union
and its officers, and the company filed.[43] Hence, the present petitions.
The Petitions
G.R. No. 167401
The petition is anchored on the following grounds –
1.
The CA erred in sustaining the Labor
Secretary's wage increase award of P48.00/day spread over three years.
2.
The CA erred in finding the
dismissal of
The union presents
the following arguments –
On
the CBA Award
The union contends that the CBA wage
increases from 1994 to 1998 ranged from P16.00/day to P27.00/day
for every year of the CBA period; the arguments behind the company’s decreased
wage offer were the same arguments it raised in previous CBA negotiations; the
alleged financial crisis in the region on which the CBA award was based
actually did not affect the company because it sourced its raw materials from
its mother company, thereby avoiding losses; the company’s leading status in
the industry in terms of wages should not be used in the determination of the
award; rather, it should be based on the company’s financial condition and its number
one rank among 7,000 corporations in the country manufacturing ladies’, girls’,
and babies’ garments, and number 46 in revenues with gross revenues of P1.08B, assets of P525.5M and
stockholders’ equity of P232.1M; in granting only a wage increase out of
44 items in its proposal, the award disregarded the factors on which its
demands were based such as the peso devaluation and the daily expenditure of P1,400.00/day
for a family of six (6) as found by the National Economic and Development
Authority.
On
the Dismissal of Reyvilosa Trinidad
The union seeks a reversal of the
dismissal of
The union thus asks this Court to modify the assailed CA ruling
through an order improving the CBA wage award and the grant of the non-wage proposals. It also asks that the dismissal of
G.R. No. 167407
For its part, the company seeks to annul the CA rulings on the
dismissal issue, on the following grounds –
1.
The CA erred in ruling that the
Labor Secretary abused his discretion in not resolving the issue of the
validity of the dismissal of the officers of the union.
2.
The CA erred in resolving the
factual issue of dismissal instead of remanding the case for further
proceedings.
3.
In resolving the issue, the company
was deprived of its right to present evidence and, therefore, to due process of
law.
The
company submits that the Labor Secretary has no authority to decide the
legality or illegality of strikes or lockouts, jurisdiction over such issue
having been vested on the labor arbiters pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor
Code; under Article 263 of the Code, the Labor Secretary’s authority over a
labor dispute encompasses only the issues, not the legality or illegality of
any strike that may have occurred in the meantime.[44] It points out that before the Labor Secretary
can take cognizance of an incidental issue such as a dismissal question, it must
first be properly submitted to him, as in the case of International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor[45]
where the Labor Secretary was adjudged to have the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental issues such as unfair
labor practices subject of cases already ongoing before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The
company takes exception to the CA ruling that it submitted the dismissal issue
to the Labor Secretary claiming that it can be seen from its opposition to the
union’s petition to cite the company for contempt;[46]
that it consistently maintained that the Labor Secretary has no jurisdiction
over the dismissal issue; that the affidavits it submitted to the Labor Secretary
were only intended to establish the union’s violation of the return-to-work
orders and, to support its petition, on February 8, 2000,[47] for
the issuance of a return-to-work order; and, that the CA overstepped its
jurisdiction when it ruled on a factual issue, the sole office of certiorari
being the corrections of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission
of grave abuse of discretion.
The
company likewise disputes the CA’s declaration that it took into consideration
all the evidence on the dismissal issue, claiming that the evidence on record
is deficient, for it did not have the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove
the involvement of the union officers in the individual acts for which they
were dismissed; had it been given the opportunity to present evidence, it could
have done so. To prove its point, it
included in its motion for partial reconsideration[48] a
copy of the information,[49]
charging union officers Nenette Gonzales and Margarita Patingo of malicious
mischief for stoning a company vehicle on
Even
assuming that it could no longer submit evidence on the dismissal of the union
officers, the company posits that sufficient grounds exist to uphold the
dismissals. It maintains that the
officers are liable to lose their employment status for knowingly staging a
strike after the assumption of jurisdiction by the Labor Secretary and in
defying the return-to-work mandated by the assumption, which are considered
prohibited activities under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code, not to mention
that without first having filed a notice, when the union officers and members
engaged in and instigated a work slowdown, a form of strike, without complying
with the procedural requirements for staging a strike, the union officers had
engaged in an illegal strike.
The parties practically reiterated these positions and the
positions taken below in their respective comments to each other’s petition.
The Court's Ruling
The CBA Award
We affirm the CA's disposition, upholding the Labor
Secretary’s award in resolving the bargaining deadlock between the union and
the company for their 1999-2001 CBA.
We find no compelling justification to disturb the
award. We are convinced, as the
appellate court was, of the reasonableness of the award. It was based on the
prevailing economic indicators in the workplace, in the industry, and in the
local and regional economy. As well, it
took into account the comparative standing of the company in terms of
employees' wages and other economic benefits.
We find the following factors as sufficient justification for the award:
1.
The regional financial crisis
and the downturn in the economy at the time, impacting on the performance of
the company as indicated in its negative financial picture in 1999.
2.
The company’s favorable comparison
with industry standards in terms of employee benefits, especially wages. Its average daily basic wage of P310.00
is 40% higher than the statutory minimum wage of P223.50, and superior
to the industry’s average of P258.00. For the years prior to the 1999
negotiations, its aggregate daily wage increase of P64.00 surpassed the
statutory minimum increase of P33.00.
3.
The forty-two (42) non-wage
benefit programs of the company which undeniably extend the reach of the
employees' cash wage in enhancing the well-being of the employees and their
families.
The
Labor Secretary's Order of
We fully agree with the
The
But even as we agree with the
Cognizance is likewise made of the Company's 42 non-wage
benefits programs which substantially [answer] the
Considering the foregoing circumstances, We deem it
reasonable and fair to balance our award on wages.
The conclusions of the Labor
Secretary, drawn as they were from a close examination of the submissions of
the parties, do not indicate any legal error, much less any grave abuse of
discretion. We accord respect to these
conclusions as they were made by a public official especially trained in the
delicate task of resolving collective bargaining disputes, and are on their face
just and reasonable. “[U]nless there is
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court cannot, and will not,
interfere with the labor expertise of the public respondent Secretary of Labor,”
as the Court held in Pier Arrastre and Stevedoring Services v. Ma. Nieves
Roldan-Confesor, et al.[51]
We also note that during the pendency
of the present dispute, the parties entered into a new CBA for the years
2000-2005, providing for a P45.00/day wage increase for the
workers. The CA cited this agreed wage
adjustment as an indication of the reasonableness of the disputed award. The
Labor Secretary himself alluded to “the letter-manifestation received by
this Office on P22.00/day effective July 19,
2005; P20.00/day for July 19, 2006; and P20.00/day for July 19,
2007.[53] The successful negotiation of two collective
agreements even before the parties could sit down and formalize the 1999-2001
CBA highlights the need for the parties to abide by the decision of the Labor
Secretary and move on to the next phase of their collective bargaining
relationship.
The
Illegal Dismissal Issue
Before we rule on the substantive
aspect of this issue, we deem it proper to resolve first the company’s submission
that the CA erred: (1) in ruling that
the Labor Secretary gravely abused his discretion in not deciding the dismissal
issue; and, (2) in deciding the factual issue itself, instead of remanding the
case, thereby depriving it of the right to present evidence on the matter.
We
agree with the CA's conclusion that the Labor Secretary erred, to the point of
abusing his discretion, when he did not resolve the dismissal issue on the
mistaken reading that this issue falls within the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. This was an egregious error and an abdication of authority on the matter
of strikes – the ultimate weapon in labor disputes that the law specifically
singled out under Article 263 of the Labor Code by granting the Labor Secretary
assumption of jurisdiction powers. Article
263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an
extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest. This grant is not
limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded
the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or
lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes,
the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve
all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the
strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversies
arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor
arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.[54]
In the present case, what the Labor Secretary
refused to rule upon was the dismissal from employment that resulted from the
strike. Article 264 significantly dwells
on this exact subject matter by defining the circumstances when a union officer
or member may be declared to have lost his employment. We find from the records that this was an
issue that arose from the strike and was, in fact, submitted to the Labor
Secretary, through the union’s motion for the issuance of an order for immediate
reinstatement of the dismissed officers and the company’s opposition to the
motion. Thus, the dismissal issue was properly brought
before the Labor Secretary and this development in fact gave rise to his
mistaken ruling that the matter is legally within the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter to decide.
We cannot disagree with the CA’s
sympathies when it stated that a remand of the case “would only compel the
individual petitioners, x x
x lowly workers who have been out
of work for more than four (4) years, to tread once again the [calvary] of a
protracted litigation.”[55] The dismissal issue and its resolution,
however, go beyond the realm of sympathy as they are governed by law and
procedural rules. The recourse to the CA
was through the medium of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 – an extraordinary but limited remedy. The CA was correct in declaring that the Labor
Secretary had seriously erred in not ruling on the dismissal issue, but was
totally out of place in proceeding to resolve the dismissal issue; its action
required the prior and implied act of suspending the Rules of Court – a
prerogative that belongs to this Court alone. In the recent case of Marcos-Araneta
v. Court of Appeals,[56] we
categorically ruled that the CA cannot resolve the merits of the case on a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and must confine itself to the
jurisdictional issues raised. Let this case be another reminder to the CA
of the limits of its certiorari
jurisdiction.
But
as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of
injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we
are in the position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it. On many occasions, the Court,
in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved
by the remand of the case.[58]
Thus,
we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue.
And while we rule that the CA could not validly rule on the merits of
this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal ruling, where
appropriate.
The
first
question to resolve is the sufficiency of the evidence and
records before us to support a ruling on the merits. We find that the union
fully expounded on the merits of the dismissal issue while the company’s
positions find principal support from the affidavits of Dayag, Bayon, Sanchez, Dinglasan,
Nacion, Vinoya, and Gomez. The
affidavits became the bases of the
individual notices of termination of employment sent to the union
officers. The parties’ affidavits
and their submitted positions constitute sufficient bases to support a decision on
the merits of the dismissal issue.
The dismissed
union officers
of the union originally numbered twenty-one (21),
twenty (20) of whom – led by union President
Cenon Dionisio – were executive officers and members of the union
board. Completing the list was shop steward Olangar.
As mentioned earlier,
fifteen (15) of the dismissed officers, including
Dionisio, executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and
readily accepted their dismissal.[59] Those who
remained to contest their dismissal were Reyvilosa N. Trinidad, 2nd
Vice-President; Eloisa Figura, Asst. Secretary; Jerry Jaicten, PRO; Rowell
Frias, Board Member; Margarita Patingo, Board Member; and Rosalinda Olangar, Shop Steward.
The officers of the union subject of the petition were dismissed from the service for allegedly committing illegal acts (1) during the CBA negotiations and (2) during the strike declared by the union, shortly after the negotiations reached a deadlock. The acts alluded to under the first category[60] involved “leading, instigating, participating in a deliberate slowdown during the CBA negotiations” and, under the second,[61] the alleged defiance and violation by the union officers of the assumption of jurisdiction and the return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary dated January 27, 2000, as well as the second return-to-work order dated February 22, 2000. More specifically, in the course of the strike, the officers were charged with blocking and preventing the entry of returning employees on February 2, 3, and 8, 2000; and on February 24 and 25, 2000, when acts of violence were committed. They likewise allegedly defied the company's general return-to-work notice for the return of all employees on February 8, 2000.[62]
The CA erred in declaring that except
for
The charges on which the company based
its decision to dismiss the union officers and the shop steward may be grouped
into the following three categories: (1) defiance of the return-to-work order
of the Labor Secretary, (2) commission of illegal acts during the strike, and
(3) leading, instigating and participating in a deliberate work slowdown during
the CBA negotiations.
While it may be true that the
affidavits the company submitted to the Labor Secretary did not specifically
identify Figuna, Jaiden, Frias, Patingo and Olangar to have committed
individual illegal acts during the strike, there is no dispute that the union
defied the return-to-work orders the Labor Secretary handed down on two occasions,
first on January 27, 2000 (more than two months after the union struck on
November 18, 1999) and on February 22, 2000. In decreeing a return-to-work for
the second time, the Labor Secretary noted:
To date, despite the lapse of the return-to-work period indicated in the
Order, the
Under the law,[65]
the Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute or its
certification to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout and all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions before the strike
or lockout. The union and its officers, as well as the workers, defied the Labor
Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction, especially the accompanying
return-to-work order within twenty-four (24) hours; their defiance made the
strike illegal under the law[66]
and applicable jurisprudence.[67]
Consequently, it constitutes a valid ground for dismissal.[68] Article 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code
provides that “Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status.”
The union officers were
answerable not only for resisting the Labor Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction and return-to-work orders; they were also liable for leading and
instigating and, in the case of Figura, for participating in a work slowdown
(during the CBA negotiations), a form of strike[69]
undertaken by the union without complying with the mandatory legal requirements
of a strike notice and strike vote.
These acts are similarly prohibited activities.[70]
There is sufficient
indication in the case record that the union officers, collectively, save for
shop steward Olangar, were responsible for the work slowdown, the illegal strike,
and the violation of the Labor Secretary's assumption order, that started with
the slowdown in July 1999 and lasted up to March 2000 (or for about ten (10)
months).[71] These illegal concerted actions could not
have happened at the spur of the moment and could not have been sustained for
several months without the sanction and encouragement of the union and its
officers; undoubtedly, they resulted from a collective decision of the entire
union leadership and constituted a major component of the union’s strategy to
obtain concessions from the company management during the CBA negotiations.
That the work slowdown happened is confirmed
by the affidavits[72]
and the documentary evidence submitted by the company. Thus, Ernesto P. Dayag,
a security officer of the agency servicing the company (Tamaraw Security
Service, Inc.) stated under oath that in October 1999, the union members were
engaging in a noise-barrage everyday and when it was time to go back to work at
noontime, they would mill around the production area or were at the toilet discussing
the ongoing CBA negotiations (among others), and were slow in their movements;
in late October (October 27, 1999), they did the same thing at about seven o’clock
in the morning which was already time for work; even those who were already working
were deliberately slow in their movements. On November 12, 1999, when union
officer Lisa Velasquez talked to the union members at lunchtime regarding the
CBA negotiations, only about 50% of the union members returned to their work
stations.
Victoria P. Sanchez, a sewer in the company's production
department, deposed that sometime in the middle of September 1999, the sewers
were told by the shop stewards to reduce their efficiency below 75%. They
followed the order as it came from a decision of the union officers at a
meeting. It was not difficult to comply
with the order because they only had to slow down at the pre-production and early
segments of the production line so that the rest of the line would suffer.
Teresita T. Nacion, another
sewer, corroborated Sanchez's deposition stating that in mid-September 1999,
during the CBA negotiations, the sewers were told by the shop stewards to
reduce their efficiency below 75% pursuant to the union decision to slow down
production so that the company would suffer losses.
The work slowdown resulted
in production losses to the company which it documented and submitted in
evidence[73] before
the Labor Secretary and was summarized in the affidavit[74]
of Leonardo T. Gomez, who testified on the impact of the decrease of the
workers’ production efficiency that peaked in September, October, and November
1999, resulting in a financial loss to the company of P69.277M. Specifically, the company’s efficiency record
for the year 1999[75]
posted Eloisa C. Figura’s[76]
work performance from April to June 1999 at 77.19% and from July to November
1999 at 51.77%, a substantial drop in her efficiency.
The union’s two-pronged
strategy to soften the company’s stance in the CBA negotiations culminated in
its declaration of a strike on November 18, 1999, which prompted the Labor
Secretary’s intervention through an assumption of jurisdiction. Judging from
the manner the union staged the strike, it is readily apparent that the union’s
objective was to paralyze the company and to maintain the work stoppage for as
long as possible.
This is the economic war that underlies the
Labor Code’s strike provisions, and which the same Code also tries to temper by
regulation. Thus, even with the assumption of jurisdiction and its accompanying
return-to-work order, the union persisted with the strike and prevented the
entry to the company premises of workers who wanted to report back for work. In
particular, Salvio Bayon, a company building technician and a member of the
union, deposed that at about seven o'clock in the morning of February 3, 2000,
he and ten (10) of his co-employees attempted to enter the company premises,
but they were prevented by a member of the strikers, led by union President
Cenon Dionisio and other officers of the union; the same thing happened on
February 8, 24 and 28, 2000.[77]
In the face of the union's
defiance of his first return-to-work order, the Labor Secretary issued a second
return-to-work directive on February 22, 2000 where the labor official noted
that despite the lapse of the return-to-work period indicated in the order, the
union continued with its strike.[78] At a conciliation meeting on February 29,
2000, the company agreed to extend the implementation of the return-to-work
order to March 6, 2000.[79]
The union, through a letter dated March 2, 2000,[80]
advised the NCMB administrator of the decision of the union executive board for
the return to work of all striking workers the following day. In a letter also dated March 2, 2000,[81]
the company also advised the NCMB Administrator that it was willing to accept
all returning employees, without prejudice to whatever legal action it may take
against those who committed illegal acts.
The above union letter clearly shows the
involvement of the entire union leadership in defying the Labor Secretary's
assumption of jurisdiction order as well as return-to-work orders. From the
illegal work slowdown to the filing of the strike notice, the declaration of
the strike, and the defiance of the Labor Secretary's orders, it was the union
officers who were behind the every move of the striking workers; and
collectively deciding the twists and turns of the strike which even became violent
as the striking members prevented and coerced returning workers from gaining
entry into the company premises. To our mind, all the union officers who knowingly
participated in the illegal strike knowingly placed their employment status at
risk.
In a different vein, the
union faulted the company for having dismissed the officers, there being no
case filed on the legality or illegality of the strike. We see no merit in this
argument. In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,[82]
we held that “[t]he law, in using the word ‘may,’ grants the employer the
option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as
having lost his employment.” We reiterated this principle in San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation
Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers v. San Juan De Dios Educational
Foundation, Inc.,[83]
where we stated that “Despite the receipt of an order from the SOLE to return
to their respective jobs, the Union officers and members refused to do so and
defied the same. Consequently, then, the strike staged by the
The union attempted to
divert attention from its defiance of the return-to-work orders with the
specious submission that it was the company which violated the Labor Secretary's
January 27, 2000 order, by not withdrawing its notice of lockout.[84]
The evidence indicates otherwise. The
Labor Secretary himself, in his order of February 22, 2000,[85]
noted that the union continued its strike despite the lapse of the
return-to-work period specified in his January 27, 2000 order. There is also
the report of the NCMB-NCR clearly indicating that all gates of the company
were blocked, thereby preventing free ingress to and egress from the company
premises. There, too, was the letter of
the company personnel manager, Ralph Funtila, advising the union that the
company will comply with the Labor Secretary's January 27, 2000 order; Funtila
appealed to the striking employees and the officers to remove all the obstacles
and to lift their picket line to ensure free ingress and egress.[86]
Further, as we earlier noted, the union itself, in its letter of March 2, 2000,
advised the NCMB that the union board of directors had decided to return to
work on March 3, 2000 indicating that they had been on strike since November
18, 1999 and were defiant of the return-to-work orders since January 28, 2000.
As a final point, the extension of the
return-to-work order and the submission of all striking workers, by the
company, cannot in any way be considered a waiver that the union officers can
use to negate liability for their actions, as the CA opined in its assailed
decision.[87] In the first place, as clarified by Funtila's
letter to the NCMB dated March 2, 2000,[88]
the company will accept all employees who will report for work up to March 6,
2000, without prejudice to whatever legal action it may take against those who
committed illegal acts. He also clarified
that it extended the return-to-work, upon request of the union and the DOLE to
accommodate employees who were in the provinces, who were not notified, and
those who were sick.
As a point of law, we find that the
company did not waive the right to take action against the erring officers, and
this was acknowledged by the Labor Secretary himself in his order of March 9,
2000,[89]
when he directed the company “to accept back to work the twenty (20) union officers
and one (1) shop steward[,] without prejudice to the Company's exercise of its
prerogative to continue its investigation.” The order was issued upon complaint
of the union that the officers were placed under preventive suspension.
For having participated in a
prohibited activity not once, but twice, the union officers, except those our
Decision can no longer reach because of the amicable settlement they entered
into with the company, legally deserve to be dismissed from the service. For failure of the company, however, to prove
by substantial evidence the illegal acts allegedly committed by Rosalinda
Olangar, who is a shop steward but not a union officer, we find her dismissal
without a valid cause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING
with MODIFICATION the challenged
decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60516, as follows:
1.
The collective bargaining
award of DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, contained in his order dated
May 31, 2000, is fully AFFIRMED;
2.
The dismissal of REYVILOSA
TRINIDAD, union 2nd Vice-President, is likewise AFFIRMED;
3.
The dismissal of ELOISA
FIGURA, Assistant Secretary; JERRY JAICTEN, Press Relations Officer; and ROWELL
FRIAS, Board Member, is declared VALID and for a just cause; and
4.
The dismissal of ROSALINDA
OLANGAR is declared illegal. The CA award is SUSTAINED in her case.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
|
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third
Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
per Special Order No. 843 dated
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), p. 1150.
[3] G.R. No. 167401.
[4] Rollo (G.R.
No. 167401), pp. 35-71. Bagong
Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al. v. Hon. Bienvenido
Laguesma, et al., promulgated on
[5]
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407).
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 167401), pp. 306-307.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No.
167407), p. 290.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No.
167401), pp. 265-266.
[10]
[11] Rollo (G.R. No.
167407), pp. 247-248.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo (G.R.
No.167401), pp. 269-270.
[18] Rollo (G.R.
No.167407), p. 346.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Rollo (G.R. No.
167401), pp. 584-662.
[24] On
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 167401), pp. 274-282.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] CA-G.R. SP No. 60516.
[30] Rollo (G.R. No.
167407), pp. 1117-1142.
[31] Rollo (G.R. No.
167401), p. 53.
[32] Rollo (G.R. No.
167407), pp. 1143-1146.
[33] Supra note 4.
[34] G.R. No.
142824,
[35] G.R. Nos. 92981-83,
[36] Supra note 9, at 3.
[37] Supra note 16, at 5.
[38] Rollo (G.R. No.
167407), pp. 465-478.
[39]
[40]
[41] Supra note 24.
[42] Supra note 28.
[43] Supra note 5.
[44] Philippine Airlines v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 88210, 193 SCRA 223.
[45] Supra note 35.
[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), pp. 347-354.
[47]
[48] Supra note 27.
[49] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), p. 1103.
[50] Supra note 24.
[51] 311 Phil. 311 (1995).
[52] Rollo (G.R. No. 167401), p. 287.
[53]
[54] Supra note 34.
[55] Rollo (G.R. No. 167401), p. 77.
[56] G.R.
No. 154096,
[57] G.R.
No. 77425,
[58]
[59] Supra note 30.
[60] Supra note 20, at 5.
[61] Supra note 15, at 4.
[62] Supra note 16, at 5.
[63] Supra note 39.
[64] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), p. 248, par. 2.
[65] LABOR CODE, Article 263(g) – When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
[66] LABOR CODE, Article 264.
[67] University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169632, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 526.
[68] Philcom Employees
[69]
[70] Supra note 64.
[71] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), pp. 314-316.
[72] Supra note 38.
[73] Supra note 69.
[74] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), pp. 477-478.
[75]
[76] One of the six union officers who pursued the union petition.
[77]
[78] Supra note 11.
[79] Supra note 12.
[80] Supra note 13.
[81] Supra note 14.
[82] G.R.
No. 103560,
[83] G.R.
No. 143341,
[84] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), p. 1204; Union Comment, par. 10.
[85] Supra note 11.
[86] Rollo (G.R. No. 167407), p. 307.
[87]
[88]
[89] Supra note 17.