Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, -
versus - EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 163835 Present: *CARPIO, J., **brion, Acting Chairperson, ***ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., and ****MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Through
a petition for review on certiorari,[1]
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) seeks to set aside the decision dated October 1, 2003[2]
and the resolution dated May 26, 2004[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 61157. The assailed CA rulings affirmed the decision
dated July 17, 2000[4]
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in
CTA Case No. 5551, partially granting respondent Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc.’s (Eastern’s) claim
for refund of unapplied input tax from its purchase and importation of capital
goods.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Eastern is a domestic corporation granted
by Congress with a telecommunications franchise under Republic Act (RA) No. 7617 on June 25, 1992. Under its franchise, Eastern is allowed to install,
operate, and maintain telecommunications system throughout the
From July 1, 1995 to December 31,
1996, Eastern purchased various imported equipment, machineries, and spare
parts necessary in carrying out its business activities. The importations were subjected to a 10% value-added
tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Customs, which
was duly paid by Eastern.
On September 19, 1997, Eastern filed with the CIR a written
application for refund or credit of unapplied input taxes it paid on the
imported equipment during the taxable years 1995 and 1996 amounting to P22,013,134.00.
In claiming for the tax refund, Eastern principally
relied on Sec. 10 of RA No. 7617, which allows Eastern to pay 3% of its gross
receipts in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof.[5] In the alternative, Eastern cited Section 106(B)
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977[6] (Tax Code) which authorizes a
VAT-registered taxpayer to claim for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
a tax refund of input taxes paid on capital goods imported or purchased locally
to the extent that such input taxes[7] have not been
applied against its output taxes.[8]
To toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period under the same provision, Eastern filed an appeal with the CTA
on September 25, 1997 without waiting for the CIR’s decision on its application
for refund. The CIR filed an Answer to
Eastern’s appeal in which it raised the following special and affirmative
defenses:
6.
[Eastern’s] claim for refund/tax credit is pending
administrative investigation;
x x x x
8.
[Eastern’s] exempting clause under its legislative
franchise x x x should be understood or interpreted as written, meaning, the 3%
franchise tax shall be collected as substitute for any internal revenue taxes x
x x imposed on its franchise or gross
receipts/earnings thereof x x x;
9.
The [VAT] on importation under Section 101 of the [1977]
Tax Code is neither a tax on franchise nor on gross receipts or earnings
thereof. It is a tax on the privilege of
importing goods whether or not the taxpayer is engaged in business, and
regardless of whether the imported goods are intended for sale, barter or
exchange;
10.
The VAT under Section 101(A) of the Tax Code x
x x replaced the advance sales tax and
compensating tax x x x. Accordingly, the
3% franchise tax did not substitute the 10% [VAT] on [Eastern’s] importation of
equipment, machineries and spare parts for the use of its telecommunication
system;
11.
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions. As such, they are regarded
in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed in strictissimi juris against the person or
entity claiming the exemption. The
burden is upon him who claims the exemption in his favour and he must be able
to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law and cannot
be permitted to exist upon vague implication x
x x;
12.
Taxes paid and collected are presumed to have been
made in accordance with the laws and regulations; and
13.
It is incumbent upon the taxpayer to establish its
right to the refund and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for
refund.[9]
Ruling in favor of Eastern, the CTA found that Eastern has a valid claim for the refund/credit of the
unapplied input taxes, not on the basis of the “in lieu of all taxes” provision of its legislative franchise,[10]
but rather, on Section 106(B) of the Tax Code, which states:
SECTION 106. Refunds or tax credits of input tax.
x x x x
(b)
Capital goods. - A VAT-registered
person may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of input taxes paid on capital goods imported
or locally purchased, to the extent
that such input taxes have not been applied against output taxes. The
application may be made only within two
(2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the importation or
purchase was made.[11] [Emphases supplied.]
The
CTA ruled that Eastern had satisfactorily shown that it was entitled to the
claimed refund/credit as all the elements of the above provision were present: (1)
Eastern was a VAT-registered entity which paid 10% input taxes on its importations
of capital equipment; (2) this input VAT
remained unapplied as of the first quarter of 1997; and (3) Eastern seasonably filed its application for
refund/credit within the two-year period stated in the law. However, the CTA noted that Eastern was able
to substantiate only P21,487,702.00 of its claimed amount of P22,013,134.00. The difference represented input taxes that
were allegedly paid but were not supported by the corresponding receipts, as
found by an independent auditor. Moreover,
it excluded P5,360,634.00 in input taxes on imported equipment for the
year 1995, even when these were properly documented as they were already booked
by Eastern as part of the cost. Once
input tax becomes part of the cost of capital equipment, it necessarily forms
part of depreciation. Thus, to grant the
refund of the 1995 creditable input tax amounts to twice giving Eastern the tax
benefit. Thus, in its July 17, 2000
decision, the CTA granted in part Eastern’s appeal by declaring it entitled to
a tax refund of P16,229,100.00, representing unapplied input taxes on
imported capital goods for the taxable year 1996.[12]
The CIR filed, on August 3, 2000, a
motion for reconsideration[13] of the CTA’s
decision. About a month and a half
later, it filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated September 15,
2000.[14] The CTA denied the CIR’s motion for
reconsideration in its resolution dated September 20, 2000.[15] The CIR then elevated the case to the CA through
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA
affirmed the CTA ruling through its decision dated October 1, 2003[16]
and its resolution dated May 26, 2004,[17] denying the motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the present
petition.
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
The CIR takes exception to the CA’s ruling
that Eastern is entitled to the full
amount of unapplied input taxes paid for its purchase of imported capital goods
that were substantiated by the corresponding receipts and invoices. The CIR posits that, applying Section 104(A)
of the Tax Code on apportionment of tax credits, Eastern is entitled to a tax
refund of only P8,814,790.15, instead of the P16,229,100.00
adjudged by the CTA and the CA. Section 104(A)
of the Tax Code states:
SEC. 104. Tax Credits. –
(a) Creditable Input tax. -
x x x x
A VAT-registered person
who is also engaged in transactions not subject to the value-added tax shall be
allowed input tax credit as follows:
(A)
Total input tax which
can be directly attributed to transactions subject to value-added tax; and
(B) A ratable
portion of any input tax which cannot be directly attributed to either
activity.[18] [Emphases supplied.]
To be entitled to a tax refund of the full
amount of P16,229,100.00, the CIR asserts that Eastern must prove that (a)
it was engaged in purely VAT taxable transactions and (b) the unapplied input
taxes it claims as refund were directly attributable to transactions subject to
VAT. The VAT returns of Eastern for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th quarters of 1996, however, showed that it earned income from
both transactions subject to VAT and transactions exempt from VAT;[19] the returns reported income earned from
taxable sales, zero-rated sales, and exempt sales in the following amounts:
|
1996 |
Taxable Sales |
Zero-Rated Sales |
Exempt Sales |
|
1st Quarter |
820,673.70 |
--- |
--- |
|
2nd Quarter |
3,361,618.59 |
225,088,899.07 |
140,111,655.85 |
|
3rd Quarter |
2,607,168.96 |
169,821,537.80 |
187,712,657.16 |
|
4th Quarter |
1,134,942.71 |
162,530,947.40 |
147,717,028.53 |
|
TOTAL |
7,924,403.96 |
557,441,384.27 |
475,541,341.54 |
|
Total Amount of Sales |
1,040,907,129.77 |
||
The
taxable sales and zero-rated sales are considered transactions subject to VAT,[20]
while exempt sales refer to transactions not subject to VAT.
Since the VAT returns clearly reflected income from exempt
sales, the CIR asserts that this constitutes as an admission on Eastern’s part that
it engaged in transactions not subject to VAT.
Hence, the proportionate allocation of the tax credit to VAT and non-VAT
transactions provided in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code should apply. Eastern is then entitled to only P8,814,790.15
as the ratable portion of the tax credit, computed in the following manner:
|
Taxable Sales + Zero-rated Sales |
x Input Tax as found by the CTA |
= Refundable
input tax |
|
Total Sales |
|
7,924,403.96 + 557,445,384.97 |
x 16,229,100.00 |
= P8,814,790.15 |
|
1,040,907,129.77 |
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Eastern objects to the arguments
raised in the petition, alleging that these have not been raised in the Answer
filed by the CIR before the CTA. In
fact, the CIR only raised the
applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code in his supplemental motion for
reconsideration of the CTA’s ruling which, notably, was filed a month and a
half after the original motion was filed, and thus beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.[21] Accordingly, the applicability of Section 104(A) was never validly presented as an
issue before the CTA; this, Eastern presumes, is the reason why it was not
discussed in the CTA’s resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Eastern claims that for the CIR to raise such
an issue now would constitute a violation of its right to due process;
following settled rules of procedure and fair play, the CIR should not be
allowed at the appeal level to change his theory of the case.
Moreover, in raising the question of
whether Eastern was in fact engaged in transactions not subject to VAT and
whether the unapplied input taxes can be directly attributable to transactions
subject to VAT, Eastern posits that the CIR is effectively raising factual questions
that cannot be the subject of an appeal by certiorari
before the Court.
Even if the CIR’s arguments were considered,
Eastern insists that the petition should nevertheless be denied since the CA found
that there was no evidence in the claim that it was engaged in non-VAT
transactions. The CA has ruled that:
The following requirements must be present before [Section
104(A)] of the [1977 Tax Code] can be applied, to wit:
1.
The person claiming the creditable input tax must be
VAT-registered;
2.
Such person is engaged in a transaction subject to
VAT;
3.
The person is also engaged in other transactions not
subject to VAT; and
4.
The ratable portion of any input tax cannot be
directly attributed to either activity.
In the case at bar, the third and fourth requisites
are not extant. It is undisputed that
[Eastern] is VAT-registered and the importation of [Eastern’s]
telecommunications equipment, machinery, spare parts, fiber optic cables, and
the like, as found by the CTA, is a transaction subject to VAT. However,
there is no evidence on record that would evidently show that respondent is
also engaged in other transactions that are not subject to VAT. [Emphasis supplied.][22]
Given the parties’ arguments, the issue for resolution is whether
the rule in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on the apportionment of tax credits
can be applied in appreciating Eastern’s claim for tax refund, considering that
the matter was raised by the CIR only when he sought reconsideration of the CTA
ruling?
THE COURT’S RULING
We
find the CIR’s petition meritorious.
The
Rules of Court prohibits raising new issues on appeal; the question of the applicability
of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code was already raised but the tax court did not
rule on it
Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court embodies the rule against raising new issues on appeal:
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. –
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court
below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed
by the parties.
The general rule is that appeals can only raise questions of law
or fact that (a) were raised in the court below, and (b) are within the issues
framed by the parties therein.[23] An issue which was neither averred in the
pleadings nor raised during trial in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.[24] The rule was made for the benefit of the adverse
party and the trial court as well. Raising
new issues at the appeal level is offensive to the basic rules of fair play and
justice and is violative of a party’s constitutional right to due process of
law. Moreover, the trial court should be
given a meaningful opportunity to consider and pass upon all the issues, and to
avoid or correct any alleged errors before those issues or errors become the
basis for an appeal.[25]
Eastern posits that since the CIR raised the applicability of
Section 104(A) of the Tax Code only in his supplemental
motion for reconsideration of the CTA decision (which was even belatedly
filed), the issue was not properly and timely raised and, hence, could not be
considered by the CTA. By raising the
issue in his appeal before the CA, the CIR has violated the above-cited
procedural rule.
Contrary to Eastern’s claim, we find that the CIR has
previously questioned the nature of Eastern’s transactions insofar as they
affected the claim for tax refund in his motion for reconsideration of the CTA
decision, although it did not specifically refer to Section 104(A) of the Tax
Code. We quote relevant portions of the motion:
[W]e maintain that [Eastern’s] claims are not creditable input taxes
under [Section 104(A) of the Tax Code].
What the law contemplates as creditable input taxes are only those paid
on purchases of goods and services specifically enumerated under [Section 104 (A)]
and that such input tax must have been paid by a VAT[-]registered person/entity
in the course of trade or business. It
must be noted that [Eastern] failed to
prove that such purchases were used in their VAT[-]taxable business. [Eastern’s pieces of] evidence are not
purchases of capital goods and do not fall under the enumeration x x x.
It is significant to point out here that refund of input taxes on capital goods shall be allowed only to the
extent that such capital goods are used in VAT[-]taxable business. x x x a perusal of the evidence submitted
before [the CTA] does not show that the alleged capital goods were used in VAT[-]taxable
business of [Eastern] x x x. [Emphases supplied.][26]
In raising these matters in his motion for reconsideration,
the CIR put forward the applicability of Section 104(A) because, essentially,
the applicability of the provision boils down to the question of whether the
purchased capital goods which a taxpayer paid input taxes were also used in a VAT-taxable
business, i.e., transactions that
were subject to VAT, in order for them to be refundable/creditable. Once proved that the taxpayer used the
purchased capital goods in a both VAT taxable and non-VAT taxable business, the
proportional allocation of tax credits stated in the law necessarily applies. This rule is also embodied in Section 4.106-1
of Revenue Regulation No. 7-95, entitled Consolidated
Value-Added Tax Regulations, which states:
SEC. 4.106-1. Refunds
or tax credits of input tax. – x x x x
(b) Capital Goods.
– Only a VAT-registered person may apply for issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund of input taxes paid on capital goods imported or locally
purchased. The refund shall be allowed to
the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against output
taxes. The application should be made
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
importation or purchase was made.
Refund of input
taxes on capital goods shall be allowed only to the extent that such capital
goods are used in VAT taxable business.
If it is also used in exempt operations, the input tax refundable shall
only be the ratable portion corresponding to the taxable operations. [Emphasis supplied.]
That
the CTA failed to rule on this question when it resolved the CIR’s motion for
reconsideration should not be taken against the CIR. It was the CTA which committed an error when it
failed to avail of that “meaningful opportunity to avoid or correct any alleged
errors before those errors become the basis for an appeal.”[27]
Exceptions
to the general rule; Eastern’s VAT returns reporting income from exempt sales
are matters of record that the tax court should have considered
The rule against raising new issues on appeal is not without
exceptions; it is a procedural rule that the Court may relax when compelling
reasons so warrant or when justice requires it.
What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension
of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.[28] Former Senator Vicente Francisco, a noted authority in
procedural law, cites an instance when the appellate court may take up an issue
for the first time:
The appellate court may, in
the interest of justice, properly take into consideration in deciding the case matters of record having some bearing on
the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court
ignored, although they have not been specifically raised as issues by the
pleadings. This is in consonance with the
liberal spirit that pervades the Rules of Court, and the modern trend of
procedure which accord the courts broad discretionary power, consistent with
the orderly administration of justice, in the decision of cases brought before
them.[29] [Emphasis supplied.]
As applied in the present case, even without the CIR raising
the applicability of Section 104(A), the CTA should have considered it since
all four of Eastern’s VAT returns
corresponding to each taxable quarter of 1996 clearly stated that it earned
income from exempt sales, i.e., non-VAT
taxable sales. Eastern’s quarterly
VAT returns are matters of record. In
fact, Eastern included them in its formal offer of evidence before the CTA “to
prove that [it is] engaged in VAT taxable, VAT exempt, and VAT zero-rated sales.”
By declaring income from exempt sales, Eastern effectively admitted that
it engaged in transactions not subject to VAT. In VAT-exempt sales, the
taxpayer/seller shall not bill any output tax on his sales to his customers
and, corollarily, is not allowed any credit or refund of the input taxes he
paid on his purchases.[30] This non-crediting of input taxes in exempt
transactions is the underlying reason why the Tax Code adopted the rule on
apportionment of tax credits under Section 104(A) whenever a VAT-registered
taxpayer engages in both VAT taxable and non-VAT taxable sales. In the face of these disclosures by Eastern, we
thus find the CA’s the conclusion that “there is no evidence on record that
would evidently show that [Eastern] is also engaged in other transactions that
are not subject to VAT” to be questionable.[31]
Also, we disagree with the CA’s declaration that:
The mere fact
that [Eastern’s] Quarterly VAT Returns confirm that [Eastern’s] transactions
involved zero-rated sales and exempt
sales do not sufficiently establish that the same were derived from [Eastern’s]
transactions that are not subject to VAT.
On the contrary, the transactions
from which [Eastern’s] sales were derived are subject to VAT but are either
zero[-]rated (0%) or otherwise exempted
for falling within the transactions enumerated in [Section 102(B) or Section 103] of the Tax Code.[32] [Emphasis supplied.]
Section
103 of the Tax Code[33] is an enumeration
of transactions exempt from VAT. Explaining the relation between exempt
transactions in Section 103 and claims for tax refunds, the Court declared in CIR v. Toshiba Equipment (Phils.), Inc.
that:
Section 103 x x x of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, relied
upon by petitioner CIR, relates to VAT-exempt transactions. These
are transactions exempted from VAT by special laws or international
agreements to which the
The
mere declaration of exempt sales in the VAT returns, whether based on Section
103 of the Tax Code or some other special law, should have prompted the CA to
apply Section 104(A) of the Tax Code to Eastern’s claim. It was thus erroneous for the appellate court to
rule that the declaration of exempt sales in Eastern’s VAT return, which may
correspond to exempt transactions under Section 103, does not indicate that
Eastern was also involved in non-VAT transactions.
Exception
to general rule; taxpayer claiming refund has the duty to prove entitlement
thereto
Another exemption from the rule against raising new issues on
appeal is when the question involves matters of public importance.[35]
The power of taxation is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty; the government chiefly relies on taxation to obtain the means to
carry on its operations. Taxes are essential to its very existence;[36] hence, the dictum that “taxes are the
lifeblood of the government.” For this
reason, the right of taxation cannot easily be surrendered; statutes granting
tax exemptions are considered as a derogation of the sovereign authority and
are strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. Claims for tax refunds, when based on statutes
granting tax exemption or tax refund, partake of the nature of an exemption;
thus, the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer-claimant similarly
applies.[37]
The taxpayer is charged with the heavy burden of proving that
he has complied with and satisfied all the statutory and administrative requirements
to be entitled to the tax refund. This burden
cannot be offset by the non-observance of procedural technicalities by the
government’s tax agents when the non-observance of the remedial measure
addressing it does not in any manner prejudice the taxpayer’s due process
rights, as in the present case.
Eastern cannot validly claim to have been taken by surprise
by the CIR’s arguments on the relevance of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code,
considering that the arguments were based on the reported exempt sales in the
VAT returns that Eastern itself prepared and formally offered as evidence. Even if we were to consider the CIR’s act as
a lapse in the observance of procedural rules, such lapse does not work to
entitle Eastern to a tax refund when the established and uncontested facts have
shown otherwise. Lapses in the literal observance
of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the
adverse party and especially when they are more consistent with upholding settled
principles in taxation.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitioner’s petition for
review on certiorari, and REVERSE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 61157, promulgated on October 1, 2003, as well as its
resolution of May 26, 2004. We order the
REMAND of the case to the Court of
Tax Appeals to determine the proportionate amount of tax credit that respondent
is entitled to, consistent with our ruling above. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
|
|
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated additional Member
of the Third Division, in view of the leave of absence of Associate Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin, per Special Order No. 859 dated July 1, 2010.
**
Designated Acting Chairperson of the Third Division, in view of the leave of
absence of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, per Special Order No. 849
dated June 29, 2010.
***Designated
additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
****Designated
additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the leave of absence of
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, per Special Order No. 850 dated June
29, 2010
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 8-25.
[2] Penned by Associate
Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, and concurred in by Associate Justice Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos and Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente; id. at 29-34.
[3]
[4] Penned by Judge (now Associate
Justice) Amancio Q. Saga, and concurred in by Judge (now Associate Justice)
Ernesto D. Acosta and Judge (Associate Justice) Ramon O. De Veyra; id. at 36-43.
[5]
[6] Presidential Decree No. 1158, enacted on June
3, 1977. The 1977 Tax Code has been
superseded by Republic Act No. 8424 (1997
Tax Code), enacted on December 11, 1997.
[7] The term "input
tax" means the value-added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered person
in the course of his trade or business on importation of goods or local
purchase of goods or services, including lease or use of property, from a
VAT-registered person (Section 104, 1977 Tax Code).
[8] The term "output
tax" means the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods
or properties or services by any person registered or required to register
under Section 236 of this Code (Section 104, 1977 Tax Code).
[9] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[10] See
rollo, pp. 39-40, where the CTA reasoned:
The “in lieu of all taxes” proviso found [in Eastern’s
legislative franchise] has been superseded by the passage of x x x the Expanded VAT Law x x x. [The Expanded VAT
Law amended,] among others, x x x the Tax Code to exclude [franchises] on telephone and telegraph systems, and radio
broadcasting stations and other [franchises] from payment of the franchise tax, [and instead subjected] these
companies to pay the VAT x x x.
Since
[Eastern], being a holder of a telecommunications franchise, is no longer
subject to franchise tax by the enactment of [the Expanded VAT Law] and is now
made liable to pay VAT, the “in lieu of all taxes” proviso under its franchise
is no longer a valid legal basis for its claim for refund. [Emphasis supplied.]
[11] Now Section 112(B) of the 1997 Tax Code.
[12] Rollo, p. 43.
[13] CA rollo, pp. 62-65.
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 2.
[17] Supra note 3.
[18] Now Section 110(A) (3) of the 1997 Tax Code.
[19] Rollo, pp. 80-90.
[20] A zero-rated sale is still considered a taxable transaction for VAT
purposes, although the VAT rate applied is 0%.
A sale by a VAT-registered taxpayer of goods and/or services taxed at 0%
shall not result in any output VAT, while the input VAT on its purchases of
goods or services related to such zero-rated sale shall be available as tax
credit or refund; Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corporation v. CIR, G.R. Nos. 141104 and 148763,
June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 73, 98.
[21] A motion for
reconsideration must be filed within the same period for taking an appeal, i.e., 15 days from notice of
judgment. Section 1, Rule 37, in
relation to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
[22] Rollo, p. 32.
[23] People
v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472,
February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682, 689-690.
[24] Dela Santa v. CA, et al.,
224 Phil. 195, 209 (1985), and Dihiansan, et al. v. CA, et al., 237
Phil. 695, 701-702 (1987).
[25] L. Bersamin, Appeal and Review in the Philippines (2nd
ed.), pp. 378, citing Soriano v. Ramirez,
44 Phil. 475, Toribio v. Decasa, 55
Phil. 461, San Agustin v. Barrios, 68
Phil. 475, US v. Paraiso, 11 Phil.
799, US v. Rosa, 14 Phil. 394, Pico v. US, 40 Phil. 1117, and Dela Rama v. Dela Rama, 41 Phil. 980.
[26] Rollo, pp. 208-210.
[27] Supra note 25.
[28] CIR v.
Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,
G.R. No. 159593, October 16, 2003, 504 SCRA 484, 496.
[29] The Revised Rules of Court in the
[30] CIR v. Seagate Technology Philippines, G.R. No. 153866, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA
132, 145; and Contex Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 151135,
July 2, 2004, 433 SCRA 376.
[31] Rollo, p. 32.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Now Section 109 of the 1997 Tax Code.
[34] G.R. No. 150154, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 211,
223.
[35] Supra note 25.
[36] CIR v.
Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November 25,
2003, 416 SCRA 436, 457.
[37] CIR v.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R.
Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 160.