Republic of the
Supreme Court
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO),
Petitioner, -
versus - SPS. EDITO and FELICIDAD CHUA, and
JOSEFINA PAQUEO, Respondents. |
G.R. NO. 160422 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,*
and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
|
|
|
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
BRION, J.: |
|
Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO or petitioner) assails in this petition for
review on certiorari[1]
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA or appellate court), dated October 20, 2003,[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77034, affirming with modification the March 26, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82, in Civil Case No. Q-97-30503.[3]
The
affirmed RTC decision ordered the petitioner to restore the electric power
connection of spouses Edito and Felicidad Chua (Chuas) at their residence, and awarded P300,000.00 as moral
damages. The CA affirmed the restoration
of electric power connection but reduced the awarded moral damages to P100,000.00.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The facts, as
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, are summarized below.
MERALCO is a
utility company engaged in the business of sale and distribution of electricity
within its franchise area. The Chuas are the beneficial users at their
residence of electric service provided by MERALCO, registered under the name of
respondent Josefina Paqueo with Account Number 05091-4038-14. MERALCO installed
an electric meter with number Co. No. 33 SPN 46170 in front of the Chuas’ home
to record the Chuas’ electric consumption.
The meter was in a concrete post outside the Chuas’ perimeter fence.[4]
From P747.84 to P887.27.
In October 1996, the Chuas were surprised to receive an electricity bill for
the amount of P4,906.87 for the period of September 11 to
On
The Chuas were billed based on the
new meter and its readings from P700.00 to P800.00.[9]
On
Our Inspection Office
has referred to us for appropriate action the following finding(s) of our
service inspectors and meter laboratory technicians after your metering
installation at the above address was inspected on
1. THE TERMINAL SEAL WAS MISSING.
2. THE SEALING WIRE OF THE ERB AND MERALCO LEAD COVER SEALS WAS CUT.
3. THE 1000TH, 100TH AND 10TH DIAL POINTERS OF THE REGISTER WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT.
Given the above condition(s) and in accordance with the rules
implementing Republic Act 7832, you are billed the amount of P183,983.66
(rate charge of P179,353.26 and energy tax of P4,630.40).
Furthermore, the company is now allowed to collect Surcharges as a penalty for
all Violation of Contract cases apprehended effective
This is a formal demand upon you to pay the above stated amount at this office within ten days from your receipt of this letter; if no settlement is made within the given grace period, your service shall be disconnected and the necessary criminal or civil action initiated against you for violation of Republic Act 7832.[10]
The Chuas refused to pay as
demanded. On
On P183,983.66 to P71,737.49.[11]
On
After
trial, the RTC rendered its decision, whose dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter as follows:
1)
To restore to plaintiffs at their residence at
2)
To pay the plaintiffs the sum of P300,000.00
as and by way of moral damages;
3)
To pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00
as and by way of attorney’s fees;
4) To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
MERALCO
appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA.
The
CA affirmed the RTC decision.[14] The appellate court confirmed that the meter
had been tampered, but found that the tampering was mitigated by the Chuas’
voluntary act of going to MERALCO to report the possible defect in their
meter. The voluntary act, according to
the court, constituted good faith as MERALCO would not have discovered the
defects in the meter if the Chuas had not reported the matter.
The appellate court also noted that while
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 (RA
7832), or the “Anti-Electricity and
Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994,” allows MERALCO to immediately
disconnect electric service, it may only do so when the owner of the house has either
been caught in flagrante delicto in any
of the acts constituting prima facie evidence
of illegal use, or has been discovered a second time in any of the enumerated
circumstances. In the Chuas’ case, they
were not caught in flagrante delicto
as they in fact reported the defect in their meter. This was the first instance,
too, that MERALCO had discovered any tampering in the Chuas’ meter. Under these
circumstances, the appellate court concluded that MERALCO had no legal right to
disconnect the Chuas’ electrical service.
While
upholding the RTC’s factual findings, the CA modified the RTC decision by
reducing the awarded moral damages from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00.
THE PETITION
MERALCO
filed the present petition, raising the following arguments:[15]
I.
The CA erred in ruling that MERALCO had no right to
disconnect the electric service of the Chuas.
II.
MERALCO is entitled to collect the differential
billing of P183,983.66.
III.
Even assuming that MERALCO had no right to
disconnect the Chuas’ electric service, they are nevertheless not entitled to
moral damages in the absence of evidence of damages they sustained.
MERALCO points out that it did not immediately disconnect
electric service to the Chuas. It first sent several demand letters explaining
the meter tampering and demanding payment for the billed differential in the
sum of P183,983.66. It was only after the Chuas refused to pay the
differential billing that MERALCO disconnected their electric service.
Additionally, MERALCO contends that based on Section 9 of RA
7832, no writs of injunction shall be issued by any court against any private
electric utility exercising its right and authority to disconnect electric
service unless there is prima facie
evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse
of authority. Since the Chuas failed to prove MERALCO’s evident bad faith in
disconnecting their electric service, they are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.
MERALCO further posits that the deliberate manipulation of
the dial pointers prevented the full and correct billing of the electric energy
actually delivered to and consumed by the Chuas. The differential billing
represents the monetary equivalent of the electricity used by the Chuas but not
registered by the meter.
Lastly, MERALCO maintains that even if it had no right to
disconnect the Chuas’ electric service, the Chuas nevertheless are not entitled
to moral damages. The Chuas did not
sustain damages after the disconnection since they sourced their electric
supply from another electric meter within the premises.
THE
COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Prima facie
evidence of
illegal use
of electricity
MERALCO claims that the meter
tampering in this case stands undisputed in the evidence on record. Under RA 7832, the law presumes that the
person benefited by the unlawful use of electricity is the perpetrator of the
meter tampering. Thus, no need arose for MERALCO to prove that the Chuas actually
tampered with their meter; pursuant to Section 4 of RA 7832, Meralco had the
right to immediately disconnect the Chuas’ electric service.
We find MERALCO’s position
legally incorrect. Essential
to the resolution of this issue is Section 4 of RA 7832, which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence. –
(a) The presence of any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the
person benefited thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric
utility to such person after due notice, x x x
(iv)
The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated,
altered, or tampered meter recording chart or graph or computerized chart,
graph, or log.
x x x
(viii)
x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must
be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
To
reiterate, the discovery of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter shall
only constitute prima facie evidence
of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from the illegal use if such discovery is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative
of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
With such prima facie evidence, MERALCO
is within its rights to immediately disconnect the electric service of the
consumer after due notice.
Section
1, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7832 (IRR) defines an officer of the law as
one “who, by direct supervision of law or
by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and
property, such as barangay captain, barangay chairman, barangay councilman,
barangay leader, officer or member of Barangay Community Brigades, barangay
policeman, PNP policeman, municipal councilor, municipal mayor and provincial
fiscal.”
The importance of
having an authorized government representative present during an inspection was
highlighted during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832 when Senator John H.
Osmeña, the law’s author, explained:
Mr.
President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations
which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I
think they should be prudent enough to bring in competent authority, either the
police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to
disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a court
case and the customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in
Section 2, then they could be in a lot of trouble.[16]
We emphasized the significance of this
requirement in Sps. Quisumbing v. MERALCO,[17] when we said:
The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.[18]
After
thoroughly examining the records of this case, we find no proof that MERALCO ever
complied with the required presence of an “officer of the law.” In his
testimony,
We note,
too, that while MERALCO claimed in its Answer that an ERB representative was
present and witnessed the testing of
the Chuas’ electric meter at the MERALCO laboratory,[19]
it never once identified this ERB representative. MERALCO did not allege in either the present
petition or in the Memorandum it filed with this Court that an ERB
representative witnessed the laboratory testing of the Chuas’ electric meter. The
Meter Verification Report,[20]
the document that contains the results of the laboratory testing, was also not signed
by either an ERB representative or by any officer of the law.
For lack of
any evidence showing that a government representative personally witnessed and attested
to the discovery of the Chuas’ tampered electric meter, no supporting prima facie evidence can be invoked for the immediate disconnection
of the Chuas’ electric service pursuant to Section 4 of RA 7832.
Consumer not the proper witness to inspection
Rule III, Section 1 of
the IRR provides: “In order to constitute prima
facie evidence, the discovery of any of the circumstances enumerated in
Section 1 hereof, must be personally witnessed and attested to by the consumer concerned or a duly
authorized ERB representative or any officer of the law, as the case may be.”
We hold the view,
however, that the inclusion of the phrase “by
the consumer concerned” in the IRR is invalid because it is in excess of
what the law being implemented provides. As RA 7832 stands, only the presence of an
authorized government agent, either an officer of the law or an authorized
representative of the ERB, during the MERALCO inspection would allow any
of the circumstances enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832 to be considered prima facie evidence of illegal use of
electricity by the benefited party. The law does not include the consumer or
the consumer’s representative in this enumeration.
In legal contemplation,
the ERB’s inclusion of the phrase “by the
consumer concerned” in Rule III, Section 1 of the IRR expanded the clear wording
of the law and violated the recognized principle that an administrative
agency’s rule-making power is confined to filling in the gaps and the necessary
details in carrying into effect the law as enacted; rule-making cannot extend,
amend, or expand statutory requirements or embrace matters not covered by the law
being implemented. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.[21] In the present case, the consumer cannot in
any way be considered to be in the same classification as the named government
representatives so that his or her presence can be a substitute for the
presence of these representatives.
For this reason, even if
Florence Chua, the Chuas’ daughter, acknowledged that she witnessed
Legal requirements
for authority
to disconnect electricity
Section
6 of RA 7832 provides another mandatory requirement before MERALCO can immediately disconnect a
consumer’s electric service. The provision reads:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. - The private electric utility or rural electric cooperative concerned shall have the right and authority to disconnect immediately the electric service after serving the written notice or warning to the effect, without the need of a court or administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the owner of the house or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall have been caught en flagrante delicto doing any of the acts enumerated in section 4 (a) hereof, or when any of the circumstances so enumerated shall have been discovered for the second time: Provided, That in the second case, a written notice or warning shall have been issued upon the first discovery: Provided, further, That the electric service shall not be immediately disconnected or shall be immediately restored upon the deposit of the amount representing the differential billing by the person denied the service, with the private electric utility or the rural cooperative concerned or with the competent court as the case may be: Provided, furthermore, That if the court finds that illegal use of electricity has not been committed by the same person, the amount deposited shall be credited against future billings, with legal interest thereon chargeable against the private utility or rural electric cooperative, and the utility or cooperative shall be made to immediately pay such person double the value of the payment or deposit with legal interest, which amount shall likewise be creditable against immediate future billings, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative action that such person may be entitled to file under existing laws, rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That if the court finds the same person guilty of such illegal use of electricity, he shall, upon final judgment, be made to pay the electric utility or the rural electric cooperative concerned double the value of the estimated electricity illegally used which is referred to in this section as differential billing.
In other words, MERALCO is authorized to immediately
disconnect the electric service of its consumers without the need of a court or
administrative order when: (a) the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf,
is caught in flagrante delicto in any
of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832; or (b) when any of the
circumstances constituting prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity is discovered for the second time.
In
flagrante delicto means “[i]n the very act of committing the crime.”[22]
To be caught in flagrante delicto,
therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses
to the act of tampering so that there
is “direct evidence” of culpability, or “that which proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption.”[23]
In the present case, however, MERALCO presented no
proof that it ever caught the Chuas, or anyone acting in the Chuas’ behalf, in
the act of tampering with their electric meter. As correctly observed by the
CA, the Chuas could not have been caught in
flagrante delicto committing the tampering since in the first place, they
were the ones who reported the defect in their meter. Moreover, the presence of
a broken cover seal, broken sealing wire, and a missing terminal seal, is not enough
to declare the Chuas in flagrante delicto
tampering with the electric meter.
As the basic complaint for mandamus alleged, without any serious
refutation from the petitioner, the electric meter is in a concrete post
outside of the Chuas’ perimeter fence; hence, in a location accessible to the
public. We note, too, that MERALCO did
not present any evidence that it caught the Chuas committing any of the acts constituting
prima facie evidence of illegal use
of electricity for the second time.
In view of MERALCO’s failure to comply with both
Section 4 and Section 6 of RA 7832, MERALCO obviously had no authority to
immediately disconnect the Chuas’ electric service.
Writ of Mandatory
Injunction
On the validity of the injunctive writ the lower court issued in the Chuas’ favor, MERALCO submits that the Chuas were not entitled to an injunctive writ since it had a right, under the law, to automatically disconnect the latter’s electric service. Furthermore, Section 9 of RA 7832 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions or restraining orders against electric utilities from disconnecting service unless the consumer proves that the electric utility acted with evident bad faith in disconnecting the electric service. This cited provision states:
Section 9. Restriction on the Issuance of Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction. – No writ of injunction or restraining order shall be issued by any court against any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative exercising the right and authority to disconnect electric service as provided in this Act, unless there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority.
We have
fully discussed above why MERALCO was not in the position under RA 7832 to
immediately disconnect the Chuas’ electric service. We add that while
electricity is property[24] whose
enjoyment, as a
general rule, the owner may extend or deny to others,[25] electricity
is not an ordinary kind of property that a service provider may grant or
withhold to consumers at will. Electricity is a basic necessity whose
generation and distribution is imbued with public interest, and its provider is
a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power.[26] In view
of the serious consequences resulting from immediate disconnection of electric
service, the law provides strict requisites that MERALCO must follow before it can
be granted authority to undertake instant disconnection of electric service due
to its consumers. In view of MERALCO’s dominance over its market and its
customers and the latter’s relatively weak bargaining position as against
MERALCO, and in view too of the serious consequences and hardships a customer stands
to suffer upon service disconnection, MERALCO’s failure to strictly observe
these legal requirements can be equated to the bad faith or abuse of right[27]
that the law speaks of.
Under the circumstances, we cannot but conclude that MERALCO abused its superior and dominant position as well as the authority granted to it by law as a service provider when it persisted in disconnecting the Chuas’ electric service. Hence, the general prohibition against the issuance of a restraining order or an injunction under Section 9 of RA 7832 cannot apply. Rather, what must prevail is the exception: an injunction can issue when a disconnection has been attended by bad faith or grave abuse of authority.
As to whether
the Chuas are entitled to a writ of mandatory injunction, we rule in the
affirmative. An injunctive writ issues only
upon a showing that: a) the applicant possesses a clear and unmistakable right;
b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and c) there is
urgent and permanent necessity for an injunctive writ to prevent serious damage.[28]
In the present
case, the Chuas have established that they are paying MERALCO customers. In the
absence of the prima facie evidence
required by Section 4 and by the requirements of Section 6 of RA 7832 that the Chuas
tampered with their electric meter, and in light as well of the merits of the
Chuas’ case as discussed below, the Chuas have an unmistakable right to be
provided with continuous power supply – a right MERALCO obviously invaded when
it cut off the Chuas’ electric service. Electricity
being what it is and has been in modern day living, an urgent and permanent need
exists to prevent MERALCO from cutting
off the Chuas’ electric service under the circumstances that gave rise to the
present dispute. Accordingly, we uphold the RTC and CA decisions ordering MERALCO
to immediately restore the Chuas’ electric service.
Differential billing
MERALCO further asserts that the Chuas should be made to pay the differential
billing for the electricity that they actually consumed but which was not reflected
on their electric bills due to the tampered electric meter. Since the prima facie presumption afforded by
Section 4 of RA 7832 does not apply, it falls upon MERALCO to first prove that the Chuas actually manipulated the
dial pointers on their meter before it can hold them accountable for the
differential billing. The circumstances discussed below, however, cast serious doubt
on the allegation and assumption that the Chuas ever tampered with their electric
meter.
First, we stress once again that the Chuas
themselves requested MERALCO to inspect their meter for possible defects after
they received their unusually high September 1996 bill; the Chuas themselves
were instrumental in discovering the tampered condition of their electric meter.
Had the Chuas been guilty of tampering as MERALCO assumed, they would not have
drawn attention to themselves by reporting the problem with their meter; as the
beneficial users of the electric service, they would have been MERALCO’s main suspects once the tampering came to
light. We thus find it highly illogical for the Chuas to be guilty of actual
tampering given their actions on record on the discovery of the tampered
condition of their meter.
Second, we observe that based on the Chuas’
billing record, no discernable
difference exists between the Chuas’ electric bills before and after MERALCO had
replaced their tampered meter. The
Chuas consumed between 231 to 269 kilowatt hours of electricity per month from P747.84 to P887.27. (Their long-term usage record is further
reflected in the appropriate footnoted table below.) The following usage record is undisputed
after MERALCO installed a new meter to replace the tampered one.
|
Date |
Kilowatt hours |
Amount Paid (pesos) |
|
October 1996 |
1,297 |
4,906.87 |
|
November |
227 |
781.86 |
|
December |
228 |
806.19 |
|
January 1997 |
254 |
898.89 |
|
|
96 |
331.04 |
Tampering
with the electric meter is committed by the consumer to prevent the meter from
registering the correct amount of electric consumed; thus, while using the same
regular power supply, they are billed for less than what they actually consumed.
Tampering affects only the registered usage as reflected in the electric meter,
not the amount of electricity actually used,
assuming a more or less uniform monthly usage of electricity.[29] Stated otherwise, when an electric meter is
tampered, the recorded consumption is less than the electricity actually used.
Consequently, when a tampered electric meter
is replaced, assuming the same amount of monthly rate of usage, the new electric meter will register the
increased use of electricity that had previously been concealed by the tampered
meter.[30]
If the
Chuas had truly tampered with their electric meter, it stands to reason that after
MERALCO replaced the tampered electric meter with a new one, the Chuas’
electric bills would have gone up to reflect the electricity they were actually
consuming. That the Chuas’ monthly electric
consumption remained virtually unchanged even after the defective electric meter
had been replaced strongly disproves the contentions that the Chuas tampered
with their electric meter and that the Chuas’ electric meter registered less
than the electricity they had actually “consumed.” Given the surrounding circumstance, the
sequence of events, and the electric meter readings, i.e., the exposed location of the Chuas’ electric meter, the
long-term consumption record shown below, the unusual upward spike of the meter
reading in September 1996, the inspection and the replacement by a new electric
meter, and the continued readings consistent with the readings prior to the September
1996 spike, it would not be surprising if the tampering of the seals came
immediately before September 1996 and were made by parties other than the Chuas
for their own reasons. To be sure, the Chuas would not have tampered with their
own meter to increase their meter reading.
Aside
from the doubtful veracity of the allegation and assumption that the Chuas
tampered with their meter, we also consider that MERALCO did not provide any factual or legal basis for its
differential billing. Section 6 of RA 7832 supplies the manner by which a
public utility can compute the differential billing.
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. – x x x
For purposes of this Act, “differential billing” shall refer to the amount to be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled electricity illegally consumed by him as determined through the use of methodologies which utilize, among other, as basis for determining the amount of monthly electric consumption in kilowatt-hours to be billed either: (a) the highest recorded monthly consumption within the five-year billing period preceding the time of the discovery, (b) the estimated monthly consumption as per the report of load inspection conducted during the time of the discovery, (c) the higher consumption between the average consumption before or after the highest drastic drop in consumption within the five year billing period preceding the discovery, (d) the highest recorded monthly consumption within four (4) months after the time of discovery, or (e) the result of the ERB test during the time of discovery and, as basis for determining the period to be recovered by the differential billing, either: (1) the time when the electric service of the person concerned recorded an abrupt or abnormal drop in consumption, or (2) when there was change in his service connection such as a change in his service connection such as a change of meter, change of seal or reconnection, or in the absence thereof, a maximum of sixty (60) billing months, up to the time of discovery: Provided, however, That such period shall, in no case, be less than one (1) year preceding the date of discovery of the illegal use of electricity.
According
to MERALCO’s witness, Enrique
Katipunan, the period affected by the Chuas’ tampered electric meter was from
Significantly,
while Katipunan stated that he “studied the Chuas’ billing history to establish
the affected period from
We are
not unaware that MERALCO used
the Chuas’ September 1996 bill to compute the differential billing – the same bill
that the Chuas protested with Meralco for being extraordinarily high. While Section
6 of RA 7832 does allow MERALCO to
use the consumer’s highest recorded monthly consumption as the basis to compute
the differential billing, still, Meralco – after examining the Chuas’ records
for the past four years[34] –
should have noticed that the September 1996 bill was truly unusual. As seen
from their billing history, while the Chuas consistently consumed no more than
300 kilowatt hours of electricity every month for the past four years, in their
September bill, their usage dramatically spiked to 1,297 kilowatt hours, or a
difference of more than 400%. Even more
telling is that after MERALCO replaced
the alleged tampered electric meter, the Chuas continued to consume the same
amount of electricity they had consumed prior to the September 1996 bill.
Given
the strange circumstances surrounding the September 1996 bill, MERALCO should
have exercised prudence and employed another method to compute the Chuas’
differential billing, such as using the estimated monthly consumption based on
a load inspection report. At the very least, MERALCO should have exerted efforts
to investigate the Chuas’ complaint regarding the sudden increase in their
electric bill, especially considering the Chuas’ claim that they had not done
anything new or used any additional appliances during the period covered by the
September 1996 bill.[35] We
find it significant that nothing in the record suggests that MERALCO even
attempted to study, or even tried to explain, the sudden surge in the Chuas’
September 1996 bill.
We
highlight another important point to consider - that MERALCO sent the Chuas another
letter dated P183,983.66 to P71,737.49.[36] While
MERALCO admitted the existence of this letter in the proceedings before the
lower courts, it chose to ignore the
existence of this February 5, 1997 letter in its submissions with this Court;
instead, in the Petition and Memorandum it filed with this Court, MERALCO reverted
to its demand that the Chuas pay the original differential billing of P183,983.66.
This unexplained and inconsistent MERALCO posture further strengthens our doubts
on to the legitimacy and correctness of the Chuas’ differential billing.
MERALCO
is duty bound to explain to its customers the basis for arriving at any given
billing, particularly in cases of unregistered consumptions. Otherwise, consumers
will stand piteously at the public utility’s mercy.[37] Courts
cannot and will not in any way blindly grant a public utility’s claim for
differential billing if there is no sufficient evidence to prove entitlement.[38] As
MERALCO has failed to substantiate
its claim for the differential billing, we rule that the Chuas cannot be held
to account for the billed amount.
MERALCO guilty of inexcusable negligence
Apart
from lacking factual or legal basis, another reason for us not to hold the
Chuas accountable for MERALCO’s
differential billing is our previous ruling in Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp. v. CA,[39]
where we said:
It has been held that notice of a defect need not be direct and express; it is enough that the same had existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected, and the presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. Hence, MERALCO’s failure to discover the defect, if any, considering the length of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence. Furthermore, we need not belabor the point that as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.
Accordingly, we are left with no recourse but to conclude that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter installed within the premises of petitioners was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
Indeed, if an unusual electric consumption was not reflected in the statements of account of petitioners, MERALCO, considering its technical knowledge and vast experience in providing electric service, could have easily verified any possible error in the meter reading. In the absence of such a mistake, the electric meters themselves should be inspected for possible defects or breakdowns and forthwith repaired and, if necessary, replaced. x x x
The rationale behind this ruling is that public utilities should be put on notice, as a deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in serviceable condition, they run the risk of forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts originally due from their customers. Certainly, we cannot sanction a situation wherein the defects in the electric meter are allowed to continue indefinitely until suddenly the public utilities concerned demand payment for the unrecorded electricity utilized when, in the first place, they should have remedied the situation immediately. If we turn a blind eye on MERALCO’s omission, it may encourage negligence on the part of public utilities, to the detriment of the consuming public.[40]
While Ridjo involved a defective meter, we
have, on occasion, applied this same doctrine to cases that involved allegations
of meter tampering. In both Manila
Electric Company v. Macro Textile Mills, Corp.[41] and
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v.
Opena,[42] we faulted
the electric companies involved for not immediately inspecting the electric
meters after they noted a sudden drop in the consumer’s registered electric
consumption. Since, in both cases, the public utility companies allowed several
years to lapse before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric meters,
we ruled that they were both negligent and consequently barred them from collecting
their claims of differential billing against the consumers.
With these rulings in mind, we held in MERALCO v. Wilcon Builders Supply, Inc.[43] that the use of the words “defect” and “defective” in Ridjo does not restrict the inexcusable negligence doctrine to cases of “mechanical defects” in installed electric meters. We said:
The
Ridjo doctrine simply states that the
public utility has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper
inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not
malfunction. Its failure to discover the defect, if any, considering the length
of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence; its failure to make the necessary
repairs and replace the defective electric meter installed within the
consumer’s premises limits the latter’s liability. The use of the words
“defect” and “defective” in the above-cited case does not restrict the
application of the doctrine to cases of “mechanical defects” in the installed
electric meters. A more plausible
interpretation is to apply the rule on negligence whether the defect is
inherent, intentional or unintentional, which therefore covers
tampering, mechanical defects and mistakes in the computation of the
consumers’ billing.[44]
The
production and distribution of electricity is a highly technical business
undertaking. In conducting its
operation, it is only logical for a public utility, such as MERALCO, to employ
mechanical devices and equipment for the orderly pursuit of its business.[45]
MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of
its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due
diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such
duties constitutes negligence.[46]
True, consumers
who tamper with their electric meter do so surreptitiously to avoid being
detected by the public utility providing the service; hence, at first glance,
it may seem unreasonable for us to chastise MERALCO for not detecting the alleged
tampering sooner. However, what stands out in this case is the sheer length of time that the Chuas’ electric
meter allegedly existed in a tampered state without being discovered by MERALCO
if indeed the electric meter had been defective since 1992. If we presume MERALCO’s findings to be
correct, MERALCO discovered the broken seals in the Chuas’ meter after more than four years (from August 1992
to October 1996), and only because the Chuas reported a possible defect with
their electric meter to the public utility company.
Aside
from the long period of time involved, we also underscore the fact that the
alleged tampering in this case did not require special training or knowledge to
be detected. Certainly, the missing terminal seal, the broken cover seal, and
the broken sealing wire of the meter[47]
are visible to the naked eye and would have caught the attention of MERALCO’s
personnel in the course of their meter readings.
As in Ridjo, we take judicial notice that
during this long period of time, MERALCO’s personnel had the opportunity to
inspect and examine the Chuas’ electric meter for the purpose of determining
the monthly dues payable. Even if MERALCO
did not conduct these regular monthly inspections, we find it reasonable to
expect that within this four-year period, MERALCO would, at the very least, annually examine the electric
meter to verify its condition and to determine the accuracy of its readings if
ordinary examination shows defects as in the case of the Chuas’ meter. That it
failed to do so constitutes negligence on its part, and bars it from collecting
its claim for differential billing.
On the issue of moral damages
Article
32 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages are proper when the rights of
individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated. Jurisprudence has established the following
requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury – whether
physical, mental, or psychological – clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[48]
Considering
the manner MERALCO disconnected the Chuas’ electric service, we find the award
of moral damages proper. Apart from the havoc wreaked on the Chuas’ daily lives
when MERALCO abruptly and without legal basis cut off their electricity, the
removal of the electric meter also caused the Chuas extreme social humiliation and
embarrassment as they were subjected to speculations in their neighborhood of
being “power thieves.” As Mrs. Felicidad Chua testified, she suffered sleepless
nights and felt serious anxiety after the removal of their electric meter came
to the attention of the barangay. In
fact, she even had to consult a doctor for this anxiety.[49] Thus,
even if the Chuas did subsequently obtain their electricity from another
source,[50] the
damage to the Chuas’ reputation and social standing had already been done.
However,
moral damages, which are left largely to the sound discretion of the courts,
should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances.[51] Moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty.[52] As
prevailing jurisprudence[53]
deems the award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00
appropriate in cases where MERALCO
wrongfully disconnected electric service, we uphold the CA ruling, reducing the
moral damages awarded from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional Member of the Third Division effective
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 9-26.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A.
Adefuin-de la Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Buenaventura
Guerrero and Eliezer de los
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Meter No. 33SPN46170.
[7] Meter No. 33RZN80082.
[8] Dated
[9]
[10]
[11] The letter said:
Dear Atty. Chua:
This
refers to our Company’s claim for the value of unregistered consumption
amounting to P183,983.66.
Please be
informed that we have re-evaluated your case base on our field findings and the
documents you have furnished. Thus, reducing the aforementioned amount to P71,737.49
(Rate Charge – P71,203.19 and Energy Tax – P184.30). In the
interest of speedy disposition of the case, we are instructed to collect the
recomputed amount and act accordingly, Moreso, we shall also require you to
register the service under your name and pay the deposit amounting to P5,410.00,
representing the meter and service deposit. This amount can be refunded upon
termination of your service.
In view thereof, please consider this letter as our FINAL DEMAND and settle the aforesaid amount; otherwise, much to our regret, we shall refer the matter to our legal for legal sanction.
RTC Records, p. 14.
[12] Rollo, pp. 44-51.
[13] Dated
[14] Dated
[15] Supra note 1.
[16] Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 61,
[17] 429 Phil. 727 (2002).
[18]
[19] Rollo, p. 62.
[20] RTC Records, pp. 58-59.
[21] Landbank of
the
[22] People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732 (2000), citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 575 (5th ed., 1979).
[23] Go v. Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc., 546 Phil. 187, 195 (2008).
[24]
[25] Article 429 of the Civil Code provides:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
[26] Republic v. Manila Electric Company, 440 Phil. 389 (2002).
[27] Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Quijano, G.R. No. 144474, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 364, 376, citing Manila Electric Company v. Hon. Lorna Navarro-Domingo, G.R. No. 161893, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 363.
[28] Manila Electric Company v. Jose, G.R. No. 152769, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 669, 675, citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 168, 175.
[29] MERALCO v. Wilcon Builders Supply, Inc.,, G.R. No. 171534, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 742, 753-754, citing MERALCO v. T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 131723, December 13, 2007, 540 SCRA 62.
[30]
[31] TSN,
[32] Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 225, 245 (2000); Philippine Fruit & Vegetable Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil. 929, 938 (1999).
[33] Supra note 31, p. 8.
[34] According to MERALCO’s Computation Worksheet, the Chuas had the following billing record for the affected period:
|
Date |
Kilowatt hours |
Amount Paid (Pesos) |
|
September 1992 |
189 |
473.96 |
|
October |
215 |
547.50 |
|
November |
232 |
605.90 |
|
December |
188 |
477.74 |
|
January 1993 |
183 |
464.60 |
|
February |
196 |
509.31 |
|
March |
183 |
470.03 |
|
April |
197 |
511.62 |
|
May |
200 |
557.11 |
|
June |
233 |
664.51 |
|
July |
229 |
651.98 |
|
August |
174 |
482.52 |
|
September |
181 |
507.44 |
|
October |
241 |
703.54 |
|
November |
255 |
751.52 |
|
December |
187 |
527.55 |
|
January 1994 |
249 |
728.65 |
|
February |
223 |
684.42 |
|
March |
187 |
559.47 |
|
April |
218 |
666.16 |
|
May |
224 |
686.80 |
|
June |
240 |
750.68 |
|
July |
213 |
656.41 |
|
August |
231 |
717.46 |
|
September |
256 |
806.03 |
|
October |
240 |
742.22 |
|
November |
244 |
750.58 |
|
December |
251 |
768.61 |
|
January 1995 |
277 |
855.29 |
|
February |
210 |
629.26 |
|
March |
220 |
669.39 |
|
April |
244 |
769.68 |
|
May |
248 |
767.34 |
|
June |
284 |
887.43 |
|
July |
240 |
733.21 |
|
August |
259 |
812.15 |
|
September |
298 |
922.09 |
|
October |
261 |
789.76 |
|
November |
278 |
855.17 |
|
December |
266 |
812.92 |
|
January 1996 |
296 |
931.59 |
|
February |
293 |
908.65 |
|
March |
157 |
462.62 |
|
April |
236 |
769.58 |
|
May |
286 |
956.09 |
|
June |
281 |
925.72 |
|
July |
231 |
747.84 |
|
August |
269 |
887.27 |
|
September |
250 |
820.59 |
|
October |
1,297 |
4,812.47 |
RTC Records, pp. 61-63.
[35] Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[36] Supra note 11.
[37] MERALCO v. Macro Textile Mills Corporation, 424 Phil. 811, 828 (2002).
[38] MERALCO v. Wilcon Builders Supply, Inc., supra note 29, pp. 756-757.
[39] 350 Phil. 184 (1998).
[40]
[41] 424 Phil. 811 (2002).
[42] G.R. No. 129807,
[43] Supra note 29.
[44]
[45] Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corp. v. CA, supra note 39, p. 193.
[46]
[47] Supra note 8.
[48] Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Villanueva, 413 Phil. 776 (2001); Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA, 368 Phil. 444 (1999).
[49] TSN,
[50] From their relative, Teresita Paqueo’s electric meter. Rollo, p. 70.
[51] Prudenciado
v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., G.R. No. L-33836,
[52] San Andres v. CA, 201 Phil. 552, 557 (1982).
[53] See Manila
Electric Company v. Jose, supra note 28; Manila Electric Company v. Vda. de Santiago,
G.R. No. 170482,