Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
BORMAHECO,
INCORPORATED, Petitioner, - versus - MALAYAN
INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED and INTERWORLD BROKERAGE CORPORATION, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 156599 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA,
ABAD,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: July 26, 2010 |
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing 1] the August 22, 2002
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV NO. 47469, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 (RTC); and 2] its December 5, 2002 Resolution which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the petitioners.
On December 13, 1985, Marcel Kopfli
Company of Lucerne, Switzerland shipped the following cargo to the Manila
Peninsula Hotel (the Hotel): (a) one unit Kolb modular
construction bakery oven; (b) one steam extraction hood; (c) one lateral
proofer; (d) one proofing cabinet; (e) one trolley for setters; (f) eight
setters; and (g) spare parts for the Kolb bakery oven. The cargo was packed in one crate and loaded
on board the vessel MS Nedlloyd Dejima which left the
On January 6, 1986, MS Nedlloyd
Dejima arrived at the port in
At the premises of the warehouse, Bormaheco’s
forklift operator, Custodio Trinidad, proceeded to unload the cargo from the
delivery truck. He placed the fork under the crate and immediately lifted it. The cargo fell from the fork at a height of
six feet and broke open.[3] As a result, the Kolb construction bakery
oven, the lateral proofer and the proofing cabinet sustained “extensive damage”
and were declared as a “total loss.”[4]
For the loss, the Hotel sought
indemnity from Malayan under its insurance policy. Malayan paid the Hotel the sum of P690,849.68
plus the additional amount of P75,151.33 representing the pro-rata
share of the freight charges on the damaged items. In turn, Malayan, which was subrogated to the
rights of the Hotel, made formal demands for reimbursement from Interworld but
to no avail.
On August 7, 1986, Malayan filed a
complaint against Interworld before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Civil Case
No. 86-37017 and raffled to Branch 17 thereof.
Interworld, on the other hand, filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Bormaheco for indemnity or other relief for the damages of the cargo. After trial,
the RTC resolved the conflict in favor of the private respondents as it found
that the forklift operator lifted the cargo when it was not yet properly balanced causing it to tilt, fall
and sustain damages. The fallo of the
subject decision[5]
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. and against defendant and third-party
plaintiff Interworld Brokerage Corporation, ordering the latter to pay the
former the sum of P756,000.71 with legal interest thereon at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from August 7, 1986 until the said sum is fully paid,
and the further sum of P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Third-party defendant Bormaheco, Inc. is ordered to
pay the defendant and third-party plaintiff whatever sums the latter will pay
to the plaintiff by virtue of this judgment.
Costs
are assessed against the defendant and third-party plaintiff in favor of the
plaintiff, and against the third-party defendant in favor of the defendant and
third-party plaintiff.
The
counterclaim of the defendant against the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim
of the third-party defendant against the third-party plaintiff are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Interworld and Bormaheco
separately filed their respective appeals before the Court of Appeals. After a
review of the records, the appellate court affirmed the RTC’s finding with
regard to the damages sustained by the cargo items.[6] The CA gave probative weight to the Final
Report of the appraisal company, Adjustment Standards Company. Interworld and Bormaheco failed to convince
the CA that the damage was caused by the faulty packing of the cargo rather
than by the forklift operator. According to the appellate court,
x x x. Verily,
if the cargo was improperly packed, as appellants would have Us believe, then
the accident should have happened while it was in transit. There were a lot of instances when the stacked
oven could have caved-in while it was being handled during its voyage yet as
the records show, the transport of the cargo went well without incident until
that fateful day. There is but one
explanation for all these – the cargo was properly handled during transit and corollarily,
the trial court was correct in holding the forklift operator responsible for
the mishap.
Appellants nevertheless suggest that faulty packing
caused the stacked oven to suddenly slip – forcing the crate to tilt to the
left as the forklift was lowering it. Such
theory is specious. If the crate was properly balanced on the forklift as the
operator claims, then there is no reason why the cargo would slip and tilt on
its own force seeing as it was stacked horizontally. Appellants’ scenario could only be possible if
the crate was not properly balanced on the forklift and the heavier weight is
concentrated on one flank, in this case the left side. Settled is the rule that evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself – such as common experience and observation of
mankind can prove as probable under the circumstances. Common experience and observation leads Us to
believe that the forklift operator miscalculated the position where he placed
the forklift under the crate. This
caused the imbalance and eventually induced the crate to tilt and fall towards
the left side of the forklift. Hence, Our inclination to believe appellee’s
explanation that the mishap was brought about by the forklift operator’s
negligence in suddenly lifting the crate even while it was not yet properly
balanced on the fork and thereby causing the entire crate to fall on the
ground. This is more in consonance with
human observation and experience.[7]
(citations omitted)
The CA thus ruled that Interworld was
liable under its contract of carriage with the Hotel, wherein the former
undertook to transport the subject cargo from the pier to the latter’s
premises. Since the cargo was damaged
when it was being delivered, Interworld is liable therefor pursuant to its
contractual undertaking. The appellate
court also affirmed the trial court’s finding with regard to Bormaheco’s
liability to Interworld.
On the other hand, Bormaheco is responsible for the
work done by persons whom it employs in its performance. Neither can Bormaheco be absolved from
liability because it exercised due diligence in the selection of the employee
whose negligent act caused the damage in question. The reason is that the obligation of Bormaheco
was created by contract, and Article 2180 is not applicable to negligence
arising in the course of the performance of a contractual obligation. Article 2180 is exclusively concerned with
cases where negligence arises in the absence of agreement.[8]
(citations omitted)
Finally, resolving the issue on
whether or not the incident was outside or beyond the thirty (30) day period of
coverage of the insurance policy, the CA noted that the incident occurred on
February 3, 1986 which was well within the said 30-day period reckoned from
January 6, 1986, the date of the unloading. According to the CA, the date February
13, 1986 mentioned in Malayan’s initial complaint was nothing but a
typographical error which was subsequently corrected and rectified.[9]
Not in
conformity, Bormaheco filed this petition for review on certiorari. Malayan
submitted its comment, but Interworld did not, despite several court orders. On
June 13, 2007, the National Bureau of Investigation’s (NBI) reported that it failed to locate Interworld’s general
manager despite efforts to serve this Court’s Order of Arrest and Commitment
against its president. The Court eventually
resolved to dispense with Interworld’s comment.[10] After Bormaheco filed its Reply, the Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
To
amplify its prayer for the reversal of the subject decision, in its memorandum,
Bormaheco presents the following:
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF BRANCH 17,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT
MALAYAN IS STILL ENFORCEABLE AGAINST PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT INTERWORLD
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT INTERWORLD FOR THE IMPROPER
PACKING OF THE GOODS
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS RESPONDENT INTERWORLD WHO EXERCISED SUPERVISION OVER THE FORKLIFT OPERATOR.[11]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Primarily,
petitioner Bormaheco zeroes in on the fact that the Complaint indicated that
the incident happened on February 13, 1986, and was, therefore, filed beyond
the 30-day coverage of the insurance policy reckoned from the date of discharge
of the shipment from the vessel, on January 6, 1986. For said reason, petitioner claims that the
policy already expired. It then argues that Malayan’s amendment as to the date should
not have been permitted because it was a substantial amendment and was filed
three (3) years after a responsive pleading had been submitted.
The Court is not persuaded.
At
present, Section 4, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court is quite clear with
regard to formal amendments:
SEC. 4. Formal amendments. – A defect in the
designation of the parties and other
clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily
corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on
motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
Although
the Rule prior to its revision did not specifically include the phrase “other
clearly clerical or typographical errors,” a similar intention may be gleaned
from the judicial pronouncements then.
In an
earlier case, the Court decreed that amendments of pleadings may be resorted to
subject to the condition that “the amendments sought do not alter the cause of
action of the original complaint.”[12] More aptly, in another case, the Court
pronounced that amendment of pleadings may be resorted to, so long as the intended amendments are not
inconsistent with the allegations in the initial complaint, and are obviously
intended to clarify the intrinsic ambiguity in it with respect to the time of
accrual of the cause of action.[13] In Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza[14]
where the old provision was applied, this Court reiterated its previous
pronouncement in Shaffer v.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments
to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented and the case decided on the
merits without unnecessary delay. This
rule applies with more reason and with greater force when, as in the case at
bar, the amendment sought to be made refers to a mere matter of form and no substantial
rights are prejudiced.[16]
Indeed,
the rule on amendment of pleadings need not be applied rigidly, particularly
where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party.[17]
In the
case at bench, while the date indicated in the original complaint was February 13,
1986, there is no denying that the actual date of the incident was really February
3, 1986 when the subject cargo was actually withdrawn from the pier and
delivered to the Hotel’s warehouse. All the supporting documents offered in evidence refer to this
date and no other. Contrary to Bormaheco’s stand, the actual date of the loss
was well within the coverage of the insurance policy. Surely, Bormaheco could not have been misled
or surprised by the correction of the error. Neither could it have been prejudiced by the correction
of the said date for this was merely a typographical mistake – purely
technical. Going back to Juasing,
this Court quoting from a much earlier case opined,
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes
than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff’s
case smacks of skill rather than right. A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is, rather, a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in
issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be
done upon the merits. x x x x[18]
As to
the delayed correction of the typographical error, no substantial prejudice was
caused to the petitioner either. In one
case, it was ruled that “a correction xxxx could be summarily made at any stage
of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party, as
Section 4 of the same Rule 10 further provides.”[19]
Next, Bormaheco
questions the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court,
more particularly the extent of the damage caused to the cargo. Bormaheco also challenges the findings that
its forklift operator, Custodio Trinidad, was at fault or negligent, and insists
that the damage to, or loss of, the cargo was due to the improper crating. Bormaheco may have forgotten that the Court is
not a trier of facts and that, in this petition for review on certiorari, will
not admit questions other than questions of law.[20]
The
antecedents mentioned earlier in this disposition readily show the congruence in the factual findings of the
trial court and the appellate court. Thus, and in the absence of any exceptional
circumstances[21] to
warrant the contrary, this Court must abide by the prevailing rule that
findings of fact of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon It.[22] Accordingly, the trial court and the appellate
court’s findings that the subject “oven, proofing cabinet and lateral proofer
were badly dented and deformed and that their glass parts were broken to
pieces,” and that the oven was also rendered inoperable, stand. The findings of the two courts below, with
regard to the fault of Bormaheco’s forklift operator, also hold.
Hence,
the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that Interworld is liable under its
contract with the Hotel for the loss of the cargo due to the negligence of those
employed by it – Bormaheco and its
forklift operator. The relationship between Interworld and the Hotel, in whose
place Malayan was subrogated, was contractual arising from the former’s commitment
to transport the subject cargo to the latter’s warehouse. With its failure to comply with this
obligation due to the negligence of the forklift operator of Bormaheco whom it
contracted to unload the subject cargo and pursuant to Articles 1172 and 1173
of the New Civil Code,[23] Interworld
necessarily becomes liable. In turn,
Bormaheco is liable to Interworld for the acts of its forklift operator whom
the trial court and the appellate court found to have been grossly negligent.[24]
WHEREFORE, the August 22, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 47469 and its December 5, 2002 Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERT A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 87-96. Penned by Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Justice Mario
L. Guariña III.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Alger
Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 219
Phil. 548 (1985).
[13] Guirao
v. Ver, 123 Phil. 466 (1966).
[14] 201 Phil. 369 (1982).
[15] 131 Phil. 22 (1968).
[16] Supra note 14 at 375.
[17] Northern
Cement Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 242 Phil. 141 (1988).
[18] Supra note 14 at 374.
[19] La
Tondena Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88938, June 8, 1992,
209 SCRA 553; cited in I Herrera,
Remedial Law, p. 596 (2000).
[20] Tayao
v.
[21] (1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record (Id., earlier citations omitted).
[22] Child
Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476
SCRA 236, 241; Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 400 Phil. 1349 (2000); Abapo v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 933
(2000); Philippine National Construction
Corporation v. Mars Construction Enterprises, Inc., 382 Phil. 510 (2000).
[23] Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of
a good father of a family shall be required.
[24] Art. 1727. The contractor is responsible for the work
done by persons employed by him.