Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
ENGR. JOB Y. BESANA, HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA
III, in his capacity as Administrator of the National Electrification
Administration, Petitioners, - versus - RODSON F. MAYOR, Respondent. AKLAN
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Intervenor. |
|
G.R. No. 153837
Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July 21, 2010 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Job Y. Besana (Besana), now deceased and substituted
by his heirs in this petition, assailing the Decision[1]
dated December 21, 2001 and Resolution[2]
dated June 4, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59732. The Court of Appeals declared null and void
the Resolution[3] dated March 30, 2000 and Order[4] dated July 8, 2000 in O.P. Case No.
98-J-8574 of
the Office of the President (OP), which set aside the resolutions of the
National Electrification Administration (NEA) Board of Administrators (Board)
insofar as they relate to Besana’s dismissal as General Manager of intervenor
Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO).
Upon
notice of this case, AKELCO filed a Petition for Intervention[5] on
September 30, 2002, joining the petition in challenging the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59732 on the ground that respondent Rodson
F. Mayor (Mayor) had no personality to file said Court of Appeals case and
praying that the Court declare valid the March 30, 2000 Resolution and Order
dated July 6, 2000 of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora. Besana filed his Comment on the Petition for
Intervention on December 26, 2002, concurring with the grounds adduced in the
Petition for Intervention of AKELCO.
Subsequently, AKELCO filed its Comment[6] on
the Petition for Review on January 20, 2003, to which Besana filed his Reply[7]
to the said Comment on February 3, 2004.
Mayor
filed his Comment[8] on the
Petition for Review on April 12, 2004, and petitioners filed their Reply[9] thereto on July 23, 2004.
In
compliance with the Resolution[10]
dated September 22, 2004 of this Court, the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda as follows: Besana on November 19, 2004,[11]
Mayor on November 30, 2004,[12]
and AKELCO on December 15, 2004.[13]
The
antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the records and narrated in part
by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The case has its genesis on July 10, 1991, when an
Administrative Complaint docketed as RRM-1-91 was filed by herein [respondent]
Rodson F. Mayor against [herein petitioner] Job Y. Besana, then General Manager
of [herein intervenor AKELCO] for grave misconduct, serious irregularity,
dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, serious neglect in the performance of
official duty, and gross mismanagement before the [NEA]. After investigation made by State Corporate
Attorney Jesus F. D. Clariza of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
and approved by NEA Administrator Rodrigo Cabrera, [petitioner] Besana was
ordered dismissed as AKELCO General Manager through a Decision dated June 1, 1992,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“Wherefore, for all the foregoing circumstances, we find
[petitioner Besana] guilty for (sic) grave misconduct, serious irregularities,
dishonesty, abuse of authority, serious neglect in the performance of his
official duties, incompetence and gross mismanagement and thus hereby
sentencing him the penalty of dismissal as AKELCO General Manager subject to
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits as well as disqualification
for reemployment in any electric cooperatives.”
Such dismissal was approved and confirmed by the NEA Board
of Administrators per its Resolution No.
41, June 25, 1992, which states in part:
RESOLVED THEREFORE, to approve, as it is hereby approved,
the removal/dismissal of Job Y. Besana as AKELCO General Manager, effective
immediately;
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize the sending of an Engineering
Team to conduct the material audit and close out all completed projects of
AKELCO to determine where the P38 Million worth of materials were rechanneled;
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to authorize Management (sic) mete out
to the former REC manager the maximum penalty within the Board’s power to
impose and to file the necessary case against him for misuse of government
property before the appropriate court of law;
RESOLVED FINALLY, to enjoin the Legal Department, with the
assistance of the OGCC, to prosecute the case vigilantly.
According to [respondent Mayor], [petitioner] Besana was
notified of the said Board Resolution No. 41 dismissing him from the service as
early as July 1992, when the Board appointed another General Manager to take
his place – but he did not appeal.
Hence, the same became final, executory and unassailable. With the finality of such resolution, the
Board of Directors of AKELCO appointed Atty. Leovigildo Mationg as the new
General Manager, which appointment was confirmed by the NEA Board of
Administrators sometime in 1992.
On June 3, 1993, [petitioner] Besana questioned his
dismissal before the Arbitration Committee of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). He got a favorable
ruling from Labor Arbiter Danilo C. Acosta, who in his decision dated September
15, 1993, directed Besana’s reinstatement and payment to him of backwages as
well as of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
On appeal by AKELCO to the NLRC, however, the latter
reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter, through its Decision
dated April 18, 1994, and dismissed [petitioner] Besana’s complaint for lack of
merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the NLRC, [petitioner]
Besana questioned the same before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari
which was, however, dismissed by the High Court on August 8, 1994 for
[petitioner] Besana’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
In another twist, the NEA Board of Administrators passed on
March 5, 1994, Resolution No. 12
which authorized the review of the administrative case against [petitioner]
Besana, and created a team to undertake such review, composed of the following:
Chairman - Solicitor Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo
Office
of the Solicitor General
Members - Mrs. Benita Montilla
Coop
Audit Department
Mr.
Resty de la Cruz
Coop
Operations Department
Mr.
Nelso Milo
Engineering
Department
After investigation, the Urbiztondo
Committee submitted its report, finding that the charge about the unaccounted
P38 Million had no leg to stand on; however, [petitioner] Besana was guilty of
the other charges against him and that his dismissal for such charges is duly
supported by the evidence on record.
In the light of such findings, the
NEA Board of Administrators passed Resolution
No. 56 on September 30, 1994, stating in part:
“WHEREAS, after a careful perusal of
the findings contained in the Committee Report, the Board finds that it has
been sufficiently established that the dismissal of Mr. Besana was legal and
based on valid grounds, except for four of the thirteen original charges which
were found to be baseless and not supported by evidence, namely: the P38
Million unaccounted materials, AIWA contracts, Boracay Island Electrification
Project and Energization of HARESCO Farm;
“WHEREAS, there is no compelling reason to disturb its
previous decision reflected in Board Resolution No. 41 dated June 25, 1992
dismissing Mr. Job Y. Besana as AKELCO General Manager;
“RESOLVED THEREFORE, TO AFFIRM, as it hereby affirms, the
decision of the NEA Board of Administrators as reflected in Board Resolution
No. 41 dated June 25, 1992, with the modification not to pursue the previous
directive to Management to file court cases against Mr. Besana for the
unaccounted P38 Million worth of materials since this was found by the
Committee to be without basis.”
On July 16, 1997, [petitioner] Besana, claiming that he
received a copy of NEA Board Resolution No. 56 only on July 3, 1997, sent a
letter to the NEA Board of Administrators which he asked to be treated as his
Motion for Reconsideration of such resolution.
The Board denied the same through Board
Resolution No. 35 dated April 16, 1998.
On October 12, 1998, [petitioner] Besana formally filed his
appeal before the Office of the President which, as above stated, issued its
assailed Resolution dated March 30, 2000, setting aside Resolutions Nos. 41, 56
and 35 of the NEA Board of Administrators insofar as they related to
[petitioner] Besana’s dismissal, and declaring the same to be without
effect. [Respondent Mayor’s] Motion for
Reconsideration of such resolution was denied through the assailed Order of
July 8, 2000.[14]
In
a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59732, Mayor assailed the
Resolution dated March 30, 2000 and Order dated July 8, 2000 issued by the OP
in O.P. Case No. 98-J-8574, alleging that the said office acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the said
OP issuances.
The
Court of Appeals first issued a TRO on August 29, 2000, then a writ of
preliminary injunction[15]
on November 27, 2000, enjoining the OP from implementing the assailed issuances
in O.P. Case No. 98-J-8574. Besana filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the issuance by the appellate court of the
injunctive writ, arguing that the NEA and AKELCO were the real
parties-in-interest, not Mayor, who was just a member of AKELCO. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution[16] dated June 28, 2001, denied Besana’s
Motion for Reconsideration because:
The said Motion is premised on the alleged fact that the
[herein respondent Mayor] is not the real party in interest in this case. It appears, however, that he has been
prosecuting the basic case before the lower bodies with the acquiescence of all
the other parties, and such matter is being raised for the first time before
this Court. Settled is the rule that
points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not raised below cannot be
considered by a reviewing court because this would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process x x x.
In
the meantime, Besana died on June 11, 2001.
The Court of Appeals was notified of Besana’s death on June 21,
2001. Mrs. Florence Besana-Cesar
(Besana-Cesar), Besana’s daughter, sought to substitute her father in the
case. In a Resolution dated July 16,
2001, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to comment on the propriety of
continuing this case as the principal relief sought was purely personal to Besana
such that the action had been extinguished upon his death.
On
December 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59732. In said Decision, the Court
of Appeals noted that none of the parties filed a comment on Besana-Cesar’s
substitution for Besana, as directed in the Resolution dated July 16,
2001. Nonetheless, the appellate court
resolved to give due course to Mayor’s Petition for Certiorari and decide the case on the merits, so as also to settle
the question on whether Besana’s heirs could claim his back salaries and other
monetary benefits. The appellate court
then appointed Besana-Cesar as Besana’s “legal representative.”
The Court of Appeals proceeded to rule that Besana’s dismissal as General
Manager of AKELCO by the NEA Board had already attained finality sometime after
July 1992 since Besana failed to appeal his dismissal. In addition, the appellate court held that
the OP lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of the NEA Board, which was
then vested upon this Court by virtue of Section 59 of Presidential Decree No.
269, the NEA Charter.[17] Presently, jurisdiction over appeals from the
decisions of the NEA is lodged with the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section
1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
Resolution dated March 30, 2000 and Order dated July 8, 2000 are declared NULL
and VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Resolutions Nos. 41, 56 and 35 issued by
the National Electrification Administration dismissing Job Y. Besana as General
Manager of AKELCO are AFFIRMED.[18]
Besana’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing judgment was denied by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated March 30, 2000.
Hence,
the instant Petition wherein petitioners make the following assignment of
errors:
[1] When
the Appellate Court ruled that Rodson F. Mayor had the standing to bring an
action assailing the decisions of Executive Secretary Zamora directing the NEA
to reinstate Engr. Job Y. Besana as General Manager of AKELCO.
[2] When the Appellate Court ruled that
Executive Secretary Zamora’s decisions were rendered in a wanton, arbitrary,
whimsical, and despotic manner that they should be set aside through the writ
of certiorari.
[3] When the appellate court ruled that the
Office of President does not have the authority to review rulings of the NEA
because PD 269, the organic law of the NEA, explicitly states that it is this
Honorable Supreme Court which has the power and authority to conduct a review
of NEA’s rulings, and such power of review is now lodged with the Court of
Appeals.[19]
Petitioners
assert that Mayor lacked material interest to challenge before the Court of
Appeals the OP ruling which favored his reinstatement as General Manager of
AKELCO. Petitioners claim that it is
either the NEA or AKELCO which stands to be benefited or injured by such ruling
of the OP. Hence, Mayor cannot be
considered a real party-in-interest.
Petitioners further argue that Mayor has a “mere interest in the
question of whether or not Besana should be reinstated, having once filed a
complaint against him (Besana) for allegedly mismanaging AKELCO and, since he
does not have a material interest in the decree to reinstate Besana, Mayor is
not a proper party to question the same.”
Petitioners
also insist that what Besana assailed before the OP were NEA Board Resolutions
Nos. 12, 56, and 35, and not NEA Board Resolution No. 41. He received NEA Board Resolution No. 35 dated
April 16, 1998, on July 8, 1998, and filed with the NEA his Notice of Appeal
five days later, on July 13, 1998.
Petitioners claim that Besana thereafter duly filed his appeal before
the OP, and with his timely appeal, NEA Board Resolutions Nos. 12, 56, and 35
had not yet attained finality. Even
assuming Besana failed to file his appeal on time, petitioners maintain that
the OP committed no reversible error and grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of said appeal and resolved the case on the merits in the interest
of substantial justice.
Petitioners
additionally aver that the OP has jurisdiction to review NEA Board Resolutions
Nos. 12, 56, and 35. Mayor and the Court
of Appeals erroneously relied on Section 59 of the NEA Charter and Section 1, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court to support their position that any order, ruling, or
decision of the NEA is subject to judicial review. These provisions only pertain to matters
related to “electric franchises” and not to the administrative functions of the
NEA. Petitioners reason out that Besana
appealed the three NEA Board Resolutions to the OP in accordance with Section
13 of the NEA Charter which provides that “the NEA shall be under the
supervision of the Office of the President of the Philippines” and that “all
orders, rules and regulations promulgated, and all appointments made by the NEA
x x x shall be subject to the approval of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.”
AKELCO
agrees with petitioners and further claims that the dismissal of Besana by the
NEA Board was a usurpation of the power of the Board of Directors of
AKELCO.
Mayor,
on the other hand, contends that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that all the parties have already acquiesced to his legal interest in prosecuting
the charges against Besana as he had done so from the inception of the case
and, thus, Besana was rightly barred from belatedly assailing the same.
Mayor
also maintains that Besana’s dismissal as General Manager of intervenor AKELCO
in 1992 already attained finality. He
points out that Besana failed to file a timely appeal of NEA Board Resolution
No. 41 dated June 25, 1992. Besana,
instead, filed an illegal dismissal case against AKELCO. The illegal dismissal case, however, likewise
attained finality when this Court denied Besana’s appeal of the dismissal of
his case by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The
Petition must fail.
First, the
Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the
belatedly-raised issue of whether or not Mayor had legal interest to challenge
before the appellate court the order of the OP for the reinstatement of Besana
as General Manager of AKELCO.
It
is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing
court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule.[20] Any issue raised for the first time on appeal
is barred by estoppel.[21]
It must be stressed that it was Mayor who
filed the administrative complaint against Besana. Since the inception of the administrative
proceedings against Besana, Mayor had been participating therein without his
legal interest being questioned, not even by Besana when the latter appealed
his dismissal before the OP. Indeed,
Besana challenged Mayor’s legal interest as a party in the administrative
proceedings only before the appellate court.
Given Besana’s failure to raise as an issue Mayor’s purported lack of
legal interest during the proceedings before the NEA and the OP, the appellate
court was then barred from taking cognizance of the same for the first time on
appeal.
It bears to point out that petitioners
admitted that Mayor, being the original complainant, had legal interest in the
issue of Besana’s dismissal, but posits that Mayor had no such interest in the
issue of Besana’s reinstatement. Such an
argument is specious. The propriety of
Besana’s reinstatement depends on the legality of his dismissal. Both issues arose from and involved exactly
the same factual background and legal arguments. The proceedings before the appellate court
are but a continuation of the proceedings before the NEA and the OP. Petitioners conceded that Mayor had legal
interest to seek Besana’s dismissal in the administrative proceedings before
the NEA and the OP, necessarily then, Mayor still had interest to appeal before
the appellate court any ruling that reinstates Besana and renders Mayor’s
administrative charges against him for naught.
Second, the
issue of usurpation by the NEA of AKELCO’s prerogative to dismiss Besana as its
General Manager was raised for the first time before this Court by AKELCO. It was not raised in the proceedings before
the NEA, the OP, and the Court of Appeals.
As has been settled in the preceding paragraphs, an issue raised for the
first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
There
is also more reason to hold AKELCO in estoppel.
The records[22]
of this case reveal that AKELCO supported the administrative charges against
Besana and actively participated in the proceedings conducted before the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC,
respecting the propriety and/or legality of Besana’s dismissal. In fact, after the NEA adopted the findings
of the OGCC holding petitioner Besana guilty of the administrative charges and
dismissing him from the service, AKELCO promptly appointed another general
manager as his replacement, and that, after the Labor Arbiter decided in favor
of Besana his illegal dismissal case against AKELCO and NEA, AKELCO appealed to
the NLRC seeking for the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. AKELCO even advocated before the NLRC the
concurring views of the OGCC and the Labor Arbiter that the NEA possesses
disciplinary authority over any or all members of the board of directors,
officers, and employees of electric cooperatives. Evidently, AKELCO made a complete turnabout
before this Court, with nary an explanation, something which this Court cannot
allow without violating the fundamental principles of fairness and due process. The issues and arguments presented by AKELCO
before this Court are not only new, but in total contradiction to the ones it
previously espoused in the proceedings below.
In
any event, contrary to the contention of AKELCO, it has been correctly noted in
the respective decisions of the OGCC, the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC that the
NEA has the disciplinary authority to suspend, remove, and/or replace any or
all of the members of the board of directors, officers or employees of electric
cooperatives as provided by Presidential Decree No. 269, amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1645, otherwise known as the charter of the NEA.
In
Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(ZAMECO II) Board of Directors v. Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc.
(CASCONA),[23] this Court
elucidated the power of the NEA to supervise electric cooperatives and to take
preventive and/or disciplinary measures against an electric cooperative's board
of directors, officers or employees, as follows:
P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, vested NEA with
the authority to supervise and control electric cooperatives. In the exercise of its authority, it has the
power to conduct investigations and other similar actions in all matters
affecting electric cooperatives. The
failure of electric cooperatives to comply with NEA orders, rules and
regulations and/or decisions authorizes the latter to take preventive and/or
disciplinary measures, including suspension and/or removal and replacement of
any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of
the electric cooperative concerned.
In Silva v. Mationg,[24]
the approval by the NEA of the dismissal of the general manager of AKELCO who
replaced Besana was upheld by this Court on this basis:
The NEA, as a public corporation, acts through its Board of
Administrators, composed of a Chairman and four members, one of whom is the
Administrator as ex-officio member.
The NEA exercises supervision and control over electric cooperatives
organized and operating under the mandate of PD 269, as amended. The extent of
government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is
largely a function of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric
cooperatives.
In
exercising its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives, the
NEA, through its Board of Administrators, can issue orders, rules and
regulations, and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, can
conduct investigations in all matters affecting electric cooperatives pursuant
to Section 10 of PD 269, as amended. Further, the NEA-BOA may avail of the
remedial measures enumerated in Section 10 of PD 269, as amended, in case of
non-compliance by the electric cooperative concerned with NEA orders, rules and
regulations, and decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement. One
of these remedial measures, Section 10(e) of PD 269, as amended, provides for
the suspension or removal of members of the Board of Directors, officers or
employees of the defiant electric cooperative as the NEA-BOA may deem fit and
necessary, thus:
Sec. 10.
Enforcement Powers and Remedies. — In the exercise of its power
of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower,
supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules
and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct
investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting
said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.
If the electric cooperative
concerned or other similar entity fails after due notice to comply with NEA
orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the
Loan Agreement, the NEA Board of Administrators may avail of any or all of the
following remedies:
x x x x
(e)
Take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including suspension and/or
removal and replacement of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors,
officers or employees of the Cooperative, other borrower institutions or
supervised or controlled entities as the NEA Board of Administrators may deem
fit and necessary and to take any other remedial measures as the law or the
Loan Agreement may provide.
Finally, this
Court finds no reversible error in the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals
that the legality of Besana’s dismissal as General Manager of AKELCO already
attained finality and, thus, the same constituted res judicata.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is
a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and
for the same cause. The doctrine of res judicata is founded on a public
policy against re-opening that which has previously been decided, so as to put
the litigation to an end.[25]
Matters settled by a court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or
invoked again. Relitigation of issues
already settled merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness
and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to
worthier cases.[26]
In
the present case, Besana’s dismissal originally stemmed from NEA Board
Resolution No. 41 which he did not appeal, whether to the OP or the Court of
Appeals, hence, rendering said Board Resolution final. NEA Board Resolution No. 41 was already even
executed with the appointment of a new General Manager.
Even
overlooking the finality of NEA Board Resolution No. 41, the legality of
Besana’s dismissal was settled with finality in another proceeding instituted
by Besana himself. Besana, instead of
directly appealing NEA Board Resolution No. 41, filed an illegal dismissal case
before the NLRC. To recall, the Labor
Arbiter initially found that Besana was illegally dismissed. However, when AKELCO appealed to the NLRC,
the latter reversed the Labor Arbiter and held that there was no illegal
dismissal. Besana’s appeal to this Court
of said NLRC ruling, docketed as G.R. No. 115591, entitled Besana v. National Labor Relations Commission, was dismissed on
technicality in a Resolution[27]
dated August 8, 1994. As a result, the
NLRC ruling – that Besana’s dismissal was legal – already attained
finality.
It
is true that Besana instituted his illegal dismissal case before the NLRC
following the issuance by the NEA of its Board Resolution No. 41, and that what
Besana appealed to the OP was NEA’s Board Resolution Nos. 12, 56 and 35. However, upon closer review, the aforesaid
NEA Board Resolutions all involve the dismissal of Besana as General Manager of
AKELCO after being found guilty of the administrative charges lodged against
him by Mayor. The reinvestigation
conducted by the NEA of exactly the same charges against Besana (and all other
proceedings arising from said reinvestigation, including those before the OP,
the Court of Appeals, and now, before this Court), subject matter of NEA Board
Resolution Nos. 12, 56, and 35, could not have served any other purpose except
to overturn the NLRC ruling that Besana was not illegally dismissed. Incidentally, even after its reinvestigation,
the NEA still found Besana guilty of several of the administrative charges
against him warranting his dismissal as General Manager of AKELCO.
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant
Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice
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JOSE Associate
Justice |
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[1] Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 56-64.
[2] Rollo, pp. 73-74.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] The Court of Appeals granted
respondent Mayor’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in a Resolution dated October 27,
2000. Upon respondent Mayor’s posting of
the required bond in the amount of P144,000 on November 13, 2000, the
appellate court issued the writ on November 27, 2000. (CA rollo, pp. 415 and 429.)
[16] CA rollo, p. 445.
[17] Section
59. Court Review. – The
Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review any order, ruling, or
decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such order, ruling, or decision
when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the NEA to support reasonably
such order, ruling, or decision, or that the same is contrary to law, or that
it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA.
The evidence presented to the NEA, together with the record of the
proceedings before the NEA, shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court.
Any order, ruling, or decision of the NEA may likewise be reviewed by the
Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari in proper cases. The procedure for review, except as herein
provided, shall be prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling,
or decision of the NEA may be reviewed on the application of any person or
public service entity aggrieved thereby and who was a party in the subject
proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate cases or by a petition for
review, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the notification of
the NEA order, decision, or ruling or reconsideration. Said petition shall be
placed on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court who shall
furnish copies thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.
[18] Rollo, p. 63.
[19]
[20] Jacot v. Dal,
G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 295, 311.
[21] Villaranda v.
Villaranda, 467 Phil. 1089, 1098 (2004).
[22] CA rollo, pp. 229-272.
[23] G.R. Nos. 176935-36, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 320, 329.
[24] G.R. No. 160174, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 724, 737-739.
[25] National Investment
and Development Corporation v. Bautista, G.R. No. 150388, March 13, 2009,
581 SCRA 92, 104.
[26] Co v. People, G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009, 592
SCRA 381, 393.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 90-91.