Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
felizardo
S. obando and JUAN S. OBANDO, Petitioners, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 138696 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari
filed by petitioners Felizardo and Juan Obando seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision[1]
dated
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1964, Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras (Alegria), together with Eduardo and Francisco
Figueras, sons of her husband Jose Figueras by previous marriage, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of the estate of Jose Figueras, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 61567. Alegria was named administratrix of Jose’s
estate without opposition from her stepsons.
While the
settlement of Jose’s estate was still pending considerations in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Alegria died in May 1979. Eduardo was issued new Letters of Administration
with the duty to administer both Jose’s and Alegria’s estates. Fritz Strebel,
as brother of Alegria, came forth claiming part of Alegria’s estate as Alegria
died without issue which the Figueras brothers made no opposition.
Subsequently,
the Figueras brothers and Fritz Strebel were served with copies of a Petition
for Probate of the alleged last will and testament of Alegria filed by
petitioner Felizardo Obando, which petition was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 123948. In his petition, petitioner
Felizardo asked to be named as executor of Alegria’s last will and testament,
which bequeathed Alegria’s rights and interest in the real properties left by
the Figueras couple, as well as personal properties, including all her pieces
of jewelry to petitioners Felizardo and Juan, and their families. The Figueras
brothers opposed the probate of the alleged will, as well as petitioner
Felizardo’s prayer for the issuance of a letter of administration, on the
ground that the alleged will was done either under duress or the same was a
forgery.
Later, both Special Proceeding
Nos. 61567 and 123948 were consolidated under Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila
which, after hearing, denied petitioner Felizardo’s prayer to be named as
executor. Petitioner Felizardo appealed the matter to the CA which partially
reversed the RTC by appointing Eduardo and petitioner Felizardo as
co-administrators of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria Figueras.
Eduardo and Fritz still opposed
the probate of the alleged Alegria’s will, insisting that the will was a
forgery. Subsequently, these conflicting parties agreed to submit the alleged
will to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination and comparison with the common standard
signatures of Alegria.[3]
After the examination and
comparison of the submitted documents,
NBI Document Examiner Zenaida Torres submitted her report[4] dated
By reason of the forged will
which was the basis of the CA in
appointing Felizardo as co-administrator of the Figueras estates,
petitioners had taken possession of the pieces of jewelry, furniture and other
personal properties enumerated in the alleged will, as well as the rentals of
the Figueras residence in Gilmore Street, Quezon City being leased to the
Community of Learners.
Eduardo and Fritz questioned
these acts of petitioner Felizardo and, since the latter could not account for
these properties which were under his possession when the probate court
required him to do so, they sued him for
Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document since the alleged will
which petitioner Felizardo submitted for probate was found to be forged.
On
That on or about November 11, 1978, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
Felizardo S. Obando, Juan S. Obando, Mercedes B. Santos, [Victorino] Cruz and
Franklin A. Cordon, being then private individuals, and accused Cipriano C.
Farrales, a Notary Public, conspiring and confederating together and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Eduardo F. Figueras thru falsification of public document in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused forged and falsified or caused to be forged
and falsified, a document denominated as the Last Will and Testament of Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras, dated November 11, 1978, duly notarized by accused
Cipriano C. Farrales and, therefore, a public document, by stating in said Last
Will and Testament, among others, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras had bequeathed to her nephews, herein accused Felizardo S. Obando and
Juan S. Obando, all her rights and interests over all her jewelries (sic),
except those given to her other relatives, with an aggregate total value of P2,000,000.00,
that she had appointed accused Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her
Last Will and Testament and the exclusive administrator of her estate, and
thereafter, feigning, simulating and counterfeiting or causing to be feigned,
simulated and counterfeited the signature of the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras appearing on the left hand margin of pages 1 and 2 and over the
typewritten name Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras on page 3 of said document,
thus making it appear, as it did appear, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras had, in fact, bequeathed all her rights and interests over the said
jewelries (sic) to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, and that she
had appointed the said Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last
Will and Testament and the exclusive Administrator of her estate, and causing
it to appear further that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras
participated and intervened in the signing of said document when in truth and
in fact as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that the said
Last Will and Testament is an outright forgery; that the late Alegria Strebel
Vda. de Figueras did not bequeath all
her rights or interests over the aforementioned jewelries to accused Felizardo
S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, that she did not appoint accused Felizardo S.
Obando as the sole executor of her Last Will and Testament and the exclusive
Administrator of her estate, and that she did not participate and intervene in
the signing of said document, much less did she authorize the said accused, or
anybody else, to sign her name or affix her signature thereon; that once the
said document has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the
said accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando presented the same for
probate with the Regional Trial Court of Manila wherein an ensuing litigation
which ultimately reached the Court of Appeals, said accused Felizardo S. Obando
was appointed co-administrator of said Eduardo F. Figueras, and who, as such
co-administrator, forthwith took possession of the jewelries mentioned above
which the said accused subsequently, with intent to defraud, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of the said Eduardo F. Figueras in the aforesaid amount of P2,000,000.00,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.[5]
Notary Public Farrales asked
for a re-investigation claiming
innocence and good faith and was, subsequently, deleted from the Information.
When
arraigned, all the accused, with the exception of Franklin Cordon who is
at-large, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. They
posted bail for their temporary liberty.
Trial
thereafter ensued.
In
its Order dated October 10, 1992, the RTC stated that the parties stipulated
that whatever testimony of witnesses utilized in the intestate and probate
proceedings of the will, as well as the documentary evidence submitted therein,
shall be utilized in the criminal case in
toto subject to further cross of the defense lawyer only on matters not
touched in the former proceedings.[6]
On
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds accused FELIZARDO S.
OBANDO and JUAN S. OBANDO GUILTY of violating Article 315, paragraph 1,
sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 172,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, their culpability having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years. Finding no evidence of culpability
in their persons, accused MERCEDES B. SANTOS and VICTORINO CRUZ are hereby
ACQUITTED.
With respect to
accused FRANKLIN A. CORDON, who remains at-large up to the present, this case
against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED, to be revived upon his apprehension. Let an Alias Warrant of Arrest be issued
against accused Franklin A. Cordon for his immediate apprehension.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In
so ruling, the RTC found that: the fact of damage was sufficiently established
with the testimonies of Felizardo and
Juan that Alegria's rights and interests in the real and personal properties of
the Figueras couple were to go to them, and that they already gave the pieces
of jewelry to their sister, to Juan's wife and his two daughters, and
Felizardo's daughter which showed that they had already profited from the
estate of the Figueras couple even before the same was brought to the court for
settlement. As to the matter of forgery, the RTC gave more credence to the
findings of NBI Document Examiner Zenaida Torres than that of PNP Document
Section Chief Francisco Cruz, since (1) Torres was the common choice of all the
parties, thus by which act, petitioners became bound to the results of said
findings; (2) Torres was definite in her conclusion that the question and standard/
sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras were not written by one and
same person unlike Cruz's report stating that no definite conclusion can be
made due to the limited amount of appropriate standard signatures for
comparison; and (3) Torres was not paid for her services and, therefore,
impartial while Cruz received honorarium from Juan Obando; that while
petitioners presented copies of pictures showing Alegria allegedly signing the
will in the presence of Mercedes Santos Cruz, Victorino Cruz and Franklin
Cordon, nothing would establish what document was being held by them.
The RTC found petitioners to have conspired to
commit forgery as established by the following evidence, to wit: (a) Felizardo
admitted that the last will and testament which Alegria voiced out to him was
dictated by him to a certain Atty. Alcantara; (b) that Felizardo retained the
services of Atty. Alcantara and Atty. Farrales who notarized the alleged will;
(c ) Juan was the one who enticed Mercedes Santos Cruz, his sister-in-law,
and Victorino Cruz into acting as
attesting witnesses and Juan's taking pictures of the entire signing ceremony
which was a sign of evil intention because it was an expectancy of future rift
or trouble; (d) Felizardo held and kept the alleged will from the time of
alleged signing up to Alegria's death which possession and control lasted for
several months; (e) the testimony of Torres that the first two pages of Exhibit
“A,” which contained the dispositions of the properties of the Figueras
estates, as well as the forged signatures were substitutes for the originals;
and (g) that petitioners and their respective families gained enormously by
reason of said will.
The RTC said that even if the alleged will was
found to be authentic, it will still be contested as the dispositions made
therein were contrary to law most particularly that portion bequeathing to
petitioners the whole residential property of the spouses Jose and Alegria
Figueras, which was conjugal, to the exclusion of Eduardo and Francisco
Figueras and Fritz Strebel who are forced heirs; that because of such
disposition, the RTC was convinced that the alleged will was not that of
Alegria but of petitioners, since Alegria being the administratrix of the
estate of her husband Jose would be the
last person to give this property outside of the Figueras family. Mercedes Santos and Victorino Cruz were
acquitted for lack of evidence.
Petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.
On
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Resolution dated
Hence, this petition for review filed by
petitioners on the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED AND FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, SHOULD HAVE DRAWN A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION AND WHICH SHALL
CONSIDERABLY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THIS CASE.
B. THE NON-PRODUCTION AND/OR NON-PRESENTATION OF
THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE ALLEGED FALSIFIED LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT IS A FATAL DEFECT WHICH ENTITLES HEREIN APPELLANTS TO
ACQUITTAL.
C. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONSPIRACY TO WARRANT
CONVICTION OF FELIZARDO AND [JUAN] OBANDO.
D. THE WILL OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS
DISPOSES ONLY OF HER RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OVER THE PROPERTIES BEQUEATHED TO
FELIZARDO AND JUAN OBANDO.
E. CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES, COUPLED WITH
THE POSITIVE EVIDENCE AS TO THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE WILL
SHOULD FAVOR APPELLANTS.
F. THE ABSENCE IN THE NBI FINDINGS (EXHIBIT “D-1”) AS TO THE GENUINENESS AND/OR
FALSITY OF THE SIGNATURES OF MERCEDES SANTOS CRUZ, VICTORINO CRUZ AND ATTY.
FRANKLIN CORDON ON THE “LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT” (EXHIBIT “A”), NEGATES THE
FALSIFICATION AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PAGES OF THE SAID
“LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF DOŃA ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS.”
G. THERE IS NO ESTAFA COMMITTED BY APPELLANTS,
NEITHER DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT.[9]
Petitioners contend that the non-presentation
of the original copy of the alleged falsified will before the RTC was a fatal
defect which entitles them to an acquittal.
We are not persuaded.
We note that during the trial of this case,
petitioners did not raise any objection when the alleged will was presented and
testified to by NBI Document Examiner Torres. We also note that in the Offer of
Prosecution Evidence,[10] where the machine copy of
the alleged will was marked as Exhibit “A,” the prosecution, in the last
paragraph of such offer, stated that “all these (documents) form the bulk of
evidence in Special Proceeding Nos. 123948 and 61567 and were simply reproduced
here as agreed upon by the parties. We
are compelled to mention this so that the accused will have no reason for questioning
their authenticity.”[11] In their
Comment/Objection to the Offer of Prosecution Evidence,[12] petitioners merely stated
that: “If this particular document is the original copy of the Last Will and
Testament of Dońa Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, which was marked as
Exhibits “J,” “J-1” to “J-17” in Special Proceedings Nos. 61567 and 123948,
then the accused admits not only of its existence but also its validity,
authenticity and due execution of said Last Will and Testament,” but nowhere
did they object to such submission of the machine copy. In fact, petitioners
never sought reconsideration when the RTC admitted the machine copy of the
alleged will.
More
importantly, we note that a duplicate original copy of the alleged will was
formally offered in evidence[13] as one of petitioners'
documentary evidence and the same was already admitted by the RTC. Thus, a
duplicate original copy of the alleged will was already admitted in the records
of the case which the RTC used for comparison of the questioned signatures with
that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioners fault the RTC and the CA for giving
more weight to the findings of NBI Document Examiner Torres that the signature
in the alleged will was forged as against the findings of PNP Document
Examination Chief Cruz that the questioned signature was genuine.
The
rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court unless when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support on
record, or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion,[14]
which we do not find in this case.
In examining the questioned signatures of Alegria, Torres used the standard specimen signatures submitted by petitioners, Eduardo and Fritz, the parties in the probate proceedings. Torres found that the questioned and standard/sample signatures of Alegria were not written by one and the same person. However, as petitioners did not agree with such findings, petitioners moved for another examination of the same documents together with three additional documents to be conducted by the PNP. PNP Document Examiner Chief Francisco Cruz submitted his report where he found that the questioned signatures and the standard signatures executed in 1978 indicated that they were written by one person. Both Torres and Cruz testified in court.
Torres, in her direct and
cross-examinations, thoroughly explained her findings by establishing the
fundamental differences in the writing characteristics and habits existing in
the questioned and standard signatures.
First,
in the alignment characteristics, i.e.,
the relationship of the letters in the name with the base line or where the
letters rest. She pointed out that in the standard signatures, all the letters
in the name were written in an even straight base notwithstanding that some of
the standard signatures were written without the horizontal line. In the questioned signatures, the name
Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras was written either in a going up or going down direction, i.e.,
there was no even placement of the letters.[15]
Second,
in the arrangement characteristics, i.e.,
the position of the written signature in relation to the typewritten name.
Torres found that the one who wrote the questioned signatures had the habit of
affixing the signatures across and covering the entire typewritten name. While
in the standard signatures, the writer affixed the signatures above the
typewritten name and there was no instance where the signature crossed the typewritten name. Torres intimated that such arrangement
characteristic in handwriting identification was very significant, because it
was considered to be an inconspicuous characteristic which meant that even the
writers themselves would not notice that manner of signing.[16]
Third, the slight but consistent difference
in the slant of the letter “g” in the name Alegria. Torres stated that slant
meant the slope of the letter in relation to the base line. She found that in
the standard signatures, the slopes of the letter “g” in Alegria formed an
angle of less than 90 degrees; that the letter “g” was slanting to the right.
While in the questioned signatures, the slopes of letter “g” formed an angle
of more than 90 degrees.[17]
Fourth,
the proportion characteristic which meant the relationship of one letter to the
next letter.[18]
Fifth,
the manner of execution of the questioned signatures was different from that of
the standard signatures. Torres found that in the questioned signatures, there
were presence of hesitations, tremors, slow drawing movement, and consciousness
which were not found in the standard signatures, which she had explained in
details in her testimony.
On the other hand, PNP Document Examiner Cruz
stated that there was a wide range of variations existing between the
questioned signatures made in 1978 and the standard signatures executed in
1974, 1976 and 1978, indicating that there was a radical change in the physical
condition of the writer wherein the muscle and nerves were affected resulting
in the loss of muscular control. He also stated that while the questioned
signatures and the standard signatures were dissimilar in the manner of
execution, quality of lines, alignment and size of letter, no definite
conclusion can be reached in view of the wide gap of execution. He then stated
that the questioned signatures executed on November 11, 1978 and the standard
signature executed in December 1978, which was most contemporaneous to the date
of the execution of the questioned signatures, he found they were similar and
showed that they were written by one person.[19]
We
note that Cruz’s findings as to the loss of muscular control in Alegria’s hand
allegedly due to her physical condition was contradicted by Torres' testimony
that the standard signature executed by Alegria in December 1978, i.e., one month after the alleged will
was executed, showed that she was in good physical condition, because her
signature was smooth with flowing strokes with an even alignment which indicated
that Alegria had good muscular control and coordination.[20] Notably, Dr. Elena
Cariaso, the doctor who was tasked by the probate court to examine the physical
and mental condition of Alegria in December 1978, testified that Alegria was physically and
mentally fit with only a weakness in her lower extremities; thus, corroborating
Torres’ finding that Alegria's hand had good muscular control and coordination.
In fact, Torres established that the standard signatures written in 1966, 1974,
1976 and in December 1978, all showed
that the signatures were made in a continuous, spontaneous and unconscious
manner[21] unlike that of the
questioned signatures.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive.
They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The courts may
place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them
inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced
with conflicting expert opinions, as in this case, courts give more weight and
credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.[22]
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he
may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.[23]
We agree with the RTC and the CA in
giving more weight and credence to the testimony of Torres as the examination
conducted by Torres was complete, thorough and scientific. We find that the RTC
had the opportunity to examine the relevant documents and make comparisons
thereof. In fact, upon our own
comparison of the questioned signatures and the standard signatures taking into
consideration inconspicuous differences noted by Torres on the questioned and
standard signatures, we find that the questioned signatures showed substantial
differences with that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioner claims that the
testimonies of the notary public, as well as the two attesting witnesses that
they saw Alegria sign the will in their presence, should have outweighed the
testimony of Torres.
We are not persuaded.
In his
testimony, Notary Public Farrales testified that when he, together with another
lawyer, Atty. Cordon, went inside the room of Alegria who was in bed, he
presented to her copies of the will which he brought from his office;[24] that Alegria read the
same and called in petitioner Felizardo to bring some small board where she
could write; after Felizardo handed the same, he again left the room. Farrales
said that Alegria signed the will in his
presence, as well as in the presence of Atty. Cordon and the other
attesting witnesses, Mercedes and Victorino; that petitioner Felizardo was just
outside the room when the signing was on-going;[25] that Farrales was the one
who assisted Alegria in turning the pages of the documents and was the one who
pointed to her the portion where she was to affix her signatures;[26] and that after the
signing and notarization of the will, Alegria requested them to call on
petitioner Felizardo and once Felizardo was inside the room, Alegria gave the
documents to the latter who placed the will in an envelope.[27]
On
the other hand, Mercedes testified that when she and Victorino entered
Alegria's room, she saw Alegria, Felizardo, Attys. Farrales and Cordon; that
Alegria instructed petitioner Felizardo
to read aloud the will which Felizardo
did;[28] and that Alegria and the
other witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other and was duly
notarized; and that she saw Felizardo
keep the will inside the vault. [29]
Victorino
testified that when he and Mercedes entered Alegria's room, he saw Atty. Farrales, Cordon,
Felizardo and Alegria who was in a reclined position in her bed; that Alegria
asked Felizardo to get the sealed document from a cabinet;[30] that Alegria told
petitioner Felizardo to give each one of them a copy of the document and
instructed petitioner Felizardo to read the contents of the will aloud;[31] and that he saw Alegria
signed the will in their presence.
Notably,
their testimonies showed material inconsistencies which affected their
credibilities. Farrales testified that the copies of the alleged will came from
his office and he was the one who gave the same to Alegria which, however, was
contrary to Victorino’s claim that petitioner Felizardo got the alleged will
from the cabinet. Farrales testified that petitioner Felizardo was not inside
the room when the signing was ongoing which was again contrary to the claims of
both Mercedes and Victorino that petitioner Felizardo was inside the room while
the signing was on-going; and that Alegria
even instructed Felizardo to read aloud the contents of the same to them.
Notably, Farrales testified that he was the one who turned the pages of the
will and was also the one who pointed to Alegria the portion where to affix her
signatures and that no other person rendered such assistance except him.[32] However, in petitioner Felizardo's testimony,
he said that he was present when the will was being signed by Alegria.[33] In fact, petitioner
Felizardo submitted photographs which were admittedly taken by co-petitioner
Juan to prove the former's presence
during the signing and to show that he was the one assisting Alegria in signing
the will.
Such contradictory statements coming from persons
who allegedly were present when the will was executed render doubtful the
genuineness of the alleged forged will. Thus, we find no error committed by the
RTC in not giving credence to their testimonies.
We find the elements of falsification of public
document present in this case.
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171; and (3) that the act of
falsification is committed in a public document. Under paragraph 2 of Article 171, a person may
commit falsification of a public document by causing it to appear in a document
that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person
or persons did not, in fact, so participate in the act or proceeding.
In this case, petitioners are private individuals
who presented the alleged will to the probate court and made it appear that
Alegria signed the alleged will disposing of her rights and interest in the real
properties, as well as all of her personal properties to petitioners when in
fact petitioners knew that Alegria never signed such alleged will as her
signatures therein were forged.
We find apropos the findings of the RTC that
petitioners conspired to perpetuate such forgery, to wit:
1.
The so-called Will and Testament was admitted by Felizardo S. Obando in open
hearing to have been dictated by him to a
certain Atty. Alcantara allegedly as voiced out to him by Alegria;
2.
He said he procured the service of said lawyer
and the very notary public, one Atty. C. Farrales to notarize it;
3.
Juanito Obando enticed the couple Mercedes B.
Santos and Victorino Cruz into acting as witnesses, Mercedes being his
sister-in-law, and his taking pictures of the entire ceremony of signing such
document. This taking of such pictures is itself a sign of evil intention,
because it is an expectancy of future rift or trouble;
4.
Felizardo held and kept the questioned document
with him from its inception to its alleged signing and up to Alegria’s death
which possession and complete control lasted for several months;
5.
Felizardo and Juanito Obando and their respective
families again by their joint admissions, gained enormously and by reason of
said will.
The
crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to
commit estafa. The
elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC[34] are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another.
Petitioner Felizardo argued
that he already had in his possession the personal properties of Alegria which included
the pieces of jewelry by virtue of an alleged general power of attorney
executed by Alegria in his favor.
However, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, such agency
between Alegria and petitioner Felizardo, was terminated upon Alegria’s death;
thus, he had no basis for taking possession and custody of Alegria’s properties
after her death. However, by virtue of the falsified will which petitioners
presented for probate, and by which petitioner Felizardo became a
co-administrator of the estate of the Figueras couple, and had gained
possession of the jewelry, he was not able to account for the same when ordered
to do so by the probate court.
On the other hand,
co-petitioner Juan admitted that the pieces of jewelry went to his daughters
and nieces, while the real properties were already sold even while the
intestate and probate proceedings were still pending in court.
Petitioners' misappropriation
of the jewelry was to the prejudice of Eduardo Figueras who also has the right
to Alegria's jewelry in general which were part of the declared conjugal estate
of his father Jose and Alegria Figueras. Notably, Alegria, as administratrix of
the estate of Jose, submitted in 1966 an inventory of the conjugal real and
personal properties of the Figueras couple and one of those listed under
conjugal personal properties was jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00.
Such inventory was contained in the Order dated
The crime committed was estafa
through falsification of public document. Being a complex crime, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.[35] While
we sustain the conviction of petitioners of the crime charged, we found, however,
that the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals was not proper.
The amount of damages is the basis
of the penalty for estafa. However, we note that the prosecution failed to
satisfactorily show that the amount of jewelry misappropriated was indeed two
million pesos. The only evidence on record which would establish the amount of
the jewelry was the inventory submitted in 1966 by Alegria where she listed the
jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00.
Since the amount misappropriated by petitioners
was established to be only in the amount of P2,150.00, the applicable
provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which
imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00
but does not exceed P6,000.00.
Thus, in this case, it appears that the most serious crime, which should
be the basis of penalty for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document, would be the falsification and, under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
Thus, the maximum penalty to be imposed in this
case is the medium period of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional
minimum in any of its period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated P5,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad
Santos, Jr. and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 411-438.
[2]
[3] Consolidated
Submission of Standard Specimen Signatures signed by the parties’ counsels.
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, p. 149.
[7] Rollo, pp. 402-409.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Petitioners' Exhibit “4;” records , pp. 1911-1913; rollo, p. 314.
[14] G.R.
No. 168437.
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22] G.R.
No. 173192.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] TSN,
[29]
[30] TSN,
[31]
[32] TSN
,
[33]
[34] Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code punishes estafa committed as follows:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x
x x x
(b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
[35] Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Art.
48. Penalty for complex crimes. -
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. (As amended by Act No. 4000).