Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
THE LEARNING CHILD, INC.
and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO,
Petitioners, - versus -
Respondents. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x JOSE
MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO AND
ATTY. MARILYN AQUINO; LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented by his
parents FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO; CHRISTOPHER E. WALMSLEY, minor
and represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA. TERESA WALMSLEY; JOANNA
MARIE S. SISON, minor and represented by her parents BONIFACIO SISON AND
JOSEPHINE SISON; and MATTHEW RAPHAEL C. ARCE, minor and represented by his
parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA. ERISSA ARCE, Petitioners, - versus -
Respondents. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Petitioners, - versus - MUNICIPALITY
(now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES FELIPE AND MARY
ANNE ALFONSO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION), Respondents. |
G.R. No. 134269
G.R. No. 134440 G.R. No. 144518 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July 7, 2010 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
At bar are three
consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
all concerning the operation of a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala
Alabang Village, more particularly on a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 149166.
The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440 assail the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096, dated November 11, 1997 and July 2,
1998, respectively, which enjoined said school’s continued operation on the
ground that the same is in violation of the Deed of Restrictions annotated on
the title of the subject property that limits the use of the lot to the
establishment thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 challenges
the Court of Appeals’ Decision[3]
dated August 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa
Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning
ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as
corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the
subject property as “institutional” where the operation of a grade school is
allowed.
FACTS
The factual and
procedural antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
Sometime in 1984,
subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the
spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. In
1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne
Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was
annotated in TCT No. 149166 issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required
by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions
indicated that:
2.2
USE
AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment
and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which
may include such installations as an office for school administration,
playground and garage for school vehicles.[4]
ALI turned over the
right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the
In 1989, the spouses
Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a
preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten
classes. In 1991, TLC was expanded to
include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross, which provided
additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.
AAVA wrote several
letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLC’s
and the spouses Alfonso’s violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting
them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating
the grade school and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in
excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.[5]
Injunction Case
On October 13, 1992,
AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On November 24, 1992,
owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely the spouses Ernesto and
Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, and LawPhil,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the adjacent property owners), filed a
Complaint-in-Intervention, seeking the same relief as AAVA and prayed for
damages.
On July 22, 1994, the RTC
rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE,
defendants are ordered to cease and desist at the end of the schoolyear 1994-95
from operating The Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes
with a maximum of two (2) classrooms in accordance with the Deed of
Restrictions, and to pay the plaintiff the following:
1)
P20,000.00 in attorney’s fees
2)
costs of this suit.
The
complaint-in-intervention is dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs-in-intervention
to show by preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to the damages
prayed for.[6]
The RTC ruled that the
operation of the grade school and the nursery and kindergarten classes in
excess of two classrooms was in violation of a contract to which the defendants
are bound. The RTC emphasized that the
restrictions were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may
validly impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code. The RTC also agreed with the plaintiffs
therein that by allowing parking on either side of the streets adjacent to the
school, the defendants likewise violated Barangay Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1991.
On August 19, 1994, TLC
and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. They alleged in the Motion that with the
passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject
property as “institutional,” there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to
uphold the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses Alfonso. The adjacent property owners did not move for
a reconsideration of, nor appeal from, the said Decision insofar as it
dismissed their Complaint-in-Intervention.
In an Order dated March
1, 1995, the RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its earlier
Decision. The decretal portion of the
RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of this Court dated 22 July 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Complaint and Complaint-in-Intervention filed on 13 October 1992
and 24 November 1992, respectively, are dismissed.[7]
The RTC ruled that with
the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject
property, the earlier residential classification can no longer be
enforced. Citing Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co.,[8] it
decreed that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed,
the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power by the municipality.
On March 22, 1995, AAVA
moved for a reconsideration of the above RTC Order. On July 21, 1995, the RTC denied the said
Motion.
AAVA filed a Notice of
Appeal on August 4, 1995. The Appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51096.
On November 11, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the March 1, 1995 RTC
Resolution:
WHEREFORE,
the appealed order dated March 1, 1995 of the lower court in Civil Case No.
92-2950 is hereby SET ASIDE. The earlier
decision of the said court dated July 22, 1994 is Reinstated. Costs against
defendants-appellees.[9]
On December 4, 1997, TLC
and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision. On February 5, 1998, petitioners in G.R. No.
134440, namely, Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Velasco, Christopher E.
Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce (Aquino, et al.),
alleging that they are minor children who suffer from various learning disabilities
and behavioral disorders benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and their own Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, the
Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being
proscribed by Section 2, Rule 19[10]
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
TLC and the spouses
Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate
Petitions for Review with this Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals. The Petition of
TLC and the spouses Alfonso, filed on July 9, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No.
134269. The Petition of Aquino, et al.,
filed within the extended period on August 21, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No.
134440.
In the meantime, on
October 3, 1994, while the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso
was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its
Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged
typographical error in the description of a parcel of land under the heading
“Institutional Zone” in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the
description “Lot 25, Block 1, Phase
V, Ayala Alabang” to “Lot 25, Block 3,
Phase V, Ayala Alabang.” This is the
same ordinance which was used as basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No.
92-2950, when it reversed its own Decision on Motion for Reconsideration in its
Order dated March 1, 1995.
On November 29, 1994,
the
On June 26, 1995, the
HLURB issued its Resolution on the Petition of the
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we defer action to the Muntinlupa SB Resolution No. 94-179
and remand the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of
the required public hearings as mandated by Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991,
of the Metro Manila Council entitled “Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the
Metro Manila Area.”[11]
According to the HLURB,
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error
but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional area, and
therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the
conduct of the required public hearings.
The
On July 27, 1999, the
Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical
error in Ordinance No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity
compliance with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing pursuant to
Resolution No. 12, series of 1991,[12]
of the Metropolitan Manila Council:
WHEREFORE,
the appealed Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, dated June 26, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Resolution No. 94-179 of the
Sanguniang Bayan (now Sangguniang Panglungsod) of Muntinlupa is declared valid.[13]
In said Decision, the
Office of the President likewise turned down the alternative prayer of
oppositors AAVA and the adjacent property owners that the Office of the
President should recognize the Deed of Restrictions on the subject property and
restrict the use thereof in accordance therewith. The Office of the President ruled on this
matter that:
Turning to the alternative relief being
sought by the oppositor [that the Office of the President should recognize the
Deed of Restrictions], the same cannot be granted.
The reason is simple. No less
than Ayala Corporation – in consenting to the transfer from the Yusons to the Alfonsos
of the subject property – agreed that the “lot
(shall) be used for school and related activities”, thereby effectively
freeing the appellants from the deed restriction that the “Lots (shall) be used exclusively for residential purposes.” This is not all. Prior to its sale, the property in question
was already used for school purposes.
Further the aforementioned Muntinlupa
Zoning Ordinance itself classifies the area occupied by the appellants’ school
as an “institutional zone” and not a residential area.
And the fact that TLC is not the only school operating within the AAV –
De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School, Woodrose School, to name a few,
conduct classes within the plush village – renders unpersuasive appellees’ line
that “x x x Through the illegal operation of their school, the
parties-in-interest appellants spouses Alfonso have effectively violated the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of the residents of the Village
x x x.”[14]
(Boldfacing supplied; underscoring and italization are present in the
original.)
AAVA and the adjacent
property owners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54438.
On August 15, 2000, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision slightly modifying the Decision of the
Office of the President:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is partly GRANTED. The
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the ruling
therein passing upon the effect of Ordinance No. 91-39 on the Deed of Restrictions
imposed on the subject property is hereby VACATED.[15]
The Court of Appeals
agreed with the Office of the President that being merely a rectifying issuance
and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply
with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing.[16] However, the Court of Appeals found the
Office of the President to have exceeded its authority when it ruled[17]
that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in view of the
passage of Ordinance No. 91-39.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Office of the President
effectively overruled said appellate court’s Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096
wherein it ruled that the reclassification under Ordinance No. 91-39 does not
have the effect of nullifying the Deed of Restrictions at the back of the title
of the subject property, inasmuch as there is no conflict between the Ordinance
and the Deed of Restrictions.[18]
On October 3, 2000, AAVA
and the adjacent property owners filed the third consolidated Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court
assailing the above Court of Appeals Decision.
This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 144518.
ISSUES
Though later in time, we shall first determine the
issue in G.R. No. 144518, as the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 impinges
on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school in the subject
property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440. We shall then resolve the issue in G.R. No.
134440 on whether Aquino, et al., should be allowed to intervene in the
injunction case against TLC. Thereafter,
we shall rule on the merits of G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440 by deciding once and
for all whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from
continuing the operation of a grade school in the subject property.
The main issues to be
decided by this Court, culled from the consolidated Petitions, are therefore
the following:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct
in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179;
2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct
in denying Aquino, et al.’s Motion to Intervene; and
3.
Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso
should be enjoined from continuing the operation of a grade school in the
subject property.
As regards the third and
decisive issue, the parties further exchanged their views on the following two
sub-issues:
a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal
Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected by Muntinlupa Resolution No.
91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions
on the subject property; and
b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from
enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.
RULINGS
Validity
of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
AAVA claims that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President
that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not
a rezoning enactment, and therefore did not have to comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing which are required for zoning
ordinances. Notice and hearing are
required under the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan
Manila Area, contained in Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the then
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).
In asserting that
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA
faults the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals in allegedly
accepting hook, line and sinker the assertion of the ENCRFO Regional Officer
and the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself that Muntinlupa Resolution
No. 94-179 was passed merely to correct a typographical error in Appendix B of
Ordinance No. 91-39.[19] AAVA adopts the HLURB finding that it was
allegedly:
[H]ard to
believe that the denomination in the text of Block 1 and instead of Block 3 as
an institutional zone was an accident of (sic) mere oversight, the numbers 1
& 3 are not adjoining each other, but are separated by the number 2. TLC’s position would have been worth
considering had the erroneous phrase typed been Block 2 for then it is more
plausible and probable for the typist to have mistyped a “2” instead of a
“3.” Besides, Blocks 1 and 3 are not
even near each other on the map.
Finally, if it were an error, it is surprising that no one noticed it
until after a court had ruled against a party, who now seeks to use said
correcting ordinance in its defense.[20]
We are not
persuaded.
The purpose of
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses:
SAPAGKAT,
ang Sanguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ay pinagtibay ang Kautusang Bayan Bilang
91-39 na nagsasaad ng bagong pagreresona ng Bayan ng Muntinlupa;
SAPAGKAT,
sa pagrerepaso sa nabanggit na kautusang bayan ay napag-alamang nagkaroon ng
isang “typographical error sa Appendix B” nito;
SAPAGKAT,
sa halip na Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, ang nailagay o nai-type sa
hindi sinasadyang dahilan ay Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang;
SAPAGKAT,
ang pagtatamang ito sa teksto ng Appendix B na nakapaloob sa institutional zone
ay hindi makakaapekto sa ibang bahagi o kabuuang nilalaman at itinatakda sa
kautusang bayan bilang 91-39.[21]
Even more telling that
there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39 is
the fact that both the
Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the
WHEREAS,
the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, approved on 10 December 1991 Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39
rezoning the entire municipality (as shown in the accompanying zoning map and
described in the attached Appendix “B”) as
a response to the need to have an updated zoning map. x x
x.[23] (Emphases supplied.)
It is furthermore noted
that TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s claim that Lot 25, Block 1, Phase 5 of
Ayala Alabang has been and remains to be a residential lot[24]
has never been rebutted by AAVA. As
regards the comment that Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near the map, we agree
with TLC and the spouses Alfonso that this bolsters their position even more,
as the distance would make it difficult to commit an error on the map. It is much more plausible to mistype a single
digit than to mistake an area for another that is far away from it.
It is therefore crystal
clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No.
91-39. AAVA, however, furthermore claims
that even assuming arguendo that
there was a typographical error in the said zoning ordinance, the proper remedy
is to legislate a new zoning ordinance, following all the formalities therefor,
citing the leading case of Resins,
Incorporated v. Auditor General.[25]
Again, we disagree.
Resins was
decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not
interfere with the workings of the executive and legislative branches of
government:
If there has
been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive – on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system – the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.[26]
In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in
the printing of the statute, unlike in the case at bar where it is the
Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which seeks to correct its own
error in the printing of the ordinance.
While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers
for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute, there would be no
violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made
by the same entity which committed the error.
In Resins, there is a
presumption of regularity in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts
should not speculate on. In the case at
bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 which is entitled to a
presumption of regularity.
Finally, AAVA claims
that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with
the HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648.[27] AAVA reminds us that the decisions of
administrative agencies on matters pertaining to their jurisdiction will
generally not be disturbed by the courts.[28]
We should remind AAVA
that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at
bar, affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside
the HLURB ruling. The authority of the
HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the
acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true that courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies,[29]
it should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate
the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area.
The then
In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution
No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the lack of
notice and hearing as AAVA contends.
Motion
to Intervene of Aquino, et al.
It is recalled that the
Motion for Leave to Intervene of Aquino, et al., was filed on February
5, 1998, which was three months after the Special Third Division of the Court
of Appeals had already rendered its Decision dated November 11, 1997 setting
aside the RTC Resolution which had been in favor of TLC and the spouses
Alfonso.
Aquino, et al.,
premised their intervention on their being grade school students in the School
of the Holy Cross, wherein they allegedly benefit from the full-inclusion
program of said school. Under said
full-inclusion program, Aquino, et al., who claim to suffer from various
learning disabilities and behavioral disorders, are enrolled full-time in
educational settings enjoyed by regular, typically developing children. Aquino, et al., alleges that TLC is
the only educational institution in the
Considering the date of
the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that
Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school at this time, thus
rendering their alleged interest in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al., claim to
represent other special children since the Motion for Reconsideration filed
with the Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication that it was intended
as a class action; they merely sought to represent themselves. Since the interest of Aquino, et al.,
in the instant case is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm the
denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene before the trial court.
Assuming, however, for
the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.’s, interest in the injunction
suit had not yet been mooted, we nevertheless find no reversible error in the
Court of Appeals’ denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The Motion to Intervene
filed by Aquino, et al., was denied in the same Resolution wherein the
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses
Alfonso. The ground for the denial of
Aquino, et al.’s, Petition is Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This section is derived
from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to
intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to
ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision
holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for
decision,[30] while
another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the
final judgment.[31] This ambiguity was eliminated by the present
Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time
before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second
doctrine above-stated. The clear import
of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial
court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar,
when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.
Aquino, et al.,
claim that they could not have intervened in the case earlier, as the
full-inclusion program was allegedly commenced by defendants TLC and the
spouses Alfonso only in 1997. However,
said defendants cannot be benefited by their allegedly recent introduction of a
full-inclusion program. While we
sympathize with the plight of the minor intervenors, we cannot allow that a
program commenced by the defendants way beyond the institution of the case in
1992 could be considered as a valid defense.
To do so would put into the hands of the defendant in a case the power
to introduce new issues to a litigation on appeal with the assistance of
intervenors.
Injunction
against the operation of the School of the Holy Cross
Effect of Ordinance No.
91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the Deed of Restrictions
In reversing itself on
Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC cited the Ortigas[32] case
and held that the earlier residential classification can no longer be
enforced due to the reclassification by Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No.
91-39 of the subject property.
In Ortigas, the restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes
was contained in the Deeds of Sale of the subject properties at the insistence
of developer Ortigas & Co. and was annotated in the corresponding titles
thereof. Therein defendant Feati Bank
and Trust Co. eventually acquired the subject properties from the
successor-in-interest of the original buyers; the deeds of sale and the TCTs
issued likewise reflected the same restriction. However, the then Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal passed a Resolution declaring the area to which
the subject property is situated as an industrial and commercial zone. Ortigas & Co. later on sued Feati Bank,
seeking an injunction to restrain the latter from completing a commercial bank building
on the premises. This Court held that
the Mandaluyong Resolution was passed in the exercise of police power.[33] Since the motives behind the passage of the
questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a
felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality’s exercise of police
power.[34]
As previously stated,
the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original
RTC Decision enjoining TLC and the spouses Alfonso from the operation of the
school beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two
classrooms. The Court of Appeals held
that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited the use
of the property for the establishment of a preparatory school, and the
provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified the
subject property as “institutional.” The
Court of Appeals continued that there are valid grounds for it not to apply the
Ortigas case cited by the RTC
Resolution, holding that while the subject property in said case was found in
an area classified as industrial and commercial, “a study of the location of
defendants’ school would clearly reveal that the same is situated within a
residential area – the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village.”[35]
TLC and the spouses
Alfonso insist on the applicability of Ortigas
in the case at bar, and likewise cited Presley
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.[36]
in order to drive home its point that reclassification of properties is a valid
exercise of the state’s police power, with which contractual obligations should
be reconciled.
AAVA counters that even
where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to
automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since the
better policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights and to preserve both
instead of nullifying one against the other, citing the case of Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[37] AAVA thus adopt the finding of the Court of
Appeals that even assuming that the subject property has been validly
reclassified as an institutional zone, there is no real conflict between the
Deed of Restrictions and said reclassification.
A careful study of the
pertinent documents yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way to
harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and the
assailed zoning ordinance.
To recall, the
annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property
provides:
PE-222/T-134042
– RESTRICTIONS – The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty (50)
years from the date of sale. The
property shall be used exclusively for
the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for
school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. x x x.[38]
(Emphasis ours.)
It is noted that the
above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of
classrooms. The two-classroom limit is
actually imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC Ordinance No.
81-01, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National
Capital Region, which classified
In
R-1 districts, no building, structure or land used, and no building or
structure shall be erected or altered in whole or in part except for one or
more of the following:
Principal
Uses
1.
One-family
dwellings;
2.
Duplex
type buildings;
3.
Churches
or similar places of worship and dwelling for the religious and seminaries;
4. Nursery
and kindergarten schools, provided that they do not exceed two (2) classrooms;
5.
Clubhouses,
lodges and other social centers;
6.
Parks,
playgrounds, pocket parks, parkways, promenades and playlots;
7.
Recreational
uses such as golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, swimming pools and
similar uses operated by the government or private individuals as membership
organizations for the benefit of their members, families or guests not
primarily for gain;
8.
Townhouses.[39] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the
following are the principal uses of an institutional site, the classification
of the subject property by virtue of Ordinance No. 91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa
Municipal Resolution No. 94-179:
Institutional
Principal
Uses
1.
Barangay
health centers;
2.
Day-care
centers;
3.
Puericulture
centers;
4.
Clinics,
family planning clinics and children’s clinics;
5. Nursery
and kindergarten schools;
6. Elementary
schools;
7. Elementary and
high school;
8. Local civic
centers, local auditoriums, halls and exhibition centers;
9. Churches,
temples and mosques;
10. Chapels;
11. Barangay
centers;
12. Maternity
hospitals;
13. National
executive, judicial, legislative and related facilities and activities;
14. Government
buildings;
15. Tertiary and
provincial hospitals and medical center;
16. National
museums and galleries;
17. Art galleries;
18. Planetarium;
20. Vocational
and technical schools, special training;
21. Convents and
seminaries;
22. Welfare and
charitable institutions;
23. Municipal
buildings;
24. Fire and police
station buildings;
25. Local museum
and libraries;
27. Penal
institutions.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
The jurisprudence cited
by TLC and the spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We find that a clarification of the doctrines
laid down in the aforestated cases of Co,
Ortigas, and Presley is in order.
In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted
differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, this Court, in upholding the
exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification of the subject
property therein over the Deed of Restrictions over the same property, took
into consideration the prevailing conditions in the area:
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of
Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard
to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed
by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power
to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
route. Having been expressly
granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations,
the
Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court added:
Applying
the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a
hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly
residential purposes, defendants-appellees should be permitted, on the strength
of the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to
use the same for commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian, et
al., it was held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are
binding on all subsequent purchasers x x x." However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance
involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the
ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any
easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." In
the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject
resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the subject
property, though declared as an institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a
residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots. Verily, the area surrounding TLC did not
undergo a radical change similar to that in Ortigas
but rather remained purely residential to this day. Significantly, the lot occupied by TLC is
located along one of the smaller roads (less than eight meters in width) within
the subdivision. It is understandable
why ALI, as the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller,
preparatory school that will generate less traffic than bigger schools. With its operation of both a preparatory and
grade school, TLC’s student population had already swelled to around 350
students at the time of the filing of this case. Foreseeably, the greater traffic generated by
TLC’s expanded operations will affect the adjacent property owners enjoyment
and use of their own properties. AAVA’s
and ALI’s insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or (2)
the obtainment of the approval of the affected residents for any modification
of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand, the then
It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently conflicting rights of
the parties herein pursuant to the aforementioned Co case. In Co, agricultural tenant Roaring, facing
a demolition order, filed a complaint for maintenance of possession with the
Court of Agrarian Relations of Quezon City.
The landowner challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing that the
classification of the subject property therein from agricultural to a light
industrial zone. This Court denied the
applicability of the reclassification, and clarified Ortigas:
This is not to
suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for
it is settled that it can legally do so, being an exercise of the police power.
As such, it is superior to the impairment clause. In the case of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati
Bank, for example, we held that a municipal ordinance establishing a
commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier stipulation in a contract of
sale of land located in the area that it could be used for residential purposes
only. In the case at bar, fortunately for the private respondent, no similar
intention is clearly manifested.
Accordingly, we affirm the view that the zoning ordinance in question,
while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights
protected by the impairment clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile
apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve both
instead of nullifying one against the other. x x x.[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision likewise
restricted its use for a residential purpose.
However, the area (
Furthermore, we should
also take note that in the case of Presley,
there can be no reconciliation between the restriction to use of the property
as a residential area and its reclassification as a high density commercial
(C-3) zone wherein the use of the property for residential purposes is not one
of the allowable uses.
Alleged estoppel on the
part of AAVA from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions
TLC and
the spouses Alfonso’s main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said
restrictions by its own acts. TLC and
the spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a
setting aside of said restrictions:
1. AAVA Village
Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had previously
approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24 classrooms,
which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site
Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.[44]
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the
Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized
through a letter the construction of a new “school building extension.”[45]
3. ALI itself
requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly
proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer
Hector S. Baltazar, who said:
Engineer
Baltazar:
There
was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in
fact, was the one who submitted this map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is
the developer of the
TLC and
the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered
institutional in the Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission
of the latter constitutes an intent to have the subject property reclassified
as institutional.
4. ALI assented to
the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its
letter dated July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C.
Gonzales concerning the proposed expansion of the school curriculum to grade
school of the
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the
school is concerned, we believe that it is a worthy undertaking that will
definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.[47]
We are
not convinced.
Estoppel
by deed is “a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other
party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from
denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it.”[48] We have previously cautioned against the
perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel:
Estoppel has
been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel becomes a most
effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man’s mouth
from speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument
or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential elements
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. x x x.[49]
TLC and
the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
gravity of AAVA’s acts so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with
the Deed of Restrictions.
In
numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous
approvals by AAVA of the construction of additional classrooms allegedly
constitute a revocation of the Deed of Restrictions. However, as we have previously discussed, the
two-classroom restriction is not imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but rather
in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. The alleged
assent of AAVA to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all
inconsistent with the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which merely
limit the use of the subject property “exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which
may include such installations as an office for school administration,
playground and garage school vehicles.”
The
circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no
intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive
its right to have said restrictions enforced.
Frank Roa’s signature in the Site Development Plan came with the note:
“APPROVED SUBJECT TO STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY NOTICES APPEARING ON THE
PLAN AND TO RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND
OCCUPANCY OF THE SAME.”[50] The Site Development Plan itself was
captioned “The LEARNING CHILD PRE-SCHOOL,”[51]
showing that the approval was for the construction of a pre-school, not a grade
school. AAVA’s letter dated March 20,
1996 contained an even more clear cut qualification; it expressly stated that
the approval is “subject to the conditions stipulated in the Deed of
Restrictions covering your above-mentioned property, which states, among
others, that the property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a PREPARATORY (NURSERY AND KINDERGARTEN) SCHOOL.”
We
furthermore accept AAVA’s explanation as regards the March 20, 1996 letter that
at it had to allow the construction of the new school building extension in
light of the trial court’s Orders dated March 9, 1995 and August 3, 1995. It should be noted here that AAVA was the
party appealing to the Court of Appeals as the trial court decision favorable
to them had been reversed by the same court on Motion for Reconsideration.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts
allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims
that these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not
a party to the case. Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALI’s
statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The general Ayala Alabang Village “Deed
Restrictions,” which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the title of
the subject property, expressly state that: “2. Compliance with the said
restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or
enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village
Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the
Ayala Alabang Village Association.”[52] As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is
jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions,
and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by
copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor,
or other person jointly interested with the party.[53]
(Emphasis supplied.)
However,
the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the alleged
assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional
which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed
of Restrictions. As regards the act in
number 2, the statement in ALI’s July 24, 1991 letter that it believes the
expansion of TLC is a “worthy undertaking,” it should be pointed out that ALI’s
purported assent came with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the
school is concerned, we believe that it is a worthy undertaking that will
definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions
mentioned below are met.
It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA)
Board does not have the authority on its own to alter the Deed of Restrictions
for
As
previously stated, a majority of AAVA’s members, on April 5, 1992, voted to
ratify the Board of Governors’ resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should
be implemented. Therefore, the conditions
for ALI’s approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namely the
concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the
village, were clearly not met.
Finally,
a thorough examination of the records of the case furthermore shows that AAVA consistently
insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions:
1. Petitioner Mary
Anne Alfonso, as directress of TLC, wrote AAVA on May 20, 1991 requesting
“reconsideration and approval to modify the restrictions at our property at 111
Cordillera to include the establishment and maintenance of a grade school” and
avowed to make a similar representation to ALI.[55] AAVA replied on June 26, 1991 with a letter
stating that the matter of interpretation or relaxation of the Deed of
Restrictions is not within its power, but of ALI, and thus referred the request
to the latter.[56] ALI wrote AAVA on July 24, 1991 stating that
while it interposes no objection to the modification of the restrictions on the
subject property, any change on such restrictions should be concurred in by
AAVA’s Board of Governors and approved by the residents of the village, particularly
the residents of the district where the school is situated.[57] AAVA’s Board of Governors, during its regular
meeting on August 27, 1991, voted unanimously to retain the restrictions and
recommended said retention to ALI.[58]
2. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on October 25, 1991
requesting a reconsideration of the decision of AAVA’s Board of Governors.[59] On October 31, 1991, AAVA wrote ALI to
inquire about the reasons for the restrictions.[60] ALI replied that the restrictions were
imposed because the school sites located along small roads had to be limited to
small nursery schools since the latter generate less traffic than bigger
schools. ALI reiterated that the
residents should be consulted prior to any change in the restrictions.[61] In the meantime, TLC proceeded to operate a
grade school on the subject property. On
February 27, 1992, AAVA’s former counsel wrote TLC a letter demanding that they
suspend the enrollment of students other than for pre-school.[62]
3. The spouses
Alfonso wrote AAVA on March 11, 1992, reiterating their request to operate a
grade school in the subject property. [63] On March 24, 1992, the Board of Governors of
AAVA affirmed its earlier decision to retain the restrictions. On March 27, 1992, AAVA replied to the
spouses Alfonso’s letter informing them of the denial.[64]
4. On April 5, 1992,
during AAVA’s annual membership meeting, the spouses Alfonso appealed directly
to the members of AAVA. Majority of
AAVA’s members voted to ratify the Board of Governor’s Resolutions,[65]
5. On April 24, 1992,
the spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA another letter requesting that it be allowed to
continue holding classes for Grades I to III at their premises for at least the
coming school year, since they needed time to relocate the same outside the
village.[66] AAVA replied on April 30, 1992, explaining
that the Board of Governors has to follow the April 5, 1992 decision of the
members and demanded that the TLC close its grade school in the coming school
year.[67]
6. On June 4, 1992,
the spouses Alfonso wrote to AAVA again, appealing to be allowed to continue in
their premises for three more months, June to August, after which they solemnly
promised to move the grade school out of the village, possibly in TLC’s former
school site in B.F. Homes Parañaque.[68] AAVA replied on June 16, 1992 denying their
request, and demanded that TLC cease its operation of a grade school on the
subject property.[69]
7. In view of the
continued operation of the grade school, AAVA sent letters to TLC on August 17
1992 and September 4, 1992 demanding that the latter immediately cease and
desist from continuing and maintaining a grade school in the subject property.[70]
From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA abrogated
the Deed of Restrictions. Neither could it be deemed estopped from seeking the
enforcement of said restrictions.
DISPOSITION
This Court hereby
resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994
RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and
desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and
kindergarten classes. Pursuant to
Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa Municipal
Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete the two-classroom restriction from
said Decision.
This Court, however,
understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current
students of the School of the Holy Cross, who are innocent spectators to the
litigation in the case at bar. We
therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy Cross be
allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their
graduation in their Grade 7. The school,
however, shall no longer be permitted to accept new students to the grade
school.
WHEREFORE, the
Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R.
No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998,
respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision
ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the
operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes
with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students
of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child School’s grade school
department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to
their graduation in their Grade 7. The
enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R.
No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher E.
Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED.
3. The Petition in G.R.
No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a
Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a
zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros with Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Oswaldo D.
Agcaoli, concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 134269), pp. 62-71; rollo (G.R.
No. 134440), pp. 83-93.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili with Associate Justices Angelina S. Gutierrez and Ricardo
P. Galvez, concurring.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.,
concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 144518), pp. 80-97.
[4] Records, Vol. VI, p. 2281.
[5]
[6] Records, Vol. II, p. 720.
[7]
[8] 183 Phil. 176 (1979).
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 134269), p.
70.
[10] Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 144518), p.
435.
[12] Otherwise known as the “Uniform
Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area.”
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 144518), p.
194.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Boldfaced portion of the
above-quoted paragraphs of the Decision of the Office of the President.
[18] Rollo (G.R. No. 144518), pp.
94-95.
[19]
[20]
[21] Records, Vol. VII, p. 2894.
[22] 82 Am. Jur. 2d 79, p. 521.
[23] Records, Vol. II, p. 943.
[24] Comment of The Learning Child, Inc.
and the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso, p. 18; rollo (G.R. No.
144518), pp. 1179-1210.
[25] 134 Phil. 697 (1968).
[26]
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 144518), p.
55.
[28] San
Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989, 174 SCRA 258,
271-272.
[29] First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 657, 664 (1996),
citing Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990,
190 SCRA 673, 680.
[30] Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Arciaga, 157 Phil. 201, 210 (1974).
[31] Lichauco
v. Court of Appeals, 159 Phil. 737, 747 (1975).
[32] Ortigas
&
[33]
[34]
[35] Rollo (G.R. No. 134269), p.
70.
[36] G.R. No. 86774, August 21, 1991, 201
SCRA 13.
[37] 245 Phil. 347 (1988).
[38] Records, Vol. V, p. 2103.
[39] MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, Appendix
“C,” referred to in Article IV, Section 5 of the same ordinance.
[40] MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, Appendix
“C”, referred to in Article IV, Section 5 of the same ordinance.
[41] Ortigas &
[42] Co
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 37 at 354.
[43] Presley v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., supra note 36 at 20.
[44] TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s
Memorandum, pp. 25-26; rollo, Vol. II (G.R. No. 134269), pp. 2512-2513.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48] Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 722, 741 (2003).
[49] Kalalo v. Luz, 145 Phil. 152,
161 (1970).
[50] Exhibit 2.
[51]
[52] Records, Vol. V, p. 1984.
[53] Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[54]
[55] Records, Vol. I, pp. 116-117.
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]