Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
Golden
apple realty and development corporation and
rosvibon realty corporation,
Petitioners, - versus - sierra
grande realty corporation, manphil investment corporation, renan v.
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 119857 Present: CARPIO,
J.,* Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR.,**and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 28, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review[1]
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and
set aside the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The
antecedent facts are the following:
On
December 1, 1981, Hayari Trading Corporation (Hayari), through a Loan Agreement,[4]
borrowed from Manphil Investment Corporation (Manphil) the amount of Two
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the benefit of
Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. (Filtex).
On
the same date, Hayari President Yu Han Yat, Jr., his wife Terry Villanueva Yu
and the latter's uncle, Bernardino Villanueva, executed an Assumption of
Joint and Solidary Liability[5]
for and in consideration of the loan granted to Hayari, assuming joint and
solidary liability with Hayari for the due and punctual payment of all and/or
any amortizations on the loan, as well as all amounts payable to Manphil, in
connection therewith and for the strict performance and fulfillment of the
obligation of Hayari.
In
connection therewith, Valiant Realty and Development Corporation, represented
by its General Manager Bernardino Villanueva, and Sierra Grande Realty
Corporation (Sierra Grande), represented by Terry Villanueva Yu, executed a Third
Party Real Estate Mortgage[6] in
favor of Manphil over a parcel of land, otherwise known as the Roberts
property.
Filtex
also constituted a real estate mortgage over certain parcels of land that it
owned and also constituted a chattel mortgage over the machinery of Hayari in
order to secure payment of the loan.
Thereafter,
Bernardino Villanueva suggested that the Roberts property be subdivided
to make it easier for Sierra Grande to sell the same. On June 22, 1985, as suggested, the Board of Directors
of Sierra Grande, composed of brothers and sisters Robert Villanueva, Daniel
Villanueva, Terry Villanueva Yu, Susan Villanueva and Eden Villanueva, passed a
resolution[7]
authorizing General Manager Bernardino Villanueva, brother of their deceased
father, to hire a geodetic engineer and cause the subdivision plan to be approved
by the Land Registration Commission, and to sell the subdivided lots after
approval of the subdivision plan, if found to be necessary and for which the
corporation may need to carry its purpose.
Eventually,
on June 22, 1985, Bernardino Villanueva executed a Contract to Sell[8]
the Roberts property with Golden Apple Realty and Development, Inc.
(Golden Apple), majority of its stocks are owned by Elmer Tan, a first cousin
of the Villanueva brothers and sisters, and Rosvibon Realty Corporation
(Rosvibon), majority of its stocks are owned by Rosita So, another sister of
the father of the Villanueva brothers and sisters, for the amount of P441,032.00.
The amount of P10,000.00 of the
purchase price will have to be paid to the vendor upon the signing of the
contract and the balance to be paid to the mortgagee Manphil, on or before
On
On
P382,080.00 and another Deed of Sale[11]
of Lot 4, with a total land area of 499 sq. m., to Rosvibon for P119,760.00.
Meanwhile,
Sierra Grande's Board, on
Nevertheless,
on September 16, 1985, Elmer Tan, on behalf of the buyer corporations, paid to
Manphil for Hayari's account an amortization of P57,819.72, for the
principal sum due on July 27, 1985; P42,192.30, for Int.-CBP; P27,329.05,
for interest; and P3,423.40, as penalties.[15]
Sometime
in January 1986, Sierra Grande learned that Bernardino Villanueva[16]
tried to secure the duplicate original title[17]
of the subject parcel of land from Manphil claiming to be the President of
Hayari. As a result, on
Later, on
However, on P3,134,921.00.[21]
Hence,
Golden Apple and Rosvibon, on
On
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering,
1) all defendants to surrender and
deliver to plaintiffs corporations the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 19801
of the Registry of Deeds for
2) defendants Sierra Grande to pay
plaintiffs the sums of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, respectively;
3) defendant Sierra Grande to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
The Counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On
The
respondents herein filed their appeal with the CA, which reversed the decision
of the trial court in its Decision[26]
dated
WHEREFORE,
the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
We DISMISS the plaintiffs' complaint and on defendant Sierra Grande's
counterclaim, we SENTENCE plaintiffs to pay defendant Sierra Grande P20,000.00,
as attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Motion for
Reconsideration[27]
dated
Petitioners raised the following
assignment of errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in:
4.1 invalidating the Deeds of Absolute Sale between “Golden Apple” and “Rosvibon,” as vendees, and “Sierra Grande,” as vendor, on the primordial premise that “badges of fraud” attended their execution;
4.2 applying Article 1602 of the Civil Code to the case at bar;
4.3 overextending Article 1602 of the Civil Code to include lack of capacity, notarial infirmity, and conflict of interest to the concept of “badges of fraud”;
4.4 invalidating the contracts on the ground of insufficiency of consideration;
4.5 invalidating the contracts on the ground of lack of legal personality of vendee “Rosvibon Realty”;
4.6 invalidating the contracts on the ground of irregularity in its execution and in concluding that the deeds of sale were ante-dated;
4.7 invalidating the contracts on the ground of conflict of interest; and finally
4.8 disallowing damages awarded by the trial court to the petitioners.
The petition is
unmeritorious.
In reversing the decision
of the trial court, the CA, in a short and succinct manner, made factual
conclusions that necessitated its finding that the contracts in question were
invalid.
The
said ruling of the CA is contrary to the factual findings of the trial
court. In Guillang v. Bedania,[29]
this Court reiterated that it is not a trier of facts, but certain exceptions
apply, thus:
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court.[30]
However, this rule is subject
to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate
court are contrary to those of the trial court.[31]
Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may also
be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the
lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts.[32]
Obviously,
the contrary findings of the trial court and the CA leave this Court with no
other alternative but to re-examine some of the facts raised in the present
petition.
Petitioners
claim that the CA misused the term badges of fraud in reaching its
decision. According to them, Article
1602, upon which the term badges of fraud refers to, is not applicable,
because the said article refers to a sale with a right to repurchase, whereas
the subject invalidated contracts were absolute sales. They cited a case[33]
where this Court pronounced that, badges of fraud is a circumstance in Article
1602 of the Civil Code, which, if present in any given transaction, gives rise
to the presumption that it is not a sale but an equitable mortgage. Thus, according to petitioners, the CA
confused Article 1602 (1) with that of Article 1470,[34]
because both articles deal with sale in general and have inadequacy of price as
subject matter. Either way, they argue, the inadequacy of the price does not
result in the cancellation or invalidation of contracts.
However, the
above argument of petitioners is speculative.
A close reading of the CA Decision would reveal that the said court used
the phrase badges of fraud to refer to certain fraudulent acts that
attended the execution of the Contract to Sell and the Deeds of Absolute Sale
which would eventually tend to prove that the same transactions were indeed
suspicious as the said contracts were antedated, simulated and fraudulent. The said findings were pointed out by the CA
in this manner:
We declare the contracts invalid.
We find that there were badges of fraud showing that the contracts were simulated and fraudulent.
First, one of the vendees, Rosvibon, was
incorporated only on
Second, the deeds of absolute sale were executed irregularly. The notarial acknowledgment did not indicate the residence certificates of the vendees which were in fact obtained subsequent to the date of notarization. This is an anomaly which shows that the deeds of sale were ante-dated to beat the resolution revoking the vendor's authority to sell.
Third, there was no sufficient consideration paid for the property involved and, worse, was attended with fraudulent conflict of interest because the vendor, Bernardino Villanueva, was a stockholder of the buyer corporations.[35]
This then refutes the whole discussion of petitioners as to
the misuse or misappreciation of the applicable laws by the CA in arriving at
its judgment. Again, an examination of
the CA’s Decision shows that the phrase did not refer to any particular
provision of a law, hence, the general and ordinary meaning of the phrase
prevails. In the same manner, this
Court, in numerous cases[36]
concerning various subjects, has used the same phrase in its rulings referring
to the said phrase's general and ordinary meaning.
Petitioners
also contend that whether or not one of the vendee corporations is not yet in
existence at the time the Contract to Sell was executed cannot be directly
questioned by any party to a suit as the existence of a corporation may only be
attacked by the Government through the Solicitor General in a quo warranto
proceeding called for the purpose and not by a collateral attack whereby the
corporate existence is questioned in some incidental proceedings not provided
by law for the express purpose of attacking the corporate existence.
That
particular line of argument is an over-stretch.
It is undisputed that petitioner Rosvibon had no legal personality at
the time of the execution of the Contract to Sell. As stated by the petitioners themselves in
their petition:
x x x It is worthy to note at this juncture, that while it may be true that one of the vendees corporation, Rosvibon, does not have the personality to enter into a Contract to Sell on June 22, 1985, as it was only incorporated on July 8, 1985, it cannot be said that said corporation does not have the personality to enter into the Contract of Sale as the said contract was executed on 26 July 1985.[37]
It
bears to stress, however, that the CA did not pass upon the corporate
personality of Rosvibon nor did it declare the same corporation's franchise
invalid. Thus, there is no need for a quo
warranto proceeding as claimed by petitioners. The CA merely made the finding which is
undisputed by the petitioners that Rosbivon had no legal personality at the
time of the execution of the Contract to Sell.
According to the CA, because of Rosbivon's lack of personality at the
time of the execution of the Contract to Sell, its presence as a party to the
same transaction is taken as another indication that fraud was indeed
attendant. This is one of the situations
included, and comprising the phrase badges of fraud.
As to the
contention of petitioners that the CA erred in invalidating the contracts on
the ground of notarial infirmity and concluding that they were ante-dated, this
Court finds the said argument devoid of any merit.
Petitioners
claim that, since the representative of the corporation appeared before the Notary
Public, the acknowledgment was complied with, even if they admitted that the
representatives of the corporations which executed the Deeds of Absolute Sale
did not present their residence certificates nor indicate the number, date and
place of issue of the same residence certificates in the acknowledgment. As shown in the records and in the testimony
of the Notary Public, Atty. Melanio L. Zoreta, the requirement of the
presentation of the residence certificate was missing. Thus, as testified:
On Cross-examination:
Atty. Alindato
Q: But you are sure, of course, that this document was completed in its form without any additional data to be filled up, Mr. Witness, except your signature and the date and the document number, and the page number, etc. And of course, the dry seal?
A: I could remember, sir, that it took upon me to see that the residence certificate of the corporation being represented by Mrs. Rosita So and Elmer Tan did not have the residence certificate.
But upon the assurance of Mr. Bernardino Villanueva that they will just put it afterwards, I notarized it because as far as I am concerned, as a notary public, as long as I know the persons who appeared before me and they have so identified themselves the company or entity that they are representing would be of legal ground already.
Q: So you are changing your previous answer that this document was represented to you was already complete when you said that in your latest answer that there were numbers of residence certificate which are lacking?
A: Actually, I am changing my answer but you asked again for me for the second time. That is why I took note that the residence certificate of the two corporations were not yet then typewritten or given by the parties involved.[38]
The
CA then had a basis in concluding the defect in the notarial requirement of the
transaction. The pertinent provisions of
the Notarial Law[39]
applicable at that time provides:
Sec. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula tax – Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula certificates or are exempt from the cedula tax, and these shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification, the number, the place of issues, and date of each cedula certificate as aforesaid.
Another issue
raised by petitioners is that the CA erred in voiding the contracts on the
ground of insufficiency of consideration or price, because the claim of
inadequacy of price must be proven and that the respondents belatedly
questioned the contracts' validity. They
further claim that the consideration was substantial and adequate.
It must be noted that the
property in question, subject of the Contract to Sell for the sum of P441,032.00,
is a land with a contained area of, more or less, One Thousand Nine Hundred and
One (1,901) sq. m. with a two-storey residential building located in Pasay
City. In claiming that the said price of
the property is not inadequate, petitioners stated that the payment of Elmer
Tan to pre-terminate Hayari's obligation amounting to Three Million One Hundred
Thirty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-One Pesos (P3,134,921.00) as
part of the consideration paid for the property should be included. However, as correctly argued by respondent
Sierra Grande, the amortizations paid by Elmer Tan to Manphil was for a loan
incurred by Hayari and not by respondent Sierra Grande; thus, any payment of
the amortizations on the loan of Hayari cannot be considered as part of the
consideration for the sale of the land owned by respondent Sierra Grande. It is then safe to declare that respondent
Sierra Grande did not benefit from the loan or from its pre-termination. Moreover, the records are bereft of any
evidence to support the claim of petitioners that the sum of money paid by
Elmer Tan, on behalf of Hayari, was part of the consideration for the same
property. What only appears is that the
only consideration paid for the sale of the Roberts property was the sum
contained in the Contract to Sell, which was P441,032.00 which,
considering the size[40]
and location[41]
of the property, is inadequate. What
prompted Elmer Tan to pay the total amount of P3,134,921.00 cannot be
gleaned from the records, except that it was for the loan incurred by Hayari,
which is an independent juridical entity, separate and distinct from Sierra
Grande. Hence, the CA did not commit any
error in declaring that there was an insufficiency of consideration or price as
the same is shown on the very face of the Contract to Sell.
Anent the contention of petitioners that inadequacy of price does not invalidate a contract, the said rule is not without an exception. As provided in the Civil Code:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
The CA was clear as to
its main reason for invalidating the contracts in question – there was
fraud. The inadequacy of price was
merely one of the circumstances upon which the CA was able to find the
existence of fraud and not the main cause for the invalidation of the subject
contracts.
All the other sub-issues
raised by petitioners are rendered inconsequential by the above disquisitions
of this Court.
WHEREFORE,
the petition for review on certiorari
dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* No part.
** Designated
as an additional member in lieu of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
per raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-65.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, with Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and B.A. Adefuin–de La Cruz, concurring; id. at 67-71.
[3] Rollo, p. 73.
[4] Records,
pp. 1212-1216.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Lot No. 889-B-1, Lot No. 889-B-2,
Lot No. 889-B-3 and
[10] Records,
pp. 1188-1190.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Through a letter dated January 23, 1986, requesting to borrow the title on the reason that such title will be transferred to a sister company, whose officers are also the officers of Hayari; id. at 1331.
[17] TCT
No. 19801; id. at 1179-1180.
[18] Records,
p. 1333.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo,
pp. 288-292.
[27]
[28]
[29] G.R. No. 162987,
[30] McKee v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. Nos. 68102-03,
[31] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
Nos. 66102-04,
[32] McKee v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 30.
[33] Romero v. Narciso, G..R. No.
43680,
[34] Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.
[35] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[36] Carlos v. Hon. Angeles, 400
Phil. 405 (2000);
[37] Rollo, p. 36.
[38] TSN,
[39] Revised Administrative Code.
[40] 1,901 sq. m.
[41]