Republic of
the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
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LUMINZA |
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A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152 |
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Complainant, |
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(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2846-RTJ) |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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DE CASTRO,* |
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JUDGE DANILO S. CRUZ and |
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BRION, |
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and CLERK OF COURT V |
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GODOLFO R. GUNDRAN, |
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ABAD, JJ. |
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of the Regional Trial Court, |
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Branch 152, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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January 18, 2010 |
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D E C I
S I O N
Courts exist to administer justice
fairly and without delay. Our overriding
concern is to eradicate the impression formed in the minds of the litigants that
the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.
We have always reminded the judges to dispose of the cases within the
prescribed period of time because we do not want the truism - justice delayed
is justice denied - to lose its meaning or relevance. In the same context, we have constantly
exhorted all court employees to be conscientious of their duties and
responsibilities considering that any indiscretion or transgression on their
part would impact negatively on the Court as an institution.
The instant administrative case
stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by complainant Luminza Delos Reyes (Delos
Reyes) against respondents Judge Danilo S. Cruz (Judge Cruz) and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R.
Gundran (Clerk of Court Gundran), both of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152, for dereliction of duty.
Specifically, Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the disposition of LRC
Case No. R-5740[1] while
Clerk of Court Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the records
of said case.
In her letter-complaint dated
However, it was only on
Complainant also alleged that after
receipt of the adverse decision, she timely filed on
On
In his Comment, Judge Cruz did not deny
that he incurred delay in the disposition of LRC Case No. R-5740. Instead, he begged the indulgence of the Court
and claimed that he was indisposed since the latter part of 2004. He narrated that in January 2005, he was
diagnosed of diabetes; on
On the other hand, Clerk of Court
Gundran denied being remiss in his duties.
He claimed that in October 2007, he already instructed the
clerk-in-charge to complete the records of the case and to prepare the
transmittal letter. Apparently, the
clerk-in-charge encountered some difficulty in completing the records. He signed the transmittal letter on February
28, 2008 only to discover that Judge Cruz has not yet issued an order giving
due course to the appeal. The records
were eventually transmitted on
In its Report and Recommendation
dated
EVALUATION: Evidently, there were two delays incurred in
this case. First is the delay in
deciding the subject case and the second is the delay in the transmittal of the
record of the case to the Court of Appeals.
The delay in deciding the case is attributable
solely to Judge Cruz. While we do not
condone such delay, we are inclined to consider in the instant matter his
physical condition the deterioration of which is supported by several medical
certificates and hospital records. He
even availed of the Health and Welfare Plan of the Supreme Court.
The
case of respondent Gundran, should, however, be treated differently. As Branch Clerk, it is his duty to verify the
completeness of the records that will be transmitted to the appellate court
within thirty (30) days after perfection of the appeal. He cannot transfer the blame to his
staff. Had he followed up his verbal
instruction, if there was any, he would not have incurred the delay.
x
x x x
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration
of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1.
this case be
RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2.
the charges
against Judge Danilo S. Cruz be DISMISSED with WARNING however that he should
be cautious in observing periods for rendition of judgment; and
3.
respondent
Clerk of Court Godofredo Gundran be SUSPENDED for one (1) month and one (1) day
for simple neglect of duty.
We find both
respondents to be remiss in their duties.
As regards Judge
Cruz, we find him grossly inefficient in failing to decide LRC Case No. R-5740
within 90 days from the time it was submitted for decision. He should be mindful that failure to resolve
cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to the speedy
disposition of their cases.[2] Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the
Constitution succinctly provides that:
SEC. 15. (1)
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
As such, lower
courts are given a period of 90 days only within which to decide or resolve a
case from the time it is submitted for decision.[3]
In this case, it is undisputed that LRC
Case No. R-5740 was submitted for decision on
The reasons
proffered by Judge Cruz for incurring delay in deciding the case within the
prescribed period fail to persuade us.
He claims that his illness primarily caused the delay in the disposition. However, it has not escaped our attention
that the case was submitted for decision as early as April 2004 while Judge
Cruz claimed to be indisposed only towards the end of 2004. There was also no showing that respondent
judge was constantly ill from the time the case was submitted for resolution in
April 2004 until the promulgation of the judgment in July 2007. He did not present any proof to show that he
was absent from work for a prolonged period of time. Moreover, removal of cataract from both eyes
does not entail prolonged confinement.
In fact, Judge Cruz claimed that he was admitted to the hospital only on
Besides,
granting that his illness hindered the efficient performance of his functions,
all respondent judge had to do was to request for an extension of time within
which to decide the case. Judge Cruz,
however, made no such request. In a
similar case,[4] we
held that:
Indeed, Judge Ubiadas’ illness could have
adversely affected the performance of his duties. Despite having just been subjected to a
triple by-pass operation, he knew fully well that he still had to act as the
judge of four (4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered
him in the discharge of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have requested this
Court for additional time to decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His illness cannot be an excuse for his
failure to render decisions or resolutions within the constitutionally
prescribed period, considering that he could have requested an extension or
other relief from this Court but he did not.
It is incumbent upon him to dispose the cases assigned to him without
undue delay.
This Court has incessantly admonished members of
the bench to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is
justice denied. The present clogged
dockets in all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless every
magistrate earnestly, painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of
the law. Undue delay in the disposition
of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn, brings the courts into
disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the
judiciary.[5]
We also find
unacceptable Judge Cruz’s justification that the delay was partly due to heavy
pressure of work. Precisely, a judge is
mandated to resolve cases with dispatch.
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[6]
categorically exhorts all judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness”. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 2, Cagayan
de Oro City,[7] we declared that:
We are not unmindful of the burden of heavy
caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial judge. But that cannot excuse them from doing their
mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with
heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary
period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with
their judicial duty. Hence, under the
circumstances, all that said judge needed to do was request for an extension of
time since this Court has, almost invariably, been considerate with regard to
such requests. x x x A heavy caseload
may excuse a judge’s failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but
not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the
case on time.
We have always extended
a sympathetic attitude towards judges.
In fact, in recent years, we have exerted efforts towards improving
their condition. In return, we expect
them to likewise exert efforts towards improving the image of the
judiciary. It must be emphasized that
the “honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the
fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the expediency with
which disputes are resolved”.[8] At this juncture, we remind respondent judge
that:
Delay in the disposition of cases not only
deprives litigants of their right to speedy disposition of their cases, but
also tarnishes the image of the judiciary.
Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering decisions
and taking appropriate actions on the cases before them not only causes great
injustice to the parties involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior
motives on the part of the judge, in addition to the fact that it erodes the
faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and
brings it into disrepute.[9]
As regards
respondent Clerk of Court Gundran, we find him guilty of simple neglect of duty
for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. R-5740. Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that:
SEC. 10. Duty
of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal. – Within
thirty (30) days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance with the
preceding section, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower
court:
(a) To
verify the correctness of the original records or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, and to make a certification of its correctness;
(b) To
verify the completeness of the records that will be transmitted to the
appellate court;
(c) If
found to be incomplete, to take such measures as may be required to complete
the records, availing of the authority that he or the court may exercise for
this purpose; and
(d)
To transmit
the records to the appellate court.
If the efforts to complete the records fail, he
shall indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not
included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons
for their non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could be taken to have
them available.
The clerk of court shall furnish the parties with
copies of his letter of transmittal of the records [to] the appellate court.
Verily, the duty to verify the
correctness and completeness of the records of the case rests with the
respondent. However, in this case,
respondent Clerk of Court Gundran relegated the performance of his job to
another court employee without any justifiable reason. We are likewise not persuaded by his contention
that the transmittal was delayed because the clerk-in-charge to whom he
assigned the job encountered some difficulty in completing the records. Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that if the records are found to be incomplete, measures should
be taken to complete the records. In his
comment, however, Clerk of Court Gundran made no mention of any steps taken to
complete the records. At any rate, the
failure to complete the records does not justify its non-transmittal. Under the Rules, when the records cannot be
completed, respondent should “indicate in his letter of transmittal the
exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the
appellate court, the reasons for their non-transmittal, and the steps taken or
that could be taken to have them available”.[10]
Finally, it has not escaped our notice
that the records were eventually transmitted only on
We stress that clerks of court are essential
judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice.
Their duty is, inter alia, to
assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all matters that
do not involve discretion or judgment properly belonging to the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the
court, as their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders,
processes and concerns. As such, they
are required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity, they cannot be
permitted to slacken on their jobs.[11]
Section 9, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or
order as a less serious charge punishable by either (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[12]
In the instant case, there was undue
delay of more than three years before the decision in LRC Case No. R-5740 was
rendered. We therefore find the penalty
of fine of P11,000.00 as appropriate under the circumstances.
On the other
hand, Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months, if committed for the first
time, and by dismissal if committed for the second time. As such, we find the penalty of suspension of
two months as appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Danilo S. Cruz of the P11,000.00. Likewise, Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundran
of the same court is also GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and is hereby meted the penalty of suspension of two
months without salary and benefits. Both
are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
* In
lieu of Justice Jose P. Perez, per raffle dated
[1] Gregorio
O. De Los Reyes, represented by Bienvenida R. de Luna, Attorney-in-fact v.
Luminza De Los Reyes and the Register of Deeds of
[2] Re:
Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 6,
[3]
[4] Letter of Judge Josefina D. Farrales, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 72, Olongapo City Re: 30 Cases and 84 Motions Submitted for Decision/Resolution in the Said Court, A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC & A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 365.
[5]
[6] A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; effective
[7] A.M. No. 02-8-207-MTCC,
[8]
[9] Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the MeTC, Branch 55,
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 10.
[11] Supra note 7.
[12] Rules of Court, Rule 140, Sec. 11.