Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
SPS. HEBER & CHARLITA EDILLO,
Petitioners,-
versus - SPS. NORBERTO & DESIDERIA DULPINA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 188360
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, and
PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: January 21, 2010 |
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
BRION, J.: |
|
We
resolve in this Decision the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
filed by defendants-petitioners Spouses Heber and Charlita Edillo (defendants-petitioners) who seek to
reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated January 28, 2009[2] and June
11, 2009[3] of the Special
Former Special Division of Five of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02436-MIN. The first assailed CA Resolution
dismissed outright the defendants-petitioners’ Petition for Review for failure to state the factual
background of the case; the second assailed CA Resolution denied the defendants-petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
facts of the case, gathered from the parties’ pleadings and annexes, are
briefly summarized below.
On
The plaintiffs-respondents alleged
that they purchased from Wencelito Camingue a 235-square meter residential lot
and house located in Poblacion,
In their Answer dated
THE MCTC RULING
On P10,000.00
as actual damages and another P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.[12] The plaintiffs-respondents’
counsel received a copy of the MCTC Judgment on
On
On
On
THE RTC RULING
The RTC decided the appeal on P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.[17]
After the RTC denied[18]
their Motion for Reconsideration,[19] the defendants-petitioners
elevated the case to the CA
through a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[20] They
argued that the plaintiffs-respondents’ appeal with the RTC was filed out of
time since the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RRSP) prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
THE CA RULING
The CA dismissed the Petition in its Resolution of
The defendants-petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal,
to amend the petition, and to admit their First Amended Petition.[23] The CA denied
the motions in its Resolution of
Faced with this development, the defendants-petitioners filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The defendants-petitioners argue that the CA’s outright
dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since the Petition for Review and the
Amended Petition (filed with the Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal of
the Original Petition) sufficiently recited the factual background of the case.
They submit that the annexes to the original and amended petitions, consisting
of the Complaint, the Answer, the other pleadings, and the MCTC and RTC Decisions,
also contain this factual background. They
point out that a relaxation of technical rules is justified by the merits of
the case – the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs-respondents’
appeal because the MCTC Decision had become final and executory; the Motion for
Reconsideration the plaintiffs-respondents filed is a prohibited pleading in summary
proceedings and did not stop the running of the period for the decision’s
finality.
For their part, the plaintiffs-respondents submit that the
requirements set forth in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court
are mandatory and the defendants-petitioners have no discretion but to comply,
citing Galang v. Court of Appeals[25] and Tan v. Court of Appeals.[26]
OUR RULING
We find for the defendants-petitioners.
Procedure on
Appeal; Liberal Construction of Rules
An appeal to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is via
a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 2 of
Rule 42 prescribes the following requirements:
SEC. 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)
Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the Petition, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule,
which reads:
SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
In not a few cases, we have ruled that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is a mere statutory
privilege that may be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of law allowing the appeal.[27]
The party who seeks to appeal must comply with the requirements of the law and
the rules; failure to comply leads to the dismissal and the loss of the right
to appeal.[28]
But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the
right to appeal is an essential part of our system of judicial processes, and
courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. We invariably made this recognition due to
our overriding concern that every party-litigant be given the amplest
opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.[29] This line of rulings is based, no less, on the
Rules of Court which itself calls for a liberal construction of its provisions,
with the objective of securing for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.[30]
In this line of rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely
a game of technicalities. The law and
jurisprudence grant to courts – in the
exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down by this Court – the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’
right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]
We are aware of the plaintiffs-respondents’ cited cases of Galang v. Court of Appeals[32] and Tan v. Court of Appeals,[33] but these rulings are not fully applicable to the present case as they are not
squarely in point.
Galang involved the dismissal of a petition
with the CA for nonpayment of costs within three (3) days from notice of the
order. It involved a direct failure to
comply with a CA directive – a matter vastly different from, and greater than,
the question of sufficiency posed in this case. Tan, on the other hand, involved a motion for reconsideration that was
considered a mere scrap of paper for lack of a notice of hearing. This is a matter that, at its core, is a due
process concern – the failure to afford the opposing party the opportunity to
respond to the motion in a duly scheduled hearing.
A commonality and the weightier reason (although not so given
this characterization) behind our rulings in these cited cases is the lack of
merit of the respective petitioners’ underlying cases. In both cases, we took into account the
relative merits of the parties’ cases and found that a liberal interpretation,
applied to the interlocutory issues before us, would be for naught because the petitioners’
underlying cases clearly lacked merit. As we ruled then, so do we rule now. We assess, albeit preliminarily, if the appeal is meritorious on its face and relax
the applicable rule of procedure only after a prima facie finding of merit.[34]
That there was substantial compliance with the Rules because
the background facts can be found within the four corners of the petition and
its incorporated annexes, is not a novel ruling for this Court. In the case of Deloso v. Marapao[35] (involving the same deficiency for lack
of a specific and separate statement of facts outlining the factual background relied
upon), we said:
An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision.
There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.[36]
Given this precedent, it only remains for us to
determine if we can apply a liberal construction of the Rules because a
meaningful litigation of the case can ensue given the Petition’s prima facie merit.
The defendants-petitioners’
meritorious
case; a motion for
reconsideration
is a prohibited
pleading in
summary procedure.
Our examination of the defendants-petitioners’ petition preliminarily
tells us that it is not without merit, which merit would remain unventilated unless
we relax our application of the technical requirements applicable to their
appeal. The question, too, that the defendants-petitioners
pose is not a minor one as it involves a very basic question of law – whether the
RTC has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final and executory MCTC
decision. According to the defendants-petitioners, the plaintiffs-respondents’
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC judgment did not stop the
running of the period for appeal since a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading under the RRSP.
We agree with the defendants-petitioners.
Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs
to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[37] The RRSP applies to prevent undue delays in
the disposition of cases; to achieve this end, the filing of certain pleadings –
a motion for reconsideration, among others – is prohibited.[38]
Specifically, Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure
and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court consider a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading.[39]
Thus, when the plaintiffs-respondents filed on
The Doctrine of Immutability
A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable
and unalterable;[40] the
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.[41]
While there are recognized exceptions – e.g.,
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable[42]
– none of these exceptions apply to the present case.
Litigation must at some time end, even at the risk of
occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the
fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and
purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable controversies with finality.[43]
In the present case, the lapse of the period for appeal
rendered the RTC without any jurisdiction to entertain, much less grant, the plaintiffs-respondents’
appeal from the final and immutable MCTC judgment. This very basic legal reality would forever be
lost if we allow the CA to dismiss the defendants-petitioners’ appeal outright
on the basis of a technicality that, after all, has been substantially complied
with.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated January
28, 2009 and June 11, 2009 of the Special Former Special Division of Five of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02436-MIN. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
MARIANO
C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate
Justice Mario V. Lopez, Michael P. Elbinias, and Associate Justice Elihu A.
Ybañez concurring. Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson dissented. See rollo, pp. 59-60.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate
Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, and Associate
Justice Elihu A. Ybañez concurring. Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson maintained
his dissent. See rollo, pp. 63-64.
[4] Rollo, pp. 65-68.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] The name also appears as
“Apolinario Saragoza” and “Apolinio Saragoza” in other parts of the rollo.
[10] The name also appears as
“Filomeno Forcadilla” in other parts of the rollo.
[11] The name also appears as
“Ricolito” in other parts of the rollo.
[12] Rollo, pp. 90-94.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Order dated
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Associate
Justice Ayson maintained his dissent; supra note 3.
[25] G.R. No.
76221,
[26] 356 Phil. 1058
(1998).
[27] Colby Construction and Management
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 170099, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 159, 168; De Guzman v.
People, G.R. No. 167492,
[28] Colby
Construction and Management Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
supra; De
Guzman v. People, supra.
[29] Lanaria v.
Planta, G.R.
No. 172891, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 79, 98; Kimberly Independent Labor
Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism (KILUSAN) – Organized Labor
Associations in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 149158-59, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 45, 62; Novelty Phils., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 36, 48 (2003); Salazar v. Court of
Appeals, 426 Phil. 864, 877 (2002).
[30] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 1, Section 6.
[31] Barranco v.
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 168990, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 222, 232; Reyes v. Sps.
Torres, 429 Phil. 95, 101 (2002); PNB v. CA, 353 Phil. 473, 480 (1998); Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
114282, November 28, 1995, 250 SCRA 371, 373.
[32] Supra note 25.
[33] Supra note 26.
[34] See: Securities
and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No.164313, September
26, 2008, 566 SCRA 451, 469; Cuevas v.
Bais Steel Corporation, 439 Phil. 793, 805 (2002).
[35] G.R. No. 144244,
[36]
[37] REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Section 1(A).
[38] Estate of
Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 565,
570-571; Spouses Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 384 (2000).
[39] Lucas v.
Fabros, 381
Phil. 1, 6 (2000); Joven v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739,
August 2, 1992, 212 SCRA 700, 707-708.
[40] Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R No. 159520,
[41] Siy v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154,
161-162; Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004,
428 SCRA 586, 599.
[42] Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, supra note 40; Siy
v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 41 at 162; Sacdalan
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41.
[43] Huerta Alba
Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22, 28 (2000).