SECOND DIVISION
SPS. MANUEL AND
SALIMBANGON,
Petitioners, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
and
Perez, JJ.
SPS.
Respondents. Promulgated:
January 20,
2010
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DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the admissibility
of testimony that tends to modify a written agreement among the parties and the
extinction of the easement of right of way upon consolidation in one person of
the ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.
The Facts and the Case
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject
to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW.
boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a
perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza,
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject
to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE.
boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a
perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.[1]
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a
city street. But Lots D and E were not, they
being interior lots. To give these
interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their
extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter
wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on
to the street. The partition that
embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles
issued to the heirs.
Roughly, the lots including the
easement of right of way would take the following configurations,[2]
not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their
relative locations:
But, realizing that the partition
resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their
agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E,
and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way,
that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to
the street.[3] Thus:
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria
Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that Victoria became
the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed
a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while the other,
located in the interior of
Subsequently, however, respondent
spouses
After hearing or on
Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73468. On
Questions Presented
Two questions are presented:
1. Whether
or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence
rule Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in
establishing the easement of right of way as against what they stated in their
written agreement; and
2. Whether
or not the CA erred in ruling that the easement of right of way established by
the partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of
The Court’s Ruling
One. The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought
to have rejected Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony that the heirs had intended to
establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the interior
Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B
subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along
its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the
subdivision;[6]
(Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the
Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to
alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the
parol evidence rule admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9.
Evidence of written agreements. -
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement. However,
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c) The
validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The
existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills. (7a)
Here, the Tans had put in issue the
true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they alleged in
their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply,
the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus said:
So that in the same partition instrument,
the said heirs voluntarily agreed to establish the so-called “perpetual and
gratuitous easement of road right of way” along LOT A, with 1.50 meters wide
and along LOT B, with the same 1.50 meters wide.
Understandably, this servitude voluntarily constituted on LOTS A and B was had for the benefit and use by the owners of LOTS D (Guillermo Ceniza, Jr.) and E (defendant Victoria Ceniza Salimbagon).[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, with the above
averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true
intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the
partition agreement literally provided.
At any rate, as the CA said, the
Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Ceniza’s
testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned,
with the partition agreement among the heirs.
Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal.
Two. The Salimbangons point out that the partition
agreement among the heirs established in their favor, as owners of
But, firstly, as Eduardo
Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the establishment of
an easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not
have direct access to the street, namely Lots D and E. His testimony made sense.
As originally constituted in that
agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between
them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E
to the street. To the extent that Lots A
and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to
the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to
use the common alley as well. As Eduardo
testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E
access to the street. Lots A and B did
not need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots
D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became
extinct by operation of law.[8] The existence of a dominant estate and a
servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the
same person.
Secondly, there is no question that when the
heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from each of Lots
A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were already small,
the heirs executed a “Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc.” that cancelled the easement of
right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed
a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
Although the “cancellation” document
did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of the easement
cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons
but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on
Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the
Salimbangons insist that their right as dominant estate under the original
partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5-meter strip of
their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot
B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
The point is that, obviously, in
establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon
the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on
Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that
only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E
now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of
right of way on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by operation of
law.[9]
ACCORDINGLY,
this Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS in all respects the decision
dated July 27, 2007 and resolution dated October 14, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 73468.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO
D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice