LIMANCH-O HOTEL AND G.R. No. 185121
LEASING CORPORATION
and CONRADO TIU,
Petitioners, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.
CITY OF OLONGAPO, ATTY. MA.
ELLEN AGUILAR, ENGR. RAMON
ZAVALLA, ENGR. ANDREW DAYOT,
and ENGR. REYNALDO EDRAISA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 18, 2010
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ABAD, J.:
This
case is about a claim for damages based on malicious prosecution.
The Facts and the Case
Sometime
in 1993, the respondent City of P9,364,276.50. The City threatened to cut off his electric
supply if he did not immediately settle the amount.
Petitioner
Tiu filed an action against the City before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo for injunction with damages, which he won. The RTC enjoined the City from collecting the
deficiency amount and from cutting off Tiu’s power supply.[1]
Pending
the RTC’s resolution of its motion for reconsideration, the City filed criminal
complaints against petitioner Tiu for: (a) theft of electrical current punished
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 401; and (b) disengaging and tampering with
his electric meter’s potential link, thereby resulting to a zero-zero power
consumption in violation of City Ordinance 23, series of 1989, and P.D.
401.
After
the preliminary investigation, the state prosecutor issued a resolution, dismissing
the complaints for insufficiency of evidence.[2] On
appeal, however, the Acting Secretary of Justice modified the State Prosecutor’s
resolution and directed the filing of the corresponding information for theft
of electricity against petitioner Tiu.[3] Subsequently, however, the Secretary of
Justice reconsidered and ordered instead the withdrawal of any information that
might in the meantime have been filed in court.[4] When the matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals (CA) and, ultimately, to this Court, both courts affirmed the dismissal
of the City’s complaints against Tiu.[5]
Claiming
that petitioner Tiu suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation and that
petitioner Limanch-O Hotel suffered loss of business goodwill, financial
reverses, and injured reputation, both filed an action for damages against the City for
having filed a malicious and unfounded charge of theft of electricity against
them.[6]
In
its answer, the City denied any ill motive in filing the criminal
complaint. It explained that it filed the
criminal action following an examination of the electric meter installed at
petitioner Tiu’s building and registered in his name. The examination showed reverse polarity
markings on the electric meter, causing it not to register Tiu’s correct power
consumption. Since this brought
tremendous losses to the PUD and to the City, the latter argued that it should
not be faulted for doing its job of going after those who pilfer electricity
and tamper with metering devices.
After
petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel rested their case, the City filed a
demurrer to the evidence. The RTC
granted the same and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal,[7]
the CA affirmed the RTC decision, having found no reversible error in the
same. Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel, said the
appellate court, were unable to prove the elements that will support an action for
malicious prosecution, namely: (a) absence of probable cause in the filing of
the criminal case and (b) a showing of legal malice.[8] Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied,[9]
Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel are now before this Court on a petition for review.[10]
Issue
Presented
The issue in this case
is whether or not the CA erred in its finding that petitioners Tiu and
Limanch-O Hotel failed to present sufficient evidence showing that respondent City
instituted the criminal complaint for theft of electricity against them maliciously
and without probable cause.
The
Court’s Ruling
To entitle petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel to
damages for malicious prosecution, they needed to prove the following elements:
(1) that the respondent City had caused their prosecution; (2) that the
criminal action ended in their acquittal; (3) that, in bringing the action, the
City had no probable cause; and (4) that it was impelled by legal malice—an
improper or a sinister motive.[11] Both
parties concede that the first two elements were present in this case. What needs to be determined is whether or not
petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel have proved the last two elements.
Here, petitioners claim that this Court itself
found in Public Utilities
Department v. Hon. Guingona, Jr.[12] that no probable cause existed to support the
charge of theft of electricity against Tiu.
This finding establishes, they said, the third element of filing of the
action without probable cause. Further, they point to the City Mayor’s call for
the boycott of Tiu’s business after he was branded an electricity theft; the procurement
of a search warrant to gather evidence against him; the eventual dismissal of
the complaint for theft of electricity; and the respondent City’s dogged
persistence in pursuing the case all the way to the Supreme Court as clear
proofs of legal malice.
But the burden in suits for malicious prosecution
is being able to prove the complainant’s deliberate initiation of a criminal
action knowing the charge to be false and groundless.[13] Here, the respondent
City did not concoct out of thin air the criminal charge for theft of
electricity against petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel. It filed the case based on the result of an
investigation carried out at Tiu’s premises which indicated a tampering of the electric
meter. Indeed, petitioners never claimed
that the inspection of Tiu’s premises was just a farce. The City did not merely conjure the charge
with the intention of vexing Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel. It acted within its right to bring up the
result of that investigation to the authorities for evaluation and resolution.
It
is not enough to say that, since the Supreme Court sustained the Secretary of
Justice’s finding that no probable cause for electricity theft existed against
petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel, a case for malicious prosecution already
exists against the complainant. When the
Supreme Court reviewed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, it merely
determined if he gravely abused his discretion in the matter. The Court’s finding does not amount to a
judicial determination that the evidence established probable cause.[14]
The test should be whether sufficient facts exist
which show that, in bringing the criminal action, complainant acted without
probable cause,[15] defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person
charged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probably guilty of the crime or
wrongdoing.[16] Here, the
fact that the filing of the complaint was prompted by the result of an
investigation shows that the City had a reasonable ground to believe that a
crime had probably been committed.
Additionally, the fact that the Department of
Justice at first found basis for filing the charge of theft of electricity
indicates that the existence of probable cause is not clearly settled, only
that its final determination had to succumb to the sound discretion of the
Secretary of Justice under his power to review, revise, or overturn the
findings of his subordinates.
Finally, no evidence was shown that there had been bad blood between respondent
City and petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel prior to the filing of the
criminal charge, which circumstance if present could justify a malicious motive
in filing the charge. Resort to judicial
processes, by itself, is not an evidence of ill will which would automatically
make the complainant liable for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, peaceful recourse to the courts
will be greatly discouraged and the exercise of one’s right to litigate would
become meaningless and empty.[17]
Even if the Court were to concede that the City
branded petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel as thieves, asked the people not to
patronize their business, and had been overly zealous in pursuing the criminal
complaint that it filed, these are not the legal malice contemplated in suits
for malicious prosecution as the determining factor is evil motive in bringing
the action, not the acts exhibited by the complainant after the case had been
filed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition
and AFFIRMS the Decision dated July 8, 2008 and Resolution
dated October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88619.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 7.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] See: Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39689 dated August 22, 1997, rollo,
pp. 127-133; and Supreme Court Decision in G.R. No. 130399 dated September 20,
2001, id. at 136-147.
[6] Docketed as
Civil Case No. 316-0-2002, id. at 52-59.
[7] Docketed as
CA-G.R. CV 88619.
[8] Rollo, pp. 37-50. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Fernanda Lampas Peralta
concurring.
[9]
[10]
[11] See: Magbanua
v. Junsay, G.R. No. 132659, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 419, 436-437.
[12] 417 Phil. 798
(2001).
[13] See: Magbanua
v. Junsay, supra note 11.
[14] See: Cometa
v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1193 (1999).
[15]
[16] Villanueva
v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 384 Phil. 130, 142 (2000).
[17]