DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR G.R. No. 185112
AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE)
and NATIONAL MARITIME
POLYTECHNIC (NMP),
Petitioners, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.
RUBEN
Y. MACEDA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 18,
2010
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ABAD, J.:
This case pertains to the importance of complying with
the prescribed qualification standards, and the appropriate mode of assailing a
decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The Facts and the Case
On June 28, 1989 respondent Ruben Y.
Maceda, a deck marine officer, joined the National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP),
a government school, with a permanent appointment as Instructor I. He rose to the permanent positions of
Assistant Professor I and later Associate Professor I. He studied law in the meantime and passed the
bar in 1996. He was later designated as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the Maritime Training Division and as NMP’s legal counsel.
In 1998, the NMP again promoted respondent
Maceda to the rank of Professor I but this time under a mere temporary
appointment. He subsequently wrote the NMP
Executive Director, submitting justifications for changing his temporary status
to a permanent one. In 1999 the
International Maritime Law sponsored his studies in the IMO-International
Maritime Law Institute in
Yearly, from January 7, 2000 to
January 7, 2003, the NMP renewed respondent Maceda’s temporary appointment as
Professor I. In 2001 he resigned from
his position as NMP legal counsel. In
2002 the NMP completed the revision of the Qualification Standard (QS) for its
staff. Maceda claimed, however, that
nothing has since been heard of that revised QS after the NMP submitted the same
to the CSC for approval.
On February 13, 2003 the Human
Resources Management Section of NMP wrote respondent Maceda, advising him that the
school would be putting him under contractual employment from January 7 to June
30, 2003 or until such time as the CSC shall have already approved the NMP Maritime
Training Revised Qualification Standard.
On March 20, 2003 the NMP Executive
Director, Noriel Devanadera, wrote respondent Maceda, informing him that his temporary
appointment as Professor I was being renewed effective on April 1, 2003 and
that the succeeding renewal of his appointment would be subject to his meeting
the requirements of the position. The
NMP considered Maceda first priority for the Shipboard Rotation Scheme for 2003
and for holding the 3rd Officer position on board ship. He answered the letter, making a number of
requests, so he could avail of the Shipboard Rotation Scheme. But the NMP did not act on his letter.
Meanwhile, Maceda applied from 2001 to
2003 for the position of Administrative Officer V which then remained
vacant. But an OIC was instead appointed
to that position.
In 2001 the NMP advised all employees
occupying next-in-rank positions to the Deputy Executive Director (DED) III to
submit their updated Personal Data Sheets (PDS) for evaluation as candidates to
that position until May 15, 2001. On May
28, 2001 Maceda belatedly submitted his updated PDS for evaluation.
On December 23, 2003, the NMP OIC wrote
respondent Maceda, informing him that his appointment as Professor I would be
renewed on contractual status effective from January 5 to June 30, 2004. Maceda agreed and signed a contract of
employment on January 5, 2004. On the
same date, however, Maceda filed a complaint with the CSC regarding his
demotion in employment status. The Administrative
Officer of the CSC regional office convinced him, however, that the renewal of
the appointments of temporary employees is a prerogative of the head of the agency.
On June 30, 2004 the NMP OIC informed
respondent Maceda that, on instructions from Devanadera, he was not to report
for work anymore on the following day.
On July 13, 2004, however, Devanadera asked Maceda to be a guest
lecturer in Maritime Law, thus acknowledging the need for his services and his
expertise on the subject.
On June 2, 2004 respondent Maceda
wrote to the members of the Board of Trustees of NMP about his illegal
termination as professor and Devanadera’s mismanagement of the school’s
affairs. Further, Maceda charged Devanadera
and NMP before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of oppression leading
to his illegal termination. On October
21, 2004, the DOLE Secretary dismissed his complaint.
On November 2, 2004 respondent Maceda appealed his case to the CSC but
the latter dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction, pointing out that,
since Devanadera was a presidential appointee, the power to discipline him
belonged to the President. Maceda filed
a motion for reconsideration but on March 7, 2007 the CSC denied the same. The CSC held that, as a holder of a temporary
and contractual employment, Maceda did not enjoy security of tenure. The CSC further held that it was his fault
that he did not take steps to remedy his deficiency, namely, a shipboard
experience on license, after holding the position of Professor I for five
years. This prompted Maceda to seek
recourse by special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 99539.
On May 28, 2008 the CA rendered a
decision, granting the petition, ordering the NMP to reinstate Maceda to his
previous position as Professor I, and directing it to pay his salary and other
benefits from July 1, 2004 until he is reinstated. The DOLE and the NMP moved for
reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied the same, hence, this
petition.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners raise two issues for this
Court’s resolution:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly
gave due course to Maceda’s special civil action of certiorari for the correction of the alleged errors in the rulings of
the CSC; and
2. Whether or not the NMP
illegally terminated Maceda from employment as professor.
The Rulings of the Court
One. The CA ruled that there was
nothing novel about a petition for certiorari being filed with that court when
the act or omission complained of involved grave abuse of discretion or excess
of jurisdiction. This Court must disagree.
In determining whether the proper remedy is a
special civil action for certiorari or a petition for review, it is not
so much the nature of the question or questions that would be raised that
matters. With very rare exceptions, what
is decisive is whether or not the challenged order is a final order that
disposes of the merit of the case.[1]
The Court held in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corp.[2]
that the remedy for seeking the reversal or modification of a judgment rendered
on the merits of the case is appeal.
This is true even if the error imputed to the officer, body, or tribunal
constitutes alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or
grave abuse of discretion in making its or his findings of fact or of law. The Court cannot countenance the blurring of
the distinction between a special civil action for certiorari and a
petition for review.[3]
Besides, it cannot be said
that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing respondent Maceda’s
complaint. Grave abuse of discretion exists
where the public respondent acts in a manner so patent and gross that it amounts
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to do what the law enjoins
on him. It is not sufficient that the CA
disagreed with the findings of the CSC or considered them in error; it had to
determine that the CSC’s findings had run berserk, prompted by passion and
personal hostility rather than by reason.[4] The CA did not make this determination.
Two. At any rate, even if the Court
were to disregard the important distinction between a special civil action of certiorari and a petition for review, it
still cannot uphold the CA’s decision. For
instance, it points out that the NMP ignored Maceda’s solid work, expertise,
and experience when it said that he was not qualified to become a permanent professor. But Maceda’s so-called accomplishments cannot
count for much where, as in this case, they do not in fact meet the uniform
standards set by the school for its permanent professors.
Nor can it be said that the NMP did not give
respondent Maceda sufficient leeway to meet those standards. The CA’s finding that the NMP disregarded
Maceda’s request[5] that
he be allowed to avail himself of the school’s training privileges, so he could
comply with the requirements of the Shipboard Rotation Scheme, is not supported
by evidence. Devanadera approved
Maceda’s request through his OED Memorandum Order 303-2003[6]
dated August 5, 2003. Maceda simply did
not avail himself of the school’s Shipboard Rotation Scheme nor submit the papers
needed under that program.
The CA also faults the NMP
for not appointing Maceda as Administrative Officer V or DED III if he could
not be given a permanent appointment as professor. But the power to appoint rests essentially on
free choice. The appointing authority
has the right to decide who best fits the job from among those who meet the
minimum requirements for it. As an
outsider, quite remote from the day-to-day problems of a government agency such
as NMP, no court of law can presume to have the wisdom needed to make a better
judgment respecting staff appointments.[7]
Lastly, the CA assumed the
power and discretion to declare Maceda’s 15 years of teaching experience
sufficient compliance with the “shipboard experience on license” requirement of
the NMP. But under the relevant NMP QS
then in force, a Professor I, who was a Marine Merchant Officer with a rank of
a 3rd Mate Officer, must possess a two-year sea experience (on
license) and three years of
teaching experience.[8] Maceda had sufficient teaching experience but
he did not have the required shipboard experience. In fact, he did not board any vessel as a
licensed 3rd Mate Officer.
The records show that, despite the repeated efforts
of the NMP Human Resource Management Section to get him on board, respondent Maceda
still did not bother to complete the required shipboard experience.[9] Because of this, the NMP could only give him temporary
appointment that did not provide any security of tenure.[10] Such appointment is of course terminable at
the pleasure of the appointing power with or without a cause.[11]
Maceda contends that the
NMP demoted him from a temporary to a contractual position. But, as both the DOLE and the CSC uniformly held,
no such demotion took place since a contractual appointment is of the same nature
as a temporary appointment. Thus, when the
NMP did not further renew Maceda’s contractual appointment, the same cannot be
regarded as a dismissal but an expiration of his term.[12]
The Court acknowledges respondent
Maceda’s numerous achievements here and abroad as well as his part in teaching Filipino
seafarers. But these cannot replace the
need for him to meet the prescribed qualification standard for the position of
ACCORDINGLY,
the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision dated May 28,
2008 and resolution dated October 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 99539, and REINSTATES Resolution
070433 dated March 7, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission.
SO
ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Del Pozo v. Penaco, G.R. No. L-48302, November 23, 1988, 167 SCRA 577, 589.
[2] 425 Phil. 961, 973 (2002).
[3]
[4]
[5] CA rollo, pp. 95-96.
[6] Rollo, p. 33.
[7] Salles v. Francisco, G.R. No. 95425, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 621, 627-628.
[8] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[9] CA rollo, p. 185.
[10] House of Representatives v. Loanzon, G.R. No. 168267, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 533, 539.
[11] Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 782, 790 (2001).
[12] CA rollo, p. 39.
[13] Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 371 Phil. 17, 29 (1999).
[14] Section 2, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987.