SECOND DIVISION
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JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, |
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G.R. No. 180870 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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January 22, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
In order to safeguard its citizenry
from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate
this social ill, we must adhere to the constitutional pronouncement that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more our faithful
adherence to said constitutional requirement.
Factual Antecedents
For review is the Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 29985 dated
July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No.
11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y
Prieto (Cacao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years
and one day to 15 years and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5]
of the CA dated
On
That on or about the 14th day of
October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1
plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of
1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or authority, in
violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[8]
When arraigned on
The inculpatory facts, as unveiled
by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were briefly
synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
On
Acting
on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went
immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the
report. Upon arrival at the target area,
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information
counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room
5 of the hotel.
The
lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel
was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so
wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5.
Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later
identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers
to look inside.
PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing
“shabu” while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing
“shabu”. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag
and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the
drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.
PO2
Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet
containing “shabu”.
After
informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and
PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over
to the police officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to
SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
The
Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the
specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for
“shabu”.[10]
Cacao professed his innocence and
presented his defense in this wise:
In
the afternoon of
While
in
x
x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5
x x x. Thereafter, Canlas stayed inside
Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotel’s counter to wait for the woman
they [had] contacted. Present at the
counter at the time was the lady cashier [named] Cherry Corpuz.
In
about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman
on board as passengers. The tricycle
went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where the
petitioner and the lady cashier were.
After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion inquired where
Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who] alighted from the tricycle in
the company of another male person was later on identified to be Mylene
Daquioag. Thereafter, Mylene Daquioag
proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion stayed behind with the petitioner
at the hotel’s counter. When petitioner
could not wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who arrived, he x
x x asked the male companion of Mylene Daquioag if another woman is
coming. The male companion answered in
the negative. A couple of minutes [later],
petitioner followed to Room 5 so he could [sic] go home instead because it was
then getting late.
Upon
entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the
table inside the room. He also saw Mylene
Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter refused as he said it is a woman
that he was asking [for].
Barely
a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the
outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately
stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that “they are (her) companions”.
As
soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged
inside the room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by
one of the police. He was later bodily searched
but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of about
P 7,000.00. The wallet was later
turned over to the petitioner’s wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City. The P7,000.00
was never seen again.
As
petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed
to a plastic sachet on the floor. It was
about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to]
it. The same police then explained that
the plastic sachet belongs to the petitioner.
Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.
Due
to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice
what the other police did to Canlas.
Without
much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to
the Laoag City Police Station. Charges were
later on filed against them.[11]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On
WHEREFORE x x x
The
accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
charged of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987
grams in Criminal Case No. 11489 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred thousand (P400,000.00)
pesos, Philippine Currency.
The
sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of
the Government, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial
court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13]
but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution[14]
dated on
Issues
In this petition, Cacao ascribes to
the trial court the following errors:
I.
The lower
court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies, discrepancies,
and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15]
II.
The lower
court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical testimony of
Benedict Villanueva.[16]
III.
The lower
court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of custody
of the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.[17]
IV.
The lower
court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up cannot be given
weight.[18]
V.
The lower
court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.[19]
VI.
The lower
court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of innocence of the
petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20]
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
As a general rule, factual findings
and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked
certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition
of the case,[21] we
will not hesitate to review the same. In
this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial
court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in
prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the
prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession
of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not
authorized by law. Essential, however,
in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt.[22] Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction,[23] it
behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item
recovered from his possession.
We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring inconsistencies on
material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the
prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The testimonies of the
prosecution’s principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited
drug to the evidence custodian.
PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2
Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the
item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta
(Ancheta). Thus:
Q: What
about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the
accused Joseph and the one plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from
the possession of Julius Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned,
what did you do with them?
A: We
turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the
evidence custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit
was also turned over by him to the evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who
was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items
you said?
A: SPO3
Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]
Mangapit corroborated Pang-ag’s
testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item he seized from Cacao.
Thus:
Q: How
about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front
pocket of accused Cacao, what did you do?
A: I
turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.
Q: Who
was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet?
A: SP02
Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]
The foregoing assertions are totally
at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who
delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically
declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic
sachet of shabu.
Q: Who
delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of
Cacao?
A: SP03
Balolong, Sir.[26]
During his cross-examination,
Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not Mangapit
who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:
Q: You
said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu
which was allegedly taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I
hear you right?
A: Julius
Cacao, yes sir.
Q: It
was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu?
A: Balolong,
sir.
Q: It
was not Mangapit?
A: No
sir.[27]
When confronted with the
afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the variance. He just gave a sweeping answer “I do not
know”.[28]
We cannot understand why the courts
below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent and contradictory
testimonies of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate
court, we are of the considered view that this contradiction is not so
inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and
significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.
The prosecution failed to
satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item
confiscated from Cacao.
The patent inconsistency between the
testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta
on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu
identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and
confiscated from petitioner. If the
version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains
to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent
person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the
item from Cacao, never actually identified the same:
Q: If
shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you
be able to recognize and identify the same?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Giving
to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please
sort out [the] contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you
confiscated from the custody of accused Cacao?
A: (Witness
sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness
examining the plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).
Q: Are
the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible
and readable?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Will
you please read for record purposes the markings?
A: Initial
JPC and my signature, sir.
(Witness
pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the
plastic sachet).[29]
Verily, there was no actual and
effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the plastic
bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a
masking tape attached to the plastic sachet.
At no instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that
the sachet contained the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The only other person who could have
identified the subject drug is Pang-ag.
However, we cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the
same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this
witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from
petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even
incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never
been in possession of it.
Be that as it may, any
identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from
petitioner is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the
categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from
Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from
the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian
received, marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is
not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated
from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence custodian.
Moreover, considering the testimony
of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange that Ancheta would point
to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the records
failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only
lawmen who participated therein were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit,
Balolong proceeded to the hotel after the operation.[30] How then was Balolong able to get hold of the
confiscated substance when he was neither a party to nor present during the
operation? Who entrusted the substance
to him assuming that somebody requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the lingering
questions which must be answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as to
ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or tampering with the
sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was never
presented to testify in this case. Thus,
there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence
custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance
recovered from petitioner. The failure
to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal possession
of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited
drug.[31] In People v. Casimiro,[32]
citing People v. Mapa,[33]
we acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,[34]
we also acquitted the accused in view of the prosecution’s failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
At this juncture, it must be
stressed that the “corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes
the drug itself. This means that proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential”.[35]
Likewise, our ruling in People v.
Gutierrez[36]
on chain of custody rule is instructive.
Thus:
As
a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the
presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. This
would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure
of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which
it was delivered to the next in the chain.
Finally, petitioner’s defenses of
denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in
drug-related cases. However, it must be
stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, we are of
the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the
prosecution. While as a rule we desist
from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with
respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and
immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until
proven otherwise. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by
strong, clear and compelling evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED
on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
[2] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(a).
[3] Rollo, pp. 63-92; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
[4] Records, Criminal Case No. 11489-13, pp. 97-108; penned by Judge Philip G. Salvador.
[5] Rollo, p. 95.
[6] Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11487-13.
[7] Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11489-13.
[8] Records, Criminal Case No. 11489-13, p. 1.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 134-136.
[11]
[12] Records, Criminal Case No. 11487-13, pp. 7-8.
[13] CA rollo, p. 164.
[14]
[15] Rollo, p. 28.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 565 (1999).
[22] People
v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492,
December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 148; Malinlin v. People, G.R No. 172950,
[23] Cariño
v. People, G.R. No. 178757,
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27]
[28] TSN,
[29] TSN,
[30] TSN,
[31]
[32] 432 Phil. 966, 977 (2002).
[33] G.R. No. 91014,
[34] G.R. No. 162064,
[35] People v. Quebral, G.R. No. 185379,
[36] G.R. No. 177777,