FIRST DIVISION
|
RIZALDY M. QUITORIANO, Petitioner, – versus – JEBSENS MARITIME, INC./ MA. THERESA GUTAY and/or
ATLE JEBSENS MANAGEMENT A/S,[1]
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 179868 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: January
21, 2010 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Jebsens
Maritime, Inc. (represented by Ma. Theresa Gutay), on behalf of its foreign
principal co-respondent Atle Jebsens Management A/S, hired[2]
on January 13, 2001 Rizaldy M. Quitoriano (petitioner) as 2nd
Officer aboard the vessel M/V Trimnes
for a period of six months with a basic monthly salary of US$936.[3]
On May 23,
2001, petitioner, who was assigned as navigating officer from 12:00 midnight to
4:00 a.m. and port watcher from 12:00 midnight to 6:00 a.m., complained of
dizziness with severe headache, “general body weakness, chest pains, easy
fatigability,” “weak grip strength,” and “numbness on the left side of his
body” and was observed to be “dragging his left foot,” “his mouth slightly down
to one side,” and his speech “slurred.”[4]
When the
vessel berthed on
Upon
arrival in
DIAGNOSIS:
Hypertension
Transient ischemic attack
MEDICATIONS:
Diovan 80mg/capsule once daily
Sulodexide one tablet two times daily
Aspilet one tablet once daily
RECOMMENDATION:
Cranial CT scan
Carotid Doppler
He is advised to come back on
On November
16, 2001 or 169 days after petitioner’s
repatriation, Dr. Cruz issued a medical report declaring him “fit to
work,” thus:
The patient has no nuchal pain, headache,
chest pain and dizziness noted. His blood pressure is normal at 130/87. There
is no motor or sensory deficit noted. Triglycerides and routine urinalysis were
within normal limits. He was evaluated by our cardiologist and neurologist who
allowed him to resume his previous activities.
DIAGNOSIS:
Hypertension
Cerebrovascular disease, right internal capsule
probably ischemic or infarct
He is fit to work effective today,
Petitioner later
sought the opinion of an independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Sharon A.
Lacson of the Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed him as suffering from “hypertension
cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia.”[9]
Dr. Abdias V. Aquino of the same
hospital also found him to have “cerebral infarction, R, basal ganglia area.”[10]
Petitioner thereupon
repeatedly asked respondents for full permanent disability compensation but was
unsuccessful. He thus filed on February 26,
2002 a complaint to recover permanent total disability compensation of
US$80,000, as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) forged with
respondents, and attorney’s fees before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Arbitration Office in Quezon City, docketed as NLRC-NCR OFW Case No.
02-02-0561-00.[11]
Respondents
disclaimed petitioner’s entitlement to any disability benefits in view of the
company-designated physician’s certification that he is fit to work.[12] Petitioner countered, however, that the “fit
to work” assessment did not reflect his real health condition; and that his
illness, given its delicate nature, could recur anytime once he resumes sea
duties.[13]
By Decision
of
On appeal
by petitioner, the NLRC, by Decision[15]
of
Since x x x the Labor Arbiter based his
decision on the opinion of the company-designated physician that appellant was
declared “fit to work” to resume sea duty, We have no reason to disturb his
finding, x x x.
But
complainant should be allowed to resume
sea duty considering
the fit to work findings of the company-designated physician.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered affirming
the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter with slight modification by
ordering the respondents to allow complainant
to resume sea duty.
SO
ORDERED.[16] (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC decision having been denied by
Resolution of
Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner faulting the Court of
Appeals for not finding that his disability is considered permanent and total,
and for not awarding him attorney’s fees.
The petition
is impressed with merit.
In
accordance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full
protection to labor, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent
total disability to Filipino seafarers,[19]
it holding that the notion of disability is intimately related to the worker’s
capacity to earn, what is compensated being not his injury or illness but his
inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity; hence,
disability should be understood less on its medical significance but more on
the loss of earning capacity.[20]
The standard employment contract for
seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247
to “secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers
and ensure compliance therewith” and to “promote and protect the well-being of
Filipino workers overseas.” Even without
this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that
the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to “the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects” (Art. 1700).
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code
concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x.
x x x x
There are three kinds of disability benefits
under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total
disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial
disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities
as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability.–
(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness
the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of
these Rules.
(b) A
disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(c) A
disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness
the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his
body.
In Vicente
v. ECC (G.R. No.
85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195):
x x x the test of whether or not an
employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity
of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability
he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the
injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his
customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the
coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in
more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability),
then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
A total disability does not require that the employee be
absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that the employee cannot
pursue his usual work and earn therefrom
(Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 146636, Aug. 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221).
On the other hand, a total disability is
considered permanent if it lasts
continuously for more than 120 days.
Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal
Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad (G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA
268, 270-271), we held:
Permanent disability is inability
of a worker to perform his job
for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. x x x.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement
of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work of similar
nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person
of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting
in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Applying
the standards reflected in the immediately quoted ruling of the Court vis-à-vis the fact that it was only on November
16, 2001 that the “fit to work” certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from the time petitioner
was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001, petitioner’s disability is
considered permanent and total.
Significantly,
it is gathered that petitioner remained
unemployed even after he filed on February 26, 2002 his complaint to
recover permanent total disability compensation and despite the August 31, 2005
Decision of the NLRC which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordering respondents
to “allow complainant to resume sea duty.”
That petitioner
was not likely to fully recover from
his disability is mirrored by the Labor Arbiter’s finding that his illness
would possibly recur once he resumes his sea duties. Such finding could account why petitioner was
not re-deployed by respondents.[22]
Petitioner’s
disability being then permanent and total, he is “entitled to 100%
compensation, i.e., US$80,000 for officers,” as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the parties’ CBA.[23]
Petitioner,
having been compelled to litigate due to respondents’ failure to satisfy his
valid claim, is also entitled to attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the
total award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment, following prevailing
jurisprudence.[24]
WHEREFORE, the March
8, 2007 Decision and September 14, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93332 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondents
are held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner 1) permanent total
disability benefits of US$80,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment; and 2) attorney’s
fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at
the time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] The Court, MCTC, has deleted the name “National Labor Relations Commission (2nd Division)” as the main party impleaded in the present Petition, in light of Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
* Additional member per Special Order No. 811-A in view of the inhibition of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the case.
[2] Petitioner alleged that this was actually his re-deployment; Petition, rollo, p. 9.
[3]
[4] Court
of Appeals Decision dated
[5] Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated
[6] Medical
report dated
[7] Ibid.
[8]
[9] Medical
Certificate dated
[10]
[11] Labor
Arbiter’s Decision dated
[12] Respondents’ Position Paper, id. at 99-120.
[13] Petitioner’s Reply, id. at 124-128, 145-146.
[14]
[15] Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.
[16] Rollo, pp. 212-213.
[17] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme Court), id. at 38-44.
[18]
[19] Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159887, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 190, 206-211; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 926, 933 (2002)
[20] Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, G.R. No. 168753, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 438, 448.
[21] Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19 at 207, 209-211.
[22] See Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, supra note 20 at 448.
[23] Rollo, p. 52 (underscoring supplied); cited also in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, rollo, p. 165.
[24] Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19 at 215.