SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, |
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G.R. No. 179161 |
Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
- versus - |
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CARPIO MORALES,* |
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ABAD, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. |
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and MICHAEL DY, |
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Promulgated: |
Respondents. |
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January 22, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
Considering that the sub-lessee which was
ordered by the court to surrender possession of the disputed property in a case
for forcible entry no longer possessed the same, having already surrendered
possession thereof to the lessor and not to the prevailing party which is the lessee,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open
it earlier issued. The question which
now confronts this Court is: Was the
recall proper?
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated
Factual Antecedents
On
On P400,000.00
representing two months security deposit.
However, the Land Management Bureau (LMB)[8]
denied on
Prior to DKS’ application for sublease, petitioner
signified its intention to renew the lease for another 25 years through a
letter dated August 24, 2000 to the LMB as the original lease was about to
expire. In a Memorandum dated May 6, 2002, then Secretary Heherson Alvarez (Sec.
Alvarez) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved
the recommendation of the LMB to renew the contract of lease for another 25
years effective August 1, 2003 or until August 1, 2028 with several conditions
on the sublease, among which were: (1) that petitioner shall sublease the 9,500-square
meter area in favor of DKS for the same period of 25 years and, (2) that DKS
shall start its development of the portion of the property within two years
from May 6, 2002 and complete its development as proposed within seven years.[10]
On
Petitioner alleged that during the period
recited above, it was in continuous and peaceful possession of the property
including the subject 9,500-square meter portion which it operated as a car
park until DKS, through force, intimidation, stealth and threat, forcibly and
unlawfully took over possession on October 9, 2002.
According to petitioner, Dy and two men in
civilian clothes arrived at the car park at around
Hence, petitioner filed a case for forcible
entry against DKS and Dy docketed as Civil Case No. 174024 which was raffled to
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
While said case was pending, the DENR came up
with a Final Endorsement[14]
signed by Sec. Alvarez on
Finding in favor of petitioner, the MeTC
rendered its Decision[15]
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants DKS International, Inc., Michael Dy and all persons claiming rights
and interest under them:
1. To vacate the
property covering 9,500 square meters located at Numancia Street, Binondo,
Manila, specifically designated as Lot No. 1, Block 1862 of the Manila Cadastre
No. 13 and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff PNB;
2. To pay
plaintiff PNB reasonable compensation in the amount of P200,000.00 per
month starting October 2002, until completely vacated and fully surrendered;
3. To pay attorney’s fees fixed in the reasonable amount
of P10,000.00; and,
4.
To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Upon motion[17]
of petitioner, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution[18]
dated
On March 10, 2004, the RTC-Manila, Branch 40
rendered its Decision[19]
affirming the Decision of the MeTC and
ordering the issuance of a writ of execution with break open order, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.[20]
Accordingly, a Writ of Execution with Break
Open Order was issued on
On
Meanwhile, before the Writ of Execution with Break
Open Order could be implemented, respondents filed before the RTC an Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ and the Command to Sheriff With Comment[22]
alleging that during the previous hearings of the case, they have proven that
petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages[23]
against the government, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0368-CFM and raffled to
Branch 118 of RTC-Pasay City (Pasay case).
Apparently, the Final Endorsement approving petitioner’s request for
renewal of lease contract earlier issued by Sec. Alvarez was withdrawn by his
successor, Sec. Elisea G. Gozun (Sec. Gozun), on grounds that same was contrary
to law and public policy and that the issuance thereof was without factual and legal
bases.[24] In view of said withdrawal, a repossession
and take-over team was created by virtue of LMB Special Order No. 2003-91.[25]
In a Memorandum dated
Respondents further alleged that when the RTC
Pasay’s denial of the TRO was affirmed by the CA in its Decision[27]
dated
The government, through the LMB, also filed
an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene on the Incident Involving the
Enforcement of the Writ of Execution and to Treat this Motion as The
Intervention.[28]
It manifested therein that although
it has nothing to do with the ejectment case, it vehemently objects to the
notice of the sheriff, particularly on the matter of surrendering possession of
the premises to petitioner. It pointed
out that since the government was already in possession of the premises
following petitioner’s loss of any right of possession therein, it will be an
abuse of discretion on the part of the court to order that the property be
taken from the government and to have the same delivered to petitioner, under
the guise of enforcing a writ of execution in the ejectment case. LMB likewise sought permission to intervene
in the incident involving the enforcement of the writ.
To these two motions, petitioner filed an
Opposition with Manifestation[29]
asserting that the two motions are both pro forma, patently
unmeritorious and serve no other purpose but to unduly delay the implementation
of the Writ of Execution and therefore, should be denied.
The RTC did not find merit in LMB’s prayer to
intervene in the issue of the implementation of the writ. In its Order[30]
dated July 14, 2004, it held that (1) the government’s intervention will unduly
delay the mandated immediate execution of the decision in the ejectment case to
the prejudice of petitioner; (2) the government’s rights may still be fully
protected in a separate proceeding (particularly in the Pasay case); and, (3)
the intervention preempts the decision in the Pasay case. The RTC also did not give credence to the
claim of LMB that the government was already in possession of the property
subject of the writ of execution saying that same was a mere general claim. Said
court, thus, accordingly denied the two motions for lack of merit and again
ordered the Branch Sheriff of the MeTC to immediately implement the Writ of
Execution with Break Open Order it earlier issued.
Upon motion for reconsideration of the
government however, the RTC recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open
Order. It considered the Sheriff’s
Partial Return dated May 5, 2004 signed by the Deputy Sheriff of MeTC-Manila,
Br. 27, which reads:
This is to certify that on May 5, 2004 at around 10:50 in
the morning, after the lapse of (the) five (5)-day period given by the
undersigned to the Defendants to voluntarily vacate the place which they failed
to do so, the undersigned, together with the representative of the Philippine
National Bank, assisted by police officers, went back [to] the premises in
question at Numancia St., Binondo, Manila to implement the Writ of Execution
with a Break Open Order issued by Hon. Placido C. Marquez. Thereat, Mr. Matusalem Ruperto, Commander of
Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective Services informed us that DKS has
already turned over the premises to Land Management Bureau. Mr. Matusalem Ruperto further informed the
undersigned that Judge Marquez issued an order [preventing us] from
implementing the Writ. Our attention was
caught by the phrase posted in the premises that the same is government
property. And upon further inquiry, said
property is already guarded by Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective
Services.[31]
Thus,
the RTC issued the Order dated
Considering that Land Management Bureau is now in
physical possession of the subject property and not defendants-appellants DKS
International Inc. and Michael Dy, it would be a blunt error for this Court to
order the transfer of the physical possession of the government which is
admittedly the owner of the subject property to plaintiff-appellee Philippine
National Bank. The [W]rit of [E]xecution
with [B]reak [O]pen [Order] dated March 29, 2001 issued by this Court can no
longer be implemented and the same must be recalled. The Sheriff is ordered to desist from
implementing the same. This renders
movant Republic’s reply (to plaintiff-appellee’s opposition with manifestation
dated April 30, 2004) dated June 1, 2004, with attached verification and
certificate against forum shopping, with prayer that LMB’S urgent motion for
leave to intervene etc., dated April 28, 2004 and related pleadings moot and
academic.
On the question of damages or monetary judgment referred
to in the Writ of Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated March 29, 2004,
plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants, thru counsel, agreed that same
should be left [for resolution to] the Honorable Court of Appeals which has
taken jurisdiction over the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Writ of
Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated
SO ORDERED.
Expectedly, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[33]
of said Order but
said motion was denied in an Order dated
Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88098 imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in recalling the writ of execution with break open order.
In the meantime, the CA rendered its Decision[35]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 83129 on
On
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied through a Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
Issues
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,
petitioner raises the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED ITS ASSAILED DECISION DATED
(i)
In passing upon an issue not submitted to it
for resolution;
(ii)
In declaring that petitioner PNB has no right
of possession over the subject property;
(iii)
In disregarding the uncontroverted findings
of facts and the unassailed Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 174024-CV, which was later affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 03-108416; and
(iv)
In allowing the stay of the execution and
recall of the break open order even in the absence of the required supersedeas
bond.[40]
Petitioner’s
Arguments
In its assailed Decision, the CA made the
following pronouncement:
It is undisputed that the property in dispute is owned by
the Republic of the
By the above-quoted portion of the CA Decision,
petitioner claims that said court sweepingly ruled on the issue of ownership and
on the basis thereof granted possession of the disputed property to the
government. Petitioner contends that as
the petition is an offshoot of a forcible entry case, the CA should not have discussed
the issue of ownership, because the only question that courts must resolve in
ejectment proceedings is who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises. Petitioner further imputes
error on the part of the CA when it passed upon the issue of the expiration of
the lease contract, which petitioner claims to be irrelevant to this case and
is already subject of a full-blown trial in RTC-Pasay.
Respondents’ Arguments
On the other hand, respondents posit that the
CA must necessarily take notice of the facts that the government is the owner
of the subject property, that it is now in possession of the same and that the
lease contract between the government and the petitioner has already expired,
since these same facts constitute the supervening events which rendered the
writ of execution with break open moot and academic.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
It is well to remind petitioner that the sole
issue raised before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88098, is whether or not the RTC
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[42] The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[43] Grave
abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction or to
violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.[44] It refers also to cases in which, for various
reasons, there has been gross misapprehension of facts.[45]
We find that the CA correctly took notice of
the government’s take-over and repossession of the subject property, as these are
the very same facts which the RTC considered to be the reasons why the writ of
execution with break open order it earlier issued cannot anymore be
implemented. Without discussing these issues, the CA would not be able to make
a determination whether the recall of the writ of execution was proper under
the circumstances. Such an assessment is
imperative because the resolution of the issue of whether or not the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on it.
However, we deem it proper to pronounce to be
without binding effect the pronouncement of the CA that there was no renewal of
the lease contract between the government and petitioner. The authority of the CA was confined only to
ruling upon the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order recalling the writ of execution. The determination of whether there was a
renewal or non-renewal of the contract of lease between petitioner and the
government is beyond the competence of the CA to pass upon, since it is already
the subject of litigation in the
This, notwithstanding a review of the
record, nevertheless shows that the CA was correct in holding that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the order which recalled the writ of execution with break open order.
By virtue of the Decisions
of the MeTC and the RTC which both ruled in favor of petitioner in the subject
forcible entry case, petitioner was indeed, as a matter of right, entitled to a
writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[47] Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ
of execution with break open in the dispositive portion of its
It is well to
emphasize for purposes of clarity, however, that the portion of the Decision
that has become impossible to implement is only that portion respecting the
order to vacate and surrender possession of the property. Conversely, the portions which provide for the
payment of reasonable compensation and attorney’s fees in favor of petitioner
remain enforceable. We note that this was
perceived by the parties themselves but they nevertheless agreed that the issue
on the monetary award be left to the discretion of the CA as shown by the
following portions of the RTC’s
On the question of damages or monetary
judgment referred to in the Writ of Execution with break open, dated March 29,
2004, plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants, thru counsel, agreed that
same should be left [for resolution to] the Honorable Court of Appeals which
has taken jurisdiction over the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Writ
of Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated
And,
in view of the finality of the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 83129 which
as earlier stated, affirmed the Decision of the RTC, it is now up to petitioner
to seek the execution of the portion of the Decision respecting the monetary
awards in the main case, if same has not yet been enforced.
Petitioner
next contends that the writ of execution with break open order was abruptly
recalled without respondents complying with the mandatory requirements of Sec.
19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner stresses that in order to stay the immediate execution of a
judgment in an ejectment case while an appeal is pending, the defendant must
perfect his appeal, file a supersedeas bond and periodically deposit the
rentals which became due during the pendency of the appeal. But despite the failure of respondents to post
the required supersedeas bond, the CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance
of the writ of execution with break open order.
Petitioner’s contention fails
to persuade us. Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court is not applicable in this case.
In Uy v. Santiago,[48] we
held that it is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts’
judgment pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the
requisites provided in Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This can be deduced from the wordings of the subject
provision, to wit:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment;
how to stay same.- If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution
shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence
of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or
period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall
be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate
court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary
bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless
the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of
reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable
reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments
above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure,
shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the
restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal
taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the
Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the Court by the defendant for purposes
of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions
of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears
that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or
building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and
restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
This is not the situation here. Respondents are not staying the execution of
the judgment of the MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court, in
fact, had already rendered its judgment on the appeal. Clearly, the above-quoted provision does not
find any application in the present petition.
Petitioner likewise faults the CA in
giving full credence to the Sheriff’s Partial Return dated
Lastly,
petitioner prays in the alternative that respondents be ordered to pay the
monetary award as contained in the RTC decision. We cannot, however, grant such relief as
again, this is beyond our competence in this petition. To reiterate, we are only confined here to
reviewing errors of law allegedly committed by the CA in its assailed Decision. Such relief should have been sought in the
appeal from the main case.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In
lieu of Justice Arturo D. Brion per Raffle dated
[1]
CA rollo, pp.
303-316; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in
by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Regalado E. Maambong.
[2]
[3] Rollo,
pp. 10-11.
[4] Records, Vol. I, pp. 12-16.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Now the agency responsible for administering, surveying,
managing, disposing alienable and disposable lands and other government lands not
placed under the jurisdiction of other government agencies, and is a staff
sectoral bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
[9] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 184-196.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo,
pp. 152-174.
[15] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 184-196; penned by Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] CA rollo, pp. 61-68.
[23] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 224-238.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Penned
by Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by
Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Amelita G. Tolentino, id. at 453-468.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Rollo,
pp. 108-109.
[33] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 739-745.
[34] Records,
Vol. II, pp. 73-74.
[35] Penned
by Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes
(now retired member of this Court) and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, id. at 389-402.
[36]
[37] Docketed
as G.R. No. 169948.
[38] Records,
Vol. II, p. 580.
[39] CA rollo,
pp. 303-316.
[40] Rollo,
p. 43.
[41] CA rollo, p. 312.
[42] Rimbunan
Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, G.R. No.
152228, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650, 661.
[43]
[44] Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Desierto, 445 Phil. 154, 175 (2003).
[45]
[46] Rollo,
pp. 143-150.
[47] Immediate
execution on appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
[48] 391 Phil. 575, 580 (2000).
[49] Bunyi
and Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. No. 172547,