FIRST DIVISION
TAMBUNTING
PAWNSHOP, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
179085 Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: January
21, 2010 |
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Petitioner protested the assessment.[2] As the protest merited no response, it filed
a Petition for Review[3]
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) pursuant to Section 228 of the National
Internal Revenue Code,[4]
raising the following arguments:
A.
Pawnshops are not subject to Value Added Tax
pursuant to Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code.[5]
B.
Petitioner
properly withheld and remitted to the respondent the correct amount of expanded
withholding tax for taxable year 1999.[6]
C.
Petitioner
has already paid the assessed amount of P14,398.38 [sic], representing deficiency withholding tax on compensation,
thus, assessment on withholding on compensation must be cancelled.[7]
D.
Petitioner’s
pawn tickets are not subject to documentary stamp tax pursuant to existing laws
and jurisprudence.[8] (emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
The
First Division of the CTA ruled that petitioner is liable for VAT and
documentary stamp tax but not for withholding tax on compensation and expanded
withholding tax.[9] Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Respondent’s assessments for deficiency
Expanded Withholding Tax and Withholding Tax on Compensation for the taxable
year 1999, in the amounts of Twenty One
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Three and 75/100 Pesos (P21,723.75) and Sixty Seven Thousand Two Hundred One and
55/100 Pesos (P67,201.55), respectively, are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE.
However, the assessments for deficiency Value-Added Tax and
Documentary Stamp Tax are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED TO PAY the respondent the amount of Three Million Fifty Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Four and 34/100 Pesos (P3,055,564.34) and Four Hundred Six Thousand Ninety Two and 500/100 Pesos (P406,092.50) representing deficiency Value-Added Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax, respectively, for the taxable year 1999, plus 20% delinquency interest from February 18, 2003 up to the time such amount is fully paid pursuant to Section 249 (c) of the 1997 NIRC.
SO ORDERED.[10] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s
Motion for Partial Reconsideration[11] having
been denied,[12] it filed
a Petition for Review[13]
before the CTA En Banc which dismissed[14] it
as it did petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[15]
Hence,
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.[16]
To petitioner,
a pawnshop is not enumerated as one of those engaged in “sale or exchange of
services”[17] in
Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code.[18] Citing Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshops, Inc.,[19] it
contends that the nature of the business of pawnshops does not fall under “service”
as defined under the Legal Thesaurus of William C. Burton, viz:
accommodate, administer to, advance, afford, aid, assist, attend, be of
use, care for, come to the aid of, commodere, comply, confer a benefit,
contribute to, cooperate, deservire, discharge one’s duty, do a service, do
one’s bidding, fill an office, forward, furnish aid, furnish assistance, give
help, lend, aid, minister to, promote, render help, servire, submit, succor,
supply aid, take care of, tend, wait on, work for.[20]
The petition is in part meritorious.
On the
issue of whether pawnshops are liable to pay VAT, the Court, in First Planters Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[21] held:
In fine, prior to the [passage of the] EVAT
Law [in 1994], pawnshops were treated as lending investors subject to lending
investor's tax. Subsequently, with the Court's ruling in Lhuillier, pawnshops were then treated as VAT-able enterprises
under the general classification of "sale or exchange of services"
under Section 108 (A) of the Tax Code of 1997, as amended. R.A. No. 9238 [which
was passed in 2004] finally classified pawnshops as Other Non-bank
Financial Intermediaries.
The Court finds that pawnshops should have
been treated as non-bank financial intermediaries from the very beginning,
subject to the appropriate taxes provided by law, thus —
• Under
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, pawnshops should have been levied the 5%
percentage tax on gross receipts imposed on bank and non-bank financial
intermediaries under Section 119 (now Section 121 of the Tax Code of 1997);
• With
the imposition of the VAT under R.A. No. 7716 or the EVAT Law, pawnshops should have been subjected to the
10% VAT imposed on banks and non-bank financial intermediaries and financial
institutions under Section 102 of the Tax Code of 1977 (now Section 108 of the
Tax Code of 1997);
• This
was restated by R.A. No. 8241, 24 which amended R.A. No. 7716, although the
levy, collection and assessment of the 10% VAT on services rendered by banks,
non-bank financial intermediaries, finance companies, and other financial
intermediaries not performing quasi-banking functions, were made effective
January 1, 1998;
• R.A.
No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 26 likewise imposed a 10% VAT under
Section 108 but the levy, collection and assessment thereof were again deferred
until December 31, 1999;
• The
levy, collection and assessment of the 10% VAT was further deferred by R.A. No.
8761 until December 31, 2000, and by R.A. No. 9010, until December 31, 2002;
• With
no further deferments given by law, the levy, collection and assessment of the
10% VAT on banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, finance companies, and
other financial intermediaries not performing quasi-banking functions were
finally made effective beginning January 1, 2003;
• Finally,
with the enactment of R.A. No. 9238 in 2004,
the services of banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, finance companies,
and other financial intermediaries not performing quasi-banking functions were
specifically exempted from VAT, 28 and the
0% to 5% percentage tax on gross receipts on other non-bank financial
intermediaries was reimposed under Section 122 of the Tax Code of 1997.
At the time of the disputed assessment, that
is, for the year 2000, pawnshops were not subject to 10% VAT under the
general provision on "sale or exchange of services" as defined under
Section 108 (A) of the Tax Code of 1997, which states: "'sale or
exchange of services' means the performance of all kinds of services in the
Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration . . . ." Instead,
due to the specific nature of its business, pawnshops were then subject to 10%
VAT under the category of non-bank financial intermediaries[.]
Coming now to the issue at hand — Since
petitioner is a non-bank financial intermediary, it is subject to 10% VAT for
the tax years 1996 to 2002; however, with the levy, assessment and
collection of VAT from non-bank financial intermediaries being specifically deferred by law, then petitioner is not liable for VAT
during these tax years. But with the
full implementation of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries
starting
In light of the foregoing ruling, since
the imposition of VAT on pawnshops, which are non-bank financial
intermediaries, was deferred for the tax years 1996 to 2002, petitioner is not
liable for VAT for the tax year 1999.
In dodging liability for documentary
stamp tax on its pawn tickets, petitioner argues that such tickets are neither
securities nor printed evidence of indebtedness.[22] The argument fails.
Section 195 of the National Internal
Revenue Code provides:
Section 195. On every mortgage or pledge of lands, estate or property, real or personal, heritable or movable, whatsoever, where the same shall be made as a security for the payment of any definite and certain sum of money lent at the time or previously due and owing or forborne to be paid, being payable, and on any conveyance of land, estate, or property whatsoever, in trust or to be sold, or otherwise converted into money which shall be and intended only as security, either by express stipulation or otherwise, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax x x x. (underscoring supplied)
Construing this provision
vis a vis pawn tickets, the Court
held in Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
x x x A D[ocumentary] S[tamp] T[ax] is an excise tax on the exercise of a right or privilege to transfer obligations, rights or properties incident thereto. x x x
x x x x
Pledge is among the privileges, the exercise of which is subject to DST. A pledge may be defined as an accessory, real and unilateral contract by virtue of which the debtor or a third person delivers to the creditor or to a third person movable property as security for the performance of the principal obligation, upon the fulfillment of which the thing pledged, with all its accessions and accessories, shall be returned to the debtor or to the third person. This is essentially the business of pawnshops which are defined under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 114, or the Pawnshop Regulation Act, as persons or entities engaged in lending money on personal property delivered as security for loans.
x x x x
Section 3 of the Pawnshop Regulation Act defines a pawn ticket as follows:
“Pawn ticket” is the pawnbrokers’ receipt for a pawn. It is neither a security nor a printed evidence of indebtedness.”
True, the law does not consider said ticket as an evidence of security or indebtedness. However, for purposes of taxation, the same pawn ticket is proof of an exercise of a taxable privilege of concluding a contract of pledge. There is therefore no basis in petitioner’s assertion that a DST is literally a tax on a document and that no tax may be imposed on a pawn ticket.[23] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to petitioner’s argument
against liability for surcharges and interest — that it was in good faith in not paying documentary
stamp taxes, it having relied on the rulings of respondent CIR and the CTA that
pawn tickets are not subject to documentary stamp taxes[24] — the Court finds the same meritorious.
It is settled that good faith and
honest belief that one is not subject to tax on the basis of previous
interpretations of government agencies tasked to implement the tax law are
sufficient justification to delete the imposition of surcharges and interest.[25]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is IN PART GRANTED. The May 24,
2007 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the assessment deficiency value-added taxes for the taxable year 1999
and for surcharges and delinquency interest on deficient Value-Added Tax and
Documentary Income Tax are SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] CIR records, pp. 293-303.
[2]
[3] CTA First Division rollo, pp. 1-13.
[4] Section 228:
x x x x
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory, and demandable.
[5] CTA First Division rollo, p. 3.
[6]
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9] Decision of
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] CTA En Banc rollo, pp. 8-36.
[14] Decision of
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 8-30.
[17]
[18] SECTION
108. Value-added Tax on
(A) Rate
and Base of Tax. — There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added
tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or
exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties.
The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' means the
performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a fee,
remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by
construction and service contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, customs
and immigration brokers; lessors of property, whether personal or real;
warehousing services; lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons
engaged in milling, processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others;
proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels, resthouses, pension
houses, inns, resorts; proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment
parlors, cafes and other eating places, including clubs and caterers; dealers
in securities; lending investors; transportation contractors on their transport
of goods or cargoes, including persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire
and other domestic common carriers by land, air and water relative to their
transport of goods or cargoes; services of franchise grantees of telephone and
telegraph, radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees
except those under Section 119 of this Code; services of banks, non-bank
financial intermediaries and finance companies; and non-life insurance
companies (except their crop insurances), including surety, fidelity, indemnity
and bonding companies; and similar services regardless of whether or not the
performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental
faculties. The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' shall likewise include:
(1) The
lease or the use of or the right or privilege to use any copyright, patent,
design or model, plan, secret formula or process, goodwill, trademark, trade
brand or other like property or right;
(2) The
lease or the use of, or the right to use of any industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment;
(3) The
supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or
information;
(4) The
supply of any assistance that is ancillary and subsidiary to and is furnished
as a means of enabling the application or enjoyment of any such property, or
right as is mentioned in subparagraph (2) or any such knowledge or information
as is mentioned in subparagraph (3);
(5) The
supply of services by a nonresident person or his employee in connection with
the use of property or rights belonging to, or the installation or operation of
any brand, machinery or other apparatus purchased from such nonresident person;
(6) The
supply of technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with
technical management or administration of any scientific, industrial or
commercial undertaking, venture, project or scheme;
(7) The
lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs; and
(8) The
lease or the use of or the right to use radio, television, satellite
transmission and cable television time.
Lease of properties shall be subject to the tax herein
imposed irrespective of the place where the contract of lease or licensing
agreement was executed if the property is leased or used in the
The term “gross receipts” means the total amount of
money or its equivalent representing the contract price, compensation, service
fee, rental or royalty, including the amount charged for materials supplied
with the services and deposits and advanced payments actually or constructively
received during the taxable quarter for the services performed or to be
performed for another person, excluding value-added tax.
x x x x
[19] 453 Phil. 1043 (2003).
[20] quoted in rollo, p. 14.
[21] G.R. No. 174134,
[22] Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[23] Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 166786, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 147, 152-154.
[24] Vide rollo, pp. 23-24; CIR records, pp. 317-318.
[25] Vide
Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc. v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 166786,