SECOND DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 178318 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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EDGARDO ESTRADA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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D E C I S I O N
A bud
plucked from the stalk
would never have its chance to blossom.
A young plant prematurely clipped of its
branches
would
never develop and grow to its full and natural potential.
Both would need care and attention to be able
to recover and mend.
In the ultimate end, however, what
has been lost could never be regained or restored.
This is exactly what
happened to “AAA”,[1] a barrio lass from Atimonan, Quezon, who was
robbed of her innocence not once but twice in July 1997. Worse, it was her paternal uncle who perpetrated
the lecherous acts and precipitately initiated her to the ways of the world. “AAA” was only 12-years old when defiled.
Factual
Antecedents
On
That on or about the month of July 1997, at
Barangay x x x, in the Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who is the uncle of the offended party, with lewd design,
by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one “AAA”, a minor, 12
years of age, against her will.
Contrary
to law.[2]
The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 5746-G & 5747-G and raffled to Branch 61 of the Regional Trial
Court of Gumaca, Quezon. Appellant was arraigned on
The prosecution presented “AAA” as
its first witness. She testified that since
she was about seven years old, she lived in the house of her grandmother in
Atimonan, Quezon. Her mother was staying
in
After the rape
incident, “AAA” stayed at her grandfather’s house which was likewise located in
the same barangay where her
grandmother’s house was situated. She
thought that she would be safe there.
However, she was grievously mistaken.
One evening, also in the month of July 1997, appellant arrived thereat
and again raped “AAA”. While the latter
was sleeping, appellant poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her
clothes. “AAA” was cowed into submission
and appellant succeeded in sexually assaulting her for the second time. “AAA’s” grandfather who was sleeping nearby
did not even notice what was happening as the latter was hard of hearing.
As proof that “AAA” was only 12
years old when the rape incidents transpired, she presented her Birth
Certificate showing that she was born on
On the other hand, appellant was 51
years old and married. He admitted that
“AAA” is his niece, the latter being the daughter of his brother. However, he denied raping “AAA” on two
occasions. He claimed that he lived in
Poblacion, Atimonan, Quezon, which is
approximately seven kilometers away from where the victim lived. He alleged that he never went to his parents’
houses; instead, it was his mother who made occasional visits to his
house. He insisted that the charges were
filed against him because “AAA” resented his advice not to socialize with boys
because she was still young.
The other defense witness was
Irene. She testified that “AAA” is her
granddaughter and that appellant is her son.
She narrated that although “AAA” used to live in her house, she was not
aware of any rape incident having been committed thereat. She admitted though that she loved her son
more than she loved her granddaughter.
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edgardo
Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE on two (2) counts
defined and punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act 7659 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH
for each rape and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00
or a total of P150,000.00; and to pay P50,000.00 or a total of P100,000.00
as moral damages and the amount of P30,000.00 or a total of P60,000.00
as exemplary damages to deter others from committing the same crime.
Costs against the accused.[4]
The trial court
found that the prosecution satisfactorily proved all the elements of rape. During the first rape, the appellant employed
violence against the person of the victim by pinning her hands above her
head. She was likewise threatened with
bodily harm in case she reports what happened.
During the second rape, he poked a knife at her and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her.[5]
The qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were likewise appreciated by the
trial court. Based on the Birth
Certificate presented by the prosecution, it was established that the victim
was a 12-year old minor when she was ravished on two occasions in July
1997. On the other hand, the trial court
held that the parties’ relationship with each other was established by their
testimonies. Appellant testified that “AAA”
is his niece while the latter admitted that appellant is her uncle.
The trial court
was not persuaded by the defenses of alibi and denial proffered by the
appellant. It found the same barren and
undeserving of any credence vis-à-vis
“AAA’s” categorical testimony. Thus:
Accused’s denial is also an intrinsically weak
defense. To merit credibility, it must
be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability x x x. The rule is that affirmative testimony is stronger
than a negative one, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness x x x. It was keenly observed by
the Court that “AAA” was emotionally affected as she recalled the harrowing
experiences she suffered from her uncle as she had to wipe the tears from time
to time as she testified. As between a
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare denial
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. x x x A mere denial constitutes self-serving
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. x x x
As against positive identification by the private complainant, mere
denials of the accused cannot overcome conviction by the trial court. x x x[6]
Appellant’s
contention that “AAA” filed the charges against him because she did not take
kindly to his advice not to associate with boys was briskly set aside by the
court a quo. It found the same too lame a reason to
charge one with a capital crime.
Likewise, the court brushed aside Irene’s corroborative account for
being incredible and partial. The trial
court found it inconceivable and not in accord with the traditional Filipino values
and norms that a son would not visit his parents for years notwithstanding the
fact that they lived only seven kilometers apart and the distance could easily
be traversed by automobiles.
On appeal,
appellant insisted that the trial court erred in convicting him because his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
He insisted that his conviction could not be based solely on the
testimony of “AAA”.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On
with
modifications the Decision of the trial court.
Just like the trial court, the appellate court found the victim’s tale
of defloration “simple, candid, straightforward and unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency thus deserving of full faith and credit”.[8] The Court of Appeals noted that “AAA’s”
account contained “details of the sexual assaults only a real victim could
remember and reveal, and narrated them in a manner only one who had undergone
them could do”.[9] Moreover, the victim’s testimony was
corroborated by the medical findings that she suffered hymenal lacerations.[10]
The Court of
Appeals completely brushed aside appellant’s imputation of ill-motives on the
part of the victim. It found as too
flimsy a reason that “AAA” resented her uncle’s advice not to have any romantic
interests motivating her to fabricate the rape charges against him.[11] It also gave short shrift to appellant’s
denial and alibi. Appellant’s denial was
disregarded in view of the victim’s positive identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crimes. His alibi was
likewise rejected because of his failure to prove that it was impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crimes at the time they were committed.
The Court of
Appeals however deviated from the ruling of the trial court when it held that appellant
should be held liable only for simple rape and not for qualified rape, notwithstanding
the minority of the victim and the fact that her attacker was her uncle. The Court of Appeals opined that mere
allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victim’s uncle would
not suffice to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity
or affinity.[12] Consequently, the award of civil indemnity was
reduced to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.
The dispositive
portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1.
finding
appellant guilty of two counts of SIMPLE RAPE in Criminal Case Nos. 5746-G and
5747-G and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; and
2.
reducing the
civil indemnity awarded to the victim to P50,000.00 for each count of
rape.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence this appeal.
On
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Applying the guiding principles that
“a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more
difficult to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and c)
the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense”,[16]
we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein appellant guilty
of two counts of simple rape.
Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, deserve great weight and respect.
Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals found the testimony of the victim credible. According to the trial court, she “candidly,
positively and categorically testified as to her harrowing experiences”.[17] Thus, it was convinced that appellant “indeed
raped ‘AAA’”.[18] It also “keenly observed” that “‘AAA’ was emotionally affected as she
recalled the harrowing experiences she suffered from her uncle as she had to
wipe the tears from time to time as she testified”.[19]
We scoured the
records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from the above
findings. There is no showing at all
that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or
circumstances of weight which would have affected the outcome of the case.[20] We therefore defer and give highest respect
to the findings of the trial court because it is in the best position to assess
and determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Because of its vantage position, it can detect a guilty blush, a slight
hesitation, a fearful glance, and an anguished cry.
In addition, the
Court of Appeals adopted the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
the victim. Hence, the more reason for
us not to disturb the said findings. The
Court of Appeals held that:
Utilizing the same settled legal precepts, we have
ourselves meticulously scrutinized the victim’s testimony and, like the trial
court, found her tale of defloration simple, candid, straightforward and
unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency thus deserving of full
faith and credit. Her account contains
details of the sexual assaults only a real victim could remember and reveal,
and narrated them in a manner only one who had undergone them could do.
Indeed,
a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness. Moreover, the testimony of a
rape victim, especially one who is young and immature, deserves full credit
considering that “no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted
in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished”. More
so when, as in this case, the rape victim accuses a close relative of having
ravished her. Indeed, if the victim, who
was only twelve years old when she was raped, had the guile to accuse her own
uncle of rape and send him to jail it was only because she was motivated by an
honest desire to have the crime against her punished.
The
victim’s credibility is further buttressed by the findings of Dr. Geronimo Ayala,
who conducted a physical examination on her on
Appellant’s denial crumbles under the weight of complainant’s positive
identification of him as the perpetrator of the crimes.
The trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly rebuffed appellant’s denial.
The same is self-serving and undeserving of any credence at all in view
of the victim’s categorical, positive and forthright identification of him as
the perpetrator of the crimes. Irene’s
testimony likewise deserved to be rejected.
She was a biased witness having admitted that she loved her son more
than she loved her granddaughter. At any
rate, appellant’s denial is an inherently weak and negative defense. It could not prevail over “AAA’s” positive
identification. We also do not deign to
dignify appellant’s imputation of ill-motives to the victim. We still believe that no woman would allow
herself to be subjected to the indignities of a rape trial if she is not in
search of truth and justice.
Appellant’s alibi deserves no consideration at all.
In order for the
defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the appellant was at a different place
at the time the crime was committed, and second, it was physically impossible
for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In this case, appellant miserably failed to
establish the fact that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. By his own admission, the distance between
his place and that of his parents where the rape incidents were committed is
about seven kilometers only and could easily be traversed by public
transport.
Appellant is guilty only of two counts of simple rape.
The rape incidents were committed in
July 1997 hence the law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659[22]
which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.
By using
force or intimidation;
2.
When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.
When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x x
In the instant case, it was clearly
established by the prosecution that on two occasions in July 1997, the victim
was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation, against her
will and without her consent. The qualifying circumstance of minority of the
victim was likewise proven by the presentation of the latter’s Birth
Certificate.
However, as
regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the
victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently
satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity
or affinity. It is immaterial that
appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant that “AAA”
testified that appellant is her uncle. We
held in People v. Velasquez:[23]
However,
the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant,
applying Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
We have consistently held that the circumstances under the amendatory
provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which could
mandate the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the
nature of qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless
alleged in the information. Even in
cases where such circumstances are proved, the death penalty cannot be imposed
where the information failed to allege them.
To impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance
which has not been alleged in the information would violate the accused’s
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
While
the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle of
the two victims, they did not state that he is their relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The testimonial evidence that accused-appellant’s wife and Luisa de
Guzman are sisters is immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a
relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree must be alleged in the information.
In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle
of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship. It was
necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third
civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant
can only be convicted of simple rape on two counts, for which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua in each
case.
In view of the
foregoing, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding appellant guilty only of
two counts of simple rape and in sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and
in ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape.[24]
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] The
identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall
be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the rule on Violence Against Women
and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 8-9.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo,
p. 28.
[15]
[16] People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 184598,
[17] CA rollo, p. 25.
[18]
[19]
[20] See People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106,
[21] CA rollo,
pp. 126-127.
[22] See People v. Manalili, supra
note 16. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 applies when the rape was
committed before
[23] 427
Phil. 454, 462-463 (2002).
[24] People v. Dalisay, supra note 20; People v. Araojo, G.R. No. 185203,