THIRD DIVISION
|
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner, - versus - NIXON LEE, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 176831
Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O
N
NACHURA, J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007
Resolution,[2] denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The
relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging
that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent
Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will
so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly,
respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.[3]
In
her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition
precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of
the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She,
moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to
his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an
exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of
Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first
exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he
filed the suit.[4]
The
RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she
had in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted
that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay,
were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition—they
did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.[5]
The
RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.[6] In
its February 4, 2005 Order,[7] however,
it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20,
2005.[8] Hence,
the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved,
respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA initially
denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would
issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient
to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate
of his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production
and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled
that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original
copy of the will.[9]
Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006
Amended Decision,[10] granted
the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the
production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time
that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in
her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied
with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.[11]
Left
with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending
in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that
the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.[12]
The
Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
The
first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that—
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.[13]
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of
law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law.[14] This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes
the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest.[15]
The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution.[16] As
the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.[17]
The
writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.[18]
Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or
as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.[19] As
a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer,
board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which he is entitled.[20] On
the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.[21]
Recognized
further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations.[22]
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and
will not lie against an individual unless some
obligation in the nature of
a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.[23]
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.[24] The
writ of mandamus lies to
enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed;
and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government;
hence, it is called a prerogative
writ.[25] To
preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.[26]
Moreover,
an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.[27]
In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.[28] Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its
issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles.[29]
Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
court.
In
the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules
of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings
for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee,
or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or
not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further
provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original
holographic will. Thus—
SEC.
2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The
person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after
he knows of
the death of the testator, deliver the
will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC.
3. Executor to present will and accept or
refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20)
days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days
after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after
the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction,
unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his
refusal to accept it.
SEC.
4. Custodian and executor subject to fine
for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two
last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined
not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC.
5. Person retaining will may be
committed.—A person having custody of a will after the death of the
testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when
ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison
and there kept until he delivers the will.[30]
There being a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject
will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that
respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants
the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Eliezer R. de Los
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 31-32.
[3] Records, pp. 1-4.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, pp. 45-51.
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] Supra note 2.
[12] Rollo, pp. 139-146.
[13] Italics
supplied.
[14] Abaga v. Panes, G.R. No. 147044, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 56, 61-62.
[15] Segre v. Ring, 163
A.2d 4, 5 (1960).
[16] Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 618, 625; Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr., G.R.
No. 164953, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 396, 417.
[17] Mayuga
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123899, August 30, 1996, 261 SCRA 309,
316-317; Reyes v.
[18] Tangonan v. Paño, No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 255; Gonzalez v. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367, 375 (1911).
[19] Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272, 275 (1949).
[20] Samson
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 117741, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA
315, 325.
[21] University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771.
[22] Manalo
v. PAIC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 146531, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 747,
754-755; National Marketing Corporation
v. Cloribel, No. L-27260, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 398, 403; National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel,
No. L-26585, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1033, 1037-1038. See, however, Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers
Union v. Bacungan, No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 510, in which
the Court considered mandamus as an appropriate equitable remedy to compel a
corporation to grant holiday pay to its monthly salaried employees. See also Hager v. Bryan, 19 Phil. 138 (1911),
cited in Ponce v. Alsons Cement
Corporation, G.R. No. 139802, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 602, 614-615, and
in Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 96674, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 510, 515-516, in which
the Court ruled that mandamus may be issued to compel the secretary of a
corporation to make a transfer of the stock on the books of the corporation if
it affirmatively appears that he has failed or refused so to do, upon the
demand either of the person in whose name the stock is registered, or of some
person holding a power of attorney for that purpose from the registered owner
of the stock.
[23] Carroll v. American Agricultural Chemical Co.,
167 S.E. 597 (1932).
[24] Crawford v. Tucker, 64 So.2d 411, 415 (1953).
[25] The American Asylum at
[26] State ex rel. Moyer v.
Baldwin, 83 N.E. 907, 908 (1908).
[27] Pimentel III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008, 548 SCRA 169, 209; Balindong v. Dacalos, G.R. No. 158874, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 607, 612; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134278, August 7, 2002, 386 SCRA 492, 499; see Manalo v. Gloria, G.R. No. 106692, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 130, 136-137, in which the Court ruled that petitioner’s claim for backwages could be the appropriate subject of an ordinary civil action and there is absolutely no showing that the said remedy is not plain, speedy and adequate.
[28] Segre v. Ring, supra note 15.
[29] Walter Laev, Inc. v.
Karns, 161 N.W.2d 227, 229
(1968).
[30] Theses
rules were taken from Sections 626-629 of Act No. 190, “An Act providing a Code
of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine
Islands,” enacted on August 9, 1901.