|
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner, - versus - SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA
BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 168970 Present: VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 15,
2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Assailed
in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil
Case No. 3263.
The
facts of the case are as follows:
Herein
petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana
Balus. Sebastiana died on
On
A parcel of land with all the
improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less,
situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as
follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line
2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line
12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2]
Rufo
failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and
was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held
for that purpose. On
On
Three
years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. On
On
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of P6,733.33
consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered
to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third portion of the land in
question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC
held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in
the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought
the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved
by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
On
Hence,
the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG
THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO
EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES'
AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING
THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS
OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]
The
main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents
over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the
Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was
eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner
insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title
over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still
proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the
intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of
continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner
posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a
contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby
the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by
“redeeming” or “repurchasing” the same from the Bank. This agreement,
petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the
respondents. As a result, petitioner
asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank
without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim
his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
The
Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner
and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution
of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate
of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the
outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact
that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents'
father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the
hearing conducted by the trial court on
The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death.[14]
In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well
as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.[15]
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during
his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed
parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the
subject lot from their father.
Petitioner
and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners
of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact
that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of
petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in
time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the
Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the issues raised in
the instant case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial
Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his
right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by respondents.
It is
true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts
are perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not
only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage and law.
Article
1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
In the
present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue
with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.
On the
contrary, a plain
reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any
way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's
intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they
believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a
cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the
parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.[16] It is the
duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the
purpose which it is intended to serve.[17] Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[18]
Absurd and illogical interpretations
should also be avoided.[19]
For petitioner to claim that the
Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to
continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject property, even
after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier
discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition,
as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of
his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership
is negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that on
several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but
he refused to do so. In fact, he claims
that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same
to him but he ignored such offer. How
then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase the
subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's
offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the
recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof,
the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was already
exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part
of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and
title to the property was already transferred
to the Bank does not give them the right
or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the
disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to
depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the
evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention
that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of
the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject
property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and
respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a
severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them
a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other.[20]
In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,[21]
an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 69-76.
[2] See Certificate of Sale and Definite Deed of Sale, Exhibits “A” and “B,” respectively, records, pp. 74-75.
[3] Exhibit “A,” records, p. 74.
[4] Exhibit “B,” id. at 75.
[5] Exhibit “C”/“4,” id. at 76.
[6] Exhibit “D,” id. at 79.
[7] Exhibit “E,” id. at 80.
[8] Records, pp. 1-6.
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 21.
[12] See TSN,
[13] Exhibit “B,” records, p. 75.
[14] Civil Code, Art. 777.
[15] Civil Code, Art. 781.
[16] Aliño v. Heirs of Angelica A.
Lorenzo, G.R. No. 159550,
[17] TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC
Employees
[18] Tating v. Marcella, G.R. No.
155208,
[19] TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC
Employees
[20] Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 357, 369 (2003).
[21] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122904, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 165, 171; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 722, 743 (2003).