THIRD DIVISION
|
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO, Petitioners, - versus - ANITA R. FLORES, assisted by her husband, BIENVENIDO
FLORES, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 167891
Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January
15, 2010 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of
the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2004 and its Resolution dated April 19,
2005, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The
facts are as follows:
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel
of land, denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an area of 25,513
square meters (sq m), located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to cultivate
said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the two until 1975 when
the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order[2]
from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III,
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos
Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir,
herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus
Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as “KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA
AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG.”[3] This was followed by another agreement,
“KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA,” executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties
agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of
10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in
the interpretation of the Kasunduan
between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan.[4] In the Report and Recommendation dated May 3,
2000, the Legal Officer advised the parties to ventilate their claims and
counterclaims with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
Malolos, Bulacan.[5]
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for
ejectment was filed by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband
Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the
complaint, she alleged that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes,
she inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land, not devoted to
agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to agriculture located in Barangay
Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in the 1960s, during the
lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the former to allow
him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted to agriculture; that Jesus
Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and
that the use and occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance
only; and that the land, which was divided equally between the two parties,
excluded the stony portion. In February
1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed them of her
intention to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the
request.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that Lot No. 2351, with an area of 25,513 sq m, was agricultural land;
that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating
the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB;
and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy involving
the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction
over the case.
Resolving
the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court did
not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that
petitioner was allowed to cultivate the land,
a closer look at the Kasunduan,
however, revealed that what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of the
complaint was the stony portion where petitioners’ house was erected. Thus, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter.[6]
On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered
judgment in favor of respondent. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff (respondent), ORDERING defendants (petitioners) –
1) and all persons claiming rights under them to VACATE the subject premises where they have erected their house, which is a portion of Lot No. 2351, Cad-320-D situated [in] Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan;
2) to DEMOLISH their house on the subject premises;
3)
to PAY plaintiff the sum of P400.00 a month by
way of reasonable compensation for their use and occupation of the subject
premises starting [in] June 2000 and every month thereafter until they finally
vacate the same; and
4)
to PAY attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and the
cost of suit.[7]
On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decision in
toto upon a finding that no reversible error was committed by the court a quo in its Decision[8]
dated August 29, 2002.
On
motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order on December 10,
2002, reversing its decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue involved appeared
to be an agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
A
petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to annul the
Order of the RTC dated December 10, 2002.
On
October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision, which reinstated the
MTC decision. It disagreed with the
findings of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners’
house stood was stony and residential in nature, one that may not be made to
fall within the ambit of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing to
its non-agriculture character. The CA explained that, on the strength of the
two instruments, the parties made a partition and divided the agricultural
portion of Lot No. 2351 equally among themselves. By virtue of said division, the parties
effectively severed and terminated the agricultural leasehold/tenancy
relationship between them; thus, there was no longer any agrarian dispute to
speak of. Fajardo had already acquired the benefits under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law when one-half of the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351
was allotted to him. Petitioners cannot,
therefore, be allowed to continue possession of a part of the stony portion,
which was not included in the land he was cultivating.[9] The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding that the court a
quo seriously erred when it reversed itself, its Order dated December 10, 2002
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 25,
2001 of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan is hereby REINSTATED.[10]
The subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.
The issue
in this case is whether it is MTC or the
DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.
There is
no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an agreement,
denominated as “KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA
MAGKABILANG PANIG.” Therein, it was
admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. This Kasunduan
was subsequently followed by another agreement, “KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA
LUPA,” whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of
Lot No. 2351 was given to petitioners.
The portion of the land where petitioners’ house is erected is the
subject of the instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent argues that this
portion is not included in the deed of partition, while petitioners insist that
it is.
We agree
with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated December 10, 2002 that
the resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the
contracts executed by the parties. The
issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be
determined without resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property
was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a
case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.[11]
More importantly, the controversy
involves an agricultural land, which petitioners have continuously and
personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural
lessees, petitioners have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive
possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code.[12] Logically,
therefore, the case involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the
contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
An
agrarian dispute[13] refers
to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over
lands devoted to agriculture.[14]
Undeniably, the instant case involves a
controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between the
parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is
untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy
involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the
landlord-tenant relationship.
.Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:
The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an “agrarian dispute.” x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
“Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that ‘all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.’ This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant—at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . .”
In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.[15]
Furthermore,
the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding the
interpretation of the Kasunduan, was,
in fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the
DARAB.[16] In
view of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario
v. Prudente,[17] that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has
initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is
vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October
28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court dated December 10, 2002 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; rollo, pp. 71-80.
[2] Records, pp. 54-55.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra note 1, at 79.
[11] Rollo, p. 65.
[12] R.A. No. 3844, Sec. 24, provides that:
Sec. 24,
Right to a Home
[13] R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 3(d).
[14] Amurao v.Villalobos, G.R. No. 157491, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 464.
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 66.
[17] G.R. No. 150635, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 485.