SECOND DIVISION
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SPOUSES PATRICIO and |
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G.R. No. 163271 |
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MYRNA BERNALES, |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN, |
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Present: |
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namely: EMMA S. FELICILDA, |
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ANITA S. SAMBAAN, |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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VIOLETA S. DADSANAN, |
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BRION, |
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ABSALON S. SAMBAAN, |
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AGUSTINE S. SAMBAAN, |
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ABAD, and |
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EDITHA S. MANGUIRAN, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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GRACE S. NITCHA. |
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CLODUALDO S. SAMBAAN, |
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GINA S. SAMBAAN and |
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FE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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January 15, 2010 |
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D e c i s i o n
A legal tussle among children is a nightmare for
their parents. Sometimes, this happens
when pecuniary interests takes precedence over family relationship. In the instant case, we are at the forefront
of a family squabble over a disputed land situated in Cagayan de Oro City which
was purportedly conveyed to the eldest child through a Deed of Absolute Sale.[1]
Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Misamis Oriental[2]
rendered judgment in favor of the herein respondents, which was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals[3]
(CA). Alleging that the CA Decision[4]
is not in accordance with law and jurisprudence, as well as the evidence on
record, petitioners now come to us via the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Julian Sambaan (Julian), married to Guillerma
Saarenas-Sambaan (Guillerma), was the registered owner of a property located at
Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. The lot was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14202[6]
issued on
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947-A of the Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-138019, being a portion of Lot No. 5947, Cagayan Cadastre, LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 1572) situated in the Barrio of Bulua, City of
The respondents herein and the petitioner Myrna
Bernales (Myrna) are the children of Julian and Guillerma. Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is
the present owner and possessor of the property in question.
Sometime in 1975, Julian was ambushed at Merayon,
Talakad, Bukidnon, and was hospitalized due to a gunshot wound. On
In January 1991, respondents received information
that the property covered by TCT No. T-14202 was already transferred to petitioners’
name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Proceedings before the Regional
Trial Court
Thus, on P300,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees plus P1,000.00 as appearance fee.
On May 6, 1992, petitioners filed their Answer,[9]
alleging that the subject property (Lot No. 5947-A) used to be a portion of Lot
No. 5947, which was originally owned by Clodualdo Sambaan (Clodualdo) and Gliceria
Dacer (Gliceria). Lot No. 5947 is more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan) situated at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 5984 and 5948; E., by Lot Nos. 5948 and 5946, SW., by Lot No. 5946; and on the NW., by Lot No. 5984, containing an area of 7,286 square meters, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 21421 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7921 issued on September 23, 1940.
After the death of Clodualdo and
Gliceria in 1949, their heirs, namely, Alicia Lago, wife of Pedro Gacusan;
Bernardo Lago (single); Gloria Lago, wife of Jimmy Angco; Dionesia Lago,
married to Paulino Unat; Prysbetero Sambaan, married to Rosario Zaragosa;
Juanito Sambaan, married to Renerio Galos; Leo Sambaan, married to Adeloisa
Tambulian; Renato Sambaan, married to Adelina Ablon; Aida Sambaan (single);
Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas; Paz Sambaan, wife of Rufinito Lago;
and, Bernie Sambaan, married to Alicia Sabuero, executed an Extra Judicial Settlement and Sale[10] dated April 10, 1970 involving the
abovementioned land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
7921.
It appears, however, that Juanito, Aida and Renato
sold their share to a certain Domingo Ebarrat (Ebarrat). Hence, a portion of the property belonged to
Julian while another portion belonged to Ebarrat. In view of the co-ownership between Ebarrat
and Julian, the former and the latter executed a Deed of Partition[11]
dated
Petitioners claimed that Julian subsequently sold
his share to them by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale [12]
dated
described as follows:
A Parcel of land (Lot No. 5947-A, being a portion of
Thereafter, on
In addition, petitioners alleged that the imputation
of falsification of the signatures of Julian and Guillerma is a product of respondents’
inflamed imagination because the latter envy them for they have been successful
in managing their properties. Petitioners
thus prayed that judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint; affirming their
title over the controverted property and ordering respondents to pay them P500,000.00
as moral damages; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.
On
On
After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered its Decision[16] dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs were able
to establish a strong preponderance of evidence in their favor. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-14204 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID, and is
hereby CANCELLED. Let another title be
issued in the name of the late Julian Sambaan.
The defendants are jointly and severally directed to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P1,671.00 representing actual expenses.[17]
Proceedings before the Court of
Appeals
Petitioners, alleging among others that the trial court
erred in finding that the signature of Julian on the assailed document was a
forgery, went to the CA by way of ordinary appeal. On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision
dated
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19]
which was denied by the CA in its Resolution[20]
dated
Issues
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners
assail the Decision of the CA on
the following grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PRESCRIPTION DID NOT BAR RESPONDENTS’ ACTION TO RECOVER OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED SETTLED PRINCIPLES ON THE ADMISSIBILITY AND APPRECIATION OF OPINIONS OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN ITS BLANKET ACCEPTANCE OF THE INADEQUATE TESTIMONY OF THE DOCUMENT EXAMINER WHO WAS COMMISSIONED BY RESPONDENTS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL CASE NO. 92-179.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WAS A FORGED DOCUMENT ON THE BASIS OF SPECIMEN SIGNATURES THE GENUINENESS OF WHICH WERE NEVER ESTABLISHED.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON HANDWRITING COMPARISON IN USING SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF GUILLERMA SAMBAAN THAT WERE MADE AT THE TIME AND FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE HANDWRITING ANALYSIS OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
E. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH
FORGERY IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JULIAN SAMBAAN ON
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
F. THE COURT OF
APPEALS CONTRAVENED THE LEGAL RULES GOVERNING THE APPRECIATION OF DOCUMENTS IN
RULING AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF JULIAN SAMBAAN’S
G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS AND IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIMS FOR DAMAGES.
Our Ruling
The core issue
to be resolved in the present controversy is the authenticity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale which is a question of fact rather than of law. In Manila Bay Club Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[21] we held
that for a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.[22]
In the case at
bench, the issues raised by the petitioners
are essentially factual matters, the determination of which are best left to
the courts below. Well-settled is the
rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality
when supported by substantial evidence on the record.[23] Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,[24]
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[25] But to erase any doubt on the correctness of
the assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless,
arrived at the same conclusion. We find
that there is substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals
and trial court’s conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the
Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.
The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed
that Julian and Guillerma’s signatures were forged.
We find that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly gave probative value to the testimony of the NBI Senior
Document Examiner Caroline Moldez Pitoy, who categorically testified that the
signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged, viz:[26]
Atty. Dalisay: As Senior Document Examiner of the
National Bureau of Investigation, do [sic] you have [the] occasion of examining
[sic] the signatures of Julian Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas by virtue of the
case of the Regional Director, Regional Office of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Cagayan de Oro City?
A: Yes sir.
x x x x
Q: What was the result
of the findings on the signatures of Julian Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas
Sambaan appearing on the Deed of Sale dated
A: After [conducting]
comparative examinations x x x on the standard specimen signatures of Julian
Sambaan [and Guillerma Sambaan] as well as the x x x questioned x x x signatures x x x we found out that [they
were] not written by one and the same person.[27]
x x x x
Q: What was the
procedure which you have taken x x x in examining the authenticity of the
signatures of Guillerma Saarenas Sambaan?
A: Per Standard Operating
Procedures, the first thing we did upon receipt of the documents submitted to
us is to check x x x the documents attached to the basic letter-request and
then the questioned and standard documents were classified as to the
sufficiency and appropriateness of the standards, and then these were
evaluated, after which, they were marked accordingly, then we go to examining
all the standard/specimens first, to determine whether the handwriting is done
by one and the same person before comparing with the questioned and standard
signatures. x x x After they were found
to be written by one and the same person, before comparing with the questioned
documents, the handwriting characteristics were properly observed in these two
(2) sheets of photographs, then, the final evaluation is made, after which, a
written report is made as a result of the examination, then the same is
forwarded to the Document Examiner for re-examination and this Examiner affixes
his signature and submits the same to the Chief of the Division for approval
and the said report passes to the office of the Regional Director for final
approval.
Petitioners failed to present any evidence to
rebut the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.
Moreover, the findings of the NBI document
examiner were corroborated by the trial court’s own observation, as affirmed by
the CA, that “even a cursory examination of Guillerma’s questioned signature
from her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographs (Exhibits ‘F’ and
‘F-1’) would show that it needs no expert witness to notice the wide difference
in stroke, as well as the writing style in capital ‘G’.”[28] What is
more, Emma S. Felicilda, the daughter of then deceased Guillerma, likewise
testified that “in fact my mother was the one who filed the complaint in this
instant case because according to her, she did not sign the said document”.[29]
The fact that the examination was commissioned by
the respondents did not make said examination null and void.
It is of no moment that the examination of the
Deed of Absolute Sale was commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it is the court which has the
discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the results of
the examination. As held in Sali v. Abubakar,[30]
the fact that the NBI conducted
the examination of certain contested documents upon the request of a private
litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made:
x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the
court having jurisdiction over said litigations, in the performance of its duty
to settle correctly the issue relative to said documents. Even a non-expert
private individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help the courts in the determination of said issue. Such
examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private
individual, does not, certainly, become null and void when the examiner is an
expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
Indeed, any person, expert or
not, either in his private or in his official capacity, may testify in court on
matters, within his personal knowledge, which are relevant to a suit, subject
to the judicial authority to determine the credibility of said testimony and
the weight thereof. [On] the other hand, the question whether a public official
may or shall be ordered or permitted by his superior to examine documents and
testify thereon in a given case, is one mainly administrative in character,
which is within the competence of said superior officer, or the Bureau Director
or Head of the Office, or the corresponding department head to decide, and is
independent of the validity of the examination thus made or of the credence and
weight to be given by the Court to the conclusions reached, in consequence of
said examination, by the official who made it.
The procedures taken by the NBI document examiner
did not violate Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
We are not swayed by petitioners’ allegation that
the comparisons made by the document examiner, the CA and the trial court, of Guillerma’s
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale and her specimen signatures, violated
Section 22, Rule 132[31]
of the Rules of Court on the authentication of private documents. It should be borne in mind that in this case respondents
were not presenting evidence to authenticate a private document. On the contrary, they are challenging the
signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The confluence of the following circumstances
prove by preponderance of evidence that the Deed of Absolute
Records show that Julian was unaware of any
absolute conveyance of his rights over the subject property in favor of
petitioners. As found by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA, Julian even requested his children to redeem subject
property from the petitioners. In
furtherance of his father’s request, Absalon offered to redeem the subject
property from the petitioners in 1982, however, the latter refused because they
were allegedly using the same as tethering place for their cattle.[32]
The caretaker of the subject property, Eufronio
Abrea, also testified on cross-examination that there were times when the
brothers and sisters of Myrna went to the land and asked for coconuts.[33] Petitioners
take this to imply that the respondents “never owned the subject property
because they had to ask for coconuts from petitioners, who were the real owners
of the property.”[34] We disagree with this interpretation. Harvesting of coconuts requires specialized
skills; an ordinary person who does not know how to climb necessarily has to
ask the caretaker to get the coconuts for him or her.
In addition, Myrna admitted that she was not present
when her parents signed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale.[35] Neither was she cognizant of who the
witnesses were to the said deed.[36] Interestingly, Guillerma, one of the alleged
signatories, would have been privy to the transaction that involved her
husband. Yet, she joined herein
respondents in filing an action for the Annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
on the ground of forgery.
Lastly, the trial court and the CA were one in
proclaiming that considering that the subject property belongs to Julian’s
capital, the execution of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale could be validly
made by Julian even without his wife’s signature.[37] As a matter of fact, the wife’s name was not
typed in the assailed deed and her purported signature merely appears next to
the supposed signature of Julian. This
only confirms that the person who prepared the deed knew that her signature was
unnecessary for the assailed document.
The trial court and the CA further concluded:
x x x If such was the case, we are in a query why the signature of GUILLERMA must have to be forged when her consent, as spouse of JULIAN, is not necessary to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale? The answer to this is simple: JULIAN never executed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of MYRNA and such deed conveys no ownership in favor of the appellants.[38]
Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case.[39] The fact that the CA adopted the findings of
fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.[40] In Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [41]
we held that factual findings of the CA which are supported by substantial
evidence are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. A departure from this rule may be warranted
where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court,[42] or when the same is
unsupported by the evidence on record.[43] There is no ground to apply the exception in
the instant case, however, because the findings and conclusions of the CA are
in full accord with those of the trial court.
The forged Deed of
Absolute
Having affirmed
the findings of fact of both the CA and the trial court that the signatures of
Julian and Guillerma are forgeries, we now come to the question of the validity
of the transfer of title to the petitioners.
In Sps. Solivel v. Judge Francisco,[44] we held that:
x x x in
order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the
registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith
for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even
if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered
owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
x x x
The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled
land by virtue of a deed executed by the
registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly
states. x x x
In Instrade,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[45] we
reiterated the said ruling maintaining that “[A]s early as Joaquin v. Madrid, x x x, we said that in order that the holder of
a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary
instrument may be considered a holder in good faith and for value, the
instrument registered should not be forged”.
Indubitably, therefore, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale did not
convey any title to herein petitioners.
Consequently, they cannot take refuge in the protection accorded by the
Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the
forged deed, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title,
the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the
assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property. The CA has aptly arrived at the same conclusion
in its
It is
significant to stress that the main thrust in the case at bench is the
regularity and validity of the assailed Deed
of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 (Record p. 374, Exhibit “3”)
allegedly executed by JULIAN in favor of the appellants. As such, we must not confuse the issue at
hand by averring that other documents should be considered in determining the
validity of the deed of absolute sale.
The reason is simple: the valid execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
will convey and transfer ownership in favor of appellants title based on the
rule that by the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the
other to pay therefor a sum certain in money or its equivalent (Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA
15). The fact that the assailed Deed
was not signed by JULIAN and the signatures of JULIAN and GUILLERMA were forged
per findings of the NBI Senior Document Examiner, it can therefore be inferred
that the subsequent issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-14204 has no basis at all since ownership was
not conveyed to appellants by reason of the forged Deed.
In
addition, as to the issue that the Agreement
dated
Prescription did not bar
respondents’ action to recover ownership of the subject property.
Citing Article 1454[47]
of the Civil Code, petitioners assert that since the respondents admit that
there was a mortgage transaction between Julian and herein petitioners
involving the subject property there is no dispute that an implied trust was
created by operation of law. In which
case, respondents’ right to reconveyance had already prescribed when they filed
the annulment case on
On the other hand, respondents assert that the
element of consent is totally wanting in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale
because the signatures of Julian and Guillerma, which is equivalent to their
consent, were forged by the petitioners.[48] They maintain that the absence of consent
made the said document null and void.[49] Hence, this case falls under the purview of
Article 1410 of the Civil Code which provides that an action to declare the
inexistence of void contracts does not prescribe.[50]
We agree with the respondents. The supposed vendor's signature having been
proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent as
"absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code.[51] According to Article 1410, "the action
or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe”. The inexistence of a
contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be cured either by
ratification or by prescription.[52]
The award of moral
damages and attorney’s fees is proper.
On this aspect, we must consider the blood
relations among the parties. One of the
respondents, Emma S. Felicilda, testified on cross examination that they had high
regard for Myrna, their eldest sister.[53] The same was echoed by respondent Anita
Sambaan on cross examination.[54] They could not believe that Myrna would keep and
appropriate the land for herself and transfer the title exclusively to her
name.[55] On direct examination, respondent Emma S.
Felicilda likewise testified that the forgery caused them anger and bad
emotions.[56]
Moreover, it was Julian’s dying wish for the
property to be redeemed from the petitioners.[57] Hence, it is not unexpected that the
sentimental significance of the property and the anger and emotions caused by
the unlawful transfer of the same have moved the respondents to recover the
same through the instant action. We
therefore hold that the award of P20,000.00 as moral damages is proper.
In addition, in view of the complexity of the
instant case and the multiple levels of appeal that this case had gone through,
we also affirm the award of attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 as well as the
actual damages of P1,671.00 incurred by the prevailing party which was
substantiated during trial.
On
a final note, it bears stressing that the arguments raised by the petitioners
are essentially the same issues they put forward before the CA which have been
duly passed upon and considered by the appellate court in affirming the RTC Decision
in toto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO
C.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T
I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, p. 374.
[2] Penned by Judge
Edgardo T. Lloren.
[3] Penned
by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred in by Associate Justices
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Rosmari D. Carandang.
[4] Rollo, pp. 45-64.
[5]
[6] Records, pp. 5-6.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, pp. 265-266.
[18]
[19] CA rollo, pp. 144-155.
[20]
[21] 315
Phil. 805, 820 (1995).
[22]
[23] Xentrex Motors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258, 262 (1998).
[24] Judge
Español v. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636, 657 (2004).
[25] Bascos, Jr. v. Tagahanan, G.R. No.
180666,
[26] Rollo, pp. 369-372.
[27] Emphasis
supplied.
[28] Rollo, p. 53.
[29] TSN,
[30] 124
Phil. 444, 447-448 (1966).
[31] Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence [in respect to] the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
[32] Rollo,
p. 47.
[33] TSN,
[34] Rollo, p. 362.
[35] TSN,
Q: But you were not present when the alleged
signature was affixed. Is that correct?
A: I was not present.
[36] TSN,
Q: Did you know who were the witnesses to
the signing of this document?
A: No, sir.
[37] Records, p. 59.
[38]
[39] Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 221
Phil. 65, 78 (1985).
[40] 395 Phil 791,
801 (2000).
[41] 341
Phil. 624, 633 (1997).
[42] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil.
1, 13 (1999).
[43] Alba Vda. De Raz v. Court of Appeals, 372
Phil. 710, 725 (1999).
[44] 252
Phil. 223, 231 (1989).
[45] 395 Phil 791,
801 (2000).
[46] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[47] Article
1454. If an absolute conveyance of
property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the
grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfilment of the obligation is
offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand reconveyance of the
property to him.
[48] Rollo, p. 425.
[49]
[50]
[51] Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
84464,
[52] Arturo M.
Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[53] TSN,
[54] TSN,
[55] TSN,
[56] Id at 8.
[57]