Republic of the
Supreme Court
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION,
Petitioner, -
versus - Respondent. |
G.R. No. 159835
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and perez, JJ. Promulgated: January 21,
2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before the Court is the
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
filed by the petitioner Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) assailing the June
13, 2002 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67614, which reversed the deportation orders issued by the
BID. The petition also assails the CA’s
THE FACTS
Sometime
in 2000, the BID received a letter dated
July 6, 2000[4]
(July 6, 2000 letter) from Gyung Taek
Cha, Consul/Police Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila,
requesting the BID’s assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he was
purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest
had been issued by the Korean Police. The letter also stated that Park’s Korean Passport No. NW0057145 had
been cancelled on
On
On
the very same date that Park was indicted, the
BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO)
against Park after finding that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act.
Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be deported, imposed upon him
administrative fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist.
To
secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed on
About
six months after the BID issued the SDO, Park filed a motion to have it set
aside.[10] He insisted that he should not be considered
as an undocumented alien since his Passport No. NW0057145 had not really been
cancelled as falsely stated in the
Park assailed the BID’s SDO and
October 15, 2001 Resolution, through a certiorari
petition filed before the CA.[11] He reiterated his arguments why he should no
longer be considered as an undocumented alien and submitted the following in
support of his claim:
a.
the February 16, 2001
letter[12] from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Young Chai Kim, Consul for
Passport Affairs, stating that he did not write the July 6, 2000 letter and
that a travel certificate had been issued in Park’s favour; and
b.
the May 28, 2001 letter[13]
from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Consul/Police
Attaché Gyung Taek Cha (the same person who wrote the July 6, 2000 letter),
stating that Park had no pending criminal cases in Korea.
Park also claimed that he
had been denied of his right to due process, since no hearing of his case was
conducted before the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry or the Board of
Commissioners; the SDO was in fact issued on the same day that the Charge Sheet
was filed.
In its Decision dated
THE ISSUE and THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
At the core of the present controversy is the validity of the two
issuances by the BID: the SDO dated
In its petition, the BID insists that it had sufficient basis for
ordering Park’s deportation – Park did not have with him a valid passport when
he returned to the
Although Park was able to present letters[16]
from the Korean Embassy that apparently repudiated the July 6, 2000 letter, the
BID alleges that these letters were submitted when the SDO had already become
final and executory, since Park failed to appeal the SDO with the Office of the
President within the 30-day period provided under Rule XIII of the Deportation
Rules[17];
the BID, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the February 16, 2001 and
May 28, 2001 letters. As the SDO had
already lapsed into finality, the BID posits that it could not be faulted for
denying Park’s motion to set aside the SDO in its
Park counters the BID’s allegations by insisting that he had a valid and
existing passport when he returned to the
While Park concedes that his motion to set aside the SDO was filed
beyond the 30-day period, he nevertheless contends that the SDO could never
achieve finality because it was, in the first place, null and void. He attacks the SDO by claiming it was issued
in violation of his right to due process, under Section 37(c) of the
Immigration Act, which reads:
No alien
shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
First, Park claims that the Charge Sheet indicting him for violation of the
Immigration Act failed to sufficiently inform him of the specific grounds for
his deportation. He was accused of
violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act[20]
for remaining in the
Second, he posits that his case should have been heard under the regular
deportation proceedings, not the summary deportation proceedings. Rule X of the
Deportation Rules states that summary deportation shall be observed in cases
where the charge is either overstaying
or expiration of passport. Since he had been charged for allegedly
violating the conditions of his admission, Park contends his case is not among
those covered by summary deportation proceedings.
THE COURT’S RULING
We
resolve to grant the petition.
A review of the records compels us to rule that the BID had sufficient
factual and legal basis for the SDO and the
Non-immigrants
are required by law to present valid passports and visas upon entry into the
All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid
visas prior to their admission into the
Section
10. Non-immigrants
must present for admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of
passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance
or other travel documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by
regulations, and valid passport visas
granted by diplomatic or consular officers, except that such document shall
not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child qualifying as a
non-immigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the
accompanying parent, the visa not having expired; and (b) a seaman qualifying
as such under section (9) of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned
to the
As things therefore stood on
No due
process violation when the summary deportation proceedings were held and when
the SDO was issued
Were the documents that Park subsequently presented sufficient to set
aside the SDO? The BID posits that these
documents should not even be considered because the SDO had already lapsed into
finality (for which reason, the BID denied Park’s motion in its
The Charge Sheet[22]
indicted Park for violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act, which
provision reads:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
x x x x
(7)
Any alien who remains in the
However, the
Charge Sheet contained not just a citation of the provision of law allegedly
violated by Park, but more importantly, a statement of the act constituting the
offense, i.e., Park’s status as an
undocumented alien whose passport had been cancelled by the Korean Government. The pertinent portion of the Charge Sheet
reads:
The
undersigned Special Prosecutor charges CHING GEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHING
KEUN PARK, Korean national, for deportation for violation of Section 37 (a)(7)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, committed as follows:
That the respondent’s passport was
cancelled by the Korean Government, therefore, he is now an undocumented alien in
violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. [Emphasis supplied.]
The actual
designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the
offense was clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform
Park of the specific ground for his deportation. In this case, we think it was. Notably, in the
We likewise do not agree with Park’s
claim that his case should be heard under the regular deportation proceedings
where a full hearing is required before the BID’s Board of Special
Inquiry. Section 1, Rule X of the
Deportation Rules states that:
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where
the charge against the alien is overstaying or expiration of his passport. In such case, the Board of Special Inquiry shall merely require the presentation of the
alien’s valid passport and shall submit the appropriate recommendation on
the bases thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]
Park was
charged for having a cancelled passport, which theoretically is equivalent to an
expired passport – in either case, the alien does not possess the valid
passport required under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. The
After rejecting Park’s legal objections against the SDO, we proceed to a
determination of whether there remains factual basis to uphold the SDO and
affirm the
Before anything else, we note that upon issuance of the SDO, Park
immediately and without any question or reservation paid the administrative
fines and fee imposed on him under the SDO.
He supposedly paid the fees to support the petition for bail which he
filed with the BID. The payment of the
administrative fines and fees, however, is not material in considering a bail
petition. In deportation proceedings,
the decision to grant bail is entirely at the discretion of the BID
Commissioner.[24] While not material in the grant of his bail
petition, the payment of the fines and fee was nonetheless a significant
indication of Park’s acceptance of and compliance with the SDO. Park’s act of
payment effectively placed him in estoppel and now bars him from contesting the
validity of the SDO.
Park mainly relies on the following documents that purportedly evidenced
his authority to enter and remain in the country: the February 16, 2001 and May
28, 2001 letters of the Korean Embassy which, he claims, repudiated the July 6,
2000 letter on which the SDO was based; the travel certificate dated January
16, 2001, also issued by the Korean Embassy; the SIRV issued on January 8, 1997
by the Bureau of Investments; and the new Passport No. PH0003486 issued on
Contrary to Park’s claims, the
Park’s SIRV and travel certificate cannot stand as substitutes for his
cancelled passport. As mentioned, Section 10 of the Immigration Act requires
non-immigrants to have (1) unexpired passports, and (2) valid passport
visas. The grant of the SIRV only
relieves the alien from the necessity of securing a valid visa; it does not
replace the requirement of a valid passport.
Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 63 declares that the SIRV entitles
the alien to enter and leave the
The issuance of a new passport to Park in no way obliterated the fact
that he entered the country on
While we ruled in the 2004 case of Domingo
v. Scheer[25]
that the subsequent issuance of a new and regular passport to the alien rendered
the SDO moot and academic, we cannot adopt that principle in the present case
because the Scheer ruling was arrived
at after considering a significantly different factual situation.
The cancellation of Scheer’s passport resulted in the loss of his privilege to stay in the country and for
which reason, the BID ordered his deportation. The subsequent issuance of a new passport to
Scheer, however, remedied his undocumented status and authorized his continued
stay; thus, we declared the SDO against him moot and academic. On the
other hand, Park was ordered deported because his cancelled passport denied him
of the privilege to re-enter the country. The
subsequent issuance of a new passport to Park, as we said, did not erase the fact that he was not lawfully
admitted into the country in the first place, as he returned without a
valid passport. When an alien has
already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found
unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it
is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.[26]
Given these findings, we rule that the supporting documents presented by
Park do not provide sufficient factual basis for overturning the SDO that, at
that point, had already lapsed into finality for Park’s failure to contest it
on time. The BID thus correctly denied
Park’s motion to set aside the SDO in its
Deported
aliens are generally barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting
state
We conclude this case by recognizing and pointing out certain aspects
that the BID may, in its discretion, still want to look into. Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act states:
Section 29. (a) The
following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the
x x x x
(15) Persons
who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision
may be waived in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided,
however, That the Commissioner of Immigration shall not exercise his discretion
in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of conviction for any
crime involving moral turpitude or for any crime penalized under sections
forty-five and forty-six of this Act or on the ground of having engaged in
hoarding, black-marketing of profiteering unless such aliens have previously
resided in the Philippine immediately before his exclusion or deportation for a
period of ten years or more or are married to a native Filipino woman;
[Emphasis supplied.]
As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the territory of the
deporting State. However, States may, upon proper application, waive
previous deportation orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the
re-entry and readmission of the alien do not pose a risk to the general
welfare. As stated in the quoted
provision above, the Commissioner of Immigration may exercise sound discretion
in the readmission of previously excluded aliens (subject to certain
limitations). After Park was first deported
back to
Section
37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him or the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien:
x x
x x
(2)
Any alien who enters the
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari
and REVERSE the
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice Chairperson |
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 10-45.
[2] Penned by Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice
Teodoro P. Regino (retired) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; id. at 47-53.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Section 37. (a) The
following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of another officer designated by him or the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
x x x x
(7) Any alien who remains in the
x x x x
[7] Rollo, pp. 58-61.
[8] Motion for Early
Resolution dated
[9]
[10] Motion to Set Aside
Summary Deportation Order dated December 22, 2000, filed on June 1, 2001; id. at 70-73.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 2.
[15] Supra note 3.
[16] Referring to the
[17] Rule XIII, Section 3 states:
Section 3. Promulgation of
Decision. Finality. – The decision of the Board [of Commissioners] shall be
returned to the Board of Special Inquiry for promulgation. Service of a copy of the decision to the last
known or given address of the respondent or at the office of his counsel shall
be deemed promulgation. The decision shall become final and
executory after thirty (30) days from promulgation, unless within such period,
the President shall order the contrary.
[18] Rollo, p. 249.
[19]
[20] Supra note 6.
[21] Immigration Act,
Section 37(d).
[22] Rollo, p. 57.
[23] Dated
[24] Section 37 (e),
Immigration Act.
[25] G.R. No. 145745,
[26] Secretary of Justice v. Koruga, G.R. No. 166199,