Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
MAELOTISEA
S. GARRIDO,
Complainant,
- versus - ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P.
VALENCIA, Respondents. |
A.C. No. 6593
Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, velasco,
JR., NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, *ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., perez, and **mendoza, JJ.
Promulgated: ______________ |
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D E C I S I O N
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PER
CURIAM: |
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido
filed a complaint-affidavit[1]
and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1.
That I am the
legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962
at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel
Cortes x x x
2.
That our marriage
blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth,
Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3.
x x x x
4.
That on May,
1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine
confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller
talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it
and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a
child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli
Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x
x
5.
x x x x
6.
That I did not
stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of
Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida
7.
That on June
1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x
8.
That since he
left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling
because of financial constraints.
x x x x
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against
his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia
considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish
but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3]
Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea
was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married
Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his “bad boy” image before she married him in 1962. As
he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty.
Garrido met Atty.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his
marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979,
with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty.
In the course of the
hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of
Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal
complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity[7] (of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second,
the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8]
the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage
between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea “an absolute nullity.” Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of
Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints
against them. The respondents also alleged
that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido
was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this
motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints
she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.[10] The
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment.[12] The
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and
adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375
dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in
part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members
of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty.
Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to
reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his
motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty.
Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for
review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his
disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the
IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido
pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise
to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our
Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed
her Comment on the petition. She recommends
a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility
for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE
COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of
the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation
with respect to Atty.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription
of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do
not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13]
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.[15]
The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment
of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In
this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose
interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16]
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed
between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not
material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From
this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,[17]
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. Admission
to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become
a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar.[19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court
over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive
power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing
the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for,
among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that
he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service
character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a
public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the
effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a
witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits
of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are
not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea
filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had
submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for
her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s
sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the
above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage
or multiple marriages.
In
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23]
the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal
remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and
family – institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24]
the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first
wife was subsisting. We held that the
respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. The lack
of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the
respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar
to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second
marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
members of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity.
We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts
gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a
pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty.
Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter
and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court
that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the
study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented
himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to
Constancia.[26] This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.
Third, Atty.
Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open
admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty.
Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead
of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death
of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Sixth, Atty.
Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not
then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not “valid.”
Seventh, as
the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong
in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after
admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and
had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded
wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more
than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty.
Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty.
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or
an act of mending his ways. This was an
attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by
having his second marriage declared void
after the present complaint was filed against him.
By
his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his
lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral
character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath,[28]
Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29]
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30]
all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the
crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage
with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage
to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession,
specifically, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of
the same Code, which demands that “[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, “[a] lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.”
As a lawyer, his
community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set
a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he
violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and
selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The
Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct – both
public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the
findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The
contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when
they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that
his marriage to complainant was void ab
initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x
x Although the second marriage of
the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of
them as members of the Bar.[35]
Moral
character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must
have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion
generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held
by the public in the place where she is known.[37]
The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1)
to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that
prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty.
While Atty.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed
belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence,
she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido.
While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on
confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented
to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only
call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39]
leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but
note that Atty.
Measured against the
definition of gross immorality, we find Atty.
We find that Atty.
Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the
legal profession. She simply failed in
her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40]
In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41]
we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of
the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely
show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of
lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this
reason.
In imposing
the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the
power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the
totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates
their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for
the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers
of the court.
While we are keenly aware
of Atty. Garrido’s plea
for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their
separation, we cannot grant his plea.
The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of
Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other
circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty.
Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside
without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the
integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle
whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1)
DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and
(2)
DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.
Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the
names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice (on wellness leave) ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate
Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice (on
leave) JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice |
* On wellness leave.
** On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-2, Vol. I.
[2] Id. at 9.
[3] Id. at 14-16.
[4] Atty. Garrido submitted a Sworn Statement of Pablito G. Uplos, his secretary who attested that he was the one who delivered the money for the financial support of Maelotisea and their children.
[5] Rollo, pp. 29-30, Vol. I.
[6] Id. at 90-91.
[7] Civil Case No. Q-95-25688, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City.
[8] Rollo, pp. 142-144, Vol. I.
[9] Id. at 167-168 and 182-183; Order dated February 7, 2003.
[10] Rollo, pp. 192-193, Vol. I.
[11] Id. at 195-196; Order dated November 7, 2003.
[12] Id. at 290-293, Vol. I.
[13] Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. 7505, Oct. 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1, 8 and Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, 393 Phil 554, 551 (2000).
[14] In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil 399, 400 (1928); Calo v. Degamo, A.C. No. 516, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 447, 450; In re Lanuevo, 160 Phil 935, 981 (1975);
Agripino Brillantes, 166 Phil 449,
461 (1977); Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil
1, 8 (1981).
[15] Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556
SCRA 1, 9 and Tomlinii v. Moya, A.C.
No. 6971, February 23, 2006, 483 SCRA 154, 159.
[16] Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, supra note 13, at 551-552.
[17] A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658, 664.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Id. at 665.
[20] Cojuangco, Jr.
v. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306,
314.
[21] St. Louis
University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) and Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624.
[22] Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 314.
[23] 424 SCRA 42, 54 (2004) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.
[24] 101 Phil.313, 314 (1957) cited in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 20, at 315.
[25] Supra note 20, at 308.
[26] Rollo, p. 4, Vol. I.
[27] In re Atty. Rovero, 189 Phil 605, 606 (1980).
[28] Namely: (1) “I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;” (2) “I will do no falsehood or consent to its commission”; (3) “and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients x x x”
[29] SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys. – It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
[30] Canon
1. A lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law
and legal processes.
[31] Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331, 339.
[32] Id. at 338.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Rollo, p. 292, Vol. II.
[36] Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600; citing Bar Matter No. 1154, 431 SCRA 146, 149 (2004).
[37] Id. at 609.
[38] Id. at 609-610.
[39] Rollo, p. 29, Vol. I.
[40] Advincula v. Macabata, supra note 36, at 609.
[41] A.C. No. 1512, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.
[42] Tapucar v. Tapucar, supra note 31, at 339.