EN BANC
|
ELEAZAR
P. QUINTO and GERINO A.
TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, -
versus - |
G.R. No. 189698 Present: PUNO,
C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. |
|
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. |
Promulgated: February
22, 2010 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
Upon
a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the
respondent Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and
the movants-intervenors’ motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this
Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).[1]
The assailed Decision granted the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,[2]
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code[3] and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,[4]
mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the
way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena.
In support of their respective
motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit
the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to,
and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation
of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan
political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not
violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to
elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on
material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the
law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer
from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse
the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments
meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the
procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC’s motion for reconsideration
which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions
for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the Court had
rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
i.
Timeliness of COMELEC’s Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,[5] in
relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the
same rules,[6] COMELEC had a period of
fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to
move for its reconsideration. COMELEC
received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until
December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of
COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in
substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was
subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 – still within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this
Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the
following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he
has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.[7]
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for
intervention may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not
inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed
in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have
not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court,[8] when
the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court,[9] and
even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.[10] In Lim v. Pacquing,[11] the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the
In fine, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court[12]
after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.[13] We
stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of
the court fully and completely available for justice.[14] Its
purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.[15]
We rule that, with the exception of
the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly intervene
in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have
each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator
Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which
nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a
matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a
personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its
system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator
Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May 2010 elections
running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009
Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign
from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision,
unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of
said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Court’s Decision
attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.
With regard to the IBP – Cebu City
Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that “this case involves the
constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections,”
and that “there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the
voice of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before this
Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance.”[16]
Prescinding from our rule and ruling
case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to
intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too
indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive
issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
The assailed Decision struck down
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they
prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a)
without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions
in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants’ activity regardless
of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in
the national, municipal or barangay
level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public appointive
officials.
We grant the motions for
reconsideration. We now rule that Section
4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence
on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA
9006 or the Fair Election Act,[17]
which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code[18] and
rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an
elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions for which they are running,[19] an
elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or
position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without
forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil
service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The
intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The
exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.
x x x x
Secondly, I would like to
address the issue here as provided in
Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the civil
service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity."
This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in
the government service have actually experienced how this provision has been
violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many
government officials.
So, is the Committee
willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict,
and which would deter its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law
and the implementing rules on the matter are more than exhaustive enough to
really prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in
any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in
implementation because, if the head
of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of
government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against
partisan political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is
now here in this draft will really implement the constitutional intent against
partisan political activity. x x x[20]
(italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this
constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is presently
reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7
and Section 55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 – respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
x x x x
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
x x x x
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities by one holding a non-political office.
x x x x
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service
officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION
261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
x x x x
(i) Intervention of public
officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except
those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now
exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly,
intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political
activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the
framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants
holding apolitical offices.
Stated differently, the constitutional
ban does not cover elected officials,
notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.”[21] This
is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage
in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period.[22] Political partisanship is
the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.[23]
The prohibition notwithstanding,
civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express
their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for
public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment
is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between
the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING
AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in lieu
thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.
May I be allowed to explain
my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Aquino
may proceed.
MS. AQUINO: The draft as
presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which
was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to
vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a
qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.
Voting is a partisan
political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to
this prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage,
although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the
Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the
right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like
to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those
who may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in
partisan political campaigns or electioneering may vote.
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this
point, but please understand that there was
no intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government
official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision was
precisely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense
that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political
contest. The last phrase or clause
might have given the impression that a government employee or worker has no
right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the case.
They are still free to express their views although the intention is not really
to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign.[24]
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
13 of RA 9369, and
Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
i.
Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already
ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the
case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary,
et al.[25]
In Fariñas,
the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground,
among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As
Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the
deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus
Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing
of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed,
the limitation on appointive officials continues to be operative – they are
deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal
protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of having the
deemed-resigned provisions “apply equally” to both elected and appointive
officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature
is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant
distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention
that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives
undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets
of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil
Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,
are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take (sic) part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in
the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position
other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus,
not infringed.[26]
The case
at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our
assailed Decision gave it new life. We
ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really “adherence to
precedents,” mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.[27] This
doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated
in his treatise The Nature of the
Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the
same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. “If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling
of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and
moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather
than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the courts.[28]
Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection
implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that
an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum.[29] This
rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the
regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is
predicated.[30] For that reason, a point
expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or
even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise
than it did.[31] As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.:[32]
… A decision which
the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another
question,
nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has
been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine
the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to
every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the
status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because
another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor
does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other
propositions dicta.[33]
(italics supplied)
ii.
Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid
ground even if reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection
clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction.[34] What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.[35] The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,[36]
which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the
law;
(3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class.[37]
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these
deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of
reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential
treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to
the purpose of the law, because “whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain,” viz.:
… For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member
of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the
Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign
affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
[Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still
use the resources of his office to support his campaign.[38]
Sad to
state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to
remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of
the evil at once; it may proceed “one step at a time.”[39] In
addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices,
thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.[40]
Nevertheless, as long as “the bounds of reasonable choice” are not exceeded,
the courts must defer to the legislative judgment.[41] We
may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been
more fully achieved by expanding the class.[42]
Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.[43]
There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and
every class to which it might be applied;[44] that
the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal
protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a
classification that is “palpably arbitrary or capricious.”[45] He
must refute all possible rational
bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those
bases as reasons for the enactment,[46] such
that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the
reasonableness of the classification is “fairly debatable.”[47] In
the case at bar, the petitioners failed – and in fact did not even attempt – to
discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a
sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient
grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s distinction is
unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy
standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason
for the differing treatment.[48]
In the instant case, is
there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation
of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people.[49]
It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote.[50]
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably
be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions
in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected.
In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely
to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.[51] (emphasis
in the original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would
have us “equalize the playing field” by invalidating provisions of law that
seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal
protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and
vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over
another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of
that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials
(vis-à-vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the
electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring – but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the
Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our
constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make
policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly
within the Legislature’s power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought
to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in
favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto
itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of
affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii.
Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence
to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and
extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.[52] This
was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a similar
statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is
“inextricably linked” with two fundamental freedoms – freedom of expression and
association;
(2) Any legislative classification that
significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal
protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling
interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force,
the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed
manner as to render them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the
exhortation that since “the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in
question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being
unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit.”
Our
assailed Decision’s reliance on Mancuso
is completely misplaced. We cannot
blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its
promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter
Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.[53] and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al.,[54] the United
States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions
prohibiting federal[55] and state[56] employees
from taking an
active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results
in dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions
compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i)
in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests
that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of
the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate
interest of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in
promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees’ expression
interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning
services, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the
Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which
positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions.[57] Therefore, insofar as government
employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an
interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness
of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question.[58]
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until
now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have
been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if
the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play
their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to
be sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed
on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of
view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They
discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek
to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence
anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v.
Board of Education,[59]
the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and ‘the speech of its
employees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
(government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.’ Although Congress is free to
strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance
it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests sought
to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained
in the Hatch Act.
It
seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of
the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the
will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a
political party. They are expected to enforce the law and
execute the programs
of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party
or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of
the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial
execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees, for example, not
take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial
roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan
political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to
fair and effective government.
There
is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the
Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to
the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.
Another
major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal
employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in
1939. That was the conviction that the
rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a
powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience
of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were
sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against the party
in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the thousands or
hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man
its political structure and political campaigns.
A
related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further
serve the goal that employment and
advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and
at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure
and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform
political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to
act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions
against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint
judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of
federal employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and
beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence
or coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation
for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission stated that ‘the prohibitions against active
participation in partisan political management and partisan political campaigns
constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . ..’ Perhaps
Congress at some time will come to a different view of the realities of
political life and Government service; but that is its current view of the
matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view,
does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither
the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute in any event.[60]
x x x
x x x x
As we see it, our task is not to
destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of
Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.
(italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that
the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally permissible, viz.:
Appellants do not question
We have held today that the Hatch
Act is not impermissibly vague.[61]
We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that ‘men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’[62]
Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to
suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it
proscribes or fails to set out ‘explicit standards' for those who must apply it.
In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from being
‘an officer or member’ of a ‘partisan political club’ or a candidate for ‘any
paid public office.’ It forbids solicitation of contributions ‘for any
political organization, candidacy or other political purpose’ and taking part
‘in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political
campaign.’ Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch
Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as
‘partisan,’ or ‘take part in,’ or ‘affairs of’ political parties. But what was
said in Letter Carriers, is
applicable here: ‘there are limitations in the English language with respect to
being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the
prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they
are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense
can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public
interest.' x x x
x
x x x
[Appellants] nevertheless maintain
that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as well as
unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to
be incapable of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the
overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner here.
x
x x x
The
consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First
Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is
totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine
in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the
Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x x x
x x x But the plain import of our
cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an
exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure
speech’ toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests
in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Although such laws,
if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there
comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence,
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from
enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to
proscribe. To put the matter another
way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is
our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever
overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace
statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at
political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818
is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The
statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and
neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a
less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818
regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to
state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass.
This much was established in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in
Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s 818
is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from:
soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other
partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local
committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan
political clubs, or candidates for any
paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any
political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or
alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or
taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting
votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get
voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign
literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding
in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.
x
x x It may be that such restrictions are
impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other improper
applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be
discarded in toto because some persons’ arguably protected conduct may or may
not be caught or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially
overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics
supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his
Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be
interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso,
since they “pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a
different set of facts,” viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service
Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act’s
prohibition against “active participation in political management or political campaigns.”
The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to
encourage and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to
participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a
political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague
and overbroad a provision in the (sic)
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation
provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil
service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination
as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston
then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City
Home Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited
We hold, however, that his position
is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved
a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the
constitutionality of §14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits “continuing in the classified service of the
city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public
office.”
(2) Letter Carriers
involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was
enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act’s prohibition against
“active participation in political management or political campaigns”[63] with
respect to certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The
plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are:
(a) The National Association of Letter
Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of, among others,
running in local elections for offices such as school board member, city
council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he
desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough
Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan
election would endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he
desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election for the
mayor of
The Hatch Act defines
“active participation in political management or political campaigns” by
cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule
pertinent to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy
for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or municipal office
is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not
merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries
leading to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing
or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that
candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the
efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence
constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity.
(italics supplied)
Section 9(b) requires the
immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds
thereafter to pay compensation to these persons.[64]
(3) Broadrick was
a class action brought by certain
Consequently, it cannot be denied that
Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the
imagination could Mancuso still be
held operative, as Letter Carriers and
Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were
decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It
was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals – the same court
that decided Mancuso – to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch[65] that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:
Magill involved
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in
this manner even though the election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for
the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active
bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt
political foes. Ruled the court:
The question before us is whether
x x x x
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district
court recognized, is to apply the Court’s
interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in
this record. We believe that the district
court found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains
after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political
candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be trenched upon only if less
restrictive alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be
viable for citizens who are not government employees, the Court in Letter
Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the
conduct and speech of its employees differs significantly from its interest in
regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only was United Public
Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave
little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of
government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to
the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit
in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing'
process".[68] It appears that the
government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits
substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough
to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x x x (italics supplied)
Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in
question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental
interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the
In Letter
Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an
efficient government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The
district court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not
likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation
undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned.
But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient
administration could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into
broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of administration favoritism
in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and
purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second
governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political
justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the
appearance of political preferment in privileges, concessions, and benefits.
The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors evidently
feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election
process. Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and
party rivalry is the norm, the city might reasonably fear that politically
active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends and
hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly
fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition
of all employee campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign,
the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily
identified.
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger
of a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing
federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court felt this
was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in
fact candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be
highly effective both in determining who would emerge from the primary election
and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs,
known party affiliation and support were highly significant factors in
The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that
employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both
coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. The district court
did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil
servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of
a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the
possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in
municipal elections as it was in Letter
Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of
public servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as
the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public
employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be
inclined to ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan
context, but without party officials looking over their shoulders most
supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict
its employees' participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if political
parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party
involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified by the
The court, however, remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings in respect of the petitioners’ overbreadth
charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is “not to be
taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,” the court held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial"
overbreadth in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in
constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when
the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend
the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define
"substantial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that
case had solicited support for a candidate, and they were subject to discipline
under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including soliciting
contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court
found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The
facts of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result without
worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech and
conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial
overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning.
The state of
the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to
be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the
short period before the election was held, was on the constitutionality of the
statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not
justified, but they should be afforded
the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a
significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees
would not pose the possible threats to government efficiency and integrity
which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant.
Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim.
(italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by
the ponencia, has effectively been
overruled.[69] As it is no longer good law, the ponencia’s exhortation that “[since] the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure
for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit”
is misplaced and unwarranted.[70]
Accordingly, our assailed Decision’s
submission that the
right to run for public office is “inextricably linked” with two fundamental
freedoms – those of expression and association – lies on barren ground.
American case law has in fact never
recognized a fundamental right to express one’s political views through
candidacy,[71] as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.[72] Bart v. Telford[73] pointedly stated that
“[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public
office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either.”
Thus, one’s interest in seeking office, by
itself, is not entitled to
constitutional protection.[74] Moreover,
one cannot bring one’s action under the rubric of freedom of association,
absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is
advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.[75]
Prescinding
from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the
case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The
deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service
faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance
of the appearance of “political justice” as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees
achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion
and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the
non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective
office.
En passant, we find it quite ironic that
Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v.
Fashing[76] and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary
Commission of the State of
…
This reading is a regrettable
misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions in
these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular
officials (vis-à-vis a general class); the questioned provisions were found
valid precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and
found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the claim that
the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to
the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States
Supreme Court:
Article XVI, § 65, of the
Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically
resign their positions if they become candidates for any other elected office,
unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less. The
burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those
imposed by § 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same
state interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient, however, not because
of the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but
because of the manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court, the classification system cannot
survive equal protection scrutiny, because Texas has failed to explain
sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to § 65 and why
others are not. As with the case of § 19, we conclude that § 65 survives a
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that
there is no rational predicate to the classification scheme.
The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the
"one step at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with
regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that
sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional
provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of
those offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision
also staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and
local offices would be contested at each election. The automatic resignation
proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic
resignation provision was added in Art. XI, § 11, which applies to
officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years.
Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending the terms of
municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic
resignation provision in
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that
the dissenters took the Morial line
that “there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office” out of context. A correct
reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its
ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would
necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis-à-vis the
specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public
employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably entitled
to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's
decision should be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from
expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner that does
not interfere with the proper performance of their public duties. In today's
decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general
restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the
methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign
his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a
reasonably necessary relation to the achievement of the state's interest in
preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a
requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression
and association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. (italics supplied)
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted
Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the
legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions
require restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left
unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the
positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
13 of RA 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code
Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1)
The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto;[79] and
(2)
The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants
holding appointive positions without due regard for the type of office being
sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
municipal or barangay level.
Again, on second look, we have to
revise our assailed Decision.
i.
Limitation on
Candidacy Regardless of
Incumbent Appointive Official’s Position, Valid
According
to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee
running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to
be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent
appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to
consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by
the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a “powerful political machine” that has amassed
“the scattered powers of government workers” so as to give itself and its
incumbent workers an “unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.”[80] As elucidated in our prior exposition:[81]
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over
others or to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote
their own candidacy may seem tolerable – even innocuous – particularly when
viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees.
Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more)
realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts,
when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging
central party structure to advance its own agenda through a “carefully
orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials” coming from various
levels of the bureaucracy.
…[T]he avoidance of such a “politically active public
work force” which could give an emerging political machine an “unbreakable
grasp on the reins of power” is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as
to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of
influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)
ii.
Limitation on
Candidacy
Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that
the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made to
apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices,
without due regard for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the
assumption that “the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it
fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed
from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,”[82] so
that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged
provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the elective office
sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such
restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective
offices, the challenged restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the
challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the alleged
overbreadth is more apparent than real.
Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose
that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of
certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.[83] Obviously, these rules and guidelines,
including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections,
which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan
in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA
8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge
leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA
9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related
laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not
intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The
only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for
barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this country which
involve nonpartisan public offices.[84]
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far
back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has
intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections
be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations
which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provision
states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person
shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad
ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in
triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election period but not
later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be
prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for
which he is a candidate.
x x x x
Any elective
or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those
in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned
or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the
filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay
elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present
state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy
found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the
proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. [85]
In any event, even if we were to assume,
for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply
also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge
would still be futile. Again, we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited
to controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial imprimatur,
because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is
simply that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech
of its employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.[86]
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional
or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this
case, “conduct” and not “pure speech” is involved, the overbreadth must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.[87]
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of
a statute’s overbreadth would entail, among other things, a rough balancing of
the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid
applications.[88] In this regard, some
sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched
does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable.[89] The
question is a matter of degree.[90]
Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan
distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this
distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge
presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the
number of potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were
insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to appointive
employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the
statute.[91]
The state of the record, however, does not permit us
to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly,
much less to be taken in the dark,[92]
especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit
the State from ‘enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is
admittedly within its power to proscribe.’[93]
This Court would do well to proceed
with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the
overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to
restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such
approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as
a last resort.[94]
In the United States, claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the
court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and
perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some
unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished.[95]
Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction
could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent
constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged
overbreadth of the statute.[96]
In the case at bar, the probable harm
to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even
as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of
having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect
of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably
impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are, at best,
bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from
enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been,
unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe.[97]
Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably
impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than
through a total invalidation of the statute itself.[98]
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our
assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration,
intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had
already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their
posts.[99]
Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of
Candidacy in their respective provinces.[100]
Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for
representative of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009[101] –
even as her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City
and Provincial Prosecutors,[102]
who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers.[103] The
Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South
has thrown his hat into the political arena.
We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their
favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now
rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which
merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the
respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET
ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE
this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section
13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, the Decision was promulgated on a vote of 8-6. Justices Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, and Del Castillo concurred. Justices Peralta, Abad and Villarama joined the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Puno, while Justices Carpio and Carpio Morales wrote separate Dissenting Opinions.
[2] SEC.
15. Official Ballot. –
x x x x
For this purpose, the
Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of the certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon that start of the campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certification of candidacy. (italics supplied)
[3]
SECTION 66. Candidates holding appointive
office or positions. — Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
[4]
SECTION 4. Effects of Filing Certificates
of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
[5] Sec. 2. Rules
applicable. The
procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rule, subject to the
following provisions:
a) All references
in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the
Supreme Court;
b) The portions of
ssaid Rules dealing strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases
in the Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and
c) Eighteen (18)
clearly legible copies of the petition shall be filed, together with proof of
service on all adverse parties.
The proceedings for disciplinary action against
members of the judiciary shall be governed by the laws and Rules prescribed
therefor, and those against attorneys by Rule 139-B, as amended.
[6] Section 1. Period
for filing. A party
may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse
party.
[7] Secretary of Agrarian Reform et al. v. Tropical Homes, G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799, July 31, 2001, 362 SCRA 115.
[8] Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155771, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 273.
[9] Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45168, September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238.
[10] Mago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115624, February 25, 1999, 300 SCRA 600.
[11] G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995, 240 SCRA 649.
[12] Heirs
of Geronimo Restrivera v. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 146540,
[13] See Mago v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
[14] Manila Railroad Company v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 (1912). See also Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 246, and Mago v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10 at 234.
[15] Manila Railroad Company v. Attorney-General, id. at 530.
[16] Motion for Leave to Intervene dated December 14, 2009, p. 2.
[17]
SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. — Sections
67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections
10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or
amended accordingly. (italics supplied)
[18]
SECTION 67. Candidates holding elective office. — Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
[19] SECTION 11. Official Ballot. —
x x x x
For this purpose, the
deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later
than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any
elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than
the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president
and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the
campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running:
Provided, further, That, x x x. (italics supplied)
[20] Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 536.
[21] Section 2(1), Article
IX-B, 1987 Constitution.
[22] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, p. 5.
[23] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, p. 6.
[24] Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 573.
[25] G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 503.
[26]
[27] Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249.
[28]
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (
[29] Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142947, March 19, 2002, 379 SCRA
463, 469 citing 21 Corpus Juris Secundum §190.
[30]
[31]
[32] Supra note 29.
[33]
[34] The Philippine Judges Association, et al. v.
Prado, et al., G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 712.
[35]
[36] The National Police Commission v. De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994,
229 SCRA 801, 809.
[37] People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
[38] Decision, p. 23.
[39] Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 577, 494 A.2d 294 (1985).
[40]
[41] Taxpayers Ass'n of
[42] Robbiani v. Burke, 77 N.J. 383, 392-93, 390 A.2d 1149 (1978).
[43] De Guzman, et al. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 188, 197; City of St. Louis v. Liberman, 547 S.W.2d 452 (1977); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 605 F.Supp. 555 (1984);
[44] State v. Ewing, 518 S.W.2d 643 (1975); Werner v.
[45] Chamber of Commerce of the
[46] Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, supra note 44.
[47]
[48]
[49] Taule v.
[50]
[51] Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, pp. 60-61.
[52] 476 F.2d 187 (1973).
[53] 413
[54] 413
[55] Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act provides:
An employee in an Executive agency
or an individual employed by the government of the
(1) use his official authority or
influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an
election; or
(2) take an active part in political
management or in political campaigns. ‘For the purpose of this subsection, the
phrase ‘an active part in political management or in political campaigns' means
those acts of political management or political campaigning which were
prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19,
1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules
prescribed by the President.
[56] Section 818 of
(1) No person in the classified
service shall be appointed to, or demoted or dismissed from any position in the
classified service, or in any way favored or discriminated against with respect
to employment in the classified service because of his political or religious
opinions or affiliations, or because of race, creed, color or national origin
or by reason of any physical handicap so long as the physical handicap does not
prevent or render the employee less able to do the work for which he is
employed.
(2) No person shall use or promise
to use, directly or indirectly, any official authority or influence, whether
possessed or anticipated, to secure or attempt to secure for any person an
appointment or advantage in appointment to a position in the classified
service, or an increase in pay or other advantage in employment in any such
position, for the purpose of influencing the vote or political action of any
person, or for consideration; provided, however, that letters of inquiry,
recommendation and reference by public employees of public officials shall not
be considered official authority or influence unless such letter contains a
threat, intimidation, irrelevant, derogatory or false information.
(3) No person shall make any false
statement, certificate, mark, rating, or report with regard to any test,
certification or appointment made under any provision of this Act or in any
manner commit any fraud preventing the impartial execution of this Act and
rules made hereunder.
(4) No employee of the department,
examiner, or other person shall defeat, deceive, or obstruct any person in his
or her right to examination, eligibility, certification, or appointment under
this law, or furnish to any person any special or secret information for the
purpose of effecting (sic) the rights or prospects of any person with respect
to employment in the classified service.
(5) No person shall, directly or
indirectly, give, render, pay, offer, solicit, or accept any money, service, or
other valuable consideration for or on account of any appointment, proposed
appointment, promotion, or proposed promotion to, or any advantage in, a
position in the classified service.
(6) No employee in the classified
service, and no member of the Personnel Board shall, directly or indirectly,
solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving any
assessment, subscription or contribution for any political organization,
candidacy or other political purpose; and no state officer or state employee in
the unclassified service shall solicit or receive any such assessment,
subscription or contribution from an employee in the classified service.
(7) No employee in the classified
service shall be a member of any national, state or local committee of a
political party, or an officer or member of a committee of a partisan political
club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office, or
shall take part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any
political campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen privately to
express his opinion and to cast his vote.
(8) Upon a showing of substantial
evidence by the Personnel Director that any officer or employee in the state
classified service, has knowingly violate any of the provisions of this
Section, the State Personnel Board shall notify the officer or employee so
charged and the appointing authority under whose jurisdiction the officer or
employee serves. If the officer or employee so desires, the State Personnel
Board shall hold a public hearing, or shall authorize the Personnel Director to
hold a public hearing, and submit a transcript thereof, together with a
recommendation, to the State Personnel Board. Relevant witnesses shall be
allowed to be present and testify at such hearings. If the officer or employee
shall be found guilty by the State Personnel Board of the violation of any
provision of this Section, the Board shall direct the appointing authority to
dismiss such officer or employee; and the appointing authority so directed
shall comply.
[57] See also Anderson
v. Evans, 660 F2d 153 (1981).
[58] Morial, et al. v.
Judiciary Commission of the State of
[59] 391
[60] See,
e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1
(1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-141, 92 S.Ct. 849, 854-855, 31
L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10-11, 21
L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).
[61]
[62] Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269
[63] Section 9(a), Hatch Act.
[64] In
1950, Section 9(b) of the Hatch Act was amended by providing the exception that
the Civil Service Commission, by unanimous vote, could impose a lesser penalty,
but in no case less than 90 days’ suspension without pay. In 1962, the period
was reduced to 30 days’ suspension without pay. The general rule, however,
remains to be removal from office.
[65] 560 F.2d 22 (1977).
[66] The relevant charter provisions read as follows:
x x x x
(5) No appointed official, employee or member of any board or commission of the city, shall be a member of any national, state or local committee of a political party or organization, or an officer of a partisan political organization, or take part in a political campaign, except his right privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote.
(6) No appointed official or employee of the city and no member of any board or commission shall be a candidate for nomination or election to any public office, whether city, state or federal, except elected members of boards or commissions running for re-election, unless he shall have first resigned his then employment or office.
x x x x
[67] See also Davis, R., Prohibiting Public Employee from Running
for Elective Office as Violation of Employee’s Federal Constitutional Rights,
44 A.L.R. Fed. 306.
[68] Alderman v.
[69] Fernandez v. State
Personnel Board, et al., 175
[70] Dissenting Opinion of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, pp. 51-56.
[71] Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 65 USLW
2476 (1997); American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1101 (1997); NAACP,
[72] Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (1977).
[73] 677 F.2d 622, 624 (1982).
[74] Newcomb v. Brennan, supra note 72.
[75]
[76] Supra note 71.
[77] Supra note 58.
[78] The provision in question in Clements covers District Clerks,
[79] Decision, pp. 25-26.
[80] Magill v. Lynch, supra note 65.
[81] Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, p. 63.
[82] Decision, p. 27, citing Mancuso v. Taft, supra note 52.
[83] See rollo, p.3, where the titular heading, as well as the first paragraph of Resolution 8678, refers to the contents of said Resolution as the “Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.”
[84] The Sangguniang Kabataan elections, although
nonpartisan in character, are not relevant to the present inquiry, because they
are unlikely to involve the candidacies of appointive public officials.
[85] Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, pp. 64-65.
[86] Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp. 818 (1976).
[87] Broadrick v.
[88] Magill v. Lynch, supra note 65.
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93] Broadrick v.
[94]
[95]
[96] Mining v. Wheeler, 378 F. Supp. 1115 (1974).
[97] Broadrick v.
[98] Aiello v.
[99] Motion for Reconsideration dated December 16, 2009, p. 2.
[100]
[101]
[102] Revised administrative code, title 3, book iv, Chapter 8, Sec. 39
[103] Republic Act No. 6646, Sec. 20.