EN BANC
|
MOZART P. PANLAQUI,
Petitioner, -
versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and NARDO M. VELASCO,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 188671 Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: February 24, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition is one for certiorari.
Petitioner Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui) assails the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc Resolution of June 17, 2009 denying his motion for proclamation, which he filed after this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051[1] the nullification of the proclamation of private respondent Nardo Velasco (Velasco) as mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
Velasco was born in Sasmuan on
Upon Velasco’s application for dual
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225[2]
was approved on
On
On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by Decision of
In
the meantime, Velasco filed on
In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of Sasmuan. As the Comelec failed to resolve Panlaqui’s petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the duties of the office.
Finding
material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec cancelled his
COC and nullified his proclamation, by Resolutions of
Panlaqui
thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec denied by the
assailed Resolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does not operate
in favor of Panlaqui as the second placer because Velasco was not disqualified
by final judgment before election
day.
Hence,
the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Comelec for not regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final judgment
of disqualification against Velasco prior to the elections, so as to fall
within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on Elections[5] on
the exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.
Velasco
filed his Comment of
In his present petition, Panlaqui implores this Court
to apply in his favor the case of Cayat where
the Court affirmed, inter alia, the
Comelec Order directing the proclamation of the second placer as Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet in this wise:
There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.
First, the COMELEC First
Division’s Resolution of
Second,
there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer. The
doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the
present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s
disqualification remained pending on election day,
Repackaging the present petition in Cayat’s
fashion, Panlaqui asserts that the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision in the voter’s
inclusion proceedings must be considered as the final judgment of
disqualification against Velasco, which decision was issued more than two
months prior to the elections. Panlaqui
posits that when Velasco’s petition for inclusion was denied, he was also
declared as disqualified to run for public office.
Unwrapping the present petition, the Court finds that
the true color of the issue of distinction between a petition for inclusion of
voters in the list and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy has already been defined in Velasco v. Commission on Elections[8]
where the Court held that the two proceedings may ultimately have common
factual bases but they are poles apart in terms of the issues, reliefs and
remedies involved, thus:
In terms
of purpose, voters’ inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are
different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a
voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application
to be a candidate. Because of their
differing purposes, they also involve different issues and entail different
reliefs, although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where
they may be said to converge or interface. x x x[9] (underscoring supplied)
Voters’ inclusion/exclusion
proceedings, on the
one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be
included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications
required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these
qualifications.[10]
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation
proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of
a material fact. The false
representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to
a material fact or those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for
elective office. Apart from the
requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public
office.[11]
In Velasco, the Court rejected Velasco’s
contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to vote when it
cancelled his COC. The Court stated that
the Comelec merely relied on or recognized the RTC’s final and executory
decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaqui’s turn to
proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC properly cancelled Velasco’s COC
when it ruled on his right to vote. The
Court rejects the same.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the
presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of
whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an
intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public
office. The finding that Velasco was not
qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate into
a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render him ineligible.
Assuming arguendo
the plausibility of Panlaqui’s theory, the Comelec correctly observed that when
the RTC issued its
IN FINE, the Comelec did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it denied Panlaqui’s motion for proclamation. Since Velasco’s disqualification
as a candidate had not become final before
the elections, the Comelec properly applied the rule on succession.
x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. x x x[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Velasco
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180051,
[2] Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (
[3] The
RTC found that Velasco was ineligible to vote since he failed to comply with
the residency requirement, citing the rule that naturalization in a foreign
country results in the abandonment of the domicile in the
[4] The appellate court reversed its
[5] G.R.
No. 163776,
[6] The
Court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration, by Resolution of
[7] Cayat v. Commission on Elections, supra note 5 at 43.
[8] Supra note 1.
[9]
[10] Ibid.
[11]
[12]
Kare v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 157526,