Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE
OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - LEOZAR
DELA CRUZ y BALOBAL,
Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 188353 Present: VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
PERALTA,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: February
16, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Leozar
Dela Cruz appeals to us the Decision[1]
dated February 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02562,
which affirmed with modification the September 5, 2006 Decision[2] in
Criminal Case No. 03-2871 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62 in Makati
City. The RTC convicted him of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
The Facts
In
an Information[3] filed on
August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal was indicted for
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
allegedly committed as follows:
That on
or about the 30th day of April, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a samurai, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, and with superior strength did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack with a samurai one VINCENT
PIMENTEL Y APOON cutting the latter’s neck thereby inflicting mortal wounds
which directly caused his untimely death.
Upon
arraignment, Elmer pleaded not guilty to the above charge.
Gleaned
from the testimonies of eye-witness Sheryll C. Blanco; Carolina Agullana, the
common-law wife of the victim; Police Officer 2 Ricardo Valenton Tan, who
investigated the crime; and Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Dr. Benjamin Venancio J.
Lara, the facts as found by the trial court and established by the prosecution
are as follows:
In
the evening of April 30, 2003, at about quarter past 7 o’clock, Leozar, a
part-time tricycle driver, was standing about two meters from Sheryll who was
with her friends Arman Taculod and Mark Anthony Medida with his wife Charissema
Daton. Sheryll and her friends were passing
time and seated at
Meanwhile,
arriving from
Subsequently,
on February 10, 2005 or almost two years after the killing, when Sheryll went
to the Makati City Jail to visit her live-in partner, she saw Leozar—detained
for the killing of Vincent—who told her not to testify against him.[7]
On
the other hand, Leozar denied the charges against him and proffered the defense
of alibi. His defense was that he could
not have been at the scene of the killing for he was drinking with his friend
Mark Magat at the latter’s house located on Bougainvilla St., Barangay Pembo, Makati City, from 3:00
p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and passed the night at the latter’s place as he got
drunk. This alibi was corroborated by
the testimonies of Mark[8]
and Mark’s father and grandmother, Pedro Magat[9]
and Emolina Buccat.[10]
The
defense likewise presented Leozar’s co-detainees at the Makati City Jail, Mark
Anthony and Christopher Labradores. Mark
Anthony testified on seeing Mark with Vincent just prior to the killing and
seeing Mark toting a samurai immediately after the killing.[11] Christopher testified that he was cooking at
his house in Block 131, Lot 10,
It
must be noted that Arman Taculod died before he could testify for the
prosecution. It is quite apparent that
the defense tried to pin Arman as the assailant of Vincent, perhaps on account
of his death. This is quite unbelievable
for it was Arman who accompanied
Mark
Anthony, however, could not, when shown his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[14] explain
why he identified Leozar as the assailant of Vincent. (It must be noted that he was an eyewitness
to the crime being with Mark Magat, Sheryll, and his wife Charissema when the
incident happened.) He merely denied
executing it and averred that all he could recall was that the police coerced
him to sign a blank piece of paper with the promise that they will give him
money so he can go home to
The Ruling
of the RTC
On
September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view thereof, the Court, in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
Murder qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery without an
mitigating circumstance being proven, the Court sentences Leozar dela Cruz y
Balobal to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and orders him to pay moral
damages of P100,000 in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
The
trial court found the testimony of eye-witness Sheryll of how the killing
transpired to be factual, straightforward, and convincing. She was unwavering and certain in her
identification of Leozar as the assailant of Vincent. The testimony of Vincent’s common-law wife
Maintaining,
however, that the crime committed was only homicide, Leozar appealed the above decision
to the appellate court.
The Ruling
of the CA
On
February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the appealed decision, affirming the
findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of
damages. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that the award of moral damages is reduced to PHP50,000.00 and PHP 25,000.00
is additionally awarded as exemplary damages. In all other respects the
appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
With double costs against the appellant.
SO
ORDERED.[16]
At
the outset, the appellate court aptly noted that Leozar, in his appeal, no
longer disputes the fact that he committed the killing of Vincent. The sole question remaining is whether the
killing of Vincent was attended with treachery so as to qualify the crime to
murder.
In
rejecting Leozar’s contention that there was no treachery and in affirming the
factual findings of the RTC, the appellate court held that the prosecution
sufficiently established all the elements of treachery as enumerated in People
v. Aguila[17] and People
v. Recepcion.[18] Moreover, citing People v. Agudez,[19]
it ratiocinated that the use of the samurai with a 24-inch blade which
inflicted the fatal wound and the location of the wound at the neck of Vincent
demonstrated the deliberate and treacherous nature of the assault.
The
CA’s modified decision granted exemplary damages of PhP 25,000 following People
v. Galigao,[20] and
reduced moral damages to PhP 50,000 in conformity with People v. Samson.[21] Thus, the instant appeal is before us.
The Issues
Both
accused-appellant Leozar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the People of the Philippines, opted not to file any supplemental
brief, since neither are there new issues raised nor are there supervening
events transpired. They correspondingly filed their respective Manifestation
and Motion[22] and Manifestation,[23]
to the effect that the Brief for the Accused-Appellant[24]
and Brief for the Appellee[25] filed
before the CA are adopted in this appeal.
Leozar
raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first,
that the courts a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery; and second, that the courts a quo
gravely erred in convicting him of murder instead of homicide.
The
Court’s Ruling
The
appeal is without merit.
Murder
is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage
of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2.
In consideration of a price, reward, or
promise;
3.
By means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4.
On occasion of any calamities enumerated
in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
5.
With evident premeditation;
6.
With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at
his person or corpse. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus,
for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2)
through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances,
duly alleged in the Information.
Generally, the elements of murder are:
1.
That a person was killed.
2.
That the accused killed him.
3.
That the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4.
The killing is not parricide or
infanticide.[26]
Here,
the fact of the death of Vincent Pimentel is undisputed, that it is neither
parricide nor infanticide, and that Leozar killed him. This was established by the trial and
appellate courts. In fact, in his appeal
before the CA and the one at bench, Leozar solely questions the appreciation of
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, which, if not
appreciated, would make the offense he committed merely homicide instead of
murder.
What
is, thus, before us is the same core issue resolved by the CA on whether the
killing of Vincent Pimentel was attended by treachery. In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial
court correctly appreciated, as affirmed by the CA, the qualifying aggravating circumstance
of treachery.
There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.[27] The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.[28] For treachery to be considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons
attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[29]
Thus,
the issue of the presence of treachery hinges on the account of eyewitness
Sheryll. She was not only certain and
unwavering in her positive identification of accused-appellant Leozar as the assailant
of Vincent Pimentel, but her testimony, aptly noted by the courts a quo,
was factual, straightforward, and convincing on how the murder transpired. To quote directly from her testimony:
Fiscal
Odronia: Was accused Leozar
Dela Cruz already holding a samurai
when he walked to the alley?
Sheryll: None yet, sir.
Q: So, you’re telling this Honorable court
that it was only after he came out from the alley that you saw him holding a
samurai?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: And the place where you were, could you
still see Leozar Dela Cruz?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: Do you know how much Vic Pimentel paid
Leozar Dela Cruz?
A: Fifty Pesos (Php50.00), sir.
Q: How did you get to know that Vic
Pimentel paid the amount of Php50.00 to Leozar Dela Cruz?
A: We heard it, sir.
Q: Was Leozar Dela Cruz still holding the
samurai which you earlier claimed he was holding when Vic Pimentel paid him
Php50.00?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When Vic Pimentel paid Php50.00 Leozar
Dela Cruz, did they converse afterwards?
A: No more, sir, then he proceeded to
Mocking Bird [sic] Street.
Q: Immediately after Vic Pimentel paid
Leozar Dela Cruz, what did Vic Pimentel do?
A: He walked towards at [sic]
Q: So, are you telling this Honorable Court
that he went away from where Leozar Dela Cruz was at that time?
A: Yes, sir, because he went somewhere.
Q: So, when Vic Pimentel walked away from
Leozar Dela Cruz, what else happened, if any?
A: When he emerged from the alley
(eskinita) Leozar put his arms around him and then he slit (ginilitan) his neck.
Q: What did Leozar Dela Cruz use in
slashing the neck of Vincent Pimentel?
A: Samurai, sir.
Q: Earlier you mentioned that Vic Pimentel
entered an alley, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he emerged from the alley
Leozar Dela Cruz in the vernacular “inakbayan siya” and afterwards slashed his
neck, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: Are you telling this Honorable Court
that the place where Leozar Dela Cruz slashed the neck of Vincent Pimentel is
precisely the same place where Vincent Pimentel paid Leozar Dela Cruz Php50.00?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With that answer would you mind then to
reconcile your earlier answer that after Vincent Pimentel paid Leozar Dela Cruz
fifty pesos he walked away?
A: He left, sir, then when he emerged from
the alley while he was walking Leozar approached him and then it also happened
there almost at exactly at the same place where he paid.
x x x x
Q: When Vincent Pimentel paid Leozar
Dela Cruz the amount of fifty pesos, did they quarrel?
A: No, sir.
Q: Immediately before Leozar Dela Cruz
in the vernacular “inakbayan si Vincent Pimentel” did they quarrel?
A: No, sir.
Q: So, after Leozar Dela Cruz slashed the
neck of Vincent Pimentel, what else happened, if any?
A: After that, he ran and Vic was still
walking towards
Q: How about the samurai which you claimed
Leozar Dela Cruz using slashing the neck of Vincent Pimentel, did Leozar Dela
Cruz taking with him when he [ran] away?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far were you in relation to the
place where Leozar Dela Cruz in the vernacular “inakbayan si Vincent Pimentel”
and slashed his neck?
A: From my place to where you are seated.
FISCAL
ODRONIA: May we ask if the
defense is willing to stipulate that the distance is around two (2) to three
(3) meters, Your Honor.
ATTY.
PAGGAO: We stipulate, Your Honor.
COURT: Noted.
Fiscal
Odronia: By the way, you
mentioned about samurai could you mind to describe to the Honorable Court how
long that samurai is?
A: Around twenty four (24) inches.
COURT: What else did you notice?
A: No more, Your Honor.
x x x x
Fiscal
Odronia: Earlier you mentioned
and you actually identified the person by the name of Leozar Dela Cruz, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: My question is, how is this Leozar Dela
Cruz related to the Leozar Dela Cruz, which you claimed you saw in the
vernacular “inakbayan si Vincent Pimentel” and slashed Vincent Pimentel’s neck?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And is this Leozar Dela Cruz present
in the courtroom today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And can you identify if he is indeed
present in this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to him if he is indeed
present?
A: Yes, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness tapped the shoulder of the accused
and when asked his name he identified himself as Leozar Dela Cruz.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
From
the foregoing transcript, it is clear that the attack was sudden affording the
victim absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, much less to
retaliate. The above testimony was not
at all rebutted by the defense. And more
revealing is the fact that the appeal of Leozar merely focuses on the
appreciation of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, which for
all intents and purposes amounts to owning up to the killing of Vincent
Pimentel.
The
fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative
of the treachery employed by Leozar.
After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and went inside the
alley. When Vincent came back to
Finally,
as regards the damages awarded by the CA, we find them in order. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory
and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence or proof
of damages other than the commission of the crime.[31] Based on current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto
of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Vincent Pimentel is in order.[32] The CA also
correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP 50,000 in view of the
violent death of the victim and the resultant grief to his family.[33]
Moreover,
if a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or
generic, an award of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages is justified under Art.
2230 of the Civil Code. Besides, the
entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary
damages is proper.[34]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the CA’s February 27, 2008
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 02562, in that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to PhP 30,000.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alińo-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 19-30. Penned by Judge Selma Palacio Alaras.
[3]
[4]
TSN,
[5]
TSN,
[6] Records, p. 110, Death Certificate of Vincent Pimentel.
[7]
TSN,
[8]
TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10]
TSN,
[11]
TSN,
[12]
TSN,
[13] Records, pp. 9-11.
[14]
[15] CA rollo, p. 30.
[16] Rollo, p. 18.
[17]
G.R. No. 171017,
[18]
G.R. Nos. 141943-45,
[19]
G.R. Nos. 138386-87,
[20]
G.R. Nos. 140961-63,
[21]
G.R. No. 124666,
[22] Rollo,
pp. 34-36, dated
[23]
[24] CA rollo, pp. 39-56.
[25]
[26] 2 L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 469 (16th ed., 2006).
[27] People
v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251 & 138606-07, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 218,
233; People v. Bato, G.R. No. 127843,
[28] People v. Albarido, G.R. No. 102367, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 194, 208; citing People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 130490, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 725, 746.
[29] People v. Amazan, supra note 27.
[30]
TSN,
[31] People
v. Ausa, G.R. No. 174194,
[32]
[33] People
v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[34] Frias
v. San Diego-Sison, G.R. No. 155223,