Republic of
the
Supreme Court
|
SILKAIR
( Petitioner, -
versus - COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 184398
Present: PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 25, 2010 |
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the May 27,
2008 Decision[1] and the
subsequent September 5, 2008 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. No. 267. The
decision dated May 27, 2008 denied the petition for review filed by petitioner
Silkair (
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner,
a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
Respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is impleaded herein in his official capacity as head of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), an attached agency of the Department of Finance which
is duly authorized to decide, approve, and grant refunds and/or tax credits of
erroneously paid or illegally collected internal revenue taxes.[3]
On June 24, 2002, petitioner filed
with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of Three Million Nine
Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Pesos and Forty-Nine Centavos
(P3,983,590.49) in excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid on
its purchases of aviation jet fuel from Petron Corporation (Petron) from June
to December 2000. Petitioner used as
basis therefor BIR Ruling No. 339-92 dated December 1, 1992, which declared
that the petitioner’s Singapore-Cebu-Singapore route is an international flight
by an international carrier and that the petroleum products purchased by the
petitioner should not be subject to excise taxes under Section 135 of Republic
Act No. 8424 or the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Since
the BIR took no action on petitioner’s claim for refund, petitioner sought
judicial recourse and filed on June 27, 2002, a petition for review with the
CTA (docketed as CTA Case No. 6491),
to prevent the lapse of
the two-year prescriptive period within which to judicially claim a refund
under Section 229[4] of the
NIRC. Petitioner invoked its exemption
from payment of excise taxes in accordance with the provisions of Section
135(b) of the NIRC, which exempts from excise taxes the entities covered by tax
treaties, conventions and other international agreements; provided that the
country of said carrier or exempt entity likewise exempts from similar taxes
the petroleum products sold to Philippine carriers or entities. In this regard,
petitioner relied on the reciprocity clause under Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement entered between the Republic of the
Section
135(b) of the NIRC provides:
SEC.
135. Petroleum
Products Sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities or Agencies. –
Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax:
x x x x
(b)
Exempt entities or agencies covered by tax treaties,
conventions and other international agreements for their use or consumption: Provided, however, That the country of said foreign international carrier or
exempt entities or agencies exempts from similar taxes petroleum products sold
to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies; x x x.
Article 4(2) of the Air Transport
Agreement between the
ART.
4. x x x.
x
x x x
(2)
Fuel, lubricants, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores introduced
into, or taken on board aircraft in the territory of one Contracting Party by,
or on behalf of, a designated airline of the other Contracting Party and
intended solely for use in the operation of the agreed services shall, with the
exception of charges corresponding to the service performed, be exempt from the
same customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes imposed in the
territory of the first Contracting Party, even when these supplies are to be
used on the parts of the journey performed over the territory of the
Contracting Party in which they are introduced into or taken on board. The materials referred to above may be
required to be kept under customs supervision and control.
In a Decision[5]
dated July 27, 2006, the CTA First Division found that petitioner was qualified
for tax exemption under Section 135(b) of the NIRC, as long as the
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CTA First Division denied the same in a Resolution[6]
dated January 17, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner elevated the
case before the CTA En Banc via
a petition for review, which was initially denied in a Resolution[7]
dated May 17, 2007 for failure of petitioner to establish its legal authority
to appeal the Decision dated July 27, 2006 and the Resolution dated January 17,
2007 of the CTA First Division.
Undaunted, petitioner moved for
reconsideration. In the Resolution[8]
dated September 19, 2007, the CTA En Banc set aside its earlier
resolution dismissing the petition for review and reinstated the same. It also required respondent to file his comment
thereon.
On May 27, 2008, the CTA En Banc
promulgated the assailed Decision and denied the petition for review, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated July 27, 2006 dismissing the instant petition on ground of failure of
petitioner to prove that it was authorized to operate in the Philippines for
the period from June to December 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that petitioner is further not found to
be the proper party to file the instant claim for refund.[9]
In
a separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,[10]
CTA Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta opined that petitioner was exempt from
the payment of excise taxes based on Section 135 of the NIRC and Article 4 of
the Air Transport Agreement between the
Petitioner again filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated September 5,
2008. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari, which raises the following issues:
I
Whether or not petitioner has substantially proven its
authority to operate in the
II
Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to claim
for the refund/tax credit of excise taxes paid on aviation fuel.
Petitioner
maintains that it has proven its authority to operate in the
[T]his Board
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves to APPROVE the petition of SILKAIR (SINGAPORE)
PTE LTD., for issuance of a regular operating permit (Foreign Air Carrier’s
Permit), subject to the approval of the President, pursuant to Sec. 10 of R.A.
776, as amended by P.D. 1462.[11]
Moreover,
petitioner argues that Exhibits “P,” “Q” and “R,” which it previously filed
with the CTA, were merely flight schedules submitted to the CAB, and were not its
operating permits. Petitioner adds that
it was through inadvertence that only photocopies of these exhibits were
introduced during the hearing.
Petitioner
also asserts that despite its failure to present the original copy of its SEC
Registration during the hearings, the CTA should take judicial notice of its
SEC Registration since the same was already offered and admitted in evidence in
similar cases pending before the CTA.
Petitioner
further claims that the instant case involves a clear grant of tax exemption to
it by law and by virtue of an international agreement between two
governments. Consequently, being the
entity which was granted the tax exemption and which made the erroneous tax
payment of the excise tax, it is the proper party to file the claim for refund.
In
his Comment[12] dated
March 26, 2009, respondent states that the admission in evidence of
petitioner’s FACP does not change the fact that petitioner failed to formally
offer in evidence the original copies or certified true copies of Exhibit “A,”
its SEC Registration; and Exhibits “P,” “Q” and “R,” its operating permits
issued by the CAB to fly its Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and
Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes for the period October 1999 to October
2000. Respondent emphasizes that
petitioner’s failure to present these pieces of evidence amounts to its failure
to prove its authority to operate in the
Likewise,
respondent maintains that an excise tax, being an indirect tax, is the direct
liability of the manufacturer or producer.
Respondent reiterates that when an excise tax on petroleum products is
added to the cost of goods sold to the buyer, it is no longer a tax but becomes
part of the price which the buyer has to pay to obtain the article. According to respondent, petitioner cannot
seek reimbursement for its alleged erroneous payment of the excise tax since it
is neither the entity required by law nor the entity statutorily liable to pay
the said tax.
After
careful examination of the records, we resolve to deny the petition.
Petitioner’s
assertion that the CTA may take judicial notice of its SEC Registration,
previously offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases before the CTA, is
untenable.
We
quote with approval the disquisition of the CTA En Banc in its Decision
dated May 27, 2008 on the non-admission of petitioner’s Exhibits “A,” “P,” “Q”
and “R,” to wit:
Anent petitioner’s argument that the Court in Division
should have taken judicial notice of the existence of Exhibit “A” (petitioner’s
SEC Certificate of Registration), although not properly identified during trial
as this has previously been offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases
involving the subject matter between the same parties before this Court, We are
in agreement with the ruling of the Court in Division, as discussed in its
Resolution dated April 12, 2005 resolving petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration on the court’s non-admission of Exhibits “A”, “P”, “Q” and “R”,
wherein it said that:
“Each and every case is distinct and separate
in character and matter although similar parties may have been involved. Thus, in a pending case, it is not mandatory
upon the courts to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence which have been
offered in other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the
same court. Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a previous case
cannot be adopted in a separate case pending before the same court without the
same being offered and identified anew.
The cases cited by petitioner concerned
similar parties before the same court but do not cover the same claim. A
court is not compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered
and admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have
accordingly complied with the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in the
previous cases cannot be considered in this instant case without being offered
in evidence.
Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that hearing is necessary before judicial
notice may be taken by the courts. To
quote said section:
Sec. 3.
Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on
appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Furthermore, petitioner admitted that Exhibit
‘A’ have (sic) been offered and
admitted in evidence in similar cases involving the same subject matter filed
before this Court. Thus, petitioner is
and should have been aware of the rules regarding the offering of any
documentary evidence before the same can be admitted in court.
As regards Exhibit[s] ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’, the
original copies of these documents were not presented for comparison and
verification in violation of Section 3 of Rule 130 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court. The said section specifically
provides that ‘when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x
x’. It
is an elementary rule in law that documents shall not be admissible in evidence
unless and until the original copies itself are offered or presented for
verification in cases where mere copies are offered, save for the exceptions provided
for by law. Petitioner thus cannot hide
behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of
properly complying with the rules of evidence.
For failure of herein petitioner to compare the subject documents with
its originals, the same may not be admitted.” (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise,
in the Resolution dated July 15, 2005 of the Court in Division denying
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion seeking allowance to compare the denied exhibits
with their certified true copies, the court a
quo explained that:
“Petitioner was already given enough time and
opportunity to present the originals or certified true copies of the denied
documents for comparison. When
petitioner received the resolution denying admission of the provisionally
marked exhibits, it should have submitted the originals or certified true
copies for comparison, considering that these documents were accordingly
available. But instead of presenting
these documents, petitioner, in its Motion for Reconsideration, tried to hide
behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of
properly applying the rules on evidence.
It was even submitted by petitioner that these documents should be
admitted for they were previously offered and admitted in similar cases
involving the same subject matter and parties.
If this was the case, then, there should have been no reason for
petitioner to seasonably present the originals or certified true copies for
comparison, or even, marking. x x x.”
In
view of the foregoing discussion, the Court en
banc finds that indeed, petitioner indubitably failed to establish its
authority to operate in the
This
Court finds no reason to depart from the foregoing findings of the CTA En Banc
as petitioner itself admitted on page 9[14]
of its petition for review that “[i]t was through inadvertence that only
photocopies of Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’ were introduced during the hearing”
and that it was “rather unfortunate that petitioner failed to produce the
original copy of its SEC Registration (Exhibit ‘A’) for purposes of comparison
with the photocopy that was originally presented.”
Evidently,
said documents cannot be admitted in evidence by the court as the original
copies were neither offered nor presented for comparison and verification
during the trial. Mere identification of the documents and the markings thereof
as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on them as said documents have
not been formally offered by petitioner and have been denied admission in
evidence by the CTA.
Furthermore,
the documents are not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires the
Court to take judicial notice of, without any introduction of evidence, as
petitioner would have the CTA do. Section
1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION
1. Judicial
notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Neither could it be said that petitioner’s
SEC Registration and operating permits from the CAB are documents which are of
public knowledge, capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to the judges because of their judicial functions, in order to allow the CTA to
take discretionary judicial notice of the said documents.[15]
Moreover, Section 3 of the same Rule[16]
provides that a hearing is necessary before judicial notice of any matter may
be taken by the court. This requirement
of a hearing is needed so that the parties can be heard thereon if such matter
is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Given the above rules, it is clear
that the CTA En Banc correctly did not admit petitioner’s SEC
Registration and operating permits from the CAB which were merely photocopies,
without the presentation of the original copies for comparison and
verification. As aptly held by the CTA En
Banc, petitioner cannot rely on the principle of judicial notice so as to
evade its responsibility of properly complying with the rules of evidence. Indeed,
petitioner’s contention that the said documents were previously marked in other
cases before the CTA tended to confirm that the originals of these documents
were readily available and their non-presentation in these proceedings was
unjustified. Consequently, petitioner’s
failure to compare the photocopied documents with their original renders the
subject exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Going to the second issue, petitioner
maintains that it is the proper party to claim for refund or tax credit of
excise taxes since it is the entity which was granted the tax exemption and
which made the erroneous tax payment.
Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 135(b) of the NIRC and Article
4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement between the
At the outset, it is important to
note that on two separate occasions, this Court has already put to rest the
issue of whether or not petitioner is the proper party to claim for the refund
or tax credit of excise taxes it allegedly paid on its aviation fuel purchases.[17]
In the earlier case of Silkair
(Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[18] involving the same parties and the
same cause of action but pertaining to different periods of taxation, we have
categorically held that Petron, not petitioner, is the proper party to
question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax, to wit:
The
proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory
taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same
even if he shifts the burden thereof to another. Section 130 (A) (2) of the NIRC provides that
“[u]nless otherwise specifically allowed, the return shall be filed and the
excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products
from place of production.” Thus, Petron
Corporation, not Silkair, is the statutory taxpayer which is entitled to claim
a refund based on Section 135 of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement between RP and
Even
if Petron Corporation passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the
additional amount billed to Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the
price which Silkair had to pay as a purchaser.
In
the second Silkair[19]
case, the Court explained that an excise tax is an indirect tax where the
burden can be shifted or passed on to the consumer but the tax liability
remains with the manufacturer or seller.
Thus, the manufacturer or seller has the option of shifting or passing
on the burden of the tax to the buyer.
However, where the burden of the tax is shifted, the amount passed on to
the buyer is no longer a tax but a part of the purchase price of the goods
sold.
Petitioner
contends that the clear intent of the provisions of the NIRC and the Air Transport
Agreement is to exempt aviation fuel purchased by petitioner as an exempt
entity from the payment of excise tax, whether such is a direct or an indirect
tax. According to petitioner, the excise
tax on aviation fuel, though initially payable by the manufacturer or producer,
attaches to the goods and becomes the liability of the person having possession
thereof.
We
do not agree. The distinction between a
direct tax and an indirect tax is relevant to this issue. In Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,[20]
this Court explained:
Based
on the possibility of shifting the incidence of taxation, or as to who shall
bear the burden of taxation, taxes may be classified into either direct tax or
indirect tax.
In
context, direct taxes are those that are exacted from the very person who, it
is intended or desired, should pay them; they are impositions for which a
taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business he is engaged in.
On
the other hand, indirect taxes are those that are demanded, in the first
instance, from, or are paid by, one person in the expectation and intention
that he can shift the burden to someone else.
Stated elsewise, indirect taxes are taxes wherein the liability for the
payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or
passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before
reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. When the seller passes on the tax to his
buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to
the purchaser as part of the purchase price of goods sold or services
rendered.
Title
VI of the NIRC deals with excise taxes on certain goods. Section 129 reads as follows:
SEC.
129. Goods
Subject to Excise Taxes. – Excise taxes apply to goods manufactured or
produced in the
As
used in the NIRC, therefore, excise taxes refer to taxes applicable to certain
specified or selected goods or articles manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or for any other disposition and
to things imported into the Philippines.
These excise taxes may be considered taxes on production as they are
collected only from manufacturers and producers. Basically an indirect tax, excise taxes are
directly levied upon the manufacturer or importer upon removal of the taxable
goods from its place of production or from the customs custody. These taxes, however, may be actually passed
on to the end consumer as part of the transfer value or selling price of the
goods sold, bartered or exchanged.[21]
In
Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.,[22]
this Court declared:
“[I]ndirect taxes
are taxes primarily paid by persons who can shift the burden upon someone
else.” For example, the excise and ad valorem taxes that oil companies pay
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue upon removal of petroleum products from its
refinery can be shifted to its buyer, like the NPC, by adding them to the
“cash” and/or “selling price.”
And as noted by us in the second Silkair[23]
case mentioned above:
When Petron removes its petroleum products from its
refinery in Limay,
As
correctly observed by the CTA, this Court held in Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
“It may indeed be that the economic burden of
the tax finally falls on the purchaser; when it does the tax becomes part of
the price which the purchaser must pay.”
Even
if the consumers or purchasers ultimately pay for the tax, they are not
considered the taxpayers. The fact that
Petron, on whom the excise tax is imposed, can shift the tax burden to its
purchasers does not make the latter the taxpayers and the former the
withholding agent.
Petitioner,
as the purchaser and end-consumer, ultimately bears the tax burden, but this
does not transform petitioner’s status into a statutory taxpayer.
Thus, under Section 130(A)(2) of the
NIRC, it is Petron, the taxpayer, which has the legal personality to claim the
refund or tax credit of any erroneous payment of excise taxes. Section 130(A)(2) states:
SEC.
130. Filing of Return and Payment of Excise Tax on Domestic Products. –
(A)
Persons Liable to File a Return, Filing
of Return on Removal and Payment of Tax. –
(1)
Persons Liable to
File a Return. – x x x
(2) Time for Filing of Return and Payment of the
Tax. – Unless otherwise specifically
allowed, the return shall be filed and
the excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic
products from place of production: x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore,
Section 204(C) of the NIRC provides a two-year prescriptive period within which
a taxpayer may file an administrative claim for refund or tax credit, to
wit:
SEC.
204. Authority
of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The
Commissioner may –
x x
x x
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or
illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the
purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have
been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of
destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the
taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund
within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided,
however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as
a written claim for credit or refund. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing discussion, it is
clear that the proper party to question, or claim a refund or tax credit of an
indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, which is Petron in this case, as it is
the company on which the tax is imposed by law and which paid the same even if
the burden thereof was shifted or passed on to another. It bears stressing that even if Petron
shifted or passed on to petitioner the burden of the tax, the additional amount
which petitioner paid is not a tax but a part of the purchase price which it
had to pay to obtain the goods.
Time and again, we have held that tax
refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which represent a loss of revenue
to the government. These exemptions,
therefore, must not rest on vague, uncertain or indefinite inference, but
should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis
of language too plain to be mistaken.[24] Such exemptions must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer, as taxes are the lifeblood of the government.
In fine, we quote from our ruling in
the earlier Silkair[25] case:
The
exemption granted under Section 135 (b) of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of
the Air Transport Agreement between RP and
This
calls for the application of the doctrine, stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Once a case has been decided one way, any
other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the case at bar,
should be decided in the same manner.[26]
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition for review is DENIED.
We affirm
the assailed Decision dated May
27, 2008 and the Resolution dated
September 5, 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. No.
267. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Erlinda P. Uy with Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (with a Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion), Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista,
Caesar A. Casanova (concurred with the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion) and
Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring; rollo,
pp. 33-50.
[2]
[3] Pursuant to Section 4 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 which states:
SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax
Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. – The power to interpret the provisions of
this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
The
power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
[4] SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding
shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face
of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have
been erroneously paid.
[5] Rollo, pp. 61-71.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] With the concurrence of Associate
Justice Caesar A. Casanova; rollo,
pp. 51-53.
[11] Rollo, p. 16.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
[16] SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. –
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.
After
the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case.
[17] Silkair
(Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 171383
and 172379, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 141; and G.R. No. 173594, February 6,
2008, 544 SCRA 100.
[18] G.R. No. 173594, February 6, 2008,
544 SCRA 100, 112.
[19] Silkair
(
[20] G.R. No. 140230, December 15, 2005,
478 SCRA 61, 71-72.
[21] De
[22] 274 Phil. 1060, 1092 (1991).
[23] Silkair
(
[24] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, 462 Phil. 96, 131-132 (2003).
[25] Silkair
(
[26] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Trustworthy Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No. 149834, May 2,
2006, 488 SCRA 538, 545.