FIRST DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioner,
- versus - CAYETANO L. SERRANO,[1]
and HEIRS OF CATALINO M. ALAAN, represented by PAULITA P. ALAAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 183063
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February
24, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano
(Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City an application for registration,[2] docketed
as LRC Case No. 270, over a 533-square meter parcel of commercial land known as
Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the lot), located in Poblacion Cabadbaran, Agusan
del Norte.
Cayetano claimed to have acquired the
lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and
Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange[3] dated
Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree or, in the
alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[4] Cayetano
also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917 by himself and through his
deceased parents–predecessors-in-interest
or for more than 70 years.
The Heirs of Catalino Alaan,
represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),[5] intervened
and filed an application for registration,[6] their
predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased[7] a
217.45-square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27,
1989 during the pendency of Cayetano’s application for registration.
The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also
invoking the provisions of the Property Registration Decree or,
alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for
confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetano’s, and that,
thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names.
Cayetano raised no objection or opposition
to the intervenor-Heirs of Catalino’s application
for registration.[8]
Cayetano’s brother-attorney-in-fact
Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented
him at the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case,
Cayetano passed away[9]
and was substituted by his heirs.
At the trial, the following pieces of
documentary evidence, inter alia, were
presented to support Cayetano’s claim of ownership over the lot: original survey
plan dated January 3, 1957 and certified by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands Director Zoilo Castrillo,[10] technical
description of the lot (Psu-157485),[11] Tax
Declarations for the years 1924 (in the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the
name of either Simeon [deceased] or Cayetano),[12] official
receipts showing real estate tax payments (from 1948-1997),[13] and
Surveyor’s Certificate No. 157485 dated January 1957.[14]
As Cayetano’s sole witness Leonardo
was already physically infirm (hard of hearing and due to old age) at the time
trial commenced, his testimony was taken by deposition on written interrogatories.[15]
In answer to the interrogatories,[16] Leonardo
declared that his family had lived on the lot since pre-war
time, his father Simeon having built a house on it following his acquisition from
Julian Ydulzura in 1923[17]
who had purchased it from Lazaro Rañada in 1917;[18]
that the construction of a family home in 1923 was reflected in Tax Declaration
No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924[19];
that after his father’s death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano
continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built
his own house and a bodega thereon; that
Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997;[20]
that the lot was assigned to him and
Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private document, “Kaligonan,” dated June 16, 1951,[21]
which was executed by all of the heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently
confirmed in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated August 24, 1988;[22]
and that on February 10, 1961, Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City
for his (Leonardo’s) half-share in the lot, thereby making Cayetano the sole
and exclusive owner thereof.[23]
On the other hand, Paulita, wife of
Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that in February 1989,
Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter
lot subject of the present case as embodied in a deed of absolute sale;[24] and
that Catalino religiously paid real estate taxes therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan
of Lot 249,[25] Cad-866
indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a
survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on
The above-said Subdivision Plan of
the lot, duly approved by Celso V. Loriega, Jr., Regional Technical Director of
the DENR, Lands Management Services, Region Office XIII for
Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77 issued by CENRO.
This survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area as per project no. 5 L.C Map No. 550 certified on July 18,
1925.
Herein
By Decision of
WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby rendered:
1.
Awarding a portion of
2.
Awarding a portion of
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on
behalf of herein petitioner, appealed the RTC decision before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds that respondents failed to present evidence that the
property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and
duration required by the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree.[28]
By Decision of
x x x x
. . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSG’s assertion that there was no competent evidence that would clearly show the subject land was released as alienable and disposable land is unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said annotation would suffice to comply with the requirement of certification as the same is competent enough to show that the disputed land or the parcels of land (now Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866, respectively) applied for by the applicants (Cayetano and Alaan) were already reclassified as alienable and disposable as early as 18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550.
x x x x
Records
show that the subject land was first owned and possessed by Lazaro Rañada and
the same was sold to Julian Ydulzura per untitled document executed on
In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L. Serrano and intervenor-appellee heirs of Catalino M. Alaan, have registrable title to the aforesaid subject lands, Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D, respectively, as they were able to prove that they are qualified and had complied with the requirements set forth by the provisions of P.D. No. 1529 which amended Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which to Our mind merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said property by the trial court.[30] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition which raises
the same grounds as those raised by petitioner before the appellate court.
The petition fails.
The requisites for the
filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof; and that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[31]
The Court reiterates the
doctrine which more accurately construes Section 14(1) in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,[32]
viz:
. . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State,
at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release
the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government
is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However,
if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it
is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court
of Appeals. Therein, the Court
noted that “to prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.” In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the
application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the
petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as
within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[33]
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While Cayetano failed to
submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V.
Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita,
constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly
indicates that
The DENR certification enjoys the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no
opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR
to contest respondents’ applications on the ground that their respective shares
of the lot are inalienable. There
being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification
may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
Petitioner’s contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of possession
and occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree does not lie.
Undeniably, respondents
and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be shown to have exercised acts of
dominion over the lot under a bona fide
claim of ownership since
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Leonardo clearly established the
character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessors-in-interest over the
lot. Thus he declared that the lot was
first owned by Lazaro Rañada who sold the same to
Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn sold it to his and Cayetano’s father Simeon
in 1923; that Simeon built a house thereon after its acquisition, which
fact is buttressed by entries in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of
Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of a 40-sq. meter residential
structure made of nipa and mixed
materials, and of coconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeon’s demise
in 1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations
made in 1948-1958.[35]
When pressed during the request for
written interrogatories if Leonardo had any other pre-war tax declarations
aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explained that all available records
may have been destroyed or lost during the last war but that after the war, the
lot was reassessed in his father’s name.[36] The Court finds Leonardo’s explanation
plausible and there is nothing in the records that detracts from its probative value.
Finally, the official receipts of realty
tax payments[37]
religiously made by Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible
indicia that Cayetano, after his father’s death in 1931, continued to exercise
acts of dominion over the lot.
The totality of the evidence thus points
to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his
occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion
of all others.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Also referred to in the records as Cayetano L. Serrano, Sr.
[2] Records, pp. 1-3.
[3]
[4] Also known as the Public Land Act.
[5] Catalino Alaan died on
[6]
[7] Pursuant to an “Absolute Sale of Commercial Lot Psu-157485 Portion Situated in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte”; records, pp. 78-79.
[8] Vide Order dated
[9] Vide Certificate of Death, id. at 167.
[10] Exhibit “I,” id. at 175.
[11] Exhibit “J,” id. at 176.
[12] Exhibits “K” “O” to “P-12,” id. at 177, 182-194.
[13] Exhibits “Q” to “Q-24,” id. at 195-204.
[14] Exhibit “V,” id. at 6.
[15] Vide
Order dated
[16]
[17] Spanish Deed of Sale dated
[18] Spanish Deed of Sale dated
[19] Vide Exhibit “K,” note 12.
[20] Vide note 13.
[21] Exhibit “R,” records, pp. 205-206.
[22] Exhibit “RR,” id. at 207-208.
[23] Vide Deed of Exchange, Exhibits “S” to “S-1”; id. at 209.
[24] Vide Exhibit “1” for Intervenor, Records, pp. 322-323.
[25] Exhibit “2”; id. at 325.
[26] TSN,
[27] Records , pp. 357-361.
[28] CA rollo, pp. 98-109.
[29] Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora Lantion with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo Camello and Edgardo Lloren; id at 140-150.
[30] CA rollo, pp. 147-149.
[31] SEC. 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
x x x x
[32] G.R. No. 144507,
[33]
[34] G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 611, 619-620 citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 68946, 209 SCRA 214 (1992), Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918) and Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115747 and 116658, 345 SCRA 104 (2000).
[35] Vide Exhibits “O” to “P-8,” at note 12. Exhibit “P-8” contains an entry in the dorsal portion thereof that “The bodega was burned on July 4, 1957 when Cabadbaran was on fire.”
[36] Vide note 16 at 128.
[37] Vide note 13.