FIRST DIVISION
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WILFREDO
M. BARON, BARRY ANTHONY BARON, RAMIL CAYAGO,
DOMINADOR GEMINO, ARISTEO PUZON, BERNARD MANGSAT,
MARIFE BALLESCA, CYNTHIA
JUNATAS, RABAGO,
JEFFERSON DELA and
JOMAR M. DELA Petitioners, |
G.R.
No. 182299 Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, NACHURA,* BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. |
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- versus - |
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MAGIC SALES,
INC. represented by JOSE Y. SY, Respondents. |
Promulgated: February
22, 2010 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
The
present petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision[1]
dated
Respondent
Magic Sales, Inc. (MSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
trading consumer goods such as soap, biscuits, candy, coffee, and juice drinks,
among other things,[4] while respondent Jose Y. Sy is the company’s
President and General Manager.[5] On the other hand, petitioners claim to be
employees of MSI.[6]
It
appears that on
In a memorandum dated
According
to the audit team, there were several irregularities in the operations of
MSI. The accounting system designed by
Baron was generally weak and compliance to procedures was not strictly
implemented. The team was also convinced
that Baron abused his authority and took advantage of the laxity of the system
he designed. It likewise believed that
Baron’s subordinates were not honest enough to report the anomalies to the management;
otherwise, the irregularities could have been limited. The audit team further concluded that there
was collusion between Baron and his subordinates and that they benefited from
the irregularities.[10]
Consequently,
management informed petitioners of the charges against them, to wit: (1) serious
misconduct and willful disobedience to the company’s lawful orders; (2) fraud
or willful breach of trust reposed by the employer; and (3) abandonment or
absence without official leave. Although
petitioners were required to explain and refute the charges, they neither
rebutted the same nor attended the investigation. Hence, MSI decided to terminate their
services.[11]
Petitioners
forthwith filed complaints[12]
with the NLRC Arbitration Branch against MSI and Sy for illegal dismissal, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.[13] In their Joint Position Paper,[14]
petitioners principally argued that they were dismissed whimsically and
capriciously in a very oppressive manner, without valid cause and without due
process of law. They prayed that
respondents be declared guilty of illegal dismissal and that they be reinstated
to their respective former positions without loss of seniority rights, with
full back wages and payment of damages.
They also prayed for payment of their monetary claims.
For
its part, MSI countered in its Consolidated Position Paper[15]
that the petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for because they
were validly dismissed. MSI insisted
that Baron orchestrated the massive irregularities and grand scale fraud. With
the help of the other petitioners, they were able to misappropriate company
funds and goods. When petitioners sensed
that their offenses would be discovered during the audit, they suddenly
abandoned their work. Furthermore, MSI
insisted that petitioners are guilty of insubordination by refusing to
cooperate with the company and subject themselves to audit to clear
themselves. Worse, petitioners attempted
to sabotage the audit by locking their drawers and refusing to surrender the
keys, stealing files and destroying documents and other papers.
On
Separate
appeals to the NLRC were filed by both parties.[17] Petitioners argued that the decision is not
in accord with law and jurisprudence and that they are appealing partially for
the denial of their claim for damages.
On the other hand, respondents claimed that the Labor Arbiter erred in
holding that: (1) petitioners Gemino, Puzon, Barry Baron and Cayago were
employees of MSI and that they were illegally dismissed; (2) petitioners
Ballesca, Junatas and Rabago were dismissed without just and valid cause; and
(3) respondent Sy is solidarily liable with MSI. Respondents also argued that the Labor
Arbiter erred in granting petitioners’ money claims.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Treating the appeal of complainants Jomar de la Rosa
and
2. Dismissing the appeal of Wilfredo Baron for being without merit; and
3. Dismissing the complaints of Aristeo Puzon, Dominador Gemino, Bernard [Mangsat], Ramil Cayago, Barry Anthony [Baron], Cynthia Junatas, Marife Ballesca and Lourdes Rabago for being also without merit.
SO ORDERED.
According
to the NLRC, there was enough evidence to show that there was conspiracy among
the employees of MSI. It found that
massive irregularities were committed in the company and one (1) of those
involved was the operations manager himself.
The audit revealed that it was Wilfredo Baron who orchestrated the
massive irregularities and grand scale fraud which, however, could no longer be
documented because of the theft of company files and deletion of computer files
which he and the other petitioners had access to. The NLRC found that petitioners anticipated
that the audit would eventually lead to their dismissal and prosecution in
court. Hence, they abandoned their work
and filed cases at the start of the audit.[19]
The NLRC held that the acts of abandoning their jobs without prior leave and of
not surrendering all the keys and documents in their possession so that
management could thoroughly conduct its audit are enough reasons to justify
their termination pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[20]
The NLRC, however, was not persuaded,
and resolved to deny the motion in its Order dated
Contending that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
Decision and Order, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari[22]
with the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Later,
the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration[24]
in its Resolution[25]
dated
Hence,
the present petition.
The
core issues in this controversy are: (1) Were petitioners validly dismissed on
the grounds of grave misconduct and loss of confidence? and (2) Were petitioners denied of their
right to due process when they were terminated from their employment?
At the outset, it must be stressed that the issues raise questions of
fact which are not proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It is axiomatic that in an appeal by
certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.[26] Furthermore,
factual findings of administrative agencies, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. This
is so because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these
quasi-judicial agencies from presiding over matters falling within their
jurisdiction, which is confined to specific matters. So long as these factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb the
same.[27]
In
this case, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioners Aristeo Puzon, Dominador
Gemino, Bernard Mangsat, Ramil Cayago, Barry Anthony Baron, Cynthia Junatas,
Marife Ballesca and Lourdes Rabago were illegally dismissed. The NLRC
disagreed with the Labor Arbiter and reversed the latter’s findings. On
appeal, the appellate court concurred with the findings of the NLRC. In
view of the discordance between the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand,
and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the other, there is a need for the
Court to review the factual findings and the conclusions based on the said
findings. As this Court held in Diamond
Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[28]
A disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission opens the door to a review thereof by this Court. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission contradict those of the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.
The Constitution, statutes and
jurisprudence uniformly mandate that no worker shall be dismissed except for a
just or valid cause provided by law, and only after due process is properly
observed. In a recent decision,[29]
this Court said that dismissals have two facets: first, the legality of the act
of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and, second, the
legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.
The just
causes for termination of employment are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended, viz.:
ART. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In the present case, respondents terminated petitioners
from their employment based on the following grounds: (1) serious misconduct
and willful disobedience to the company’s lawful orders; (2) fraud or willful
breach of trust reposed by the employer; and (3) abandonment or absence without
official leave.
Misconduct
has been defined as improper or wrong conduct.
It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be
serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial
and unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be
in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his
separation.[30]
To our mind, respondents were able to prove substantially the
existence of serious misconduct committed by petitioners to justify their
termination from employment. Daroya
submitted a report[31]
dated
In
addition, the audit team discovered that MSI incurred an inventory shortage of
One Million Thirty Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight Pesos and Twenty-One
Centavos (P1,030,258.21). It
found that Wilfredo Baron, the operations manager, in conspiracy with the other
petitioners, orchestrated massive irregularities and grand scale fraud, which
could no longer be documented because of theft of company documents and deletion
of computer files. Unmistakably, the unauthorized
taking of company documents and files, failure to pay unremitted collections,
failure to surrender keys to the filing cabinets despite earlier instructions,
concealment of shortages, and failure to record inventory transactions pursuant
to a fraudulent scheme are acts of grave misconduct, which are sufficient
causes for petitioners’ dismissal from employment.
They
are also grounds for loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended. For there to be a valid dismissal based on loss of
trust and confidence, the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse.[32]
The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the
employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust that results in
the employer’s loss of confidence in the employee. In the instant case, we note that petitioners
were holding the following positions: Wilfredo Baron - operations manager,
Jomar dela
All
given, we affirm the conclusion of the NLRC and appellate court that
petitioners Wilfredo Baron, Jomar dela Rosa, Jefferson dela Rosa, Cynthia
Junatas, Marife Ballesca and Lourdes Rabago were dismissed for just causes. Meanwhile, petitioners Aristeo Puzon,
Dominador Gemino, Bernard Mangsat, Barry Anthony Baron and Ramil Cayago failed to
prove by substantial evidence the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them and MSI. In
fact, they admitted that they were probationary employees of Superb Trading and
Services, Inc. (STSI), and not of MSI.
It must also be stressed that the connection between MSI and STSI was
not proven. Thus, having no cause of
action against MSI, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the NLRC in
dismissing their complaints.
On
the procedural aspect, petitioners claim that they were denied due process. We disagree.
In
the dismissal of employees, it has been consistently held that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process.
The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a notice apprising the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought,
and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision
to dismiss him. With regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence
of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.[33]
Likewise, there is no requirement that the notices of
dismissal themselves be couched in the form and language of judicial or
quasi-judicial decisions. What is required is that the employer conduct a
formal investigation process, with notices duly served on the employees
informing them of the fact of investigation, and subsequently, if warranted, a
separate notice of dismissal.[34]
Through the formal investigatory process, the employee must be accorded the
right to present his or her side, which must be considered and weighed by the
employer. The employee must be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the
charge, so as to be able to intelligently defend himself or herself against the
charges.
In this case, records show that
respondents complied with the two-notice rule prescribed in Article 277(b) of
the Labor Code, as amended. Petitioners were given all avenues to
present their side and disprove the allegations of respondents. Thus, we
agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
On
various dates, two [2] separate notices were given the employees. In the first notice, the acts imputed against
them were enumerated with a call for an investigation, while the second notice
contained MSI’s decision terminating them after they failed to respond to the
first notice. Thus, the employees’ inaction is attributable to them. Due process is not violated where a person is
given the opportunity to be heard but chooses not to give his side of the case
(Caurdanetaan Piece Workers
Evidence shows that petitioners were properly notified of the charges
against them. They received letters[36]
signed by Jose Y. Sy instructing them to explain within seventy-two (72) hours
from receipt why they should not be dismissed for their offenses. They were likewise warned that failure to
reply would mean that they were waiving their right to present evidence in
their favor. Furthermore, petitioners were afforded the chance to defend
themselves during the scheduled investigation on
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
WE
CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson |
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|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 821, in view of the official leave of absence of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.
[1] Rollo, pp. 61-75. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 47-84.
[4] NLRC records, p. 15.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 203.
[9] NLRC records, pp. 64-71.
[10]
[11]
[12] Docketed as NLRC Case Nos. SUB-RAB-I-7-3-0051-2000 D.C. and SUB-RAB-I-7-4-0069-2000 D.C.
[13] NLRC records, pp. 1-4.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, pp. 205-223, 506-537.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 61-75.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 587-615.
[25] Rollo, p. 77.
[26] Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R. No. 149285, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 186, 194; JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139401, October 2, 2002, 390 SCRA 223, 229.
[27] Morales v. Skills International Company, supra at 195; Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146397, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 258, 262-263.
[28] G.R. No. 151981,
[29] Tirazona
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169712, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 560, 579,
citing Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
74229, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 385, 390.
[30] Samson v. National Labor Relations Commission, 386 Phil. 669, 682 (2000).
[31] NLRC records, p. 49.
[32] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Matias, G.R. No. 156283, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 148, 159, citing Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 207; P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 784, 798, citing Tiu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 83433, November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 540, 547; Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148256, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 465, 485, citing Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 119536, February 17, 1997, 268 SCRA 458, 470.
[33] Paguio Transport Corporation v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 158, 170 (1998); Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 560, 565-566 (1997), citing Roces v. Aportadera, Adm. Case No. 2936, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 108, 114 and Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 107590, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 506, 516.
[34] See Article 277, Labor Code, as amended.
[35] Rollo, p. 73.
[36] NLRC records, pp. 83-85, 87, 122, 131, 137-138, 140-141.
[37] J.D. Legaspi Construction v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 143161,