FIRST DIVISION
|
METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST CO. and SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioners, - versus – BERNARDITA
H. PEREZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact PATRIA H. PEREZ, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 181842 Present: PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.
On
Solidbank
was later acquired by its co-petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank),
the latter as the surviving entity.
On
Metrobank asserted in its Answer with
Counterclaim, however, that the lease contract did not prohibit pre-termination
by the parties.
After
respondent rested her case, Metrobank was, by Order of
By Decision of
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, jointly and severally:
1.
To pay the plaintiff the amount of P212,322.60
as unrealized income before the filing of the case (Sept. 2002 to Feb. 2003);
2.
To pay the plaintiff the amount of P2,013,753.03
as unrealized (income) after the filing of the case up to present (March 2003
to March 2006);
3. To pay the plaintiff the would be unrealized income for the ensuing idle months of said building amounting to P7,126,494.30 (covering April 2006 until expiration of the contract of lease);
4.
To pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as
moral damages;
5.
To pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
6.
To pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and
7. To pay plaintiff as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On
appeal, Metrobank challenged, in the main, the trial court’s award of
“unrealized income for the ensuing idle months” despite respondent’s failure to
pay docket fees thereon to thus render the complaint dismissible for lack of
jurisdiction.
By
Decision[5] of
In
her Comment, respondent admitted that the filing fees she paid did not cover her
prayer for unrealized income for the ensuing idle months, for “at the time
of filing and payment[,] the period that the building would be idle could not
yet be determined.”[7]
In
sustaining respondent’s justification for nonpayment of additional docket fees,
the appellate court held:
For
one, plaintiff-appellee Perez could not have been certain at the time
she filed the Complaint that defendant-appellant Metrobank would no
longer return to the Leased Property. It would have been speculative
therefore on the part of plaintiff-appellee Perez to allege in her Complaint
any unrealized income for the remaining period of the Lease Contract
considering that the possibility of defendant-appellant Metrobank reconsidering
its decision to terminate the said Lease Contract and returning to the Leased
Property at some future time was not definitively foreclosed when the Complaint
was filed. In light of her predicament,
plaintiff-appellee Perez was thus justified in just making a general prayer for
the court a quo to award unrealized income for the “ensuing idle months” of the
Leased Property.[8] (italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)
The
petition is partly meritorious.
In
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[9]
the Court held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the
amount sought shall not be admitted or shall be expunged, and that a court
acquires jurisdiction only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. This rule was relaxed in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion[10] which was echoed in the 2005 case of
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melico,
the pertinent portion of the decision in the latter case reads:
Plainly,
while the payment of prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
Metrobank
takes exception to the application of Sun Insurance Office to the
present case because, by its claim, respondent deliberately concealed the insufficient
payment of docket fees.
Metrobank’s
position fails. The ensuing months in which the leased premises would be
rendered vacant could not be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint. It bears recalling that the building
constructed on respondent’s leased premises was specifically constructed to
house a bank, hence, the idle period before another occupant with like business
may opt to lease would be difficult to project.
On
Metrobank’s raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint for
respondent’s failure to pay the correct docket fees, apropos is the
ruling in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals: [12]
Although
the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the
trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a
reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this
requirement, the defendant should timely
raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel.
In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the
amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien on any award he
may obtain in his favor.[13] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Metrobank
raised the issue of jurisdiction only before the appellate court after it and
its co-petitioner participated in the proceedings before the trial court. While lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any time, a party may be held in estoppel if, as in the present case, it has
actively taken part in the proceedings being questioned.
The
foregoing disposition notwithstanding, respondent is liable for the balance
between the actual fees paid and the correct payable filing fees to include an
assessment on the award of unrealized income, following Section 2 of Rule 141
which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fee (underscoring supplied),
and jurisprudence, viz:
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.[14] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A word on the grant of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The
Court notes that respondent’s witness-attorney-in-fact testified only on the
existence of the lease agreement and unrealized income due to pre-termination. Since an award of moral damages is predicated
on a categorical showing from the claimant that emotional and mental sufferings
were actually experienced, absent any evidence thereon in the present case,[15] the award must be disallowed. And so too must the award of attorney’s fees,
absent an indication in the trial court’s Decision of the factual basis thereof,
the award having been merely stated in the dispositive portion.[16] Parenthetically, while respondent prayed in
her complaint for the award of attorney’s fees and testified during the trial
that:
Q: Now, in connection with the filing of this case and hiring your lawyer, do you have agreement with your counsel with respect to attorney’s fees?
A: P100,000.00 acceptance fees.
Q: What about appearance fees?
A: I forgot already, sir.,[17]
there is no showing that she
submitted any documentary evidence in support thereof.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is in part GRANTED. The November 23, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to reassess, determine and collect
additional fees that should be paid by respondent within fifteen (15) days, in
accordance with the foregoing discussion of the Court, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not
yet expired, which additional fees
shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The award
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is DELETED.
In
all other respects, the appellate court’s Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO DE-CASTRO LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Special Power of Attorney executed by Bernardita H. Perez; records, p. 9.
[2] Rollo, p. 82
[3] Records, pp. 6-7.
[4]
[5] Penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with the concurrence of then CA Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[6] CA rollo, pp. 59-84.
[7] Rollo, p. 127.
[8]
[9] G.R. No. L-75919,
[10] G.R. Nos. 79937-39,
[11] G.R. No. 140954,
[12] G.R. No. 123215,
[13]
[14] Proton Pilipinas Corporation v.
Banque Nationale de Paris, G.R. No.
151242, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 260, 278 citing Ayala Corporation v. Madayag.
[15] Bank of Commerce v. Sps.
Prudencio San Pablo, Jr., G.R. No.
167848,
[16] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123238, Sept. 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 124, 137-138.
[17] TSN,