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MALAYAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW and RODOLFO MANGALINO, Petitioners, -
versus - MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 181357 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VELASCO,**
BRION, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: February 2, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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The petitioner Malayan Employees
Association-FFW (union) asks us in this
petition for certiorari,[1]
to set aside the
BACKGROUND FACTS
The union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the company. A provision in the union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company allows union officials to avail of union leaves with pay for a total of “ninety-man” days per year for the purpose of attending grievance meetings, Labor-Management Committee meetings, annual National Labor Management Conferences, labor education programs and seminars, and other union activities.
The company
issued a rule in November 2002 requiring not only the prior notice that the CBA
expressly requires, but prior approval by the department head before the union
and its members can avail of union leaves.
The rule was placed into effect in November 2002 without any objection
from the union until a union officer, Mangalino, filed union leave applications in January and
February, 2004. His department head disapproved the applications because the
department was undermanned at that time.
Despite the disapproval, Mangalino
proceeded to take the union leave. He said he believed in good faith that he
had complied with the existing company practice and with the procedure set
forth in the CBA. The company responded by suspending him for one week and,
thereafter, for a month, for his second offense in February 2004.
The union raised
the suspensions as a grievance issue and went through all the grievance
processes, including the referral of the matter to the company’s president,
Yvonne Yuchengco. After all internal remedies failed, the union went to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board for preventive mediation. When this
recourse also failed, the parties submitted the dispute to voluntary arbitration[4] on
the following issues:
1.
whether
or not Mangalino’s suspensions were valid; and
2.
whether
or not Mangalino should be paid backwages for the duration of the suspensions.
The Voluntary Arbitrators decided the
submitted dispute on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Honorable Office adjudged the suspension of Mr. Rodolfo Mangalino’s on first availment of union leave invalid while the second suspension valid but illicit in terms of penalty of thirty (30) days suspension. We consider the honesty of the same as mitigating circumstances, for the Chairman of this panel of Arbitrators attested that complainant attended labor matter in the Office of Voluntary Arbitrator last January 19, 2004 and February 5, 2004. However, it is good to note the wisdom of Justice Narvasa in the aforecited Supreme Court Ruling of obey first before you complain.
In view thereof, this Honorable Office reduced the suspension from thirty seven (37) days to ten (10) days only. Henceforth, the Complainant is entitled to twenty seven (27) days backwages.
Proof of payment of backwages should be submitted to the chairman of this Panel of Arbitrators within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Parties are hereby enjoined to comply in this Award as provided in the submission Agreement.
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the decision was not unanimous. Voluntary Arbitrator
dela Fuente submitted the following dissent:[6]
The act of any employee that can only be interpreted to be an open and utter display of arrogance and unconcern for the welfare of his Company thru the use of what he pretends to believe to be an unbridled political right cannot be allowed to pass without sanction lest the employer desires anarchy and chaos to reign in its midst.
Hence, having failed
to comply with the requirements for availment of union leaves and for going on
such leave despite the express disapproval of his superior, Mr. Mangalino’s two
suspensions are valid and he is not entitled to any backwages for the duration
of his suspensions.
The company
appealed the decision to the CA on
The union
moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision and received the CA’s denial
(through its resolution of
THE PETITION
The union seeks relief from this
Court against the CA decision through its Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed on
In our Resolution of
In its comment, the company raised both
procedural and substantive objections.
It questioned the petition’s
compliance with the Rules, particularly the use of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to question the
CA decision, when the appropriate remedy is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The company also asserted that the union
violated Section 2, Rule 45 when it failed to attach the material portions of
the record as would support its petition, such as the company’s pleadings and
the entirety of the company’s evidence. More importantly, it posited that the
petition is barred by time limitation and
has lapsed to finality as it was filed sixty-two (62) days after the
union’s receipt of the CA decision.
On the substantive aspect, the
company mainly contended that the regulation of the use of union leaves is within
the company’s management prerogative, and the company was simply exercising its
management prerogative when it required its employees to first obtain the
approval of either the department head or the human resource manager before making
use of any union leave. Thus, Mangalino committed acts of insubordination when
he insisted on going on leave despite the disapproval of his leave
applications.
In its reply and subsequent
memorandum, the union presented its justification for the technical
deficiencies the company cited (quoted below), and maintained as well that the
use of management prerogative was improper because the CBA grant of the union
leave benefit did not require prior company approval as a condition; any change
in the CBA grant requires union conformity.
The union posited as well that any unilateral change in the CBA terms
violates Article 255 of the Labor Code, which guarantees the right of employees
to participate in the company’s policy and decision-making processes on matters
directly affecting their interests. It argued against the company position that
it had not objected to the company rule and is now in estoppel.
THE
COURT’S RULING
We
deny the petition for lack of merit.
The company
position that the union should have filed an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules
and not a petition for certiorari is
correct. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
states that:
SECTION 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. – A
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth. [Emphasis supplied.]
Complementing this Rule is Section
1, Rule 65 which provides that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." From this Rule proceeds the established jurisprudential
ruling that a petition for certiorari
cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, as certiorari
is not a substitute for a lost appeal.[13]
In our Resolution of
9)
In a resolution dated
10)
For having treated this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner humbly admits that delay was incurred in the filing thereof, such
delay was caused by several factors beyond control such as the transfer of
handling legal assistant to another office and the undersigned had to reassign
the case for the preparation of the petition.
Furthermore, the undersigned counsel, other than being the Chief of FFW LEGAL CENTER is also the Vice President
of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), who has to attend similar and urgent
pressing problems of local affiliates arising from the effects of contracting
out and closure of companies.
11)
Considering the issue to be resolved requires only two CBA provisions – (1) the
recognition of management prerogative (Section 1, Article III of the CBA), and
union leave (Section 3, Article XV of the CBA) to guide the Honorable Court reached
(sic) a decision, petitioner honestly
thought that the other pleadings referred to by respondent are not relevant.
With this kind and tenor of justification,
we appear to have acted with extreme liberality in recognizing the petition as
a Rule 45 petition and in giving it due course.
We cannot extend the same liberality, however, with respect to the
union’s violation of the established rules on timelines in the filing of
petitions, which violations the company has kept alive by its continuing objection.
While we can be liberal in considering the mode of review of lower court
decisions (and even in the contents of the petition which the company insists
are deficient), we cannot do the same with respect to the time requirements
that govern the finality of these decisions. A final judgment can no longer be
disturbed under the combined application of the principles of immutability of
final judgments[14] and res
judicata,[15] subject
only to very exceptional circumstances not at all present in this case.[16]
Under Rule 45, a petition for
review on certiorari should be filed
within 15 days from notice of judgment, extendible in meritorious cases for a
total of another 30 days.[17] Given that a Rule 45 petition is appropriate
in the present case, the period of 60 days after notice of judgment is way past
the deadline allowed, so that the CA decision had lapsed to finality by the
time the petition with us was filed. This
reason alone – even without considering the company’s other technical objection
based on the union’s failure to attach relevant documents in support of the
petition – amply supports the denial of the petition.
The
lack of merit of the petition likewise precludes us from resolving it in the
union’s favor. In short, we see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
While
it is true that the union and its members have been granted union leave
privileges under the CBA, the grant cannot be considered separately from the
other provisions of the CBA, particularly the provision on management
prerogatives where the CBA reserved for the company the full and complete authority
in managing and running its business.[18] We see nothing in the wordings of the union leave provision that
removes from the company the right to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations to govern the manner of availing of union leaves, particularly the
prerogative to require prior approval.
Precisely, prior notice is expressly
required under the CBA so that the company can appropriately respond to the
request for leave. In this sense, the rule
requiring prior approval only made express what is implied in the terms of the
CBA.
In any event, any doubt in
resolving any interpretative conflict is settled by subsequent developments in
the course of the parties’ implementation of the CBA, specifically, by the
establishment of the company regulation in November 2002 requiring prior approval
before the union leave can be used. The union accepted this regulation without
objection since its promulgation (or more than a year before the present dispute
arose), and the rule on its face is not unreasonable, oppressive, nor violative
of CBA terms. Ample evidence exists in
the records indicating the union’s acquiescence to the rule.[19] Notably,
no letter from the union
complaining about the unilateral change in policy or any request for a meeting
to discuss this policy appears on record.
The union and its members have willingly applied for approval as the
rule requires.[20] Even
Mangalino himself, in the past, had filed applications for union leave with his
department manager, and willingly complied with the disapproval without protest
of any kind.[21] Thus, when Mangalino
asserted his right to take a leave without prior approval, the requirement for
prior approval was already in place and established, and could no longer be
removed except with the company’s consent or by negotiation and express
agreement in future CBAs.
The “prior approval” policy fully
supported the validity of the suspensions the company imposed on Mangalino. We point
out additionally that as an employee, Mangalino had the clear obligation to
comply with the management disapproval of his requested leave while at the same
time registering his objection to the company regulation and action. That he
still went on leave, in open disregard of his superior’s orders, rendered Mangalino
open to the charge of insubordination, separately from his
absence without official leave.[22]
This charge, of course, can no longer prosper even if laid today, given the
lapse of time that has since transpired.
In light of the petition’s procedural
infirmities, particularly its late filing that rendered the CA decision final,
and the petition’s lack of substantive merit, denial of the petition
necessarily follows.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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JOSE P.
PEREZ Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the
Second Division vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Raffle
dated
** Designated additional Member of the
Second Division vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No.
820 dated
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Romeo Barza; id. at 26-32.
[3]
[4] The Voluntary Arbitrators are Herminigildo Javen, Atty. Marcial de la Fuente and Allan Montano.
[5] Rollo, pp. 179-191.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Bernardo
v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413 (1997);
see also Macawiag
v. Balindog, G.R. No. 159210,
[14]
See Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-BALAIS v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 155651,
[15] See
Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108089,
[16] The
immutability doctrine admits several exceptions, like: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. (Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees
[17] Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court states:
Section
2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly
filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme
Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only
within which to file the petition.
[18] Article III, Section 1 of the CBA provides:
The
[19] Rollo, pp. 118-136.
[20]
[21]
[22] See GTE Directories Corporation v. Sanchez, 274 Phil. 738 (1991) which held:
To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or
order laid down by management, on the pleaded theory that the rule or order is
unreasonable, illegal, or otherwise irregular for one reason or another, would
be disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both
the employer and his employees to preserve and maintain in the working
establishment and without which no meaningful operation and
progress is possible. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules,
defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as unjust or
illegal. They may object thereto, ask to
negotiate thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the employer before
the Ministry of Labor. But until and unless the rules or orders
are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees
ignore or disobey them at their peril. It is impermissible to reverse the process:
suspend enforcement of the orders or rules until their legality or propriety
shall have been subject of negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration. [Emphasis
supplied.]