Republic of
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Supreme
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SECOND DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 179717 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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NIEVA ALBERTO y DE NIEVA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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February 5, 2010 |
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D E C I
S I O N
In a prosecution for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Law, the pivotal issue usually boils down to the question
of credibility of witness. The
testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the accused in a buy-bust
operation are usually accorded credence because of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duty, which presumption may be
overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary or
that they were inspired by improper motive.[1]
Moreover, non-compliance by the
apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not
fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team.[2]
The
Charge
The present appeal
stems from an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
which was subsequently docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-470 and raffled to
Branch 135 of said court. The
Information charging appellant Nieva Alberto y De Nieva with violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of
January 2003, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic] sell, deliver and
distribute Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing zero
point twenty-five (0.25) gram, in consideration of P500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On
The
Version of the Prosecution
On P500.00 bill marked money.
The informant contacted the
appellant through a cellular phone and they agreed to meet at J.P. Rizal
Extension, Comembo,
Upon their arrival thereat, the
informant approached the appellant and introduced the poseur-buyer, PO1 Inopia. The appellant asked PO1 Inopia how much shabu
he needed and the latter handed over the P500.00 buy-bust money. The appellant then gave a small plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO1 Inopia lighted his cigarette,
which was the pre-arranged signal for the consummation of the illegal
sale. PO1 Santos responded and together with
PO1 Inopia arrested the appellant and retrieved from her the buy-bust
money. The sachet containing the white
crystalline substance was marked with the initials “NDA”[4]
and sent to the crime laboratory for examination. The examination showed that the contents of
the plastic sachet weighed 0.25 gram and are positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
The
Version of the Defense
The disparate version of the
incident by the appellant consisted of denial and frame-up. According to the appellant, she was engaged
in the buy and sell of used cellular phones. A certain Angie Angeles (Angeles)
assisted her in searching for prospective sellers.
On P1,500.00. The appellant went to the house of Angeles in
Comembo,
The appellant claimed that during
her detention, a certain Wilmer Antonio demanded P50,000.00 from her so
that she would be not be charged with any offense. She alleged that she could not file a
complaint against the people responsible for her apprehension since nobody
could help her while she was already detained.
The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court
On
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of accused
NIEVA ALBERTO y DE NIEVA was proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, as principal, with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P500,000.00, and to pay costs.
Let
the zero point twenty-five (0.25) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be
turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
The trial court found that all the
elements for the illegal sale of shabu were satisfactorily established
by the prosecution. The identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration were proven. Likewise, the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor were established.
Thus,
appellant filed an appeal raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION’S SOLE WITNESS.
II.
THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]
The
Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision[8]
promulgated on
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In a successful
prosecution for offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (1) the
identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.[9] What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance
seized as evidence.[10]
In the present
case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established. Prosecution witness PO1 Inopia consistently
testified that a buy-bust operation took place. As the poseur-buyer, he positively identified
the appellant as the seller of a sealed sachet containing a white crystalline
substance for a sum of P500.00. The
sachet was confiscated and marked with initials “NDA” and taken to the crime
laboratory for examination, where a chemical analysis on the contents thereof confirmed
that the same are indeed methylamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”. The sachet containing said dangerous drug was
positively identified by PO1 Inopia during the trial as the very sachet with
white crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by the appellant. Thus, appellant’s defense of denial is
unavailing. It has been consistently
held that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a prosecution
witness. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight
in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing,
straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters.[11]
Likewise
unavailing is the defense of the appellant that the police officers arrested
her to extort P50,000.00 and that the case was filed after she refused
to give said amount. This defense of frame-up
is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a
common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law.[12]
In fact, aside from the bare assertions
of the appellant that she was a victim of frame-up and extortion, there is no clear
and convincing evidence to substantiate such claim. On the other hand, she admits that there was
no existing rancor between her and the arresting officers,[13]
and that there is no reason why the buy-bust team would single her out for the
sole purpose extorting money from her.
Appellant
likewise assails the credibility of the lone prosecution witness. According to the appellant, considering the
circumstances under which the buy-bust operation was conducted as narrated in
open court by PO1 Inopia, it is difficult to believe that the buy-bust team seized
only a single sachet of “shabu” from her. Likewise unbelievable, per appellant’s
contention, is the amount of P500.00 paid by PO1 Inopia for the alleged 0.25
gram of “shabu”, which is grossly inadequate compared to its prevailing
street value. Besides, PO1 Inopia’s testimony
is not worthy of credence for want of corroborative evidence.
We are not
persuaded.
It is
well-settled that the trial court’s determination on the issue of credibility
of witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight
and respect on appeal, unless certain facts or substance have been overlooked,
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because of the judicial experience
that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial.[14]
In the case at
bench, we have thoroughly reviewed the records and, like the appellate court,
did not find any justification to disturb the findings of the trial court. Our re-examination of the testimony of PO1
Inopia follows the trial court’s conclusion that his testimony was given in a
straightforward and simple manner. Besides,
appellant is questioning the testimony of PO1 Inopia only on matters pertaining
to minor details of the incident that do not, in any way, affect her
conviction. The inconsistencies
ascribed to PO1 Inopia involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect
his credibility as prosecution witness,[15]
and do not negate his positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.[16] On the other hand, the testimony of PO1
Inopia on the circumstances that occurred on the date of the entrapment
operation against the appellant – from the moment he received a confidential
tip from his informer until the time the buy-bust team apprehended the
appellant – deserves to be given weight and significance as it emanated from
the mouth of a policeman who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duty. Police officers
are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official
functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or proof
that they were moved by ill will.[17]
The argument of
the appellant that the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation is unworthy
of belief since no corroborative testimony was presented, fails to impress. There is no law requiring that in drug cases the
testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated to be believed. Corroborative evidence is vital only when
there are reasons to suspect that the witness twisted the truth, or that his or
her observation was inaccurate. Evidence
is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted. Thus, it is not uncommon to reach a
conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.[18] Moreover, it is on record that the appellant
no longer required the presentation of corroborative testimony. During the trial, the prosecution was ready
to present another witness in the person of PO1 Santos. However, the parties agreed to dispense with his
testimony since it would only be corroborative in nature.[19]
The appellant further
asserts that there is a serious doubt as to the veracity of the offense charged
since the Information alleges that the offense was committed on
Lastly, the appellant
maintains that serious doubt exists on whether the alleged “shabu” was
actually seized from her due to the failure of the buy-bust team to observe the
proper procedure in the seizure of the alleged shabu and the subsequent
delay in transmitting the same for laboratory examination. The appellant argues
that, under the law, the buy-bust team is mandated to physically inventory and
photograph the seized drug in his presence, or in the presence of his representative
or counsel, and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice.[21] She further contends that it was also
imperative for the prosecution to submit the alleged shabu to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Forensic Laboratory for qualitative
and quantitative examinations within 24 hours from its confiscation.[22] However, the laboratory report shows that the
said item was submitted for examination only five days after the alleged
buy-bust operation.
The defense of
the appellant of alleged non-compliance by the apprehending police officers with
existing procedure is based on Section 21 of RA 9165. It reads:
SEC. 21. Custody
and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instrumental Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four
(24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
x x x x
However, the
prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated will not result to appellant’s acquittal
of the crime charged.[23] Non-compliance with the above-provisions of
RA 9165 is not fatal and will not render the arrest of an accused illegal or
the items seized from her inadmissible.[24] What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the appellant.[25]
Here, there is
no doubt that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug confiscated from
the appellant during the entrapment operation were properly preserved and
safeguarded. The specimen was immediately
and adequately marked. Thereafter, it
was sent to the crime laboratory for the requisite chemistry report. In other words, the sachet of drug seized
from the appellant and subsequently marked with initials “NDA” was the same specimen
submitted to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis. It was not shown to be contaminated in any
manner. The white crystalline substance
contained therein was later on determined to be positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as “shabu”, as shown in Chemistry Report
No. D-109-03S dated
Further,
appellant did not assail the chain of custody or the issue of the disposition
and preservation of subject drug before the trial court. Consequently, she cannot now be allowed to
question its integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to the admissibility of evidence raised for the first time on
appeal cannot be considered.[28]
The
Penalty
Having ruled
that the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been established
beyond reasonable doubt, a determination of the appropriate imposable penalty
is now in order. Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165 penalizes the sale of shabu as follows:
SEC. 5. P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.[29]
For selling 0.25
gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride to poseur-buyer PO1 Inopia, we find
that the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of
life imprisonment. We also find the fine
of P500,000.00 imposed on appellant to be in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMMISED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00894 dated January 19, 2006 which sustained the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, finding appellant Nieva Alberto y
De Nieva, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 172975,
[2] People
v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928,
[3] Records,
p. 1.
[4] Exhibit
“E-1”, id. at 32.
[5] Id
at 44 – 47; penned by Judge Francisco B. Ibay.
[6]
[7] CA rollo, p. 30.
[8]
[9] People
v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599,
[10]
[11] People
v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179036,
[12] People
v. Astudillo, 440 Phil. 205, 224 (2002).
[13] TSN,
[14] People
v. Vallador, 327 Phil. 303, 310-311 (1996).
[15] People
v. Ondalok, 339 Phil. 17, 25 (1997).
[16] People
v. Daen, Jr., 314 Phil. 280, 292 (1995).
[17] People
v. Mateo, supra note 11 at 390.
[18] People
v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 208-209 (2002).
[19] TSN,
[20] Pascual
v. People, G.R. No. 160540,
[21] Dangerous
Drugs Board Resolution No. 01, Section 2.
[22]
[23] People
v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747,
[24]
[25] People
v. Del Monte, G.R. No.179940,
[26] Records, p. 35.
[27]
[28] People
v. Mateo, supra note 11 at 410.
[29] Republic Act No. 9165, Article II, Section 5.